Japanese expansionism and the Chinese Civil War The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese
Nationalists had been engaged in a
civil war since 1927. Although the
Empire of Japan's expansionism in China posed a clear threat to both sides, at first it did not lead to a cessation of hostilities. Nationalist leader
Chiang Kai-shek believed that "The Japanese are a disease of the skin. The Communists are a disease of the heart." He responded to the 1931
Japanese invasion of Manchuria by ordering General
Zhang Xueliang not to resist. He felt unprepared to confront Japan with China's limited military capacity and the ongoing civil war. When the invasion ended in an unstable peace, Chiang decided to prioritize winning the civil war before he confronted Japan. He called this policy "first internal pacification, then external resistance." The CCP in turn reacted to Chiang's policy of nonresistance with disdain, viewing him as a pawn of the Japanese. They saw fighting the Nationalist government as an essential part of resistance to Japan and called for "Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang". Nonetheless, prosecuting the civil war while resisting Japan became increasingly impractical as time went on. Already by late 1932, Communist guerilla groups in Manchuria had begun to cooperate with Nationalist guerillas against the Japanese occupiers. The CCP also began to come under pressure from the
Soviet Union to negotiate an end to the civil war. The USSR was concerned with events in Europe—especially
Hitler's rise to power—and wanted Communist parties to form
united fronts with moderates to resist fascist aggression. This policy was formally adopted by the
7th World Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1935. The CCP delegation at the Congress, headed by
Wang Ming, published the "
August 1 Declaration" describing how a united front could be created in China. They recommended a
government of national defense including all parties in China that wanted to resist Japanese imperialism. Importantly, because they still considered Chiang to be a "running dog" of the Japanese, they did not extend this offer to the
Nationalist government. The CCP itself was in the middle of the
Long March during the Comintern Congress and was cut off from radio communication with Moscow. Its leaders learned of the Congress's decisions in November 1935. The following month, they held a conference at
Wayaobu to discuss the implications of this new Comintern policy. The
Wayaobu Manifesto that they published was a significant retreat from the hardline positions they had held during the early civil war. It called for "the most broad national united front" to resist Japan, and announced that the CCP was willing to suspend class conflict in the interests of cross-class collaboration. However, they did not intend for the
Chinese Red Army to surrender or submit to the Nationalists. On the contrary, their plan to resist the Japanese centered on expanding the Red Army to 1 million men and dramatically increasing the land area covered by the
Chinese Soviet Republic. In late 1935 relations between Nanjing and Tokyo took a sharp downturn as Japan stepped up its expansionist policies in
north China. Chiang Kai-shek feared that a full-scale invasion of China was imminent, and wanted to secure the material and diplomatic support of the Soviet Union. He also faced growing public pressure to actively resist Japan; on 9 December 1935, for example,
a major student protest broke out in Beiping. In January, Chiang Kai-shek sent emissaries to Moscow to negotiate a military mutual assistance treaty. However, as a precondition for a treaty, Chiang wanted the Soviet Union to order the CCP to submit to the Nationalist Government. The Soviet ambassador told Chiang that while the USSR hoped the CCP would agree to a unified command under the Nationalists, Chiang would have to negotiate directly with the CCP. This upset Chiang, who worried that if the USSR was unwilling to order the CCP to stop, they might be willing to support further revolutionary actions by the CCP if a ceasefire broke down. Progress halted, and after news leaked to the press that Chiang was contemplating a treaty with the USSR, he called off negotiations.
