Intentional close calls may occur during increased military tensions involving one or more
nuclear states. They may be a threat made by the state, or an attack upon the state. They may also come from
nuclear terrorism.
1950–1953: Korean War During the
Korean War, the US considered nuclear attacks on
North Korea and
Manchuria, in response to involvement from the
People's Volunteer Army from China.
Mark 4 nuclear bombs, lacking their
fissile pits, were deployed to Guam and Okinawa.
Boeing B-29 Superfortresses were stationed in
Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, and flew practice bombing runs with dummy nuclear or conventional bombs against North Korean targets. The US also considered strikes on
Soviet Air Force bases in the
Russian Far East. The
Artem air base was the most immediate.
1954: First Indochina War During the
Battle of Dien Bien Phu, at the request of the French, the US considered
tactical nuclear weapons use against the
Viet Minh. US strategic bombers stationed in the Philippines or Okinawa, as well as carrier aircraft in the
Seventh Fleet, were considered for a strike using three tactical nuclear bombs, possibly
Mark 7s.
1956: Suez Crisis During the
Suez Crisis, the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) received a number of simultaneous reports, including unidentified aircraft over
Turkey, Soviet
MiG-15 fighters over
Syria, a downed British
Canberra medium bomber, and unexpected maneuvers by the Soviet
Black Sea Fleet through the
Dardanelles that appeared to signal a Soviet offensive. Considering previous Soviet threats to use conventional missiles against
France and the
United Kingdom, U.S. forces believed these events could trigger a
NATO nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. In fact, all reports of Soviet action turned out to be erroneous, misinterpreted, or exaggerated. The perceived threat was due to a coincidental combination of events, including a wedge of swans over Turkey, a fighter escort for
Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli returning from
Moscow, a British bomber brought down by mechanical issues, and scheduled exercises of the Soviet fleet.
1958: Second Taiwan Strait Crisis U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter characterized the
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis as "the first serious nuclear crisis". In this conflict, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) shelled the islands of
Kinmen (Quemoy) and the
Matsu Islands along the east coast of
mainland China (in the
Taiwan Strait) in an attempt to probe the extent of the
United States military defense of Taiwan's sovereign territory. This was an ultimately failed preemptive strike prior to an attempted invasion of Taiwan, where the
Republic of China's (ROC)
military forces and political apparatuses, known as the
Kuomintang (KMT), had been exiled since the end of the
Chinese Civil War in 1949. A naval battle also took place around
Dongding Island when the ROC Navy repelled an attempted amphibious landing by the PRC Navy.
1962: Cuban Missile Crisis Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba Under
Operation Anadyr, the Soviet Union deployed both
strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, totalling 158 warheads. Of these, 80 were for use by the
9K52 Luna-M nuclear rocket artillery/
short-range ballistic missile system, and 12 were for use by the
FKR-1 cruise missile. At least one unit of the latter was targeted at the US
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the island of Cuba.
US false alarm at interceptor airbase during takeoff During the Cuban Missile Crisis, United States military planners expected that
sabotage operations might precede any
nuclear first strike by the Soviet Union. Around midnight on 25 October 1962, a guard at the
Duluth Sector Direction Center in
Minnesota saw a figure climbing the security fence. He shot at it and activated the sabotage alarm, which automatically set off similar alarms at other bases in the region. At
Volk Field in
Wisconsin, a faulty alarm system caused the
klaxon to sound instead, which ordered
Air Defense Command (ADC) nuclear-armed
F-106A interceptors into the air. The pilots had been told there would be no practice alert drills and, according to political scientist
Scott Sagan, "fully believed that a nuclear war was starting". Before the planes were able to take off, the base commander contacted Duluth and learned of the error. An officer in the command center drove his car onto the runway, flashing his lights and signaling to the aircraft to stop. The intruder was discovered to be a bear. Sagan writes that the incident raised the dangerous possibility of an ADC interceptor
accidentally shooting down a Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber. Interceptor crews had not been given full information by SAC of plans to move bombers to dispersal bases (such as Volk Field) or the classified routes flown by bombers on continuous alert as part of
Operation Chrome Dome. Declassified ADC documents later revealed that "the incident led to changes in the alert Klaxon system [...] to prevent a recurrence".
