(1904) (now Jackson Square), New Orleans, marking the transfer of sovereignty over French Louisiana to the United States, December 20, 1803, as depicted by
Thure de Thulstrup in 1902 After Monroe and Livingston had returned from France with news of the purchase, an official announcement of the purchase was made on July 4, 1803. This gave Jefferson and his cabinet until October, when the treaty had to be ratified, to discuss the constitutionality of the purchase. Jefferson considered a
constitutional amendment to justify the purchase; however, his cabinet convinced him otherwise. Jefferson justified the purchase by rationalizing, "it is the case of a guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an important adjacent territory; & saying to him when of age, I did this for your good." Jefferson ultimately came to the conclusion before the ratification of the treaty that the purchase was to protect the citizens of the United States therefore making it constitutional.
Henry Adams and other historians have argued that Jefferson acted hypocritically with the Louisiana Purchase, because of his position as a
strict constructionist regarding the Constitution, by stretching the intent of that document to justify his purchase. The American purchase of the Louisiana territory was not accomplished without domestic opposition. Jefferson's philosophical consistency was in question and many people believed he and others, including
James Madison, were doing something they surely would have argued against with
Alexander Hamilton. The
Federalists strongly opposed the purchase, because of the cost involved, their belief that France would not have been able to resist U.S. and British encroachment into Louisiana, and Jefferson's perceived hypocrisy. Both Federalists and Jeffersonians were concerned over the purchase's constitutionality. Many members of the
House of Representatives opposed the purchase. Majority Leader
John Randolph led the opposition. The House called for a vote to deny the request for the purchase, but it failed by two votes, 59–57. The Federalists even tried to prove the land belonged to Spain, not France, but available records proved otherwise. The Federalists also feared that the power of the
Atlantic seaboard states would be threatened by the new citizens in the West, whose political and economic priorities were bound to conflict with those of the merchants and bankers of
New England. There was also concern that an increase in the number of slave-holding states created out of the new territory would exacerbate divisions between North and South. A group of Northern Federalists led by Senator
Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts went so far as to explore the idea of a separate northern confederacy. The opposition of New England Federalists to the Louisiana Purchase was primarily economic self-interest, not any legitimate concern over constitutionality or whether France indeed owned Louisiana or was required to sell it back to Spain should it desire to dispose of the territory. The Northerners were not enthusiastic about Western farmers gaining another outlet for their crops that did not require the use of New England ports. Also, many Federalists were speculators in lands in upstate New York and New England and were hoping to sell these lands to farmers, who might go west instead if the Louisiana Purchase went through. They also feared that this would lead to Western states being formed, which would likely be Republican, and dilute the political power of New England Federalists. Another concern was whether it was proper to grant citizenship to the French, Spanish, and free black people living in New Orleans, as the treaty would dictate. Critics in Congress worried whether these "foreigners", unacquainted with democracy, could or should become citizens. Spain protested the transfer on two grounds: First, France had previously promised in a note not to alienate Louisiana to a third party and, second, France had not fulfilled the Third Treaty of San Ildefonso by having the King of
Etruria recognized by all European powers. The French government replied that these objections were baseless as the promise not to alienate Louisiana was not in the treaty of San Ildefonso itself and therefore had no legal force, and the Spanish government had ordered Louisiana to be transferred in October 1802 despite knowing for months that Britain had not recognized the King of Etruria in the
Treaty of Amiens. Madison, in response to Spain's objections, noted that the United States had first approached Spain about purchasing the property, but had been told by Spain itself that the U.S. would have to deal with France for the territory. Henry Adams claimed "The sale of Louisiana to the United States was trebly invalid; if it were French property, Bonaparte could not constitutionally alienate it without the consent of the French
Chambers; if it were Spanish property, he could not alienate it at all; if Spain had a right of reclamation, his sale was worthless." The sale, of course, was not "worthless"—the U.S. actually did take possession. Furthermore, the Spanish prime minister had authorized the U.S. to negotiate with the French government regarding "the acquisition of territories which may suit their interests." Spain turned the territory over to France in a ceremony in New Orleans on November 30, a month before France turned the city over to American officials. Other historians counter the above arguments regarding Jefferson's alleged hypocrisy by asserting that countries change their borders in two ways: (1) conquest, or (2) an agreement between nations, otherwise known as a treaty. The Louisiana Purchase was the latter, a treaty. Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution specifically grants the president the power to negotiate treaties, which is what Jefferson did. Madison (the "Father of the Constitution") assured Jefferson that the Louisiana Purchase was well within even the strictest interpretation of the Constitution. Treasury Secretary
Albert Gallatin added that because the power to negotiate treaties was specifically granted to the president, the only way extending the country's territory by treaty could
not be a presidential power would be if it were specifically excluded by the Constitution (which it was not). Jefferson, as a strict constructionist, was right to be concerned about staying within the bounds of the Constitution, but felt the power of these arguments and was willing to "acquiesce with satisfaction" if the Congress approved the treaty. The
Senate quickly ratified the treaty, and the House, with equal readiness, authorized the required funding. The fledgling United States did not have $15 million in its treasury; instead, it borrowed the sum from British and Dutch banks, at an annual interest rate of six percent. (See below.) The United States Senate consented to ratification of the treaty with a vote of 24 to seven on October 20. On the following day, October 21, 1803, the Senate authorized Jefferson to take possession of the territory and establish a temporary military government. In legislation enacted on October 31, Congress made temporary provisions for local civil government to continue as it had under French and Spanish rule and authorized the president to use military forces to maintain order. Plans were also set forth for several missions to explore and chart the territory, the most famous being the
Lewis and Clark Expedition. ==Formal transfers and initial organization==