, southern France, showing a cavalry battle, c. 40 BC
Recruitment As their name implies, the
equites were required to serve up to 10 years of service in the cavalry between the ages of 17 and 46. in the
Polybian legion.
Equites originally provided a legion's entire cavalry contingent, By the time of the
Second Punic War, it is likely that all members of the First Class served in the cavalry, since Livy states that members of Class I were required to equip themselves with a round shield (
clipeus), rather than the oblong shield (
scutum) required of the other classes (all images of cavalrymen of this period show round shields). Cavalrymen in service were paid a
drachma per day, triple the infantry rate, and were liable to a maximum of ten campaigning seasons' military service, compared to sixteen for the infantry.
Unit size and structure Each Polybian legion contained a cavalry contingent of 300 horse, which does not appear to have been officered by an overall commander. The cavalry contingent was divided into 10
turmae (squadrons) of 30 men each. The squadron members would elect as their officers three
decuriones ("leaders of ten men"), of whom the first to be chosen would act as the squadron's leader and the other two as his deputies. From the available evidence, the cavalry of a Polybian legion (and presumably confederate cavalry also) was armoured and specialised in the shock charge.
Equipment The majority of pictorial evidence for the equipment of Republican cavalry is from stone monuments, such as mausoleums, columns, arches and Roman military tombstones. The earliest extant representations of Roman cavalrymen are found on a few coins dated to the era of the
Second Punic War (218–201 BC). In one, the rider wears a variant of a Corinthian helmet and appears to wear greaves on the legs. His body armour is obscured by his small round shield (
parma equestris). It was probably a bronze breastplate, as a coin of 197 BC shows a Roman cavalryman in Hellenistic composite cuirass and helmet. But the Roman cavalry may already have adopted
mail armour (
lorica hamata) from the
Celts, who are known to have been using it as early as ca. 300 BC. Mail had certainly been adopted by ca. 150 BC, as Polybius states that the First Class were expected to provide themselves with mail cuirasses, and the monument erected at
Delphi by
L. Aemilius Paullus to commemorate his victory at the
Battle of Pydna (168 BC) depicts Roman cavalrymen in mail. However, a coin of 136 BC and the Lacus Curtius bas-relief of the same period show horsemen in composite bronze cuirasses. The Roman
saddle was one of the earliest solid-treed saddles in the West. It was of the "four horn" design, first used by the Romans as early as the 1st century BC. Neither design had stirrups. Similar uncertainty exists as to whether cavalrymen carried shields, despite the fact that many Roman military tombstones depict
equites with oval shields on the left side of their horses (not generally used by Greek cavalry until after ca. 250 BC) and the related question of whether they carried long lances or shorter spears, the
doru mentioned by Polybius. Most representations show cavalrymen with the
parma equestris, a flat type of shield, but the Ahenobarbus monument of 122 BC and the coin of 136 BC both show cavalrymen without shields. Sidnell suggests that since
equites were expected to provide their own equipment they may have chosen their own type and combination of armour and weapons (e.g., long lance with no shield or short spear with shield),. The Ahenobarbus monument also shows a cavalryman with a dagger (
pugio). There is no evidence that
equites carried bows and arrows and the Romans probably had no mounted archers before they came into contact with
Parthian forces after 100 BC.
Campaign record There is a conception that Roman Republican cavalry was inferior to other cavalry and that they were just to support their far superior infantry. However, Philip Sidnell argues that this view is misguided and that the cavalry was a powerful and crucial asset to the Republican army. Sidnell argues that the record shows that Roman cavalry in Republican times were a strong force in which they bested higher reputed cavalry of the time. Examples include the
Heraclea (280 BC), in where the Roman cavalry dismayed the enemy leader
Pyrrhus by gaining the advantage in a bitterly contested
melee against his
Thessalian cavalry, then regarded as some of the finest in the Western world, and were only driven back when Pyrrhus deployed his elephants, which panicked the Roman horses. Other examples include the Equites' victory over the vaunted Gallic horse at
Telamon, and
Sentinum, against the Germanic cavalry of the
Teutons and
Cimbri at
Vercellae, and even against the technologically more advanced
Seleucid cavalry (including fully armored
cataphracts) at
Magnesia. Contrary to the popular depiction that the legionary infantry were the primary battle winning force of the Roman army, these encounters were primary decided by the success of the Roman cavalry, who crushed the enemies' mounted forces before falling on the flanks of their infantry. At the
Clastidium the Roman cavalry were even able to triumph unaided against superior numbers of Gallic foot soldiers and horsemen, showing their ability when properly led. A key reason for some historians' disparagement of the Roman cavalry were the crushing defeats at the
Trebia and at
Cannae, that it suffered at the hands of the Carthaginian general
Hannibal during the latter's invasion of Italy (218-6 BC), which were only rendered possible because of a powerful cavalry force. But Sidnell argues that this is only because of a consistent numerical superiority in cavalry. Another disadvantage for the Romans in the Second Punic War was that their respective cavalry were melee cavalry better suited for combating enemy melee cavalry and engaging the rear and flanks of infantry formations. This, however useful and effective against the Romans' regular opponents, failed against Hannibal's nimble
Numidian light cavalry, whose use of skilful hit and run tactics exasperated the Roman cavalry who were unable to come to grips with them. Nevertheless, on those occasions during the Second Punic War when they were deployed properly, led competently, and/or had the advantage of numbers or surprise, such as during the skirmish before
Ilipa and at the pitched battles of the
Great Plains and
Zama, the Italo-Roman cavalry were able to best their Carthaginian counterparts, independent of the success of their own allied Numidians. On occasion, such as at
