After briefly rejoining the
Continental Army, Marshall won election to the
Virginia House of Delegates in early 1782, where he aligned himself with members of the conservative
Tidewater establishment, including
James Monroe and
Richard Henry Lee. With the backing of his influential father-in-law, Marshall was elected to the
Council of State, becoming the youngest individual up to that point to serve on the council. In 1785, Marshall took up the additional office of Recorder of the Richmond City
Hustings Court. Meanwhile, Marshall sought to build up his own legal practice, a difficult proposition during a time of economic recession. In 1786, he purchased the law practice of his cousin,
Edmund Randolph, after the latter was elected Governor of Virginia. Marshall gained a reputation as a talented attorney practicing in the state capital of
Richmond, and he took on a wide array of cases. He represented the heirs of
Lord Fairfax in
Hite v. Fairfax (1786), an important case involving a large tract of land in the
Northern Neck of Virginia. Under the
Articles of Confederation, the United States during the 1780s was a confederation of sovereign states with a weak national government that had little or no effective power to impose tariffs, regulate interstate commerce, or enforce laws. Influenced by
Shays' Rebellion and the powerlessness of the
Congress of the Confederation, Marshall came to believe in the necessity of a new governing structure that would replace the powerless national government established by the Articles of Confederation. He strongly favored ratification of the
new constitution proposed by the
Philadelphia Convention in
Philadelphia, since it provided for a much stronger federal government. Marshall was elected to the 1788
Virginia Ratifying Convention, where he worked with
James Madison to convince other delegates to ratify the new constitution. After a long debate, proponents of ratification emerged victorious, as the convention voted 89 to 79 to ratify the constitution. After the United States ratified the Constitution, newly-elected U.S. President
George Washington nominated Marshall as the
United States Attorney for Virginia. His nomination was confirmed by the
United States Senate, but Marshall declined the position, instead choosing to focus on his own law practice. In the early 1790s, the
Federalist Party and the
Democratic-Republican Party emerged as the country was polarized by issues such as the
French Revolutionary Wars and the power of the presidency and the federal government. Marshall aligned with the Federalist Party. At
Alexander Hamilton's request, he organized a Federalist movement in Virginia to counter the influence of
Thomas Jefferson's
Democratic-Republican Party. Like most other Federalists, Marshall favored neutrality in foreign affairs, high
tariffs, a strong executive, and a
standing military. In 1795, Washington asked Marshall to accept appointment as the
United States Attorney General, but Marshall again declined the offer. He did, however, serve in a variety of roles for the state of Virginia during the 1790s, at one point acting as the state's interim Attorney General. In 1796, Marshall appeared before the Supreme Court of the United States in
Ware v. Hylton, a case involving the validity of a Virginia law that provided for the confiscation of debts owed to British subjects. Marshall argued that the law was a legitimate exercise of the state's power, but the Supreme Court ruled against him, holding that the
Treaty of Paris in combination with the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution required the collection, rather than confiscation, of such debts. According to biographer Henry Flanders, Marshall's argument in
Ware v. Hylton "elicited great admiration at the time of its delivery, and enlarged the circle of his reputation" despite his defeat in the case.
