The Marne Gallieni was designated as Joffre's successor "in case of emergency" on 31 July. Joffre refused to have him at his headquarters, saying "He is difficult to place. I have always been under his orders.
Il m’a toujours fait mousser [He always riled me]." On 14 August, as the
Lorraine offensive was beginning, Gallieni visited Joffre at the insistence of War Minister
Adolphe Messimy, who felt intimidated by Joffre. Messimy imagined that Joffre would be more likely to listen to his former superior, but he was quickly palmed off onto the staff officer General Belin and his deputy
Berthelot.
Military Governor of Paris As a condition of becoming
Military governor of Paris, Gallieni demanded three active corps to defend the city. War Minister
Messimy ordered Joffre to provide them on 25 August but Joffre, regarding this as interference with strategy, ignored the order. Gallieni learned from Messimy that 61st and 62nd Infantry Divisions, formerly the Paris Garrison, were being ordered north for
Maunoury’s planned offensive against the German west flank near Amiens, leaving Gallieni with only territorial troops. Already in poor health, Gallieni was appointed on 26 August, not yet knowing that he did not have the resources he had demanded. However, on that day
Viviani formed a new government (
Union sacrée), and on 27 August the new War Minister
Millerand (who had replaced Messimy largely because of the poor state of the Paris defences) visited Joffre, who promised to provide the three corps if Maunoury's attack should fail. On 28 August the "Zone of Armies" was extended to cover the Paris suburbs. From 10am to 10:15am Gallieni held his one and only Council of Defence, at which his military and civil cabinets, standing up and without discussion, were made to sign the order placing Paris in a state of defence. He sacked two generals in his first two days. On 2 September, the anniversary of the
Battle of Sedan, the government left Paris for Bordeaux, with the evacuation continuing through the night of 2/3 September. Paris was made a
"camp militaire retranché". Before departing, Millerand ordered Gallieni to defend Paris
"à outrance," repeating the order when Gallieni explained that it meant destroying buildings and bridges. Gallieni later recorded that he had been certain that he was remaining behind to die. That day Gallieni told Joffre that without the three corps it would be "absolutely impossible to resist." Joffre placed Maunoury's
Sixth Army, which was retreating down from the Amiens area, under Gallieni's direct command as the "Armies of Paris." Gallieni at once drove out to inspect his new command—he was horrified by the sight of the refugees—and to visit Maunoury. Gallieni had four territorial divisions and the 185th Territorial Brigade. He soon received a Marine Artillery Brigade (mostly Breton reservist sailors) and the 84th Territorial Division. Sixth Army was soon augmented by IV Corps from Third Army. Maunoury had an active division of VII Corps, a 5,000 strong native Moroccan brigade, and four reserve divisions: 61st and 62nd under Ebener, and 55th and 56th which had fought in Lorraine. Joffre also added Drude's 45th Division of Zouaves from Algeria, who made a huge impression marching through Paris, and IV Corps from Third Army. The Prefect of Police had resigned "on grounds of health" on being ordered to remain at his post. Gallieni stayed up with his staff all night drawing up plans for Sixth Army to give battle between the Oise and Pontoise. Joffre had Millerand place Gallieni under his own command on 2 September. Gallieni believed that Joffre's strategy of retreating behind the Seine was "divorced from reality" as the Germans would not allow his forces enough time to rally. He spent the night of 2/3 September at his new HQ at Lycee Victor-Duruy, expecting a German attack the next day. On the morning of 3 September he learned that
von Kluck was marching southeast across Paris, offering his flank to a French counterattack. The first public proclamation on the morning of 3 September promised to defend Paris "to the last extremity." That morning Gallieni set engineers and civilian labourers to work cutting down woods and trees, and preparing bridges and buildings for demolition to clear lines of sight for guns. For three days concrete was poured and barbed wire strung up. Even the
Eiffel Tower was prepared for demolition. Paris had 2,924 guns, ranging from 155mm to 75mm. Hospitals and fire departments put on alert. Gas for three months of electricity was stockpiled, along with bread for 43 days, salt for 20 days and meat for 12 days. Pigeons were brought under state control for carrying messages. Lt-Col
Dreyfus rejoined the artillery. Civilian
paniquards were encouraged to leave and reconnaissance patrols were set up.
