Phoney War During the
Phoney War, Spears favoured a
hawkish policy; lamenting that Britain and France were not doing 'anything more warlike than dropping leaflets'. He urged active support for the Poles and wanted Germany to be bombed; he was set to speak in the House criticizing the failure to aid Poland as a violation of the
Anglo-Polish Agreement but was dissuaded by Secretary of State for Air
Kingsley Wood – much to his later regret. As Chairman of the Anglo-French Committee of the House of Commons, he fostered links with his friends across the Channel, and in October 1939 led a delegation of MPs on a visit to the
Chamber of Deputies of France when they were taken to the
Maginot Line. Four months later, Spears was sent to France to check on
Operation Royal Marine for Winston Churchill, returning with him in April. Thousands of mines were to be released into the
Rhine by the Royal Navy to destroy bridges and disrupt river traffic. The operation was vetoed by the French for fear of reprisals, but a postponement was finally agreed.
Battle of France On 10 May 1940, the
Wehrmacht began the
Battle of France by invading
Belgium, the
Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. The same day, King
George VI appointed Churchill
prime minister following the resignation of
Chamberlain. The
Churchill war ministry was a
unity coalition government. Also on 10 May 1940,
Operation Royal Marine was launched, producing the results that Spears had prophesied. By then the German
blitzkrieg was underway and the success, as Churchill noted, was lost in the 'deluge of disaster' that was the
fall of France.
Churchill's Personal Representative to the French Prime Minister Spears leaves for Paris On 22 May 1940 (four days before the
Battle of Dunkirk beegan), Spears was summoned to
10 Downing Street. With British and French forces retreating before the German
Blitzkrieg, and confused and contradictory reports arriving from across the Channel, Churchill had decided to send Spears as his personal representative to
Paul Reynaud, the
Prime Minister of France, who was also acting as
Minister of Defence since 18 May 1940. Three days later, having managed to find the various pieces of his uniform which he had not worn since leaving the army in 1919, he left by plane for Paris holding the rank of major general.
Doubts about Pétain During the chaos and confusion of the allied retreat, Spears continued to meet senior French political and military figures. He put forward the view that tanks could be halted by blowing up buildings; he also urged that
prefects should not leave their
departments without first ensuring that all petrol had been destroyed. On 26 May, he met Marshal
Philippe Pétain; the old man reminisced about their time together during the First World War and 'treated him like a son'. Yet it seemed that the Marshal 'in his great age, epitomised the paralysis of the French people'. He became aware of the difficulties of re-creating a liaison organisation; in 1917 his mission had been established over several years. Starting again from scratch, the task seemed 'as impossible as to recall the dead'.
Weygand's pessimism and Belgian capitulation During a visit to London on Sunday 26 May, the French Prime Minister
Paul Reynaud had reported to Churchill the view of the new Commander-in-Chief General
Maxime Weygand that the struggle had become hopeless. On 27 May, Churchill demanded an immediate report from Spears, who was told to resist such defeatism. Reynaud referred to 'mortal danger' with reference to a possible attack by
Fascist Italy, which had not yet entered the war; Spears' view was that the French army in the Alps was strong and that the only danger from the Italians would be if they interfered with the transport of troops from
French North Africa. Yet perversely, Italian intervention might be good for allied morale: 'our combined fleets would whip them around the
Mediterranean'. Reynaud and Spears argued, the former calling for more British air support, the latter, exasperated, asking, "Why don't you import Finns and Spaniards to show the people how to resist an invader?" He went on to compare unfavourably the spirit of Paris in 1940 with that which he had known in 1914. That evening, Spears and the British Ambassador were summoned to the Ministry of War – news of the sudden
Belgian surrender had infuriated Reynaud, Pétain and Weygand; Spears was briefly encouraged, but then irritated by Weygand's criticism of
Lord Gort, the commander of the
British Expeditionary Force. At the end of the day, Spears noted that he 'sensed a break in
the relationship between the two nations; they were 'no longer one'.
