An earlier British attempt to relieve Kimberley, led by Lieutenant General
Lord Methuen, had been opposed by Boers under Cronjé and
Koos de la Rey. Although the Boers had failed to prevent the British crossing the
Modder River on 28 November, they had fought them to a standstill at the
Battle of Magersfontein thirteen days later, inflicting heavy casualties. Over the next two months, the front south of Kimberley stagnated. A substantial Boer detachment under De la Rey was sent to
Colesberg where, in contrast to the situation elsewhere, the Boers were being driven back by a roughly equal British force. Cronjé's remaining forces were weakened by lack of grazing for their horses. Many of the Boer fighters' families joined Cronjé's main encampment at
Jacobsdal. The inclusion with Cronje’s forces of large numbers of non-combatants with their slow-moving ox-drawn wagons would later prove to be a significant handicap to him.
British plans Field Marshal
Roberts had been appointed to command the British forces in South Africa in December 1899, succeeding General
Buller. Roberts had just learned that his son
Freddy had been mortally wounded at the
Second Battle of Colenso. Like Buller, Roberts at first intended to make a direct thrust on the Boer capitals of
Bloemfontein and
Pretoria, using the central railway line from
Cape Town to these two capital cities as his line of communication. Also like Buller, he found on arrival in South Africa that public opinion both in Britain and South Africa was clamouring for the relief of British forces besieged at
Ladysmith,
Kimberley and
Mafeking and was forced to modify his plans. Leaving Buller in command of the attempt to relieve Ladysmith, Roberts collected large numbers of reinforcements which had recently arrived in South Africa along the railway line between the
Orange and Modder rivers on 11 February 1900. He intended to outflank the Boer left and pass his cavalry around them to relieve Kimberley, while his infantry secured vital fords behind them. Roberts had two infantry divisions (the 6th and the 7th) each of two infantry brigades, and a mounted division of three brigades under Major General
John French. Another infantry division (the 9th, under Lieutenant General
Henry Edward Colville) was formed during the campaign.
Relief of Kimberley on their way to
relieve Kimberley While Methuen's 1st Division demonstrated against the Boer entrenchments at Magersfontein and the
Highland Brigade under Major General
Hector MacDonald marched westward to Koedoesberg and fixed the Boers' attention to their right flank, Roberts's large force began marching east in secret, late on 11 February. By the evening of 12 February, his leading horsemen had secured fords across the first obstacle, the
Riet River. The next day, 13 February, the British mounted force made a gruelling march of under a blazing sun to capture fords across the Modder. The effect of the heat was made worse when the dry grass of the veld caught fire from a carelessly discarded match. French's division had to wait at the fords (at Klip Drift) during the next day until the leading infantry reached them, after making an equally exhausting march. Luckily for the British, the move had taken the Boers by surprise and they did not move in strength to defend the fords or the hills nearby. Early on 15 February, French's division began the final march to relieve Kimberley. Only scattered and disorganised Boers opposed them, and the enormous mass of British horsemen broke through their thin line, concealed in the dust cloud they created. Late that evening they reached Kimberley, where they were greeted with cheering crowds. French should by rights have gone to the military commander of the besieged garrison, Lieutenant Colonel
Kekewich. Instead he called first on
Cecil Rhodes, the former prime minister of Cape Colony and foremost Imperialist, at the town's chief hotel. The final day's ride had crippled most of French's division. Most of his British regular cavalry carried too much equipment and their unacclimatised horses (and those of the seven batteries of horse artillery) were exhausted. His effective force was reduced to two regiments of New Zealand and Australian light horse, and two "brigades" (actually battalions) of mounted infantry. French was to further tire his men on 16 February by futile attempts to intercept one of the Boers'
Creusot 40-pounder siege guns (nicknamed "Long Tom") which was withdrawing to the north.
Cronjé's move to Paardeberg , commander of the Boer forces at Paardeberg Drift Also on 15 February, Cronjé's men, some 5,000 Transvaalers and Freestaters, finally evacuated their camp at
Jacobsdal. Their position at Magersfontein was no longer relevant and they were in danger of being besieged in Jacobsdal by the British 7th Division under Lieutenant General
Charles Tucker, which had turned west from Klip Drift. On the night of the 15th, the large convoy of Boer ox-wagons passed between the rear of French's division and the outposts of Lieutenant General
Thomas Kelly-Kenny's 6th Division at the Modder fords. Throughout the next day, the Boer mounted rearguards prevented the British 6th Division (with only one understrength mounted infantry unit) overtaking them. On the 17th, the large convoy of Boer wagons reached the crossing of the Modder at Paardeberg Drift. They were starting to cross the river when a force of 1,500 British mounted troops, almost all of French's fit horses and men who had covered the from Kimberley in another desperately tiring march, opened fire on them unexpectedly from the north, causing confusion. Cronjé then inadvisedly decided to form a laager and dig in on the banks of the Modder river. His reasons for doing so are unclear because the British had insufficient cavalry and it would therefore have been an easy matter for Cronjé to brush them aside and link up with other Boers east of the Modder. Boers under noted commander
Christiaan De Wet were only away to the south-east and other forces under Chief Commandant
Ignatius Ferreira were a similar distance to the north. In any event, Cronje’s pause allowed the British to assemble a force of 15,000 men that significantly outnumbered Cronje and that enjoyed overwhelming superiority in artillery. All the British then had to do was lay siege to the Boer position and bombard them at their leisure. ==Battle==