The
United Nations Charter is the foundation of modern international law. The US and its principal coalition allies in the 2003 invasion of Iraq have all ratified the charter and are thus legally bound by its terms. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter generally bans the
use of force by states except when carefully circumscribed conditions are met, stating: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. According to
Louise Doswald-Beck,
Secretary-General International Commission of Jurists, this rule was "enshrined in the United Nations Charter in 1945 for a good reason: to prevent states from using force as they felt so inclined". Therefore, in the absence of an armed attack against the US or the coalition members, any legal use or threat of force against Iraq had to be supported by a UN Security Council resolution. Some international legal experts, including the
International Commission of Jurists, the U.S.-based
National Lawyers' Guild, a group of 31 Canadian law professors, and the U.S.-based
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, have found this legal rationale to be untenable and are of the view that the invasion was not supported by UN resolution and was therefore illegal.
UN resolutions (TLAM) is fired from an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer during the fourth wave of attacks on Iraq in support of Operation Desert Fox. As part of the
1991 Gulf War ceasefire agreement, the Iraqi government agreed to
Security Council Resolution 687, which called for weapons inspectors to search locations in Iraq for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as weapons that exceed an effective distance of 150 kilometres. After the passing of resolution 687, thirteen additional resolutions (
699,
707,
715,
949,
1051,
1060,
1115,
1134,
1137,
1154,
1194,
1205, 1284) were passed by the Security Council reaffirming the continuation of inspections, or citing Iraq's failure to comply fully with them. On 9 September 1998, the Security Council passed resolution 1194 which unanimously condemns Iraq's suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM, one month later on 31 October Iraq officially declares it will cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM. The period between 31 October 1998, and the initiation of
Operation Desert Fox (16 December 1998), contained talks by the Iraqi government with the United Nations Security Council. During these talks Iraq attempted to attach conditions to the work of UNSCOM and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, which was against previous resolutions calling for unconditional access. The situation was defused after Iraq's Ambassador to the U.N.,
Nizar Hamdoon, submitted a third letter stating the position of the Iraqi government on 31 October was "void". After weapons inspections resumed, UNSCOM requested arms documents related to weapon usage and destruction during the
Iran–Iraq War. The Iraqi government rejected this request because it was handwritten and did not fall within the scope of the UN mandate. The UN inspectors insisted in order to know if Iraq destroyed all of its weapons, it had to know "the total holdings of Iraq's chemical weapons". Further incidents erupted as Iraqi officials demanded "lists of things and materials" being searched for during surprise inspections. On 16 December 1998, U.S. President
Bill Clinton initiated
Operation Desert Fox based on Iraq's failure to fully comply with the inspectors. Clinton noted the announcement made by the Iraqi government on 31 October, stating they would no longer cooperate with
UNSCOM. Also noted was the numerous efforts to hinder UNSCOM officials, including prevention of photographing evidence and photocopying documents, as well as prevention of interviewing Iraqi personnel. Inspection teams were withdrawn before the Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign and did not return for four years. The United Nations no-fly zone enforced by the United States,
United Kingdom and
France—also legality disputed—became a location of constant exchange of fire since Iraqi Vice President
Taha Yassin Ramadan instructed Iraqi military to attack all planes in the no-fly zone. A memo written by US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld dated 27 Nov 2001 considers a US invasion of Iraq. One section of the memo questions "How start?", listing multiple possible justifications for a US-Iraq War, one scenario being "Dispute over WMD inspections—Start thinking now about inspection demands". There is no credible evidence of WMD production (see
Duelfer Report) and no WMDs have been found to date after 1991 (see below and
WMD in Iraq).
George W. Bush has since admitted that "much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong". The United States offered intelligence from the
Central Intelligence Agency and British
MI5 to the
United Nations Security Council suggesting that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. claimed that justification rested upon Iraq's violation of several U.N. Resolutions, most recently
UN Security Council Resolution 1441. U.S. president
George W. Bush claimed Iraq's WMDs posed a significant threat to the United States and its allies. An inspection team
UNMOVIC, before completing its UN-mandate or completing its report was ordered out by the UN because the US-led invasion appeared imminent. The then
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in September 2004 that, "From our point of view and the
UN Charter point of view, it [the war] was illegal." The political leaders of the US and UK at the time argued that the war was legal, and that existing
UN Security Council resolutions related to the first
Persian Gulf War and the subsequent ceasefire (
660,
678), and to later inspections of Iraqi weapons programs (
1441), had already authorized the invasion.
Critics of the invasion have challenged both of these assertions, arguing that an additional Security Council resolution would have been necessary to specifically authorize the invasion.