Adams administration (1797 to 1801) Diplomat Vice President
John Adams, a member of the
Federalist Party, defeated Jefferson in the
1796 presidential election and sought to continue Washington's policy of neutrality in the French Revolutionary Wars. After Adams took office,
France refused to meet with American envoys and began attacking American ships. In 1797, Marshall accepted appointment to a three-member commission to France that also included
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and
Elbridge Gerry. The three envoys arrived in France in October 1797, but were granted only a fifteen-minute meeting with French Foreign Minister
Talleyrand. After that meeting, the diplomats were met by three of Talleyrand's agents who refused to conduct diplomatic negotiations unless the United States paid enormous bribes to Talleyrand and to the Republic of France. The Americans refused to negotiate on such terms, and Marshall and Pinckney eventually decided to return to the United States. Marshall left France in April 1798 and arrived in the United States two months later, receiving a warm welcome by Federalist members of Congress. During his time in France, Marshall and the other commissioners had sent secret correspondence to Adams and Secretary of State
Timothy Pickering. In April 1798, Congress passed a resolution demanding that the administration reveal the contents of the correspondence. A public outcry ensued when the Adams administration revealed that Talleyrand's agents had demanded bribes; the incident became known as the
XYZ Affair. In July 1798, shortly after Marshall's return, Congress imposed an embargo in France, marking the start of an undeclared naval war known as the
Quasi-War. Marshall supported most of the measures Congress adopted in the struggle against France, but he disapproved of the
Alien and Sedition Acts, four separate laws designed to suppress dissent during the Quasi-War. Marshall published a letter to a local newspaper stating his belief that the laws would likely "create, unnecessarily, discontents and jealousies at a time when our very existence as a nation may depend on our union."
U.S. Representative After his return from France, Marshall wanted to resume his private practice of law, but in September 1798 former President Washington convinced him to challenge incumbent Democratic-Republican Congressman
John Clopton of
Virginia's 13th congressional district. Although the
Richmond, Virginia district favored the Democratic-Republican Party, Marshall won the race, due partly to his conduct during the XYZ Affair and partly due to support he received from
Patrick Henry. After winning the election, Marshall was sworn into office when the
6th Congress convened in December 1799. He quickly emerged as a leader of the moderate faction of Federalists in Congress. His most notable speech in Congress was related to the case of Thomas Nash (alias Jonathan Robbins), whom the government had extradited to Great Britain on charges of murder. Marshall defended the government's actions, arguing that nothing in the Constitution prevents the United States from extraditing one of its citizens. His speech helped defeat a motion to censure President Adams for the extradition.
U.S. Secretary of State In May 1800, President Adams nominated Marshall as
Secretary of War, but the President quickly withdrew that nomination and instead nominated Marshall as
U.S. Secretary of State. Marshall was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on May 13, and took office on June 6, 1800. Marshall's appointment as Secretary of State was preceded by a split between Adams and Hamilton, the latter of whom led a faction of Federalists who favored declaring war on France. Adams fired Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, a Hamilton supporter, after Pickering tried to undermine peace negotiations with France. Adams directed Marshall to bring an end to the Quasi-War and settle ongoing disputes with Britain,
Spain, and the
Barbary States. The position of Secretary of State also held a wide array of domestic responsibilities, including the deliverance of commissions of federal appointments and supervision of the construction of
Washington, D.C. In October 1800, the United States and France agreed to the
Convention of 1800, which ended the Quasi-War and reestablished commercial relations with France.
U.S. Supreme Court With the
Federalist Party divided between
Alexander Hamilton and
John Adams, the
Democratic-Republican Party and
Thomas Jefferson emerged victorious in the
presidential election of 1800. Because Jefferson and
Aaron Burr both received 73
electoral votes, the election was sent to the Federalist Party-controlled
U.S. House of Representatives. Hamilton asked Marshall to support Jefferson, but Marshall declined to support either candidate. In the
contingent election held to decide whether Jefferson or Burr would become president, each state delegation had a single vote. Under this rule, it turned out that neither party had a majority because some states had split delegations. Over the course of seven days, February 11–17, 1801, the House cast a total of 35 ballots, with Jefferson receiving the votes of eight state delegations each time, one short of the necessary majority of nine. On February 17, on the 36th ballot, Jefferson was elected as president. Burr became vice president. After the election, Adams and the
lame duck Congress passed what came to be known as the
Midnight Judges Act. This legislation made sweeping changes to the federal judiciary, including a reduction in Supreme Court justices from six to five (upon the next vacancy in the court) so as to deny Jefferson an appointment until two vacancies occurred. In late 1800, Chief Justice