Invasion of Britain could be repulsed On 28 May, Reynaud asked the British Ambassador, Sir
Ronald Hugh Campbell and Spears for their view regarding a direct appeal for help to the United States. Sir Ronald declined to comment, but Spears said it had no chance of success; America would not
declare war overnight and, in any case, it was not within the
President's power. The prospect of an attempted
German invasion across the Channel was of some comfort to Reynaud for it would give the French breathing space. Far from feeling intimidated, Spears welcomed the prospect: 'it did not even occur to me that we could not deal successfully with an attempted invasion. It would be wonderful indeed if the Nazi forces ventured on our own element, the sea'. During a discussion with
Georges Mandel (Interior Minister, and one of the few hawks in the French Cabinet), he was told that
Albert Lebrun, the
President of the Republic was weeping with despair. Mandel reported the criticism of Weygand and General
Joseph Vuillemin (Commander of the French
Armée de l'Air) over insufficient British air support; Vuillemin doubted that his own air force could withstand the losses it was sustaining.
Discussions about Dunkirk, Narvik and Italy at Supreme War Council in Paris On 31 May 1940, Churchill flew to Paris with Clement Attlee and Generals
John Dill (
Chief of the Imperial General Staff) and
"Pug" Ismay for a meeting of the
Anglo French Supreme War Council to discuss the deteriorating military situation with a French delegation consisting of Reynaud, Pétain and Weygand. Three main points were considered:
Narvik, the
Dunkirk evacuation and the prospect of an
Italian invasion of France. Spears did not take part in the discussions but was present 'taking voluminous notes'. It was agreed that British and French forces at Narvik be evacuated without delay – France urgently needed the manpower. Spears was impressed with the way that Churchill dominated the meeting. Dunkirk was the main topic, the French pointing out that 'out of 200,000 British 150,000 had been evacuated, whereas out of 200,000 Frenchmen only 15,000 had been taken off'. Churchill promised that now British and French soldiers would leave together 'bras dessus, bras dessous' – arm in arm. Italian entry into the war seemed imminent, with Churchill urging the bombing of the
industrial north by British aircraft based in
southern France while at the same time trying to gauge whether the French feared retaliation. Spears guessed that he was trying to assess the French will to fight. With the agenda completed, Churchill spoke passionately about the need for the two countries to fight on, or 'they would be reduced to the status of slaves for ever'. Spears was moved 'by the emotion that surged from Winston Churchill in great torrents'. During discussions after the meeting, a group formed around Churchill, Pétain and Spears. One of the French officials mentioned the possibility of France seeking a separate peace. Speaking to Pétain, Spears pointed out that such an event would provoke a blockade of France by Britain and the bombardment of all French ports in German hands. Churchill declared that Britain would fight on whatever happened.
Returns to London with message for Churchill transport aircraft. Churchill's personal Flamingo, in which he flew to and from France during the crisis of May and June 1940, was operated by
No. XXIV Squadron RAF.On 7 June, with the Wehrmacht
advancing on Paris, Spears flew to London in Churchill's personal aircraft bearing a personal message from Reynaud to the British Prime Minister. The French were requesting British divisions, and fighter squadrons to be based in France. In reply, Spears had inquired how many French troops were being transferred from North Africa. In London, he was asked whether the French would, as Clémenceau had said, "Fight outside Paris, inside Paris, behind Paris." His view was that they would not permit the destruction of that beautiful city, but this was contradicted on 11 June by a French government spokesman who told the
Daily Telegraph that Paris would never be declared an
open city. (The following day General Weygand issued orders declaring that Paris was not to be defended.)
Accompanies Churchill to conference at Briare On 11 June, Spears returned to France with Churchill, Eden, Generals Dill and Ismay and other staff officers. A meeting of the
Anglo French Supreme War Council had been arranged with Reynaud, who had been forced to leave Paris, at
Briare near Orleans, which was now the HQ of General Weygand. Also present was General
Charles de Gaulle; Spears had not met him before and was impressed with his bearing. As wrangling continued over the level of support from Britain, Spears suddenly became aware that 'the battle of France was over and that no one believed in miracles'. The next day Weygand's catastrophic account of the military situation reinforced his pessimism. Despite assurances from Admiral
François Darlan, the British were worried that the powerful French fleet might fall into German hands. With the conference drawing to a close, it dawned on Spears that the two countries were 'within sight of a cross-roads at which the destinies of the two nations might divide'.
