In pre-Islamic Arabia,
Bedouins raided enemy tribes and settlements to collect spoils. According to some scholars (such as James Turner Johnson), while Islamic leaders "instilled into the hearts of the warriors the belief" in
jihad "holy war" and
ghaza (raids), the "fundamental structure" of this Bedouin warfare "remained, ... raiding to collect booty". The primary aim of
jihad as warfare is not the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam by force, but rather the expansion and defense of the
Islamic state. There could be truces before this was achieved, but no permanent peace. The eighth century jurist
Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 778) headed what
Khadduri called a pacifist school, which maintained that
jihad was only a defensive war. The duty of
Jihad was a collective one (
fard al-kifaya). It was to be directed only by the caliph who might delay it when convenient, negotiating truces for up to ten years at a time.
jihad consisted of wars against unbelievers,
apostated, and was the only form of permissible warfare. and that while the classical perception and presentation of
jihad was warfare in the field against a foreign enemy, internal
jihad "against an infidel renegade, or otherwise illegitimate regime was not unknown.") However, some argue martyrdom is never automatic, because it is God's province to judge who is worthy of that designation. Classical manuals of Islamic jurisprudence often contained a section called
Book of Jihad, with
rules governing the conduct of war covered at great length. Such rules include treatment of nonbelligerents, women, children (also cultivated or residential areas), Spoils include
Ghanimah (spoils obtained by actual fighting), and
fai (obtained without fighting i.e. when the enemy surrenders or flees). The first documentation of the law of
jihad was written by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i and
Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani. (It grew out of debates that surfaced following Muhammad's death. Both
Ibn Taymiyya and
Ibn Qayyim asserted that
Muhammad never initiated hostilities and that all the wars he engaged in were primarily defensive. He never forced non-Muslims to Islam and upheld the truces with non-Muslims so long as they did not violate them. Ibn Taymiyya's views on
Jihad are explained in his treatise titled
Qāʿidah mukhtaṣarah fī qitāl al-kuffār wa muhādanatuhum wa taḥrīm qatlahum li mujarrad kufrihim. (An abridged rule on fighting the unbelievers and making truces with them, and the prohibition of killing them merely because of their unbelief). According to Ibn Taymiyya, human blood is inviolable by default, except "by right of justice". Although Ibn Taymiyya authorised offensive
Jihad (
Jihad al-Talab) against enemies who threaten Muslims or obstruct their citizens from freely accepting Islam, unbelief (
Kufr) by itself is not a justification for violence, whether against individuals or stated. According to Ibn Taymīyah,
jihad is a legitimate reaction to military aggression by unbelievers and not merely due to religious differences. Ibn Taymiyya wrote:"As for the transgressor who does not fight, there are no texts in which Allah commands him to be fought. Rather, the unbelievers are only fought on the condition that they wage war, as is practiced by the majority of scholars and is evident in the Book and Sunnah." As important as
jihad was, it is not considered one of the "
pillars of Islam". According to one scholar (
Majid Khadduri, this is because the five pillars are individual obligations, but
jihad is a "collective obligation" of the Muslim community meant to be carried out by the Islamic state. This was the belief of "all jurists, with almost no exception", but did not apply to
defense of the Muslim community from a sudden attack, in which case
jihad was an "individual obligation" of all believers, including women and children. Scholars had previously claimed it was the responsibility of a centralized government to organize
jihad. But this changed as the authority of the
Abbasid caliph weakened. Classical Shia doctrine maintained defensive
jihad was always permissible, but offensive
jihad required the presence of the Imam. An exception to this, during medieval times, was when the first Fatimid caliph
Abdallah al-Mahdi Billah claimed to be the representative of the Imam and claimed the right to launch offensive
jihad. Even when the
Ottoman Empire carried on a new holy war of expansion in the seventeenth century, "the war was not universally pursued". They made no attempt to recover Spain or Sicily. By the 1500s, it had become accepted that the permanent state of relations between
dar al-Islam and
dar al-harb was that of peace.
Shah Ismail of the
Safavid dynasty tried to claim the right to wage offensive
jihad, particularly against the Ottomans. However, Shia ulama did not permit that, maintaining the classical position that the true Imam could wage such a war. During the Qajar period, Shia ulama adopted the position that the Shah was responsible for national security. They authorized the Perso-Russian wars in the 19th century as
jihad.
Colonialism and modernism of West Africa, c. 1830 When Europeans began to colonize the Muslim world,
jihad was one of the first responses. However, this view left open
jihad against colonialism, which was seen as an attack on Muslims. The
Fula jihads in West Africa during the 18th and 19th centuries led to the establishment of various states, most notably the
Sokoto Caliphate. None of these movements were victorious.
