Nagarjuna

(where Nāgārjuna may have lived and worked according to Walser) and Vidarbha (the birthplace of Nāgārjuna according to Kumārajīva) Background India in the first and second centuries CE was politically divided into various states, including the Kushan Empire and the Satavahana Kingdom. At this point in Buddhist history, the Buddhist community was already divided into various Buddhist schools and had spread throughout India. At this time, there was already a small and nascent Mahāyāna movement. Mahāyāna ideas were held by a minority of Buddhists in India at the time. As Joseph Walser writes, "Mahāyāna before the fifth century was largely invisible and probably existed only as a minority and largely unrecognized movement within the fold of nikāya Buddhism." By the second century, early Mahāyāna Sūtras such as the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā were already circulating among certain Mahāyāna circles. Life Very little is reliably known of the life of Nāgārjuna and modern historians do not agree on a specific date or place (multiple places in India suggested) for him. Nevertheless, most scholars place him somewhere in South India at some time between 1st to 3rd century CE. This is supported by most of the traditional hagiographical sources as well. He also argues that "it is plausible that he wrote the Ratnavali within a thirty-year period at the end of the second century in the Andhra region around Dhanyakataka (modern-day Amaravati)." They include the Zhu weimo-jie jing (注維摩詰經; T. 1775, a commentary on the Vimalakirti), the Maming pusa zhuan (馬鳴菩薩傳, Tradition of Aśvaghoṣa Bodhisattva, a combined biography of Nāgārjuna and Aśvaghoṣa) and also various prefaces to the Chinese translations to Nāgārjuna's works, such the preface to the Zhong lun (中論; *Madhyamaka-śāstra, T. 1564) and the preface to the Da zhidu lun (大智度論; T.1509). The traditional religious hagiographies place Nāgārjuna in various Indian regions. Chinese sources, as well as Candrakirti, place him in Vidarbha, South India, while Xuanzang mentions he was from south Kosala. rising out of the water are offering Buddhist sutras. "Nagarjuna Conqueror of the Serpent" (1925) Nāgārjuna himself is often depicted in composite form comprising human and nāga characteristics. Nāgas are snake-like supernatural beings of great magical power that feature in Hindu, Buddhist and Jain mythology. Nāgas are found throughout Indian religious culture, and typically signify intelligent serpents or dragons that are responsible for rain, lakes, and other bodies of water. In Buddhism, a naga can be a symbol of a realised arhat or wise person. Tibetan and Chinese Esoteric sources also associate Nāgārjuna with the use of mantras, and with the Vajrayana tradition in general. For example, Yijing (635–713) writes that Nāgārjuna had passed down the teachings of the Vidyādharapiṭaka ("Canon of the Spell-Wielders"), which was a legendary source of Buddhist dhāraṇī and mantra incantations, to his disciple Nanda, placing him at the beginning of the East Asian Buddhist esoteric tradition, which soon began to see him as their founding patriarch. Tibetan hagiographies also state that Nāgārjuna studied at Nālanda Mahavihara. However, according to Walser, this university was not a strong monastic center until about 425. Also, as Walser notes, "Xuanzang and Yijing both spent considerable time at Nālanda and studied Nāgārjuna’s texts there. It is strange that they would have spent so much time there and yet chose not to report any local tales of a man whose works played such an important part in the curriculum." Some sources (Buton Rinchen Drub and the other Tibetan historians) claim that in his later years, Nāgārjuna lived on the mountain of Śrīparvata near the city that would later be called Nāgārjunakoṇḍa ("Hill of Nāgārjuna"). The ruins of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa are located in Guntur district, Andhra Pradesh. The Caitika and Bahuśrutīya nikāyas are known to have had monasteries in Nāgārjunakoṇḍa. Other Nāgārjunas There are a multitude of texts attributed to "Nāgārjuna", many of these texts date from much later periods. This has caused much confusion for the traditional Buddhist biographers and doxographers. Modern scholars are divided on how to classify these later texts and how many later writers called "Nāgārjuna" existed (the name remains popular today in Andhra Pradesh). Some scholars have posited that there was a separate Aryuvedic writer called Nāgārjuna who wrote numerous treatises on Rasayana. Also, there is a later Tantric Buddhist author by the same name who may have been a scholar at Nālandā University and wrote on Buddhist tantra. There is also a Jain figure of the same name who was said to have travelled to the Himalayas. Walser thinks that it is possible that stories related to this figure influenced Buddhist legends as well. ==Works==