Oliver Ellsworth resigned due to poor health. Adams nominated former Chief Justice
John Jay to once again lead the Supreme Court, but Jay rejected the appointment, partly due to his frustration at the relative lack of power possessed by the judicial branch of the federal government. Jay's letter of rejection arrived on January 20, 1801, less than two months before Jefferson would take office. Upon learning of Jay's rejection, Marshall suggested that Adams elevate Associate Justice
William Paterson to chief justice, but Adams rejected the suggestion, instead saying to Marshall, "I believe I must nominate you." The Senate at first delayed confirming Marshall, as many senators hoped that Adams would choose a different individual to serve as chief justice. According to New Jersey Senator
Jonathan Dayton, the Senate finally relented "lest another not so qualified, and more disgusting to the bench, should be substituted, and because it appeared that this gentleman [Marshall] was not privy to his own nomination". Marshall was confirmed by the Senate on January 27, 1801, and took office on February 4. At the request of the president, he continued to serve as Secretary of State until Adams' term expired on March 4. Consequently, Marshall was charged with delivering judicial commissions to the individuals who had been appointed to the positions created by the Midnight Judges Act. Adams would later state that "my gift of John Marshall to the people of the United States was the proudest act of my life."
Supreme Court Chief Justice The
Marshall Court convened for the first time on February 2, 1801, in the
Supreme Court Chamber of the
Capitol Building. The Court at that time consisted of Chief Justice Marshall and Associate Justices William Cushing,
William Paterson,
Samuel Chase,
Bushrod Washington, and
Alfred Moore, each of whom had been appointed by President Washington or President Adams. Prior to 1801, the Supreme Court had been seen as a relatively insignificant institution. Most legal disputes were resolved in state, rather than federal courts. The Court had issued just 63 decisions in its first decades, few of which had made a significant impact, and it had never struck down a federal or state law. During Marshall's 34-year tenure as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court would emerge as an important force in the federal government for the first time, and Marshall himself played a major role in shaping the nation's understanding of constitutional law. The Marshall Court would issue more than 1000 decisions, about half of which were written by Marshall himself. Marshall's leadership of the Supreme Court ensured that the federal government would exercise relatively strong powers, despite the political domination of the Democratic-Republicans after 1800. Soon after becoming chief justice, Marshall changed the manner in which the Supreme Court announced its decisions. Previously, each Justice would author a separate opinion (known as a
seriatim opinion) as was done in the
Virginia Supreme Court of his day and is still done today in the
United Kingdom and
Australia. Under Marshall, however, the Supreme Court adopted the practice of handing down a single
majority opinion of the Court, allowing it to present a clear rule. Thomas Jefferson complained about the supposedly unanimous judgments being decided "huddled up in conclave...with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law to his mind".
John Schmidhauser's analysis of Marshall's correspondence with the associate justices did not corroborate Jefferson's statements. Del Dickson has written that the "[n]ew procedures were adopted by consensus...to build the reputation of the Court as
the source of reliable, predictable, and definitive final judgments in legal and constitutional matters". The Court met in Washington only two months a year, from the first Monday in February through the second or third week in March. Six months of the year the justices were doing
circuit duty in the various states. When the Court was in session in Washington, the justices boarded together in the same rooming house, avoided outside socializing, and discussed each case intently among themselves. Decisions were quickly made, usually in a matter of days. The justices did not have clerks, so they listened closely to the oral arguments, and decided among themselves what the decision should be. Marshall's opinions were workmanlike and not especially eloquent or subtle. His influence on learned men of the law came from the charismatic force of his personality and his ability to seize upon the key elements of a case and make highly persuasive arguments. As
Oliver Wolcott observed when both he and Marshall served in the Adams administration, Marshall had the knack of "putting his own ideas into the minds of others, unconsciously to them". By 1811, justices appointed by a Democratic-Republican president had a 5-to-2 majority on the Court, but Marshall retained ideological and personal leadership of the Court. Marshall regularly curbed his own viewpoints, preferring to arrive at decisions by consensus. Only once did he find himself on the losing side in a constitutional case. In that case—
Ogden v. Saunders in 1827—Marshall set forth his general principles of constitutional interpretation: While Marshall was attentive when listening to oral arguments and often persuaded other justices to adopt his interpretation of the law, he was not widely read in the law, and seldom cited precedents. After the Court came to a decision, he would usually write it up himself. Often he asked
Justice Joseph Story, a renowned legal scholar and longtime friend of Marshall, to do the chores of locating the precedents, saying, "There, Story; that is the law of this case; now go and find the authorities."