Dertosa, they were able to hold their own despite being supposedly outnumbered in a skirmish with Carthaginian cavalry. The Second Punic War placed unprecedented strains on Roman manpower, not least on the over 10,000+
drachmae First Class, which provided the cavalry. During Hannibal's march through Italy (218-6 BC), thousands of Roman cavalrymen were killed on the battlefield. The losses were especially serious for the knights properly so-called (
equo publico): Livy relates how, after Cannae, the gold rings of dead Roman knights formed a pile one
modius (ca. 9 litres) large. In the succeeding years 214-203 BC, the Romans kept at least 21 legions in the field at all times, in Italy and overseas (and 25 legions in the peak year). This would have required the knights to provide 220 senior officers (120
tribuni militum, 60
decuriones and 60
praefecti sociorum). It was probably from this time that the 18
centuriae of knights became largely an officer class, while the 6,300 Roman cavalrymen required were raised from the rest of the First Class. The cavalry of Roman armies before the Second Punic War had been exclusively Roman and confederate Italian, with each holding one wing of the battleline (the Romans usually holding the right wing). After that war, Roman/Italian cavalry was always complemented by allied native cavalry (especially
Numidian cavalry), and was usually combined on just one wing. Indeed, the allied cavalry often outnumbered the combined Roman/Italian force, e.g. at Zama, where the 4,000
Numidians held the right, with just 1,500 Romans and Italians on the left. One reason was the lessons learnt in the war, namely the need to complement heavy cavalry with plenty of light, faster horse, as well as increasing the cavalry share when engaging with enemies with more powerful mounted forces. It was also inevitable that, as the Roman Republic acquired an overseas empire and the Roman army now campaigned beyond the Italian peninsula, the best non-Italian cavalry would also be enlisted in increasing numbers, including (in addition to Numidians) Gallic, Spanish and Thracian horse. Towards the end of the Republic and the beginning of the Empire, the Roman cavalry itself was rendered less and less of a powerful force, with Rome meeting its cavalry needs with auxiliary, allied cavalry instead. Nevertheless, Roman and Italian confederate cavalry continued to form an essential part of a Roman army's line-up for over a century. They were again, less successful against elusive tribal cavalry, such as the
Lusitanians under
Viriathus in their bitter resistance to Roman rule (151-140 BC) and the Numidians themselves under king
Jugurtha during the latter's rebellion (112-105 BC), when they were obliged to rely heavily on their own Numidian allied horse and the Romans were deprived of their strongest cavalry.
End of the citizen cavalry (armed with a
labrys) by her
Phrygian cap;
Roman mosaic emblema (marble and limestone), 2nd half of the 4th century AD; from Daphne, a suburb of
Antioch-on-the-Orontes (now
Antakya in
Turkey) By the end of the 1st century BC citizen cavalry disappeared completely from the
Roman army and was replaced by foreign auxiliaries. This process may have happened gradually as a result of the grant of Roman citizenship to all of Rome's Italian confederates after the
Social War (91–87 BC), which led to the abolition of the old Italian confederate
alae and the recruitment of confederates into the legions. For the cavalry, the abolition of the
alae had the radical result of reducing the Roman cavalry to just a quarter of its previous size, since legions contained only a third as many horse as confederate
alae. Legionary cavalry was thus reduced to a fraction of a Roman army's overall cavalry complement: a consular army of two legions now contained about 20% cavalry (i.e., ca. 4,000 horse) of which, at most, only 600 were Romans. Indeed, the Roman element may now have numbered just 240, as it is possible that around this time, the legionary cavalry contingent was reduced to 120. It also appears that from this time onwards, Roman knights were no longer levied for cavalry service, which was now recruited from commoners. By the time of
Julius Caesar's
Gallic Wars (58–50 BC), it appears that legionary cavalry may have disappeared altogether, and that Caesar was entirely dependent on allied Gallic contingents for his cavalry operations. This is deduced from an incident in 58 BC when Caesar was invited to a parley with the German king
Ariovistus and needed a cavalry escort. Since he didn't yet trust the allied Gallic cavalry under his command, he instructed them to lend their horses to some members of the Tenth Legion, which thereafter acquired the nickname
equestris ("mounted legion"). (However, this incident leaves open the possibility that Roman cavalry still existed, but was not large enough to satisfy the needs of the moment). The question arises as to why the Romans allowed their citizen cavalry to lapse in this way, given its record as a highly effective and useful force. The main reason is probably the limited pool of available
equites and First Class members. The
equites had long since become exclusively an officer class (a role they retained throughout the Principate), as the empire had become simply too large and complex for aristocrats to serve as ordinary troopers. At the same time, many of the First Class of commoners had developed major business interests and had little time for military service. Although commoners of the lower classes could, of course, have been recruited and trained as cavalrymen in larger numbers, that must have seemed costly and unnecessary when subject countries such as Gaul, Spain, Thrace and Numidia contained large numbers of excellent native cavalry which could be employed at much lower pay than citizens.
Allied cavalry The Romans always relied on their allies, known as the
foederati, to provide cavalry. A typical consular army of the Second Punic War would have much more Italian confederate cavalry. As confederates gained citizenship by the time of
Social War and the Legionary cavalry became less, most cavalry were provided by allied nations from Numidia, Greece, Thrace, Iberia, Gaul and Germania. Such as at the
Battle of Zama where the majority of cavalry were Numidians. Most of the cavalry in Caesar's campaigns were Gauls and Germans. These units were not part of the regular Roman army and were bound by treaties. These often were armed with their own native equipment and were led by native chiefs. == Imperial cavalry (30 BC – 476 AD) ==