There exist a number of influential texts attributed to Nāgārjuna; however, as there are many pseudepigrapha attributed to him, lively controversy exists over which are his authentic works. The Chinese Canon includes over 22 texts attributed to Nāgārjuna, while the Tibetan Tanjur contains over 140 works attributed to Nāgārjuna.According to one view, that of Christian Lindtner, the works definitely written by Nāgārjuna are: • Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way, MMK), available in three Sanskrit manuscripts and numerous translations. • Śūnyatāsaptati (Seventy Verses on Emptiness), accompanied by a prose commentary ascribed to Nagarjuna himself. • Vigrahavyāvartanī (The End of Disputes). • (Pulverizing the Categories), a prose work critiquing the categories used by Indian Nyaya philosophy. • Vyavahārasiddhi (Proof of Convention). • (Sixty Verses on Reasoning). • (Four Hymns): Lokātīta-stava (Hymn to transcendence), Niraupamya-stava (to the Peerless), Acintya-stava (to the Inconceivable), and Paramārtha-stava (to Ultimate Truth). • Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland), subtitled (rajaparikatha), a discourse addressed to an Indian king (possibly a Satavahana monarch). • (Verses on the heart of Dependent Arising), along with a short commentary (Vyākhyāna). • Sūtrasamuccaya, an anthology of various sutra passages. • (Exposition of the awakening mind). • (Letter to a Good Friend). • (Requisites of awakening), a work the path of the Bodhisattva and paramitas, it is quoted by Candrakirti in his commentary on Aryadeva's four hundred. Now only extant in Chinese translation (Taisho 1660). Other scholars have challenged and argued against some of the above works being Nagarjuna's. David F. Burton notes that Christian Lindtner is "rather liberal" with his list of works and that other scholars have called some of these into question. He notes how Paul Williams argued convincingly that the must be a later text. In his study, Burton relies on the texts that he considers "least controversial": Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Śūnyatāsaptati, , , and Ratnāvalī. The Tibetan historian Buston considers the first six to be the main treatises of Nāgārjuna (this is called the "yukti corpus", rigs chogs), while according to Tāranātha only the first five are the works of Nāgārjuna. TRV Murti considers Ratnāvalī, Pratītyasamutpādahṝdaya and Sūtrasamuccaya to be works of Nāgārjuna as the first two are quoted profusely by Chandrakirti and the third by Shantideva. Other attributed works In addition to works mentioned above, numerous other works are attributed to Nāgārjuna, many of which are dubious attributions and later works. There is an ongoing, lively controversy over which of those works are authentic. Christian Lindtner divides the various attributed works as "1) correctly attributed, 2) wrongly attributed to him, and 3) those which may or may not be genuine." Lindtner further divides the third category of dubious or questionable texts into those which are "perhaps authentic" and those who are unlikely to be authentic. Those which he sees as perhaps being authentic include: • Mahāyānavimsika, it is cited as Nagarjuna's work in the Tattvasamgraha as well as by Atisha, Lindtner sees the style and content as compatible with the yukti corpus. Survives in Sanskrit. • Bodhicittotpādavidhi, a short text that describes the sevenfold write for a bodhisattva, • Dvadasakāranayastotra, a madhyamaka text only extant in Tibetan, • (Madhyamaka-)Bhavasamkrānti, a verse from this is attributed to Nagarjuna by Bhavaviveka. • Nirālamba-stava, • Sālistambakārikā, only exists in Tibetan, it is a versification of the Śālistamba Sūtra • Stutytitastava, only exists in Tibetan • Danaparikatha, only exists in Tibetan, a praise of giving (dana) • Cittavajrastava, • Mulasarvāstivadisrāmanerakārikā, 50 karikas on the Vinaya of the Mulasarvastivadins • Dasabhumikavibhāsā, only exists in Chinese, a commentary on the Dashabhumikasutra • Lokapariksā, • Yogasataka, a medical text • Prajñadanda • Rasavaisesikasutra, a rasayana (biochemical) text • Bhāvanākrama, contains various verses similar to the Lankavatara, it is cited in the Tattvasamgraha as by Nagarjuna • Rasaratnākara deals with the formation of mercury