Jefferson administration Marbury v. Madison In his role as Secretary of State in the Adams administration, Marshall had failed to deliver commissions to 42 federal justices of the peace before the end of Adams's term. After coming to power, the Jefferson administration refused to deliver about half of these outstanding commissions, effectively preventing those individuals from receiving their appointments even though the
United States Senate confirmed their nominations. Though the position of justice of the peace was a relatively powerless and low-paying office, one individual whose commission was not delivered,
William Marbury, decided to mount a legal challenge against the Jefferson administration. Seeking to have his judicial commission delivered, Marbury filed suit against the sitting Secretary of State, James Madison. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of
Marbury v. Madison in its 1803 term. Meanwhile, the Democratic-Republicans passed the
Judiciary Act of 1802, which effectively repealed the Midnight Judges Act and canceled the Supreme Court's 1802 term. They also began impeachment proceedings against federal judge
John Pickering, a prominent Federalist; in response, Federalist members of Congress accused the Democratic-Republicans of trying to infringe on the independence of the federal judiciary. In early February 1803, the Supreme Court held a four-day trial for the case of
Marbury v. Madison, though the defendant, James Madison, refused to appear. On February 24, the Supreme Court announced its decision, which biographer Joel Richard Paul describes as "the single most significant constitutional decision issued by any court in American history." The Court held that Madison was legally bound to deliver Marbury's commission, and that Marbury had the right to sue Madison. Yet the Court also held that it could not order Madison to deliver the commission because the
Judiciary Act of 1789 had unconstitutionally expanded the Court's
original jurisdiction to include
writs of mandamus, a type of court order that commands a government official to perform an act they are legally required to perform. Because that portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional, the Court held that it did not have original jurisdiction over the case even while simultaneously holding that Madison had violated the law.
Marbury v. Madison was the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a federal law as unconstitutional and it is most significant for its role in establishing the Supreme Court's power of
judicial review, or the power to invalidate laws as unconstitutional. As Marshall put it, "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." By asserting the power of judicial review in a holding that did not require the Jefferson administration to take action, the Court upheld its own powers without coming into direct conflict with a hostile executive branch that likely would not have complied with a court order. Historians mostly agree that the framers of the Constitution did plan for the Supreme Court to have some sort of judicial review, but Marshall made their goals operational. Though many Democratic-Republicans expected a constitutional crisis to arise after the Supreme Court asserted its power of judicial review, the Court upheld the repeal of the Midnight Judges Act in the 1803 case of
Stuart v. Laird.
Impeachment of Samuel Chase In 1804, the House of Representatives impeached Associate Justice
Samuel Chase, alleging that he had shown political bias in his judicial conduct. Many Democratic-Republicans saw the impeachment as a way to intimidate federal judges, many of whom were members of the Federalist Party. As a witness in the Senate's impeachment trial, Marshall defended Chase's actions. In March 1805, the Senate voted to acquit Chase, as several Democratic-Republican senators joined with their Federalist colleagues in refusing to remove Chase. The acquittal helped further establish the independence of the federal judiciary.
