Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall define power as "the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate".
Power as a goal The view that hegemony is a goal in international relations has long been discussed by political theorists. Philosophers such as
Thucydides,
Niccolò Machiavelli,
Thomas Hobbes and
Hans Morgenthau are thought to have provided a realistic portrait of this political aim. Especially among Classical
Realist thinkers, political dominance is the aim of nation states. The German military thinker
Carl von Clausewitz is considered to be the quintessential projection of European growth across the continent. In more modern times,
Claus Moser has elucidated theories centre of distribution of power in Europe after the Holocaust, and the power of universal learning as its counterpoint.
Jean Monnet was a French left-wing social theorist, stimulating expansive Eurocommunism, who followed on the creator of modern European community, the diplomat and statesman
Robert Schuman.
Power as influence accounts for 55% of
global military expenditure, with the
United States alone accounting for 37% of global military expenditure in 2023.
Political scientists principally use "power" in terms of an actor's ability to exercise
influence over other actors within the
international system. This influence can be
coercive, attractive,
cooperative, or
competitive. Mechanisms of influence can include the threat or use of force, economic interaction or pressure, diplomacy, and popular culture. Under certain circumstances, states can organize a
sphere of influence or a bloc within which they exercise predominant influence. Historical examples include the spheres of influence recognized under the
Concert of Europe, or the recognition of spheres during the
Cold War following the
Yalta Conference. The
Eastern Bloc, the
Western Bloc, and the
Non-Aligned Movement were the blocs that arose out of the Cold War contest. Military alliances like
NATO and the
Warsaw Pact are another forum through which influence is exercised. However, "
realist" theory attempted to maintain the
balance of power from the development of meaningful diplomatic relations that can create a
hegemony within the region.
British foreign policy, for example, dominated Europe through the
Congress of Vienna after the defeat of France. They continued the balancing act with the
Congress of Berlin in 1878, to appease Russia and Germany from attacking Turkey. Britain has sided against the aggressors on the European continent—i.e. the
German Empire,
Nazi Germany,
Napoleonic France or the
Austrian Empire, known during
World War I as the
Central Powers and, in
World War II as the
Axis powers. International orders have both a material and social component.
Martha Finnemore argues that unipolarity does not just entail a material superiority by the unipole, but also a social structure whereby the unipole maintains its status through legitimation, and institutionalization. In trying to obtain legitimacy from the other actors in the international system, the unipole necessarily gives those actors a degree of power. The unipole also obtains legitimacy and wards off challenges to its power through the creation of institutions, but these institutions also entail a diffusion of power away from the unipole. David Lake has argued along similar lines that legitimacy and authority are key components of international order.
Susan Strange made a key contribution to International Political Economy on the issue of
power, which she considered essential to the character and dynamics of the global economy. Strange was skeptical of static indicators of power, arguing that it was structural power that mattered. In particular, interactions between states and markets mattered. She pointed to the superiority of the American technology sector, dominance in services, and the position of the U.S. dollar as the top international currency as real indicators of lasting power. She distinguished between relational power (the power to compel A to get B to do something B does not want to do) and structural power (the power to shape and determine the structure of the global political economy).
Power as capability American author
Charles W. Freeman, Jr. described power as the following:
Power is also used to describe the
resources and
capabilities of a state. This definition is quantitative and is most often used by geopoliticians and the military. Capabilities are thought of in tangible terms—they are measurable, weighable, quantifiable assets. A good example for this kind of measurement is the
Composite Indicator on Aggregate Power, which involves 54 indicators and covers the capabilities of 44 states in
Asia-Pacific from 1992 to 2012. Hard power can be treated as a potential and is not often enforced on the international stage.
Chinese strategists have such a concept of
national power that can be measured
quantitatively using an index known as
Comprehensive National Power.
Michael Beckley argues that gross domestic product and military spending are imprecise indicators of power. He argues that better measurements of power should take into account "net" indicators of powers: "[Gross] indicators systematically exaggerate the wealth and military capabilities of poor, populous countries, because they tally countries' resources without deducting the costs countries pay to police, protect, and serve their people. A country with a big population might produce vast output and field a large army, but it also may bear massive welfare and security burdens that drain its wealth and bog down its military, leaving it with few resources for
power projection abroad." ==Power as status==