compounds. Ruegg notes various works of uncertain authorship which have been attributed to Nagarjuna, including the Dharmadhatustava (Hymn to the Dharmadhatu, which shows later influences), Mahayanavimsika, Salistambakarikas, the Bhavasamkranti, and the Dasabhumtkavibhāsā. Furthermore, Ruegg writes that "three collections of stanzas on the virtues of intelligence and moral conduct ascribed to Nagarjuna are extant in Tibetan translation": Prajñasatakaprakarana, Nitisastra-Jantuposanabindu and Niti-sastra-Prajñadanda. Attributions which are likely to be false Meanwhile, those texts that Lindtner considers as questionable and likely inauthentic are: Aksarasataka, Akutobhaya (Mulamadhyamakavrtti), Aryabhattaraka-Manjusriparamarthastuti, Kayatrayastotra, Narakoddharastava, Niruttarastava, Vandanastava, Dharmasamgraha, Dharmadhatugarbhavivarana, Ekaslokasastra, Isvarakartrtvanirakrtih (A refutation of God/Isvara), Sattvaradhanastava, Upayahrdaya, Astadasasunyatasastra, Dharmadhatustava, Yogaratnamala.Meanwhile, Lindtner's list of outright wrong attributions is: Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Dà zhìdù lùn), Abudhabodhakaprakarana, Guhyasamajatantratika, Dvadasadvaraka, Prajñaparamitastotra, and Svabhavatrayapravesasiddhi.Notably, the Dà zhìdù lùn (Taisho 1509, "Commentary on the great prajñaparamita") which has been influential in Chinese Buddhism, has been questioned as a genuine work of Nāgārjuna by various scholars including Lamotte. This work is also only attested in a Chinese translation by Kumārajīva and is unknown in the Tibetan and Indian traditions. Other works are extant only in Chinese, one of these is the Shih-erh-men-lun or 'Twelve-topic treatise' (*Dvadasanikaya or *Dvadasamukha-sastra); one of the three basic treatises of the Sanlun school (East Asian Madhyamaka). Several works considered important in esoteric Buddhism are attributed to Nāgārjuna and his disciples by traditional historians like Tāranātha from 17th century Tibet. These historians try to account for chronological difficulties with various theories, such as seeing later writings as mystical revelations. For a useful summary of this tradition, see Wedemeyer 2007. Lindtner sees the author of some of these tantric works as being a tantric Nagarjuna who lives much later, sometimes called "Nagarjuna II". ==Teaching and philosophy==

temple in Elista, Kalmykia, Russia Nāgārjuna's teachings bring together key Buddhist doctrines, particularly emptiness, not-self and pratītyasamutpāda ("dependent origination"), to refute the metaphysics of some of his contemporaries and present a coherent Mahayana Buddhist worldview. The core of his thought is based on refuting all metaphysical theories of svabhāva (substances), which leads to the middle way (madhyamā pratipad), which avoids metaphysically extreme views of existence (astitva/bhāva) and views of nonexistence (nāstitva/abhāva), also known as the views of eternalism (śāśvata) and annihilationism (uccheda). Because of this, Nāgārjuna's philosophical teaching is called the "middling" or "centrist" view (Madhyamaka), though this term was first introduced by Bhavaviveka in the sixth century. Emptiness Sutras, relief at Buddhavanam Stupa, Telangana. The Prajñaparamita texts are a major source for the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness. A central theme of Nāgārjuna's writings, especially his philosophical texts, is the key Mahayana concept of śūnyatā (Sanskrit, translated into English as "emptiness"), which for Nāgārjuna means that all things are empty of svabhāva (inherent existence, intrinsic nature). Jan Westerhoff notes that the meaning of svabhāva has metaphysical and cognitive dimensions. Metaphysically it is a kind of unchanging substance, a primary existent (dravyasat), an "objective and irreducible constituent of the world" which exists independently and by itself, without depending on anything else. This concept, which was defended in some way or another by Buddhist schools like Vaibhāṣika and by non-buddhist schools like Vaiśeṣika, is the main target of Nāgārjuna's arguments. To say that all things are 'empty' is to deny any kind of ontological foundation; therefore Nāgārjuna's view is often seen as a kind of ontological anti-foundationalism or a metaphysical anti-realism by modern philosophers. Arguments against svabhāva theory In Nāgārjuna's central philosophical work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), he provides numerous arguments against svabhāva theory. Nāgārjuna never provides a single "master argument", instead he dismantles various