Planning the counterattack On the night of 3–4 September Joffre sent a handwritten note to Gallieni, wanting Maunoury's Sixth Army to push east along the north bank of the Marne, although not specifying a date. This was in line with his modification of
Instruction General No 4 (2 September), envisaging a giant pocket from Paris to Verdun, of which he enclosed copies to Gallieni. Gallieni decided that it was "vital to act quickly" so as not to leave Paris uncovered. At 09:10 on 4 September, based on the previous day's reports of Paris aviators, which he had passed on to Joffre, and on his own authority, he sent orders to Maunoury to be ready to move his army that afternoon (now reinforced with Drude's 45th Infantry Division) and to be ready to come to Paris for a conference. Having first informed
President Poincaré in Bordeaux—in Tuchman's view, to force Joffre's hand—at 9:45am he had the first of a series of telephone calls, conducted through aides, as Joffre would not come to the phone, and Gallieni refused to speak to anyone else. Gallieni would later write that "the real Battle of the Marne was fought on the telephone." He proposed, depending on how much further the Germans were to be allowed to advance, to attack north of the Marne on 6 September or south of the Marne on 7 September. Joffre's reply, saying he preferred the southern option (which would take a day longer as it forced
Sixth Army to cross to south of the Marne, but would allow Sixth Army and the BEF to not be separated by the river), arrived too late to reach Gallieni. To ensure British cooperation Gallieni, accompanied by Maunoury, left Paris at 1pm to drive to BEF GHQ at Melun, driving past lines of southbound cars leaving Paris. He had already received advice from the liaison officer Victor Huguet that BEF Commander-in-Chief
Sir John French, influenced by BEF Chief of Staff
Murray and concerned about his supply lines along the lower Seine, was unlikely to join in any offensive. They arrived at 3pm and with some difficulty located Murray, who had no idea when Sir John, who was out visiting
British I Corps, was to return and was unwilling to make any decision in his absence. In a three-hour meeting, the French generals proposed that Sixth Army was to move that afternoon, then on 5 September was to strike
German IV Reserve Corps on the west flank. A provisional agreement was drawn up, with copies kept by Maunoury, Gallieni, and Lt-Col Brecard to take to GQG for Joffre's approval. The French came away with the impression that the British would not cooperate and that Murray had
"une grande repugnance" for them, but he did in fact pass the plans along to Sir John. While this was going on,
Wilson (BEF Sub Chief of Staff) was negotiating separate plans with
Franchet d’Esperey (
Fifth Army, on the British right), which envisaged Sixth Army attacking
north of the Marne. In the absence of news from Franchet d'Esperey, Joffre ordered
Major Gamelin to draft orders for Maunoury to attack south of the Marne on 7 September. That evening Gallieni, who returned to Paris to find Joffre's message from earlier in the day and a message from Wilson, insisted on speaking to Joffre personally on the telephone, informing him that it was too late to cancel the movement of Maunoury's Army. Joffre agreed to bring forward the Allied offensive to 6 September and to have Sixth Army attack north of the Marne instead, later writing that he had done so reluctantly as Maunoury would probably make contact with the Germans on 5 September, but that an extra day would have left the Germans in a more "disadvantageous" position. Tuchman argues that he may simply have been swayed by the dominant personality of Gallieni, his former superior. At 8:30pm Gallieni ordered the attack by Maunoury's Army, which was in fact already under way. At 10pm Joffre issued
General Order No 6, ordering a General Allied Offensive.
