in Berlin to attend the
Potsdam Conference in 1945. US
Secretary of War Henry Stimson hired McCloy as a consultant in September 1940, even though McCloy was a
Republican Party supporter and opposed
Franklin Roosevelt for the upcoming November 1940 presidential election. Stimson was particularly interested in McCloy due to McCloy's extensive experience with German sabotage in
the Black Tom case. Stimson knew that the Germans would once again try to sabotage American infrastructure if a war against the United States were to break out. Working for Stimson, McCloy became immersed in war planning. On April 22, 1941, he was made Assistant Secretary of War but held only civilian responsibilities, especially the purchase of war materials for the Army,
Lend Lease, the draft, and issues of intelligence and sabotage. Once the USA entered the war, McCloy was a crucial voice in setting US military priorities and played a key role in several notable decisions.
Creating a wartime security apparatus An indefatigable committee member, McCloy during the war served on the government task forces that built the Pentagon, created the
Office of Strategic Services, which eventually became the
Central Intelligence Agency, and he proposed both the
United Nations and the war crimes tribunals. He chaired the predecessor to the
National Security Council.
Internment of Japanese-Americans In February 1942, his involvement in combating sabotage made McCloy heavily involved in the decision to forcibly remove Japanese-Americans from their homes on the
West Coast to inland internment camps.
Kai Bird wrote in his biography of McCloy: More than any individual, McCloy was responsible for the decision, since the (U.S.) President had delegated the matter to him through (U.S. Secretary of War) Stimson. The generals on the scene had insisted on mass relocation to prevent sabotage, and the Army's G-2 (intelligence division) concluded that it was needed. A key document was a
Magic-decrypted interception of a Japanese diplomat in
Los Angeles, who reported, "We also have connections with our second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes." The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) disagreed with the Army; in a concurrent report prepared by Commander Kenneth Ringle, ONI had argued against mass internment because most of the Japanese-American citizens suspected of espionage or sabotage were already under surveillance or in FBI custody. McCloy was responsible for supervising the evacuations to the camps, but the camps were run by a civilian agency. The actions were unanimously upheld by the
Supreme Court. By 1945, the judicial consensus had eroded considerably. Three justices dissented in a similar internment challenge brought by
Fred Korematsu. The dissenters were led by Justice
Frank Murphy's reversal of his reluctant concurrence in the earlier case of
Gordon Hirabayashi. Historian Roger Daniels says McCloy was strongly opposed to reopening the judicial verdicts on the constitutionality of the internment. The dissent eventually led to judicial reversal of the criminal convictions of Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and others on the basis of government misconduct including the deliberate suppression of the ONI's Ringle report during the Supreme Court's deliberations in 1943. Edward Ennis, a former colleague and Justice Department lawyer tasked with the preparation of the government's briefs to the Supreme Court in the Hirabayashi case, would directly accuse McCloy of personal deception in testimony before the Seattle Federal Court's 1985
coram nobis review. That led directly to the final resolution, in 1987, of the internment cases before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which fully exonerated Hirabayashi and other Japanese-American citizens, who fought the wartime curfews and forced relocations resulting from Army orders which the three-judge panel unanimously held were "based upon racism rather than military necessity."
Bombing of Auschwitz The
War Department was petitioned throughout late 1944 to help save Nazi-held prisoners by ordering the bombing of the railroad lines leading to
Auschwitz and the gas chambers in the camp. McCloy responded in a letter dated July 4, 1944 to John W. Pehle of the
War Refugee Board, "The War Department is of the opinion that the suggested air operation is impracticable. It could be executed only by the diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations and would in any case be of such doubtful efficacy that it would not amount to a practical project." "In fact, long range American bombers stationed in Italy had flown over Auschwitz several times that spring in search of the I.G. Farben petrochemical plant nearby." In another series of letters, A. Leon Kubowitzki of the
World Jewish Congress requested on August 9, 1944 that McCloy consider a message sent to them by Ernest Frischer of the Czechoslovak State Council from the War Refugee Board. Frischer believed that "destruction of gas chambers and crematoria in
Oswiecim by bombing would have a certain effect," and that "bombing of railway communications in this same area would also be of importance and of military interest." On the August 14, 1944 McCloy responded to Kubowitzki with a letter detailing how the operation would "be of such doubtful efficacy that it would not warrant the use of our resources," adding that "even if practicable, might provoke even more vindictive action by the Germans." On November 8, 1944, McCloy received another letter from Pehle, now urging McCloy to speak with the War Department and reconsider their refusal to conduct the bombings. Pehle described how he was "hesitant to urge the destruction of these camps by direct, military action," but felt differently after reading a report from two escapees from Auschwitz who described the conditions of the death camp. McCloy had no direct authority over the
Army Air Forces and could not overrule its choice of targets; the Army Air Forces, led by General
Hap Arnold was adamantly opposed to any outside civilian group choosing its targets. Roosevelt himself rejected any such proposals.
Preserving Rothenburg ob der Tauber In March 1945,
Rothenburg ob der Tauber was defended by German soldiers. Since McCloy knew about the historic importance and beauty of Rothenburg, he ordered US Army General
Jacob L. Devers not to use artillery in taking Rothenburg. Battalion commander
Frank Burke, a future
Medal of Honor winner, ordered six soldiers of the
12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Division to march into Rothenburg on a three-hour mission and negotiate the surrender of the town. When stopped by a German soldier, one of the six soldiers, Private Lichey, who spoke fluent German and served as the group's translator, held up a white flag and explained, "We are representatives of our division commander. We bring you his offer to spare the city of Rothenburg from shelling and bombing if you agree not to defend it. We have been given three hours to get this message to you. If we haven't returned to our lines by 1800 hours, the town will be bombed and shelled to the ground." The local military commander Major Thömmes gave up the town, ignoring the order of Hitler for all towns to fight to the end and thereby saving it from total destruction by artillery. American troops of the 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Division occupied the town on April 17, 1945, and in November 1948, McCloy was named an honorary citizen (
German:
Ehrenbürger) of Rothenburg.
Ending war with Japan McCloy tried to convince President Truman that an
invasion of Japan was not sensible. By mid-1945, the Japanese emperor began looking for ways to unwind the war, going as far as asking the Soviet Union to broker a peace between the United States and Japan. Through Magic intercepts, McCloy had known that the emperor was prepared to surrender if assurances to preserve the Japanese monarchy were given. As such, he advised Truman to offer terms of surrender that offered such a guarantee bundled with the implied threat of using the
atomic bomb against Japan. He argued that by doing so, it would enable the United States to claim a moral high ground, in the event that a bombing would be needed to thwart a Japanese mainland invasion. While traveling by boat to the Potsdam Conference, Secretary of State
James Byrnes convinced Truman to ignore McCloy's advice. Eventually, Truman ordered the atomic bombs to be dropped as soon as they were ready.
Rejection of the Morgenthau Plan In 1945, he and Stimson convinced President Truman to reject the
Morgenthau Plan and to avoid stripping Germany of its industrial capacity.
Ending segregation As chairman of the Army's Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policy, he at first opposed the civil rights spokesman who wanted the Army to end segregation. However, he changed his mind and in late 1945, just before leaving the government to return to Wall Street, he proposed ending segregation in the military. On March 17, 1949, McCloy and General
Alvan Cullom Gillem, Jr. testified before the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. == Later career ==