arguments for svabhāva one by one throughout the various chapters of the MMK, which discuss topics such as causation, time, movement, change, mereology, personal identity, and conceptual dependence. This is what later came to be called the prāsaṅgika method, which relies on refutations that seek to show the unintended consequences (Sanskrit: "prāsaṅga") of the opponent's arguments and positions. In each of the chapters of the MMK, various substantialist theories on different philosophical topics are analysed, deconstructed and attacked. Causation Nāgārjuna begins his MMK with a discussion of causation. He analyses various ways of understanding cause and effect through the lens of svabhāva theory and shows how they are logically unsatisfactory. Nāgārjuna then applies similar types of arguments for other concepts in later chapters of the MMK. Understanding the arguments on causation used in the first chapter of the MMK then allows us to see how Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka method functions and how the theory of emptiness is to be understood. At the same time, rather than seeing emptiness as being a kind of nihilism which rejects that anything exists or functions at all, Nāgārjuna posits that emptiness and dependent arising are precisely the best explanation for how there can be anything at all. His arguments often turn the tables on the substance theorist by attempting to show that svabhāva theories actually lead to absurd conclusions and thus cannot explain how the world works. This idea that emptiness is the proper understanding of dependent arising and that only through the lack of svabhāva can one properly explain the central teachings of Buddhism, including the origin and cessation of suffering, is the basis of a famous verse in MMK Chapter 24 (verse 14) which states: Knowledge Another major philosophical topic which Nāgārjuna discusses is how to asses the proper instruments of epistemology, or the means of knowledge (Sanskrit: pramāṇa). This was a key topic in the philosophy of his time, and a major theme discussed by the non-buddhist Nyaya school. As with Nyaya thinkers, Nāgārjuna discusses four epistemic instruments: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy or comparison (upamāna), and reliable testimony (āgama), which are held to be able to establish the existence epistemic objects (prameyas). His main concern is how any set of epistemic instruments can be established or grounded. That is to say, how do we know that any epistemic instrument is a good guide for the existence of things in the world? 8. The Dharma teaching of the Buddha rests on two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth. 9. Who do not know the distinction between the two truths, they do not understand reality in accordance with the profound teachings of the Buddha. 10. The ultimate truth is not taught independently of customary ways of talking and thinking. Not having acquired the ultimate truth, nirvana is not attained.For Nāgārjuna, the ultimate truth is the fact that that everything is empty, and this includes emptiness itself ("the emptiness of emptiness"). While some (Murti, 1955) have interpreted this by positing Nāgārjuna as a neo-Kantian and thus making ultimate truth a metaphysical noumenon or an "ineffable ultimate that transcends the capacities of discursive reason", the more traditional and standard interpretation, defended by modern scholars like Westerhoff, Mark Siderits and Jay L. Garfield holds that Nāgārjuna's view is that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth" (Siderits) and that Nāgārjuna is a "semantic anti-dualist" who posits that there are only conventional truths.Thus, when we understand the ultimate truth, "all one is left with is conventional truth" (Westerhoff), which is based on commonly accepted practices, conventions, language and concepts. While these inevitably distort and veil reality itself, there is no other way of perceiving and investigating the world but through these conventions, since it is these very conventional processes which generate the very idea of a world in the first place. In articulating this view of the two truths doctrine in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna draws on and quotes an early Buddhist source (Kātyāyanagotrasūtra), which distinguishes definitive meaning (nītārtha) from interpretable meaning (neyārtha) and discusses a "teaching via the middle" between the extremes of existence and non-existence. Ethics , Buddhavanam Stupa Drum Reliefs, Telangana While Nāgārjuna is most well known for his philosophical