Resolution 1441 UNSC Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously on 8 November 2002, to give Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations" that had been set out in several previous resolutions (
resolution 660,
resolution 661,
resolution 678,
resolution 686,
resolution 687,
resolution 688,
resolution 707,
resolution 715,
resolution 986, and
resolution 1284). According to the US State Department, "The resolution strengthened the mandate of the
UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), giving them authority to go anywhere, at any time and talk to anyone in order to verify Iraq's disarmament." The most important text of Resolution 1441 was to require that Iraq "shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect". However, on 27 January 2003,
Hans Blix, the lead member of the UNMOVIC, said that, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it." Blix noted that Iraq had failed to cooperate in a number of areas, including (1) the failure to provide safety to
U-2 spy planes that inspectors hoped to use for
aerial surveillance, (2) refusal to let UN inspectors into several chemical, biological, and missile sites on the belief that they were engaging in
espionage rather than disarmament, (3) submitting a 12,000-page arms declaration in December 2002, which contained little more than old material previously submitted to inspectors, and (4) failure to produce convincing evidence to the UN inspectors that it had unilaterally destroyed its anthrax stockpiles as required by resolution 687 a decade before 1441 was passed in 2002. On 7 March 2003, Blix said that Iraq had made significant progress toward resolving open issues of disarmament but the cooperation was still not "immediate" and "unconditional" as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1441. He concluded that it would take "but months" to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks. The US government observed this as a breach of resolution 1441 because Iraq did not meet the requirement of "immediate" and "unconditional" compliance. On the day Resolution 1441 was passed, the US ambassador to the UN,
John Negroponte, assured the Security Council that there were no "hidden triggers" with respect to the use of force and that, in the event of a "further breach" by Iraq, resolution 1441 would require that "the matter will return to the Council for discussions as required in paragraph 12". However, he then added, "If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security." At the same meeting, UK Permanent Representative Sir
Jeremy Greenstock KCMG used many of the same words and stated, "If there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as required in Operational Paragraph 12." On 17 March 2003, the
Attorney General for England and Wales,
Lord Goldsmith, agreed that the use of force against Iraq was justified by resolution 1441 in combination with the earlier resolutions 678 and 687. According to an independent commission of inquiry set up by the government of the Netherlands, UN resolution 1441 "cannot reasonably be interpreted as authorizing individual member states to use military force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council's resolutions".
Resolutions related to First Persian Gulf War and also the 2003 invasion As part of the
1991 Gulf War ceasefire agreement, the Iraqi government agreed to
UN Security Council Resolution 687, which called for weapons inspectors to search locations in Iraq for
chemical,
biological, and
nuclear weapons, as well as for weapons that exceeded an effective distance of 150 kilometers. After the passing of resolution 687, thirteen additional resolutions (
699,
707,
715,
949,
1051,
1060,
1115,
1134,
1137,
1154,
1194,
1205,
1284) were passed by the Security Council, reaffirming the continuation of inspections or citing Iraq's failure to comply fully with them. On 9 September 1998, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1194, which unanimously condemned Iraq's suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM. One month later, on 31 October, Iraq officially declared that it would cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM. Resolution 678 (1990) allows the use of any means necessary to enforce resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions in order to force Iraq to stop certain activities that threaten international peace and security, such as making weapons of mass destruction and refusing or obstructing United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 68. The commission of inquiry by the government of the Netherlands found that the UN resolution of the 1990s provided no authority for the invasion. and not with individual nations. On 8 November 2002, immediately after the adoption of
Security Council resolution 1441, Russia, the People's Republic of China, and France issued a joint statement declaring that Council Resolution 1441 did not authorize any "automaticity" in the use of force against Iraq and that a further Council resolution was needed if force were to be used. Critics pointed out that statements from US officials leading up to the war indicated their belief that a new Security Council resolution was required to make an invasion legal. They also pointed out that the UN Security Council had not made such a determination despite serious debate over this issue. To secure Syria's vote in favor of Council Resolution 1441, Secretary of State Powell reportedly advised Syrian officials that "there is nothing in the resolution to allow it to be used as a pretext to launch a war on Iraq". The UN Security Council, as outlined in Article 39 of the UN Charter, theoretically has the ability to rule on the legality of the war, but the US and the UK have
veto power in the Security Council, so action is highly improbable even if the issue were to be raised. Despite this, the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) may ask that the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)—"the principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (Article 92)—give either an 'advisory opinion' or 'judgement' on the legality of the war. Indeed, the UNGA asked the ICJ to give an 'advisory opinion' on "the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel", by its resolution A/RES/ES-10/14, as recently as 12 December 2003; despite opposition from permanent members of the Security Council. It achieved this by sitting in tenth 'emergency special session', under the framework of the
'Uniting for Peace' resolution. The ICJ had previously found against the US for its actions in