Taxicab Army and the Battle of the Ourcq On 5 September Gallieni informed Maunoury that there was to be no retreat and issued secret orders for the destruction of important parts of Paris, including the
Pont Neuf and the
Pont Alexandre III. On 7 September Gallieni, concerned that with Maunoury's Sixth Army fighting out in the open, Paris was now vulnerable, telegraphed the government in Bordeaux to discuss the possible evacuation of the civilian population from the Paris suburbs, and ordered
prefects and the police to find "emergency locations" for them. That day Gallieni was ordered not to communicate directly with the government. This left Joffre "all-powerful" (in Gallieni's description), as he had sacked so many generals and Gallieni was his only serious rival. The same day, frustrated at the slowness at which the British were advancing into the gap between the German First and Second Armies, Gallieni sent Lartigue's 8th Infantry Division to the BEF's
right flank to keep contact between the BEF and Franchet d’Esperey's Fifth Army (the French and British generals of 1914 were extremely concerned at the prospect of armies being encircled and besieged, after what had happened to the French Armies at
Sedan and
Metz in 1870). Joffre, concerned that Gallieni might arouse Sir John's "touchiness," sent a telegram to
Lord Kitchener (
British War Secretary) thanking him for Sir John's efforts. It was Gallieni's decision to send 103rd and 104th Infantry Regiments (5 battalions, part of Trentinian's 7th Infantry Division, itself part of IV Corps; most of 7th Infantry Division, including artillery, had been sent to the front by rail and truck the previous night) to the front on the night of 7/8 September, in taxicabs commandeered the previous evening. The division's attack failed completely so the taxicab troops had even less impact than sometimes supposed. Although "great publicity for Gallieni; militarily it was insignificant" in Herwig's view. Upon seeing the "taxicab army" ferrying troops to the front, Gallieni made one of the most oft-quoted remarks of the First World War: "''Eh bien, voilà au moins qui n'est pas banal!''" ("Well, here at least is something out of the ordinary!"). Learning of Gallieni's contingency plans to evacuate Paris the previous day, Joffre telegraphed Millerand (8 September) demanding that he cancel Gallieni's "dangerous" message, and insisting that Gallieni was under his orders and had no business communicating directly with the government. On 8 September Gallieni ordered Maunoury, under heavy pressure from von Kluck, to hold his ground. Joffre gave permission for Maunoury to pull back his left if necessary. The Germans, concerned at the gap between their First and Second Armies, began to pull back on 9 September, giving the Allies a strategic victory in the Battle of the Marne.
After the Marne When the German warships
Goeben and
Breslau went to Constantinople, Gallieni proposed attacking the Turkish straits. By early December 1914 some of Gallieni's supporters were suggesting that he be appointed Commander-in-Chief in Joffre's place, or be made Minister of War, or both. Gallieni was an early supporter of some kind of expeditionary force to the Balkans. Early in 1915 Gallieni supported the proposal of Franchet d’Esperey and
Aristide Briand (Justice Minister) for an expedition to Salonika, which he hoped would detach first Turkey then Austria-Hungary, leaving Germany "doomed". President Poincaré came out in favour of such a scheme, over Joffre's opposition, on 7 January 1915.
Minister of War Appointment With
Viviani’s government in trouble following the resignation of
Delcasse as Foreign Minister, the
unsuccessful autumn offensive and the
entry of Bulgaria into the war, he asked Joffre, who had told him that nine out of ten generals would make poor ministers of war, whether Gallieni would be a good replacement for
Millerand as
Minister of War. Joffre replied "perhaps," then after a pause for thought "maybe." Although Gallieni agreed, in the event other French leaders refused to join Viviani's government so
Briand formed a new government on 29 October 1915, with Viviani as vice-president of the Council of Ministers (Deputy PM) and Gallieni as War Minister. Since July 1915 Joffre had been demanding that he be appointed commander-in-chief over
all French forces, including those at the Dardanelles and Salonika. By November 1915 President Poincaré was persuaded, and Briand, initially reluctant because of the difficulty of defending Gallieni's inclusion in his new ministry, agreed and on his first day in office asked Poincaré to help him persuade Gallieni to accept Joffre's enhanced role. Gallieni agreed and wrote to Joffre—having first shown the letter to Briand—assuring him that "you can count on me." Briand had the two men meet and shake hands. At the meeting of the Superior Council of Defence (24 November 1915) Joffre had Briand address the demarcation of his own and Gallieni's authority, and objected to the Council discussing operational matters, threatening to resign if they attempted to interfere with his "liberty." Joffre met with Poincaré and Briand both before and after the meeting to discuss the issue. Gallieni complained bitterly in his diary about the politicians’ unwillingness to stand up to Joffre. On 1 December Poincaré and Briand met with Gallieni. They rejected the proposal prepared by his staff to vest authority in the Minister of War, Briand objecting that he would be obliged to answer questions in the Chamber about operational matters. Gallieni agreed that Joffre be commander-in-chief, with de Castelnau—who was soon sidelined—as his chief of staff, and under the War Minister's orders. A Presidential Decree of 2 December 1915 made Joffre "Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies" (
generalissimo) over all theatres apart from North Africa. After considerable discussion this was approved by the Chamber of Deputies by 406–67 on 9 December.