theories, he also wrote numerous religious works, like the Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland), Suhṛllekha (Letter to a Good Friend) and Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra (Requisites of Awakening). These texts discuss Mahayana Buddhism more broadly and present an overall ethical and religious framework in which ethics and faith are paramount. Nāgārjuna's religious ethics focus on the bodhisattva path, the religious path of those who have set out to attain Buddhahood for the sake of all beings. The Ratnāvalī discusses ethics mainly from the point of view of a layperson, promoting classic Mahayana Buddhist virtues like generosity, non-harming and the six perfections (pāramitās). In this work, he makes a crucial distinction between two dimensions or aspects of the Dharma: (1) the Dharma of ascendance (abhyudaya, "rising up", success, prosperity), which refers to all the ways to gain happiness and good rebirths; and (2) the Dharma of transcendence or the Supreme Good (naiḥśreyasa), which he glosses as liberation (moksha) obtained through wisdom.In whom there is first the Dharma of ascendance, afterward arises the highest good, since after reaching ascendance, one proceeds gradually to the highest good. Nāgārjuna continues, associating faith with the path of ascendance and wisdom with the path of the Supreme Good: For Nāgārjuna, it is precisely this philosophy of emptiness which is uniquely adequate for the ethics of universal compassion, because emptiness dissolves the division between self and others and thus abandons the very possibility of selfish thoughts. That is to say, truly virtuous and compassionate actions unravel all action (all karma), including craving and attachment, just like the wisdom of emptiness unravels all views. Relativity Nāgārjuna also taught the idea of relativity; in the Ratnāvalī, he gives the example that shortness exists only in relation to the idea of length. The determination of a thing or object is only possible in relation to other things or objects, especially by way of contrast. He held that the relationship between the ideas of "short" and "long" is not due to intrinsic nature (svabhāva). This idea is also found in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, in which the idea of relativity is expressed similarly: "That which is the element of light ... is seen to exist on account of [in relation to] darkness; that which is the element of good is seen to exist on account of bad; that which is the element of space is seen to exist on account of form." Buddhahood and nirvana The bulk of Nāgārjuna's writings discuss the emptiness of all sorts of conventional phenomena, such as the five aggregates, the self, change, desire, suffering and karma. However, Nāgārjuna also outlines the emptiness of even the highest Buddhist ideals, explaining that even the supreme goals of nirvana and buddhahood are empty of self-existence. Therefore, nothing whatsoever escapes Nāgārjuna's analysis of emptiness. That is to say, there is nothing at all which is not empty of svabhāva. Thus, according to Nāgārjuna, "The Tathagata is devoid of intrinsic nature; this world is devoid of intrinsic nature." Ultimately, the Buddha is also beyond all conceptualisations and linguistic distinctions, thus we cannot describe the Buddha as eternal, non-eternal, as both or neither. Likewise, we cannot say after his nirvana the Buddha exists, does not, both or neither. As with the Buddha, so with nirvana, the supreme goal of Buddhism. Thus, in chapter twenty five of the MMK, Nāgārjuna analyses nirvana to show that it cannot have svabhāva. He further argues that nirvana cannot be accurately described with any statement that could apply ultimately, stating that nirvana is neither an existent (bhāva), a non-existence (abhāva), both or neither. Nirvana cannot be an existent thing because then it would dependent and conditioned, and nirvana is always described as unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). Nirvana also cannot be non-existent because then it would also be dependent, since absences depend on existence, they are defined by what they are not. Once he has rejected all possible views on the ontological status of nirvana, Nāgārjuna affirms that the status of the Buddha after death is an indeterminate question (avyakrta), relying on a classic Buddhist category. Finally, in this nirvana chapter, Nāgārjuna also applies the same logic to the realm of suffering itself, samsara, arguing that the ultimate ontological status of both samsara and nirvana are equal