Nicaragua, a finding the US refused to comply with. The United States structured its reports to the United Nations Security Council around intelligence from the
Central Intelligence Agency and
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) stating that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction. The US claimed that justification for the war rested upon Iraq's violation of several UN resolutions, with the most recent being UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
Commission of Inquiry of the Dutch Government According to a detailed legal investigation conducted by an independent commission of inquiry set up by the government of the Netherlands, the 2003 invasion violated international law. The investigation was headed by former
Netherlands Supreme Court president Willibrord Davids and concluded that the notion of "
regime change", as practiced by the powers that invaded Iraq, had "no basis in international law". Also, the commission found that UN resolution 1441 "cannot reasonably be interpreted as authorizing individual member states to use military force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council's resolutions". In a letter to the parliament, the Dutch cabinet admitted that MPs could have been better informed about the doubts and uncertainties of the Dutch intelligence services and about the United States' request for Dutch support. The Davids inquiry also investigated rumors but was unable to find any proof that the appointment of former Dutch foreign minister
De Hoop Scheffer as NATO secretary general was the result of his support for the US-led invasion of Iraq. In February 2010, De Hoop Scheffer himself criticized the Davids Commission report. In an interview with newspaper
de Volkskrant, he argued that the cabinet did fully inform parliament and that there had never been any doubts. He rejected the conclusion that it took less than 45 minutes to decide to give political support to the United States. He also contested the conclusion that Prime Minister Balkenende failed to provide adequate leadership. In addition, he argued that no United Nations mandate was needed for the invasion of Iraq and remarked that there was no UN mandate when the Netherlands supported the 1991 US operations in Iraq.
Doubts in the British government Jack Straw, then UK
Foreign Secretary, sent a secret letter to
Prime Minister Tony Blair in April 2002, warning Blair that the case for military action against Iraq was of "dubious legality". The letter goes on to state that "regime change per se is no justification for military action" and that "the weight of legal advice here is that a fresh [UN] mandate may well be required". Such a new UN mandate was never given. The letter also expresses doubts regarding the outcome of military action. In March 2003,
Elizabeth Wilmshurst, then deputy legal adviser to the British Foreign Office, resigned in protest of Britain's decision to invade without Security Council authorization. Wilmshurst also insinuated that the English Attorney General
Lord Goldsmith also believed the war was illegal but that he changed his opinion several weeks before the invasion. In March 2004, when a
Royal Court trial raised the question of whether the invasion was legal, the under-secretary of state, Sir Michael Hastings, wrote to the court and warned, "it would be prejudicial to the national interest and to the conduct of the Government's foreign policy if the English courts were to express opinions on questions of international law." In 2010, then-
deputy prime minister of a later government
Nick Clegg, during
prime minister's questions in Parliament, asserted that the Iraq war was illegal. Statements issued later suggested that this was a personal view and not a formal view of the coalition government. In 2016, the deputy prime minister at the time of the invasion,
John Prescott, wrote: "In 2004, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that as regime change was the prime aim of the Iraq War, it was illegal. With great sadness and anger, I now believe him to be right." In 2017, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time of the invasion, Gordon Brown, in his memoir "My Life - Our Times" said that US president George W Bush duped Tony Blair into the 2003 Iraq War. Brown sensationally revealed that the US kept quiet about a top-secret report which showed there was no evidence Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Brown added, "It is astonishing that none of us in the British government ever saw this American report." The
Iraq Inquiry in the UK later found that the legal basis for the law was questionable.
War of aggression The
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held following
World War II determined that waging a
war of aggression is a
war crime:
Benjamin B. Ferencz was a former law professor and one of the chief prosecutors for the United States at the
military trials of German officials following World War II. In an interview given on 25 August 2006, Ferencz stated that in addition to
Saddam Hussein,
George W. Bush should be tried as well because the
Iraq War was started by the U.S. without permission by the
UN Security Council. Benjamin B. Ferencz wrote the foreword for Michael Haas's book, ''George W. Bush, War Criminal?: The Bush Administration's Liability for 269 War Crimes''. Ferencz elaborated as follows: Professor Ferencz quoted the resignation letter of British deputy legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, who resigned suddenly before the Iraq war started: According to the
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in Geneva, the invasion of Iraq was neither in self-defense against armed attack nor sanctioned by a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force and thus constituted the crime of war of aggression. A "war waged without a clear mandate from the United Nations Security Council would constitute a flagrant violation of the prohibition of the use of force". We note with "deep dismay that a small number of states are poised to launch an outright illegal invasion of Iraq, which amounts to a war of aggression". Then Iraq Ambassador to the United Nations
Mohammed Aldouri shared the view that the invasion was a violation of international law and constituted a war of aggression, as did a number of American legal experts, including
Marjorie Cohn, Professor at
Thomas Jefferson School of Law and president of the
National Lawyers Guild, and former
Attorney-General of the United States Ramsey Clark. ==Domestic law==