Soviet averted launch of nuclear torpedo At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet patrol submarine almost launched a
nuclear torpedo while under harassment by American naval forces on October 27. One of several vessels surrounded by American
destroyers near Cuba,
B-59 dove to avoid detection and was unable to communicate with Moscow for a number of days. began dropping practice
depth charges to signal
B-59 to surface; however, the captain of the Soviet submarine and its
zampolit (political officer) took these to be real depth charges. With low
batteries affecting the submarine's life support systems and unable to make contact with
Moscow, the commander of
B-59 feared that war had already begun and ordered the use of a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo against the American fleet. The
zampolit agreed, but the chief of staff of the flotilla (second in command of the flotilla)
Vasily Arkhipov refused permission to launch. He convinced the captain to calm down, surface, and make contact with Moscow for new orders.
US loss of ICBM launch authority According to Scott Sagan, also on 27 October, at
Malmstrom Air Force Base in
Montana, officers of
Strategic Air Command jerry-rigged their launch system on a
Minuteman ICBM, bypassing standard procedure and obtaining an independent launch authority. American
F-102A interceptors armed with
GAR-11 Falcon nuclear
air-to-air missiles (each with a 0.25 kiloton yield) were then scrambled to escort the U-2 into friendly airspace. Individual pilots were capable of arming and launching their missiles. The incident remained secret for many years. In late 1969, the
Nixon White House developed the
Duck Hook, which involved major escalation of the US war effort via bombing and mining campaigns. The plan was abandoned by Nixon on 1 November due to opposition from the cabinet, lowered public war support, and uncertain effectiveness.
1969: DPRK shootdown of US EWAC aircraft A United States
Lockheed EC-121 Warning Star early warning aircraft was shot down by a
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)
MiG-21, killing all 31 servicemen aboard.
F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber jets at
Kunsan Air Base were ordered to load
B61 nuclear bombs and began preparations for a nuclear strike against the DPRK. The attack was to include the airfield from which the North Koreans had attacked the US aircraft. After a few hours, the order to stand down was given and the jets never took off. Reportedly, President
Richard Nixon was drunk when he gave the order for a nuclear attack against the DPRK. The order to stand down was given on the advice of
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
1969: Sino-Soviet conflict In 1969, following the border conflict
Battle of Zhenbao Island in March, the USSR
considered a massive nuclear attack on China, targeting cities and nuclear facilities. It made military activity in the
Russian Far East, and informed its allies and the United States of this potential attack. The Chinese government and archives were evacuated from Beijing while the
People's Liberation Army scattered from its bases. The crisis abated when US secretary of state Henry Kissinger informed the Soviet Union that an attack on China would be met by a US nuclear attack on 130 Soviet cities. According to the
U.S. Department of State, one of the two main "after-the-fact explanations" for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test conducted by the U.S. military in October 1969 was to deter a possible Soviet nuclear strike against the People's Republic of China.
1973: Yom Kippur War During the Yom Kippur War, Israeli officials panicked that the Arab invasion force would overrun Israel after the
Syrian Army nearly achieved a breakout in the
Golan Heights, and the
U.S. government rebuffed Israel's request for an emergency
airlift. According to a former
CIA official, Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan requested and received authorization from Israeli prime minister
Golda Meir to arm 13
Jericho missiles and 8
F-4 Phantom II fighter jets with nuclear warheads. The missile launchers were located at
Sdot Micha Airbase, while the fighter jets were placed on 24-hour notice at
Tel Nof Airbase. The missiles were said to be aimed at the Arab military headquarters in
Cairo and
Damascus. Declassified Israeli documents have not confirmed these allegations directly, but have confirmed that Israel was willing to use "drastic means" to win the war.