Ottoman Jihad in World War One Regimental Standard at Kanlisirt,
Gallipoli campaign in 1915 When the
Ottoman caliph
called for a "Great Jihad" Muslims against Allied powers during World War I, hopes and fears emerged that non-Turkish Muslims would side with Ottoman Turkey, but the appeal did not unite the Muslim world, (The war led to the end of the caliphate as the Ottoman Empire allied with the war's losers and surrendered. Post-war capitulations were overturned by secularist
Mustafa Kemal, who later abolished the caliphate.) Between 1918 and 1919 in the Shia holy city of
Najaf the League of the Islamic Awakening was established by religious scholars, tribal chiefs, and landlords who assassinated a British officer in the hopes of sparking a similar rebellion in
Karbala. During the revolt, Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, father of
Mohammad al-Husayni al-Shirazi and grandfather of
Sadiq Hussaini Shirazi, declared British rule impermissible and called for
jihad against European occupations in the Middle East.
Post-colonialism Islamism played an increasing role in the Muslim world in the 20th century, especially following the
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. One of the first Islamist groups, the
Muslim Brotherhood, emphasized physical struggle and
martyrdom in its creed: "God is our objective; the Qur'an is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; struggle (
jihad) is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations."
Hassan al-Banna emphasized
jihad of the sword, and called on Egyptians to
jihad against the
British Empire, and its Palestinian branch,
Hamas, called for
jihad against Israel during the
First Intifada. Modern Muslim thought had been focused on when to go to war (
jus ad bellum), not paying much attention on conduct during war (
jus in bello). This was because most Muslim theorists viewed
international humanitarian law as consistent with Islamic requirements. However, Muslims later discussed conduct during war in response to
terrorist groups who targeted civilians. Later ideologue,
Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, departed from some of Qutb's teachings. While Qutb felt that
jihad was a proclamation of "liberation for humanity" (in which humanity has the free choice between Islam and unbelief), Faraj saw
jihad as a mean of conquering the world and reestablishing the
caliphate.
Terrorism Many Muslims, including scholars like
al-Qaradawi and
Sayyid Tantawi, denounced Islamic terrorist attacks against
civilians, seeing them as contrary to rules of
jihad that prohibit targeting
noncombatants. Justifying violence can be seen as
incitement and mitigated with
deradicalization.
Abdullah Azzam In the 1980s
Abdullah Azzam advocated waging
jihad against the "unbelievers". Azzam issued a
fatwa calling for
jihad against the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, declaring it an obligation for all able-bodied Muslims to repel invaders. His fatwa was endorsed by others, including
Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz. Azzam saw Afghanistan as the beginning of
jihad to repel unbelievers from many countries—the
southern Soviet Republics of Central Asia,
Bosnia, the
Philippines,
Kashmir,
Somalia,
Eritrea, Spain, and especially his home country of Palestine. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the Muslim world." Many fighters returned to their home countries to continue
jihad, participating in insurgencies and later creating a "transnational jihadist stream." In February 1998, bin Laden put a "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for
Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders" in the
Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper. He later organised the
September 11 attacks against the United States.
Shia In
Shia Islam,
jihad is one of the ten
Practices of the Religion (though not one of the five pillars). Traditionally,
Twelver Shi'a doctrine differed from that of
Sunni Islam on the concept of
jihad, with
jihad seen as a "lesser priority" in Shia theology and "armed activism" by Shias "limited to a person's immediate geography". Because of their history of oppression, Shias also associated
jihad with certain passionate features, notably in the remembrance of
Ashura.
Mahmoud M. Ayoub says: In Islamic tradition
jihad or the struggle in the way of God, whether as armed struggle, or any form of opposition of the wrong, is generally regarded as one of the essential requirements of a person's faith as a Muslim. Shi'î tradition carried this requirement a step further, making
jihad one of the pillars or foundations (arkan) of religion. If, therefore,
Husayn's struggle against the Umayyad regime must be regarded as an act of
jihad, then, In the mind of devotees, the participation of the community in his suffering and its ascent to the truth of his message must also be regarded as an extension of the holy struggle of the Imam himself. The
hadith from which we took the title of this chapter stated this point very clearly.
Ja'far al-Sadiq is said to have declared to
al-Mufaddal, one of his closest disciples, 'The sigh of the sorrowful for the wrong done us is an act of praise (
tasbih) [of God], his sorrow for us is an act of worship, and his keeping of our secret is a struggle (
jihad) in the way of God'; the Imâm then added, 'This
hadith should be inscribed in letters of gold'. and Hence, the concept of
jihad (holy struggle) gained a deeper and more personal meaning. Whether through weeping, the composition and recitation of poetry, showing compassion and doing good to the poor or carrying arms, the Shi'i Muslim saw himself helping the Imam in his struggle against the wrong (
zulm) and gaining for himself the same merit (
thawab) of those who actually fought and died for him. The
ta'ziyah, in its broader sense the sharing of the entire life of the suffering family of Muhammad, has become for the Shi'i community the true meaning of compassion. ==Islamic jurisprudence==