Spears argues with Pétain – departure for Tours He remained at Briare after Churchill had left for London on 12 June; later that day he argued with Marshal Pétain, who maintained that an armistice with Germany was now inevitable, complaining that the British had left France to fight alone. Spears referred to Churchill's words of defiance at the meeting, feeling that some of the French might remain in the struggle if they could be made to believe that Britain would fight on. The Marshal replied, "You cannot beat Hitler with words." He began to feel estrangement from Pétain, whose attitude, for the first time in their relationship, savoured of hostility. His concern was now to link up with the Ambassador,
Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, and he set out by car for
Tours. On the way they drove through crowds of refugees, many of whom had become stranded when their cars ran out of fuel. At the Chateau de Chissey high above the
River Cher, he found Reynaud and his ministers struggling to govern France, but with insufficient telephone lines and in makeshift accommodation. Again he met de Gaulle, 'whose courage was keen and clear, born of love of, and inspired by, his country'. Later in the day, he heard to his astonishment that Reynaud had left for Tours because Churchill was flying over for another meeting. In the confusion, neither Spears nor Sir Ronald had been informed. Fearful that he might not arrive in time, he set off at once along roads choked with refugees.
Last-ditch talks at Tours What would prove to be the final meeting of the
Anglo French Supreme War Council took place at the
Préfecture in Tours on 13 June. When Spears arrived, the British delegation – Churchill,
Lord Halifax,
Lord Beaverbrook, Sir
Alexander Cadogan and General 'Pug' Ismay – were already there. The French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, was accompanied by
Paul Baudoin, a member of the War Committee. Spears found the atmosphere quite different from that at Briare, where Churchill had expressed good will, sympathy and sorrow; now it was like a business meeting, with the British keenly appraising the situation from its own point of view. Reynaud declared that unless immediate help was assured by the US, the French government would have to give up the struggle. He acknowledged that the two countries had agreed never to conclude a separate peace – but France was physically incapable of carrying on. The news was received by the British with shock and horror; Spears' feelings were expressed by the exclamation marks which he scrawled in his notes. Spears noted Churchill's determination as he said, "We must fight, we will fight, and that is why we must ask our friends to fight on." Prime Minister Reynaud acknowledged that Britain would continue the war, affirming that France would also continue the struggle from North Africa, if necessary – but only if there were a chance of success. That success could come only if America were prepared to join the fray. The French leader called for British understanding, asking again for France to be released from her obligation not to conclude a separate peace now that she could do no more. Spears passed a note to Churchill proposing an adjournment – a suggestion that was taken up. The British walked around the sodden garden of the prefecture, Spears reporting that Reynaud's mood had changed since that morning, when he had spoken of his resistance to the 'armisticers'. He told Churchill that he was certain that de Gaulle was staunch, but that General Weygand looked upon anyone who wished to fight as an enemy. Beaverbrook urged Churchill to repeat what he had already said – namely that U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt be telegraphed and American help sought. When the proceedings were resumed, it was agreed that both countries would send identical telegrams. It was on this note that the conference ended. . There was some dispute after the war as to whether the aircraft had been at the command of Spears or of de Gaulle; the matter has never been satisfactorily resolved.
Linguistic misunderstanding After the meeting, de Gaulle told Spears that
Paul Baudoin had been telling journalists that Churchill had said that "he would understand if France concluded a separate armistice" ... ''"que l'Angleterre comprendrait si la France faisait un armistice et une paix séparée
". Spears realised there had been a linguistic misunderstanding. When Reynaud spoke (in French) about a separate armistice, Churchill had said, "Je comprends"'' (I understand) in the sense of 'I understand what you say', not in the sense of 'I agree'. Just as Churchill was about to take off for Britain, Spears obtained his assurance that he had never given consent to a separate armistice. But the damage had been done and, on 23 June, the words would be quoted by Admiral
François Darlan, who signalled all French warships saying that the British Prime Minister had declared that 'he understood' the necessity for France to bring the struggle to an end'.