Burr conspiracy trial Vice President Aaron Burr was not renominated by his party in the
1804 presidential election and his term as vice president ended in 1805. After leaving office, Burr traveled to the western United States, where he may have entertained plans to establish an independent republic from
Mexican or American territories. In 1807, Burr was arrested and charged for
treason, and Marshall presided over the subsequent trial. Marshall required Jefferson to turn over his correspondence with General
James Wilkinson; Jefferson decided to release the documents, but argued that he was not compelled to do so under the doctrine of
executive privilege. During the trial, Marshall ruled that much of the evidence that the government had amassed against Burr was inadmissible; biographer Joel Richard Paul states that Marshall effectively "directed the jury to acquit Burr." After Burr was acquitted, Democratic-Republicans, including President Jefferson, attacked Marshall for his role in the trial.
Fletcher v. Peck In 1795,
Georgia sold much of its western lands to a speculative land company, which then resold much of that land to other speculators, termed "New Yazooists." After a public outcry over the sale, which was achieved through bribery, Georgia rescinded the sale and offered to refund the original purchase price to the New Yazooists. Many of the New Yazooists had paid far more than the original purchase price, and they rejected Georgia's revocation of the sale. Jefferson tried to arrange a compromise by having the federal government purchase the land from Georgia and compensate the New Yazooists, but Congressman
John Randolph defeated the compensation bill. The issue remained unresolved, and a case involving the land finally reached the Supreme Court through the 1810 case of
Fletcher v. Peck. In March 1810, the Court handed down its unanimous holding, which voided Georgia's repeal of the purchase on the basis of the Constitution's
Contract Clause. The Court's ruling held that the original sale of land constituted a contract with the purchasers, and the Contract Clause prohibits states from "impairing the obligations of contracts."
Fletcher v. Peck was the first case in which the Supreme Court ruled a state law unconstitutional, though in 1796 the Court had voided a state law as conflicting with the combination of the Constitution together with a treaty.
McCulloch v. Maryland In 1816, Congress established the
Second Bank of the United States ("national bank") in order to regulate the country's money supply and provide loans to the federal government and businesses. The state of Maryland imposed a tax on the national bank, but James McCulloch, the manager of the national bank's branch in
Baltimore, refused to pay the tax. After he was convicted by Maryland's court system, McCulloch appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court heard the case of
McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819. In that case, the state of Maryland challenged the constitutionality of the national bank and asserted that it had the right to tax the national bank. Writing for the Court, Marshall held that Congress had the power to charter the national bank. He laid down the basic theory of implied powers under a written Constitution; intended, as he said "to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs ...." Marshall envisaged a federal government which, although governed by timeless principles, possessed the powers "on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends." "Let the end be legitimate," Marshall wrote, "let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but consist with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." The Court also held that Maryland could not tax the national bank, asserting that the power to tax is equivalent to "the power to destroy." The Court's decision in
McCulloch was, according to Joel Richard Paul, "probably the most controversial decision" handed down by the Marshall Court. Southerners, including Virginia judge
Spencer Roane, attacked the decision as an overreach of federal power. In a subsequent case,
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, the Court ordered a state official to return seized funds to the national bank. The
Osborn case established that the
Eleventh Amendment does not grant state officials
sovereign immunity when they resist a federal court order.
Cohens v. Virginia Congress established a
lottery in the District of Columbia in 1812, and in 1820 two individuals were convicted in Virginia for violating a state law that prohibited selling out-of-state lottery tickets. The defendants, Philip and Mendes Cohen, appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court's subsequent decision in the 1821 case of
Cohens v. Virginia established that the Supreme Court could hear appeals from state courts in criminal lawsuits. The Court held that, because Virginia had brought the suit against the defendants, the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit the case from appearing in federal court.