in a famous passage (ch. 22, verses 19-20):There is no distinction whatsoever between samsara and nirvana. There is no distinction whatsoever between nirvana and samsara. What is the limit of nirvana, that is the limit of samsara. There is not even the finest gap to be found between the two.Thus one cannot say that samsara and nirvana exist in some ultimate sense. Likewise we cannot say they do not exist, nor can we affirm nor reject both positions either. At this point, we reach of apophatic peace in which nothing can be said and our need to conceptualise everything stops. Nāgārjuna closes with the following key verse:This stopping of cognising everything, of prapañca, is blissful. No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone. Pure Land teaching Nāgārjuna caps the Suhṛllekha with a dedication of merit towards rebirth in higher realms, ultimately towards birth in Amitābha Buddha's Sukhavati pure land: "May you be born in a buddhafield, freed from illness, old age, attachment, and hatred, and may you become equal to Amitāyus, Protector of Worlds, with the Bhagavān Amitābha" (Verse 122). Further details of this pure land rebirth ideal are discussed in other sources attributed to Nāgārjuna, especially the Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Stages (Dasabhumika-vibhāsā). This text is an important work in East Asian Pure Land Buddhism, where it is seen as a foundational treatise establishing the Pure Land path and the distinction between the "easy" path and the "difficult" path. In the “Chapter on Easy Practice”, Nāgārjuna explains how relying on Amitābha Buddha to attain birth in the pure land of Sukhavati can be an "easy" method for attaining non-retrogression on the bodhisattvas path. According to Nāgārjuna, a pure land (a pure buddhafield, Sanskrit: viśuddha-buddhakṣetra) is a realm of purification (vyavadāna) where there is no impurities, including the impurities of wrong views, conceptual proliferation (prapañca), and the impurity of karma, and where instead there is the pure wisdom of emptiness. In chapter five of the Dasabhumika, Nāgārjuna gives a general description of the qualities of the pure lands of the buddhas which includes "the complete presence of the dharmas associated with a buddha’s meritorious qualities and powers; The complete presence of the Dharma; The complete presence of śrāvaka disciples; The completeness of the bodhi tree; A world that is adorned; Beings that are well-endowed with good fortune; The abundant presence of beings capable of achieving liberation; The gathering of an immense congregation; And completeness in the powers of a buddha." Other qualities of the pure lands include: "rapid achievement of realization" for bodhisattvas, the complete presence of bodhisattvas which visit pure lands from throughout the cosmos, the absence of demonic maras, the presence of amazing miracles, the presence of an immeasurable radiance which heals all suffering and affliction. Nāgārjuna also explains that on being born in a pure land, "there are beings who, upon seeing a buddha, become immediately able to dwell on the ground of irreversibility", since "when these beings see the body of a buddha, their minds are filled with great delight, joy, and pure happiness. Their minds immediately become focused and acquire a bodhisattva samādhi of this sort. Due to the power of this samādhi, they achieve a penetrating understanding of the true character of all dharmas." He also mentions that there beings who can enter the stage of certainty when they hear the name of a buddha. This occurs because "a buddha may have made an original vow" which helps beings achieve this. In its influential chapter nine, the Dasabhumika explains how difficult following the eons long bodhisattva path can be and then compares the easy path to taking a boat:There are innumerable gates to the buddha-dharma. Just as there are difficult and easy paths in this world, going over land being wearying while taking a boat over water is pleasant, just so are the bodhisattva paths.The Treatise then discusses various buddhas and their pure lands, teaching the practice of reciting the names of the buddhas. Nāgārjuna singles out Amitābha, explains the qualities of his buddhafield of Sukhavati and provides a set of verses in praise of Amitābha. This passage later became a foundational text for Pure Land Buddhism, where Nāgārjuna (Chinese: 龍樹 lóng shù, lit. Dragon Tree) is considered a patriarch of the school. == Influence of Brahmanical Schools (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Vedic Traditions) ==