Churchill fails to address French cabinet The day ended in confusion – Churchill flew back to London without speaking to the French cabinet, as had been promised by Reynaud. The ministers were dismayed and angry; Spears was depressed, realising that 'an opportunity that might not recur had been missed'. He was at a loss to understand why a meeting had not taken place – had Reynaud simply forgotten? Did Reynaud wish to explain the situation to the ministers himself? In any event, his ministers were disillusioned and felt abandoned. Spears believed that this event played its part in swaying the majority of the cabinet towards surrender. He was sure that 'by the night of 13 June, the possibility of France remaining in the war had almost disappeared'. The only hope rested on the decision of President Roosevelt – would America now join the war?
End game at Bordeaux – London offers a Franco-British Union On 14 June, Spears left Tours to look for Reynaud and his government, which had moved to
Bordeaux. On the way, he was conscious that the attitude of people to the sight of a British uniform had changed – they were morose if not hostile. When he reached Bordeaux, he learnt that
Paris had fallen that morning. Spears found Reynaud – he had not received a satisfactory reply from
Roosevelt but was still clinging to the hope. Spears found him worn out, forlorn and undecided. The British consulate was besieged with crowds of would-be refugees seeking passage out of France.
Spears rails against defeatism The next day he clashed with
Camille Chautemps, vice-president of the cabinet, upbraiding him for his defeatism and praising the spirit of the French soldiers that he had known during the First World War. He later spoke to
Roland de Margerie, Reynaud's
Chef de cabinet and raised the matter of several hundred German pilots who were prisoners of the French, asking that they be handed over to the British. However, there was much confusion and telephone communications were difficult even within the city of Bordeaux itself. Spears now had misgivings about Reynaud's determination to stay in the war, if necessary from French North Africa. He was outraged that despite the critical situation, the French Commander in Chief in North Africa was opposed to receiving troops from France. There was insufficient accommodation, no spare weapons, there was a shortage of doctors; moreover the climate was rather warm for young Frenchmen at this season! In Spears' view this was monstrous; why did Reynaud not dismiss the obstructionist general? He asked why the idea of forming a redoubt in Brittany had been dropped and why Reynaud did not dismiss General Weygand for his defeatism. Margerie replied that the people had faith in Weygand and that he also had the support of Pétain. Continuing in the same vein, Spears poured cold water on the notion that America might join the war. Spears and the ambassador sent a telegram to London explaining that everything now hung on an assurance from the US, adding that they would to their utmost to obtain the scuttling of the French fleet. Their final words were, "We have little confidence in anything now." They heard that Marshal Pétain would resign if American help was not forthcoming; Spears concluded that Reynaud would not continue in the face of combined opposition from the Marshal and Weygand. He longed for the presence of Churchill, which would have been 'worth more than millions in gold could buy'. Spears and the Ambassador were called following a meeting of the cabinet. The linguistic confusion from Tours returned to haunt them as Reynaud began, "As Mr Churchill stated at Tours he would agree that France should sue for an armistice...." Spears stopped writing and objected, "I cannot take that down for it is untrue." The minutes of the Tours meeting were produced and Spears was vindicated. Reynaud wrote a message to Churchill, stating that France sought leave of Britain to inquire about armistice terms; if Britain declined, he would resign. At this point an aide handed him Roosevelt's refusal to declare war – Reynaud was in despair. He did, however, guarantee that any successor would not surrender the fleet in an armistice. Spears felt sympathy for the French army, but contempt for Weygand, 'a hysterical, egocentric old man'.
British refusal to allow France to seek a separate peace By 16 June, Spears and Sir Ronald Campbell were sure that once the French had asked for an armistice they would never fight again. With regard to the French Empire and the fleet, there was a possibility that if German armistice terms were too harsh, the Empire might rebel against them, even if metropolitan France succumbed. It did not occur to them that Hitler would split France into two zones thus dividing it against itself. Early the same morning, Reynaud, nervously exhausted and depressed, asked again for France to be relieved of its undertaking not to make a separate peace. The British took a hard line, pointing out that the solemn undertaking had been drawn up to meet the existing contingency; in any case, France [with its overseas possessions and fleet] was still in a position to carry on. While these top-level discussions were being held,
Hélène de Portes, Reynaud's mistress repeatedly entered the room, much to the irritation of Spears and the Ambassador. Spears felt that her pernicious influence had done Reynaud great harm.