Formation of a northwestern alliance In October 1935 the Chinese Communist Party arrived in
northern Shaanxi at the end of the
Long March. The party had lost over 90% of its numbers and was in desperate need of supplies. But their new base area was economically backwards, agriculturally unproductive, and cut off from the outside world. It was bordered to the north by the
Ordos Desert, to the east by Shanxi (governed by the warlord
Yan Xishan), and to the south and west by the "Northwest Bandit Suppression Headquarters". The Northwest Bandit Suppression Headquarters was a command created by the Nationalist government to wipe out the remnants of the CCP. Based in
Xi'an, it consisted of the 130,000-strong
Northeastern Army, led by
Zhang Xueliang, and the 40,000-strong Northwestern Army, led by
Yang Hucheng. Both Yang and Zhang were former warlords who had pledged their armies to the Nationalist Government. As such, they retained a degree of independence from the central government that the CCP would seek to exploit. Zhang and Yang had been promised an easy victory against the Communists. They were therefore surprised and dismayed when the Chinese Red Army defeated them in several major engagements. The Red Army treated their
prisoners of war well and gave them a political education, sending them back to tell their comrades that the Communists wanted to form an anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese alliance. This proposal struck a chord with both the soldiers and their commanders. Zhang Xueliang had governed Manchuria before it was overrun by the Japanese, and he and his army strongly wished to retake their homeland. He resented the policy of nonresistance ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, and was frustrated to be fighting the Communists instead of the Japanese. Yang had likewise become skeptical of Chiang's anti-Japanese commitment after he suppressed the
anti-Japanese demonstrations in December 1935 and found the offer of a united front persuasive. With his officer
Nan Hanchen acting as intermediary, Yang quickly concluded a secret ceasefire with the CCP. Negotiations with Zhang took longer to begin. But after
Dong Jianwu (see the next section) requested passage to CCP territory on his mission from the central government, Zhang realized that the central government was negotiating with the CCP and was encouraged to do so himself. By 25 February 1936 the Communists had agreed to a temporary ceasefire. On 9 April, Zhou Enlai arrived at Zhang Xueliang's headquarters in Xi'an to solidify their agreement. Zhou, an experienced negotiator, not only formalized the covert ceasefire, but also secured supplies for the Red Army. In May, the CCP formalized a non-aggression pact with the Northwestern Army as well. Zhou and Zhang began a series of secret meetings to discuss what a united front could look like. Zhang Xueliang argued that resisting Japan would only be possible if the CCP was willing to let Chiang lead the united front. Zhou offered to discuss the point with CCP leadership, but refused to commit to changing the policy. Meanwhile, Zhang tolerated growing Communist influence within the Northeastern Army. Communist cadres spread ideas among the soldiers and recruited officers into secret societies. In June they set up an officer training camp that preached the virtues of a united front. His army's receptiveness to the Communists helped persuade Zhang to conclude a formal alliance on 22 September. Yan Xishan also concluded secret agreements with the CCP. Illegally imported Japanese products were undermining the Shanxi economy and the Japanese puppet
Mongol Military Government was encroaching on Yan's rule over
Suiyuan. Out of fear of the Japanese, Yan was attracted by the CCP's proposition for a united front and agreed to a truce in June 1936. In September, he created the "League for Sacrifice and Salvation" to agitate the Shanxi public against the Japanese. CCP leaders
Bo Yibo and
Feng Xuefeng went to Shanxi and began working closely with Yan. The partners in this covert northwestern alliance were united by their desire to resist Japan, but they differed over the details of how this could best be accomplished. The Communists proposed a plan to unite under Zhang's command and use Soviet support to take over
Shaanxi,
Gansu,
Ningxia,
Qinghai, and
Xinjiang, turning northwest China into a base to resist Japan and oppose Chiang. Zhang, Yang, and Yan were still committed to convincing Chiang to lead the anti-Japanese resistance. But none of them informed Chiang of their secret alliance and they even staged fake military battles to deceive the Nanjing government.