Gibbons v. Ogden In 1808,
Robert R. Livingston and
Robert Fulton secured a monopoly from the state of New York for the navigation of
steamboats in state waters. Fulton granted a license to
Aaron Ogden and
Thomas Gibbons to operate steamboats in New York, but the partnership between Ogden and Gibbons collapsed. Gibbons continued to operate steamboats in New York after receiving a federal license to operate steamboats in the waters of any state. In response, Ogden won a judgment in state court that ordered Gibbons to cease operations in the state. Gibbons appealed to the Supreme Court, which heard the case of
Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824. Representing Gibbons, Congressman
Daniel Webster and Attorney General
William Wirt (acting in a non-governmental capacity) argued that Congress had the exclusive power to regulate commerce, while Ogden's attorneys contended that the Constitution did not prohibit states from restricting navigation. Writing for the Court, Marshall held that navigation constituted a form of commerce and thus could be regulated by Congress. Because New York's monopoly conflicted with a properly issued federal license, the Court struck down the monopoly. However, Marshall did not adopt Webster's argument that Congress had the sole power to regulate commerce. Newspapers in both the Northern states and the Southern states hailed the decision as a blow against monopolies and the restraint of trade.
Jackson administration Marshall personally opposed the presidential candidacy of
Andrew Jackson, whom the Chief Justice saw as a dangerous
demagogue, and he caused a minor incident during the
1828 presidential campaign when he criticized Jackson's attacks on President
John Quincy Adams. After the death of
Associate Justice Washington in 1829, Marshall was the last remaining original member of the Marshall Court, and his influence declined as new justices joined the Court. After Jackson took office in 1829, he clashed with the Supreme Court, especially with regards to his administration's policy of
Indian removal. In the 1823 case of
Johnson v. McIntosh, the Marshall Court had established the supremacy of the federal government in dealing with
Native American tribes. In the late 1820s, the state of Georgia stepped up efforts to assert its control over the
Cherokee within state borders, with the ultimate goal of removing the Cherokee from the state. After Georgia passed a law that voided Cherokee laws and denied several rights to the Native Americans, former Attorney General William Wirt sought an injunction to prevent Georgia from exercising sovereignty over the Cherokee. The Supreme Court heard the resulting case of
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1831. Writing for the Court, Marshall held that Native American tribes constituted "domestic dependent nations," a new legal status, but he dismissed the case on the basis of
standing. At roughly the same time that the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, a group of white missionaries living with the Cherokee were arrested by the state of Georgia. The State did so on the basis of an 1830 state law that prohibited white men from living on Native American land without a state license. Among those arrested was
Samuel Worcester, who, after being convicted of violating the state law, challenged the constitutionality of the law in federal court. The arrest of the missionaries became a key issue in the
1832 presidential election, and one of the presidential candidates, William Wirt, served as the attorney for the missionaries. On March 3, 1832, Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in the case of
Worcester v. Georgia. The Court's holding overturned the conviction and the state law, holding that the state of Georgia had improperly exercised control over the Cherokee. It is often reported that in response to the
Worcester decision President
Andrew Jackson declared "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!" More reputable sources recognize this as a false quotation. Regardless, Jackson refused to enforce the decision, and Georgia refused to release the missionaries. The situation was finally resolved when the Jackson administration privately convinced Governor
Wilson Lumpkin to pardon the missionaries.
Other key cases Marshall established the Charming Betsy principle, a rule of
statutory interpretation, in the 1804 case of
Murray v. The Charming Betsy. The Charming Betsy principle holds that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." In ''
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee'', the Supreme Court held that it had the power to hear appeals from state supreme courts when a
federal issue was involved. Marshall recused himself from the case because it stemmed from a dispute over Lord Fairfax's former lands, which Marshall had a financial interest in. In
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Court held that the protections of the Contract Clause apply to
private corporations. In
Ogden v. Saunders, Marshall dissented in part and "assented" in part, and the Court upheld a state law that allowed individuals to file
bankruptcy. In his separate opinion, Marshall argued that the state bankruptcy law violated the Contract Clause. In
Barron v. Baltimore, the Court held that the
Bill of Rights was intended to apply only to the federal government, and not to the states. The courts have since
incorporated most of the Bill of Rights with respect to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified decades after Marshall's death. ==Authorship of Washington biography==