1983: Able Archer 83 NATO exercise Able Archer 83 was a
command post exercise carried out by NATO military forces and political leaders between 7 and 11 November 1983. The exercise simulated a Soviet conventional attack on European NATO forces 3 days before the start of the exercise (D-3), transitioning to a large scale chemical war (D-1) and on day 1 (D+1) of the exercise, NATO forces sought political guidance on the use of nuclear weapons to stem the Soviet advance which was approved by political leaders. NATO then began simulating preparations for a transition to nuclear war. These simulations included 170 radio-silent flights to air lift 19,000 US troops to Europe, regularly shifting military commands to avoid nuclear attack, the use of new nuclear weapon release procedures, the use of nuclear
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) networks for passing nuclear orders, the moving of NATO forces in Europe through each of the alert phases from DEFCON 5 to DEFCON 1, and the participation of political leaders like
Margaret Thatcher,
Helmut Kohl and
Ronald Reagan. The issue was worsened by leaders referring to B-52 sorties as "nuclear strikes", and by the nuclear attack false alarm in September. In response, Soviet nuclear capable aircraft were fueled and armed ready to launch on the runway, and ICBMs were brought up to alert. Soviet leaders believed the exercise was a ruse to cover NATO preparations for a nuclear first strike and frantically sent a telegram to its residencies seeking information on NATO preparations for an attack. The exercise closely aligned with Soviet timeline estimations that a NATO first strike would take 7 to 10 days to execute from the political decision being made. Soviet forces stood down after 11 November when the exercise ended. NATO was unaware of the complete Soviet response until British intelligence asset
Oleg Gordievsky passed on the information.
1991: Gulf War Coalition nuclear weapons The
Coalition of the Gulf War included the
nuclear-armed countries of the United States and the United Kingdom. They both deployed nuclear weapons to the region during the conflict, ostensibly to allow retaliation in the event of an
Iraqi chemical weapons attack. The United States deployed 1,000
tactical weapons to the region, with 300 land-based weapons in
Turkey, and 700 aboard warships in the
Persian Gulf region. The United Kingdom also deployed five nuclear-capable vessels probably carrying between eight and sixteen nuclear weapons. Western chemical weapons were also mobilized to the region. Threats of nuclear use by Coalition officials came from public statements, private communication with Iraqi officials, and
leaked communications. On January 9, 1991,
US Secretary of State James Baker delivered to Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz a letter carrying a formal threat, presumably nuclear retaliation, to the following actions: • If
Saddam Hussein used
chemical or
biological weapons • If Saddam Hussein
destroyed the Kuwaiti oil fields • If Saddam Hussein
supported terrorists Baker warned that the US had "the means to exact vengeance" in the event of an Iraqi resort to WMD. After the war, the
Defense Intelligence Agency credited these threats with deterring Iraq from launching chemical attacks on Coalition forces. Israeli prime minister
Yitzhak Shamir and
Israeli Air Force Commander-in-Chief
Avihu Ben-Nun both warned that an Iraqi chemical attack would trigger "massive retaliation", implying that Israel would retaliate with nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein did have a contingency plan to launch WMD-armed warheads against
Tel Aviv in the event that he became cut off from the
Iraqi Armed Forces leadership or if the
Iraqi government was about to collapse, which almost certainly would have triggered a retaliatory nuclear response from Israel. Saddam Hussein ultimately never deemed this option necessary because he never felt as if his government was about to collapse.