The Madhyamaka Engagement with Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika Realism Nāgārjuna’s (c. 150–250 CE) Madhyamaka philosophy developed as a systematic internal critique of the epistemological and ontological frameworks of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. These traditions defined the dominant standards of rational justification in classical Indian philosophy through theories of valid cognition pramāṇa, inference anumāna, and ontological classification. Nāgārjuna’s principal works—including the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the Vigrahavyavartani, and the Vaidalyaprakaranam—are structured as engagements with these shared epistemic and metaphysical assumptions rather than external refutations. Madhyamaka does not reject these systems at the level of conventional reasoning; rather, it interrogates whether their categories can sustain claims to intrinsic ontological grounding svabhāva. Epistemology, Pramāṇa, and the Problem of Justification The Nyāya Sūtras articulate a theory of valid cognition pramāṇa-vāda in which knowledge jñāna is valid pramā when it is non-defective and corresponds to its object arthavattā. The pramāṇas—perception, inference, comparison, and testimony—are treated as structurally distinct and normatively reliable means of accessing reality. Nāgārjuna’s analysis in the Vigrahavyāvartanī targets the justificatory structure of this system. If a pramāṇa is validated by another pramāṇa, justification leads to infinite regress anavasthā. If it is self-validating, the distinction between validating cognition and validated object collapses, undermining Nyāya’s internal differentiation of epistemic roles. This is not a denial of cognition, but a critique of the possibility of non-relational epistemic foundations. Thus, pramāṇas are reinterpreted as conventionally effective cognitive structures lacking intrinsic grounding. Dialectical Method and the Reorientation of Debate Nāgārjuna’s engagement with Nyāya dialectics preserves inferential structure while transforming its philosophical aim. Classical Nyāya seeks determinate ontological conclusions through structured inference. Madhyamaka instead uses inference to expose the instability of all claims to intrinsic existence. This methodological shift is expressed in the "no thesis" argument: Nyāya commentators such as Vātsyāyana interpret this as self-refuting, arguing that the denial of thesis functions as a thesis. Madhyamaka responds that its reasoning operates only within conventional discourse and does not assert ultimate ontological commitments. Ontological Deconstruction: Vaiśeṣika Atomism and Substance Theory The Vaiśeṣika system posits atoms paramāṇu, substances dravya, qualities guṇa, and inherence samavāya as ultimately real constituents of the world, unified by intrinsic nature svabhāva. Nāgārjuna’s critique demonstrates internal instability in this framework. If atoms possess spatial extension, they must have parts; if they lack extension, they cannot form composites. Substance likewise cannot be separated from qualities in experience, undermining its independent status. Later Nyāya responses, including those of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra, refine realist accounts of causation and cognition in response to these objections, but Madhyamaka maintains that such refinements remain dependent on conceptual imputation rather than ontological necessity. Svabhāva and Dependent Origination At the centre of Nāgārjuna’s critique is svabhāva (intrinsic nature). Against this, he reinterprets dependent origination as a principle of ontological dependence rather than causal succession. Nāgārjuna argues that whatever arises dependently lacks intrinsic nature, and whatever lacks intrinsic nature cannot serve as an independent ontological ground. Therefore all phenomena are empty śūnya of svabhāva. This is not a metaphysical claim about emptiness as an entity, but a logical consequence of relational dependence. Causality and Brahmanical Theories of Production Nāgārjuna’s analysis of causality in Chapter 1 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā engages both satkāryavāda (effect pre-exists in cause) and asatkāryavāda (effect is entirely new). Causality is therefore reinterpreted not as a relation between independently existing substances, but as a conventional designation applied to interdependent processes lacking intrinsic origination. Classical Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika Responses Later Nyāya philosophers develop sustained responses to Madhyamaka