British acceptance of armistice dependent on fate of French fleet Shortly before lunch a telegram arrived from London agreeing that France could seek armistice terms provided that the French fleet was sailed forthwith for British harbours pending negotiations. Spears and the Ambassador felt this would be taken as an insult by the French Navy and an indication of distrust. Reynaud received the news with derision – if Britain wanted France to continue the war from North Africa, how could they ask her fleet to go to British harbours? He had spoken by telephone with Churchill and asked Spears to arrange a meeting with the British Prime Minister, at sea somewhere off Brittany. The meeting, however, never took place as he preferred to go in a French warship and this never materialised. As the day wore on, Spears became more aware of defeatism – but the hard-liners tended to be socialists. His British uniform struck a false note and people avoided him.
French reject Franco-British Union On the afternoon of 16 June, Spears and the Ambassador met Reynaud to convey a message from London – it would be in the interest of both countries for the French fleet to be moved to British ports; it was assumed that every effort would be made to transfer the air force to North Africa or to Britain; Polish, Belgian and Czech troops in France should be sent to North Africa. While they were arguing with increasing acrimony about the fleet, a call came through from de Gaulle, who was in London. The British proposition was nothing less than a Declaration of Union – 'France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one
Franco-British Union. Every
citizen of France will enjoy immediate
citizenship of Great Britain; every
British subject will become a citizen of France.' Spears became 'transfixed with amazement'; Reynaud was exulted. When the news got out, hard-liners such as
Georges Mandel were pleased and relieved. The proposal would be put before the French cabinet. Spears was optimistic that it would be accepted for how could it be that of the countries fighting Germany, France should be the only one to give up the struggle, when she possessed an Empire second only to our own and a fleet whole and entire, the strongest after ours in Europe'. Yet he joked that the only common denominator of an Anglo-French Parliament would be 'an abysmal ignorance of each other's language'! While the cabinet meeting was taking place, Spears and the Ambassador heard that Churchill,
Clement Attlee,
Sir Archibald Sinclair, the three
Chiefs of Staff and others would arrive off Brittany in a warship the next day at noon for talks with the French. However, the French cabinet rejected the offer of union; Reynaud would be resigning. One minister had commented that the proposal would make France into a British
Dominion. Spears, on the other hand, felt the rejection 'was like stabbing a friend bent over you in grief and affection'. Churchill and his delegation were already in the train at
Waterloo station, when news of the rejection came through. He returned to
Downing Street 'with a heavy heart'.
De Gaulle fears arrest In Bordeaux, Spears and Sir Ronald Campbell went to see Reynaud at his dimly-lit offices. According to Spears, he was approached in the darkness by de Gaulle, who said that Weygand intended to arrest him. Reynaud told the British that Pétain would be forming a government. Spears noted that it would consist entirely of defeatists and that the French Prime Minister had 'the air of a man relieved of a great burden'. Incredibly Reynaud asked when Churchill would be arriving off Brittany in the morning. Spears was short with him: "Tomorrow there will be a new government and you will no longer speak for anyone." However, he later came to realise that Reynaud had never double-crossed his ally, but had done his best to hold the alliance while fighting against men stronger than he was. His fault lay in his inability to pick good men. After the meeting, Spears found de Gaulle and decided to help him escape to Britain. He telephoned Churchill and got his somewhat reluctant agreement to bring over both de Gaulle and
Georges Mandel. The latter, however, declined to come, opting instead to go to North Africa. It was arranged that de Gaulle would come to Spears' hotel at 7 o'clock in the morning of the following day.
Spears leaves for Britain with de Gaulle On 17 June, de Gaulle and his ADC, Lieutenant
Geoffroy de Courcel, went with Spears to the airfield on the pretext of seeing him off. After a delay while de Gaulle's baggage was secured, the
De Havilland Flamingo took off for Britain. Winston Churchill wrote that Spears personally rescued de Gaulle from France just before the German conquest, literally pulling the Frenchman into his plane as it was taking off from Bordeaux for Britain. When they had reached Britain, de Gaulle gave Spears a signed photograph with the inscription, "To General Spears, witness, ally, friend."