Sluggish negotiations Despite breaking off negotiations with the USSR in late 1935, Chiang did secretly reach out to the CCP. Two prominent figures in the Nationalist government,
Soong Ching-ling and
Chen Lifu, managed to recruit two members of the Communist underground,
Dong Jianwu and , to cross the front line and tell the CCP that Chiang was interested in negotiations. They arrived on 27 February, 1936. Despite their skepticism towards Chiang, the CCP
Central Committee sent a list of five conditions to the Nationalists in March. They sought a ceasefire, a government of national defense (i.e., one where the Communists, the Nationalists, and the warlord factions were equal partners), a military alliance against Japan (but with continued Red Army independence), the right to move their base of operations to
Hebei, and political and economic reforms. The Nationalists responded in June with a proposal for a different vision of a united front. They wanted to see the Red Army fully integrated into the
National Revolutionary Army (NRA), for it to move to
Suiyuan and
Chahar rather than Hebei, and for the CCP to recognize the legitimacy of the Nationalist government. However, they did offer CCP leaders the chance to come to Nanjing to participate in the central government. The CCP disliked this proposal, but because they had failed to break out of Northern Shaanxi, they continued to negotiate. The Communist attitude towards the negotiations underwent a major shift after they re-established radio communications with Moscow in late June. The CCP transmitted the
Wayaobu Manifesto and informed the Comintern of their alliance with Zhang. They asked for assistance in carrying out their plan to form an anti-Japan, anti-Chiang base in the northwest. However, by this time Moscow had learned the full details of the devastating Long March. The Comintern responded with a telegram on 15 August that harshly criticized the CCP's proposal as unrealistic and ordered them to seek a united front under Chiang's leadership. The Comintern did give its approval to the other provisions of the Wayaobu Manifesto, agreeing that neither the power of the Chinese soviets nor the independence of the Chinese Red Army should be sacrificed. But they absolutely vetoed the CCP's plan to form a base in the northwest, arguing that such a move would scuttle the chance for a united front with the Nationalists. After recovering from their shock at what appeared to them to be a sudden change in policy, CCP accepted the new directive from the Comintern. They adopted the new slogan "compelling Chiang to resist Japan", and CCP secret agent
Pan Hannian was sent to Nanjing to begin negotiating a truce with one of Chiang's close advisors,
Chen Lifu. By the time Pan and Chen met, however, Chiang Kai-shek had regained confidence in his ability to end the civil war by military means. In September he had successfully resolved the . In mid-to-late October, the Nationalist-allied
Hui cavalry had intercepted a Communist resupply mission and cut the Second and Fourth Corps of the Red Army to pieces. Thus, the terms that Chen Lifu presented to Pan Hannian in early November were extremely harsh. They called for, among other things, reducing the Red Army to 3,000 men and sending all of its senior officers into exile. Pan balked, calling them "conditions for surrender". Chiang had always considered a military victory to be preferable to a negotiated settlement, and he pressed ahead with preparations for a sixth encirclement campaign. But he faced pressure from his generals to consider leading a united front. During Chiang's birthday celebrations on 31 October, Zhang Xueliang attempted to convince Chiang to give up the bandit suppression campaign and focus on Japan instead. Zhang was supported by
Yan Xishan and
Feng Yuxiang, but Chiang angrily refused. He gave a speech the following day where he proclaimed that "the Communists are our greatest traitors". When Zhang returned to Xi'an and recounted the incident to Yang Hucheng, the latter suggested reviving the ancient idea of a
bingjian (). In an episode in Chinese history, a military officer had arrested the Emperor to force him to change a bad policy. The officer had been rewarded for his conduct rather than punished. Zhang, who historian Alexander Pantsov calls a "gallant cavalier", was intrigued by the nobility of the idea. In late November, Chiang ordered the Northeastern Army and forces from the central Nationalist Army,
Hu Zongnan's Right Route Army, to attack towards the Communist capital at
Bao'an. At the resulting Battle of Shanchengbao, the Northeastern Army withheld most of its forces from the attack. This allowed the Red Army to ambush and nearly wipe out Hu's 78th regiment. After the battle, Chen Lifu presented Pan Hannian with more moderate conditions for a deal. But by then the CCP had lost faith in the negotiations and on 10 December recalled Pan from Nanjing. The relationship between Zhang and Chiang only continued to deteriorate after the defeat at Shanchengbao. On 23 November, Chiang ordered the arrest of seven leaders of the
National Salvation Association, and organization of leading intellectuals who wanted China to confront Japan. The move was broadly unpopular in China, and Zhang flew to Luoyang on 3 December and tried to convince Chiang to reverse his decision. He also repeated his pitch for Chiang to lead a united anti-Japanese front. Chiang responded with outrage: "You are the only one in the whole country who sees things as you do. I am the revolutionary government; what I do is revolution!" When news arrived that day that Japanese marines had landed at
Qingdao under the pretext of suppressing anti-Japanese agitation there, Chiang decided to redouble his efforts to defeat the Communists—disgusting Zhang. ==Chiang's arrest==