critique: • Vātsyāyana argues that denial of pramāṇa undermines the possibility of philosophical discourse itself. • Uddyotakara strengthens inferential theory to resist regress-based objections. • Vācaspati Miśra develops refined accounts of error bhrānti and cognition to preserve realism. • Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that Madhyamaka emptiness, if extended beyond convention, collapses practical intelligibility. These responses show that Madhyamaka operates not as a marginal scepticism but as a persistent pressure that forces systematic refinement of realist epistemology. Historical and Philosophical Consequences The significance of Nāgārjuna’s engagement with Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika lies in its role as a structural dialectical force within Indian philosophy. Rather than replacing realist ontology, Madhyamaka destabilises the assumption that ontology must be grounded in intrinsic existence. This produces a sustained reciprocal dynamic in which both Buddhist and Brahmanical systems refine their accounts of cognition, inference, and metaphysical explanation in response to each other. == Comparative philosophy ==

Hinduism Nāgārjuna was fully acquainted with the classical Hindu philosophies of Samkhya, Nyaya and Vaiseshika. Nāgārjuna assumes a knowledge of the definitions of the sixteen categories as given in the Nyaya Sutras, the chief text of the Nyaya school, and wrote a treatise on the pramanas where he reduced the syllogism of five members into one of three. In the Vigrahavyavartani, Nāgārjuna criticises the Nyaya theory of pramanas (means of knowledge). Buddhism Nāgārjuna was conversant with the scholasticism of the non-Mahayana Buddhist schools of Abhidharma and with the Mahāyāna sutra tradition. His arguments often attack positions held by the realist Sarvastivada Vaibhāṣika school, and some modern scholars like Walser have argued that Nāgārjuna was associated with the Mahāsāṃghikas. David Kalupahana sees Nāgārjuna as a philosophical successor to the scholar-monk Moggaliputta-Tissa in being a champion of the middle-way and a reviver of the original ideals of the Buddha. Pyrrhonism Because of the high degree of similarity between Nāgārjuna's philosophy and Pyrrhonism, particularly the surviving works of Sextus Empiricus, According to Thomas McEvilley this is because Nagarjuna was likely influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India. Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE), the founder of this school of sceptical philosophy, was himself influenced by Indian philosophy. Pyrrho travelled to India with Alexander the Great's army and studied with Indian sages he termed gymnosophists. According to Christopher I. Beckwith, Pyrrho's teachings are based on Buddhism, because the Greek terms adiaphora, astathmēta and anepikrita in the Aristocles Passage resemble the Buddhist three marks of existence. According to him, the key innovative tenets of Pyrrho's scepticism were only found in Indian philosophy at the time and not in Greece. However, other scholars, such as Stephen Batchelor and Charles Goodman question Beckwith's conclusions about the degree of Buddhist influence on Pyrrho. Modern thinkers Nāgārjuna came to the attention of modern university scholarship through the modern field of Buddhist studies. Numerous interpretations of Nāgārjuna were offered by Buddhist studies scholars, East and West, including Kantian idealism (Stcherbatsky and T. R. V. Murti), nihilism, relativism, and pragmatism (Kalupahana). More recently, modern Western philosophers and thinkers have begun to study Nāgārjuna's works from the point of view of philosophy and even physics, rather than from a purely Buddhist studies perspective. Several modern English language analytical philosophers like Graham Priest, Jay L. Garfield, Mark Siderits and Jan Westerhoff have studied Nāgārjuna and drawn on his insights for their own philosophical work. Westerhoff's The Non-Existence of the Real World (2020) is a modern take on Nāgārjunian anti-foundationalism, while Priest's Beyond the limits of thought (2002) contains a chapter on Nāgārjuna. In his book Helgoland, the Italian theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli mentions how Nāgārjuna influenced his thinking on his relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. Another modern physicist who was influenced by Nāgārjuna is the American David Ritz Finkelstein. In particular, Finkenlstein developed a theory of "universal relativity" which saw all physical phenomena was relative. == See also ==