Spears heads British government's mission to de Gaulle De Gaulle's famous
Appeal of 18 June was transmitted in French by the BBC and repeated on 22 June, the text having then been translated into English for the benefit of 10 Downing Street by Nancy Maurice, Spears's secretary. Towards the end of June 1940, Spears was appointed head of the British government's mission to de Gaulle, whose headquarters were finally established at 4 Carlton Gardens in London.
Aftermath of Dunkirk and Mers el Kebir Over 100,000 French troops were evacuated from Dunkirk during
Operation Dynamo between 26 May and 4 June 1940, but the majority returned to France from ports in the
west of England within a few days. On 3 July, Spears had the unpleasant task of informing de Gaulle of the British ultimatum to the French ships at anchor in the North African port of
Mers El Kébir; this would result in the first phase of
Operation Catapult, an action which led to the loss many French warships and the deaths of 1,297 French seamen. The attack caused great hostility towards Britain and made it even more difficult for de Gaulle to recruit men to his cause. De Gaulle, while regarding the naval action as 'inevitable', was initially uncertain whether he could still collaborate with Britain. Spears tried to encourage him and at the end of July in an unsuccessful attempt to rally support, flew to the internment camp at
Aintree Racecourse near
Liverpool, where French seamen who had been in British ports were taken as part of Operation Catapult. In the event, de Gaulle had only some 1,300 men at his disposal in Britain, the majority being those who had recently been evacuated from Narvik following the
Norwegian Campaign.
Dakar – Operation Menace . Winston Churchill pressed for action by the
Free French to turn
French colonies from the
Vichy regime. The target was
Dakar in
French West Africa; the main reason being that it could become a base threatening shipping in the Atlantic. A show of force by the Royal Navy was planned coupled with a landing by de Gaulle's which, it was hoped, would convince the Vichy defenders to defect. Spears accompanied de Gaulle on the mission, (
Operation Menace), with orders to report directly to the Prime Minister. However, security had been lax and the destination was said to be common talk among French troops in London. While the task force was en route, it came in sight of a French fleet – including three cruisers – on its way from
Toulon to
Douala to recapture
French Equatorial Africa which had declared for de Gaulle. Surprised, the French fleet sailed for Dakar instead, thus making the outcome of the expedition much more uncertain. Churchill was now of the opinion that the project should be abandoned, but de Gaulle insisted and a telegram from Spears to the Prime Minister stated, "I wish to insist to you personally and formally that the plan for the constitution of French Africa through Dakar should be upheld and carried out." On 23 September 1940, a landing by de Gaulle's troops was repulsed and, in the ensuing naval engagement, two British
capital ships and two cruisers were damaged while the Vichy French lost two destroyers and a submarine. Finally Churchill ordered the operation to be called off. The Free French had been snubbed by their countrymen; de Gaulle and Spears were deeply depressed, the latter fearing for his own reputation – and rightly so. The
Daily Mirror wrote: "Dakar has claims to rank with the lowest depths of imbecility to which we have yet sunk". De Gaulle was further discredited with the Americans and began to criticise Spears openly, telling Churchill that he was 'intelligent but egotistical and hampering because of his unpopularity at the War Office etc.'.
John Colville, Churchill's private secretary, wrote on 27 October 1940, "It is true that Spears' emphatic telegrams persuaded the Cabinet to revert to the Dakar scheme after it had, on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, been abandoned".