Policies Gallieni cleared out soldiers from cushy jobs—three Paris theatres had been directed by Army officers. He authorised the renewed use of black African troops—50,000 in total—on the Western Front. He introduced
foyers du soldat—waiting rooms for soldiers in transit at railway stations. Although Gallieni supported the
Salonika expedition, he shared Joffre's low opinion of
Sarrail’s military abilities. On 12 November Gallieni ordered Sarrail to retreat to Salonika with as much of the Serb Army as he could gather. After Sarrail lobbied politicians for reinforcements Gallieni wrote back to 19 November telling him that he was not going to receive the four corps he wanted, although on 20 November he sent Sarrail (whom he thought "indecisive and not up to the task") a telegram giving him a free choice as to whether to assist the latest Serb attack and when to fall back on Salonika. With evacuation of the Gallipoli bridgeheads under discussion, Gallieni was willing to divert troops there from Salonika for one last attempt. On 9–11 December Gallieni took part in the Anglo-French talks in Paris (along with
Grey (British
Foreign Secretary), Kitchener (British War Secretary), Joffre and Briand) at which it was decided to maintain an Allied presence in Salonika, although it was unclear for how long. He later ordered Joffre to send an extra French division, although not the two Sarrail demanded.
Resignation Gallieni made an effort to unite soldiers and politicians, and to establish a working relationship in which he concentrated on supplying resources (not dissimilar to the role to which Kitchener was restricted in the UK from the end of 1915). However, Gallieni had
prostate cancer, with pain making him less tolerant of criticism at a time when political disquiet was growing after the failure of the
Second Battle of Champagne, especially the failed attack on
Hartmannswillerkopf and its subsequent total loss. In Clayton's view, Gallieni may well have been sceptical of Joffre's plans for a
massive Anglo-French offensive on the Somme, to be accompanied by Italian and Russian offensives, as floated at the Chantilly meeting in 6–8 December 1915. There was also friction over Gallieni's assertion of his right to appoint generals, Joffre's practice of communicating directly with the British generals rather than going through the War Ministry, and Gallieni's maintaining contacts with generals whom Joffre had replaced. In autumn 1915
Lt-Colonel Driant, a member of the Chamber of Deputies and commander of a
chasseurs brigade, complained to Gallieni of how Joffre had been removing guns and garrisons from Verdun and even preparing some forts for demolition. Joffre was furious and disputed Gallieni's right to comment. Driant, who had served at Verdun, was a member of the Army Commission of the
Chamber of Deputies. The Council of Ministers discussed his reports and President Poincaré asked Gallieni to investigate. Gallieni wrote to Joffre (16 or 18 December 1915) expressing concern at the state of trenches at Verdun and elsewhere on the front—in fact matters were already being taken in hand at Verdun. The political atmosphere was poisonous after the opening of the
German attack at Verdun (21 February). Rumours circulated in Paris that Joffre had ordered the abandonment of Verdun at the end of February 1916 when the Germans first attacked. Gallieni demanded to see all paperwork from the period, but Joffre had made no such order in writing, merely despatching de Castelnau to assess the situation. Gallieni launched an angry report at the Council of Ministers on 7 March—read in his usual precise way—criticising Joffre's conduct of operations over the last eighteen months and demanding ministerial control, then resigned. Gallieni was falsely suspected of wanting to launch a military takeover of the government. Poincaré wrote that Gallieni was trying to force Joffre's resignation, although it is unclear whether he was specifically trying to do so. Briand knew that publication of the report would damage morale and might bring down the government. Gallieni was persuaded to remain in office until a replacement had been designated and approved.
Rocques was appointed as his successor after it had been ensured that Joffre had no objections. This would be the last attempt to assert ministerial control over the army until
Clemenceau became Prime Minister late in 1917. == Later life ==