2017–2018: North Korea crisis Between 2017 and 2018, the
United States and
North Korea, most particularly
U.S. president Donald Trump and North Korean supreme leader
Kim Jong-un, exchanged threats that have been described as on the brink of nuclear war. In August 2017, Trump warned that North Korea would be met with "fire and fury, the likes of which the world has never seen". During his speech in 2017 at the
United Nations General Assembly, he warned that if the
United States were forced to defend itself, they would have no choice but to "totally destroy North Korea". North Korea, in response, has referred to Trump as a "dotard", stated that he will "pay dearly", and accused the US of "declaring war". In January 2018, Trump also tweeted that his country has a "bigger nuclear button" than North Korea. In January 2018, it was reported that Trump withdrew
Victor Cha as a pick to be
U.S. Ambassador to South Korea over his opposition to launch a limited strike at North Korea. The withdrawal sparked major concerns for North Korean experts that the US was seriously considering war with North Korea. The crisis has been described as the "Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion". In Van Jackson's book
On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War, he stated that the United States was close as ever to World War III between 2017 and early 2018. Trump also reportedly considered evacuating Americans from
South Korea despite warnings that such a move could lead to war. Reports also emerged in 2023 that Trump was considering the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea in 2017.
2019 India-Pakistan conflict In 2023,
Mike Pompeo, who served as
United States Secretary of State in 2019, claimed that U.S. diplomacy prevented heightened tensions between India and Pakistan from sparking a nuclear war. According to Pompeo, he was informed by
Sushma Swaraj in February 2019 that the Indian government believed Pakistan was preparing a nuclear attack, and that India was preparing an escalatory response. Pompeo claimed that he and then-national security advisor
John Bolton spoke with then-Pakistani Army Chief
Qamar Javed Bajwa in "the tiny secure communications facility in our hotel", who was under the equivalent impression about Indian nuclear preparations. The situation was de-escalated as U.S. side informed both countries that no nuclear attack preparations were occurring. Neither the Indian Ministry of External Affairs or Pakistani Foreign Office commented on Pompeo's claims.
2022–present: Russian invasion of Ukraine Russia has threatened the use of nuclear weapons throughout the invasion of Ukraine, characterized as
nuclear blackmail. In late 2022, tensions over Russian nuclear use reached a high point. Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov implied nuclear weapons could be used to defend
annexed Ukrainian territories. Russian officials, including Russian defense minister
Sergei Shoigu, publicly and privately accused Ukraine of preparing to use a radioactive
dirty bomb on Ukrainian territory. A tweet by the Russian Ministry of Defence, purportedly showing evidence of a Ukrainian dirty bomb in production, was debunked as a collection of old and unrelated photos. On 24 October, John Kirby stated that there was no evidence Russia was preparing a dirty bomb strike. At Ukraine's request, the
United Nations sent an
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigation to Ukraine, which found no evidence of a dirty bomb being developed or any other undeclared nuclear activity. US feared that those allegations by Russia may be a confirmation of it preparing for a nuclear strike on Ukraine, using dirty bomb allegations or a
false flag attack as a pretext. The US, as reported by CNN, has "prepared 'rigorously' for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine". It also engaged US diplomats, as well as asked other countries, namely China and India, to engage diplomatically to persuade Russia to avoid nuclear escalation. On 19 November 2024, Putin signed a
decree allowing Russia to use nuclear weapons in response to
conventional attacks by a non-nuclear state supported by a
nuclear power, lowering the threshold for a nuclear strike in response to a possible conventional attack. On 21 November 2024, Russia used a conventionally armed
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) system, on the
Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile to attack the Ukrainian city of
Dnipro, marking their first usage in combat. The MIRV system was developed by multiple nations for nuclear strategic missiles. On 7 December 2024, Russia and Belarus signed an agreement offering security guarantees to
Belarus including
nuclear security and the possible use of
Russian nuclear weapons to repel aggressions. Two days later Belarusian president
Alexander Lukashenko confirmed the presence of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus, including Russia's Oreshnik missile system. On 4 May 2025, in an interview to mark his 25 years of power in Russia, Putin remarked that "he hoped that there would be no need to use nuclear weapons" to bring the Russian invasion of Ukraine "to its logical conclusion". == Unintentional close calls ==