De Gaulle and Spears in the Levant , emblem of the Free French.Still acting as Churchill's personal representative to the Free French, Spears left England with de Gaulle for the
Levant via Cairo in March 1941. They were received by British officers, including General
Archibald Wavell, the British Commander in Chief Middle East, and also General
Georges Catroux, the former Governor General of
French Indo-China, who had been relieved of his post by the
Vichy France regime of Marshal
Philippe Pétain. Wavell, the British
Commander-in-Chief, wanted to negotiate with the Governor of
French Somaliland, which was still loyal to Vichy France, and lift the blockade of that territory in exchange for the right to send supplies to British forces in
Abyssinia via the railway from the coast to
Addis Ababa. However, de Gaulle and Spears argued in favour of firmness, the former arguing that a detachment of his
Free French should be sent to confront the Vichy
Armistice Army troops in the hope that the latter would be persuaded to change sides. Wavell agreed, but was later overruled by
Anthony Eden, who feared an open clash between the two French factions. British vacillations persisted against the advice of Spears and to the extreme irritation of de Gaulle.
Syria and Lebanon More serious differences between Britain and de Gaulle soon emerged over
Syria and Lebanon. De Gaulle and Spears held that it was essential to deny the Germans access to
Vichy French Air Force bases in
Syria from where they would threaten the
Suez Canal. However, Wavell was reluctant to stretch his limited forces and did not want to risk a clash with the French in Syria. The French in Syria had initially been in favour of continuing the struggle against Germany but had been snubbed by Wavell, who declined the offer of cooperation from three French divisions. By the time de Gaulle reached the Levant, Vichy had replaced any Frenchmen who were sympathetic towards Britain. Having left the Middle East with de Gaulle on a visit to
French Equatorial Africa, Spears had his first major row with the general who, in a fit of pique caused by 'some quite minor action by the British government', suddenly declared that the landing ground at
Fort Lamy would no longer be available to British aircraft transiting Africa. Spears countered furiously by threatening to summon up British troops to take over the aerodrome and the matter blew over. De Gaulle told Spears that the Vichy authorities in the Middle East were acting against the Free French and the British. French ships blockaded by the British at
Alexandria were permitted to transmit coded messages which were anything but helpful to the British cause. Their crews were allowed to take leave in the
Levant States where they stoked up anti-British feeling. They also brought back information about British naval and troop movements which would find its way back to Vichy. In
Fulfilment of a Mission Spears writes bitterly about how Britain was providing pay for Vichy sailors who were allowed to remit money back to France. Their pay would, of course, be forfeited if they joined de Gaulle. However, his biggest bone of contention – one over which he frequently clashed with the
Foreign Office and the
Admiralty – was that a French ship,
SS Providence, was allowed to sail unchallenged between
Beirut and
Marseille. It carried contraband 'and a living cargo of French soldiers and officials [prisoners] who were well disposed to us or who wished to continue the fight at our side'. De Gaulle and Spears held the view that the British at
GHQ in
Cairo were unwilling to accept that they had been duped over the level of collaboration between Germany and the Vichy-controlled states in the Levant. The British military authorities feared that a blockade of the Levant would cause hardship and thus antagonise the civilian population. However, Spears pointed out that the Vichy French were already unpopular with the local population – ordinary people resented being lorded over by defeated foreigners. He urged aggressive propaganda aimed at the Vichy French in support of the Free French and British policy. He felt that the Free French would be considered as something different as they were allies of Britain and enjoyed the dignity of fighting their enemy instead of submitting to him. On 13 May 1941, the fears of de Gaulle and Spears were realised when German aircraft landed in Syria in support of the Iraqi rebel
Rashid Ali, who was opposed to the pro-British
Kingdom of Iraq. On 8 June, 30,000 troops (Indian Army, British, Australian, Free French and the
Trans-Jordanian Frontier Force) invaded Lebanon and Syria in what was known as
Operation Exporter. There was stiff resistance from the Vichy French and Spears commented bitterly on 'that strange class of Frenchmen who had developed a vigour in defeat which had not been apparent when they were defending their country'. Spears soon became aware of the poor liaison which existed between the British Embassy in Cairo, the armed forces,
Palestine and the
Sudan. The arrival in Cairo in July 1941 of
Oliver Lyttelton, who was a Minister of State and a member of the War Cabinet, improved matters considerably. The Middle East Defence Council was also formed – a body that Spears would later join. In January 1942, having received the title of
KBE, Spears was appointed the first British minister to Syria and Lebanon. Beirut still holds his name on one of its major streets,
Rue Spears. ==Later life==