On October 29, 1980, the night after Reagan's successful performance in the debate, Reagan campaign consultant Stuart Spencer proposed to Reagan that Baker should be his chief of staff, should he win. Supported by
Nancy Reagan and Reagan aide
Michael Deaver, Spencer felt that Baker would be a less provocative choice than hardliner
Edwin Meese, who had worked with Reagan throughout his campaigns and governorship. Reagan agreed, announcing Baker as his choice the morning after his election victory. Other callers would have to receive Troika approval. Among other influences, the Troika had effective veto power over hiring and firing. Though Reagan was the ultimate decider, he only acted on unanimous consent from the Troika, often preferring not to fire people if possible. Despite the power-sharing principle behind the Troika, Baker is considered to have had a high degree of influence over the first Reagan administration. Reagan biographer
Max Boot argued that the arrangement let Baker "run circles around Meese," whom Baker privately derided as "
Pillsbury Doughboy."
Lou Cannon, who covered the administration for
The Washington Post, referred to Baker as being the "key" to the proper functioning of the Troika. Ford and Bush advisor
Brent Scowcroft referred to Baker as "co-president, in a way," under Reagan. In 1992, Washington Post columnist
Marjorie Williams referred to Baker as "the most powerful [chief of staff] in political memory." Baker wasn't in his entourage and learned of the shooting as Reagan was in the
hospital. Baker and Meese joined Deaver at the hospital, where Reagan was in critical condition. Baker, Meese, and White House Political Director
Lyn Nofziger decided amongst themselves whether to use the provisions of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to make Bush the Acting President while Reagan's status was in flux. The group of advisors decided, without asking Bush, to avoid any temporary transition. Baker himself worried that such an action would feed into conservatives' existing distrust toward both him and Bush. With Baker's authorization, his deputy
Richard Darman actively stopped White House discussion—by
White House Counsel Fred Fielding and
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, among others—of any transition by taking the transition documents they had drafted and putting it in his office safe. According to his biographers, Baker consciously restricted access to Reagan during his recovery period, fearing that it would cast doubts on his overall competence if the country knew his poor health in the immediate aftermath.
Conservative criticism Members of the conservative movement publicly criticized Baker for his support of
Sandra Day O'Connor and apparent inaction on conservative priorities. In Spring 1982, Baker confronted conservative writer
Robert Novak for the negative coverage he felt he received over multiple
Evans & Novak columns. Shortly after Baker's outburst at Novak, long-time Reagan booster
Clymer Wright of Houston wrote a letter to Republicans in an unsuccessful effort to convince Reagan to dismiss Baker. Wright claimed that Baker, a former Democrat and a Bush political intimate, was a "usurper" who undermined conservative initiatives in the administration. Reagan directly rejected Wright's request in a letter at Baker's request. Reagan wrote that he himself was in charge and that Baker was following Reagan's own initiative. Despite the rebuttal, conservatives continued to distrust Baker. Former administration official
Lyn Nofziger wrote a letter to conservative Republicans in late 1982 to express concern that the 1984 race would be a "Bush-Reagan," rather than a "Reagan-Bush," campaign. Baker and Reagan both called Nofziger directly to ask him to retract the sentiment. In January 1983,
Interior Secretary James G. Watt pioneered the slogan "Let Reagan be Reagan," a barb about Baker and Bush, which became a common refrain among activists and columnists. Three years into the administration, Baker became heavily dispirited and tired due to the weight of his job; according to his wife, Baker was "so anxious to get out of [his job]" that he gave some consideration to the prospect of becoming
Commissioner of Baseball. Despite having no strong baseball fandom, Baker reached the last level of consideration to replace
Bowie Kuhn before losing out to
Peter Ueberroth. Reagan offered to appoint Baker as
Secretary of Transportation in 1983, but Baker believed that his rival Meese had pushed the plan. At Bush's suggestion, he also strongly considered trying to become CIA Director. In 1983, some Texas legislators attempted to draft Baker to run for the Senate seat that would open following John Tower's retirement, but Baker declined what he felt might be a demotion in power.
National Security Advisor In October 1983, Baker attempted to replace
William Clark as
National Security Advisor. Clark left for the Interior Department, partly out of feeling frustrated by what he perceived as Baker, Deaver, and Nancy Reagan's undue influence over the president. Upon seeing the press release announcing the changes, Clark organized the NSC's conservative bloc— Clark, Meese, Casey, Weinberger—to reject the reshuffle. The conservative bloc wanted to appoint
UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, an anti-Soviet hardliner, as Clark's replacement instead. Baker, Deaver, and Shultz rallied to reject Kirkpatrick as unacceptably extreme. Reagan eventually chose
Robert McFarlane, who was later convicted of crimes stemming from the
Iran-Contra affair, as Clark's replacement. In his memoir, Reagan referred to the decision not to appoint Baker as a "turning point" in his presidency.
1984 campaign Baker began to plan Reagan's expected re-election bid beginning in Autumn 1982. Though Reagan did not officially announce his campaign until late January 1984—which the planning committee itself decided—Baker and his informal group—which included Deaver, Stuart Spencer, and Republican pollster
Robert Teeter—believed his candidacy was a foregone conclusion. The meetings ran weekly in the
Madison Hotel until late 1983. Baker informally chose Laxalt's deputy,
campaign manager Ed Rollins, and the question of who Rollins reported to spurred some minor internecine conflicts. Early in the campaign, Laxalt directly complained to Reagan that Baker had assumed de facto control over the campaign. Reagan confirmed Laxalt's authority, leading to Baker accusing Rollins of "sandbagging" him in the campaign. Laxalt also dismissed Baker as "the hired help" when they were at odds over campaign direction. Instead, they had Reagan make his stance not that he would promise not to raise taxes, only that he had "no plans" to raise taxes. The latter would allow Reagan to avoid upsetting anti-tax conservatives while allowing that taxes could be necessary to reach a balanced budget without major cuts to Medicare or Social Security. Reagan won the election with a record 525 electoral votes total (of a possible 538), and received 58.8% of the popular vote to
Walter Mondale's 40.6%. The campaign overall was optimistic about its chances throughout the process. A widely shared sentiment among Baker and senior aides was the one expressed by Stuart Spencer, that their goal was not to "screw up" their otherwise excellent chances. Baker himself earned praise for minimizing campaign conflicts by directing conflicting aides toward Rollins, who would then adjudicate disputes before they boiled over. Unlike in the 1976 and 1980 campaigns that Baker was involved in, there were no major staffing changes throughout the Republican campaign. == Secretary of the Treasury (1985–1988) ==