Early battles , 1948 Eitan was a junior officer in the
Palmach, the
Haganah's elite strike force, and took part in the
1948 Arab–Israeli War. He fought in
Jerusalem and received a head wound in the battle for the
San Simon Monastery in April 1948. Later he served with the 10th Infantry Battalion in the
Lachish-
Negev region. In 1954, Captain Eitan became commander of a Paratroops company in
Unit 101. During
Operation Olive Leaves in 1955 he received a machine gun wound to his chest, while participating in a military raid into
Syria. For this action he was decorated with the
Medal of Courage. In the 1956
Suez Crisis, Major Eitan was the commander of the
890 Paratroopers battalion and participated in the 29 October parachute attack on the
Mitla Pass. During the
Six-Day War in early June 1967, as a Colonel he commanded the
Paratroopers Brigade on the
Gaza front. He received a severe head wound in combat while approaching the
Suez Canal. On the evening of 28 December 1968, he commanded the
commando raid on Beirut airport. According to a legend which circulated among Israeli special forces soldiers, at one point during the raid, he entered the airport terminal, and finding it in a state of disorder with no security guards present, walked to a coffee shop, ordered a coffee, and paid for it in Israeli currency before leaving. In 1969 he was appointed head of infantry forces and later served as a division commander. As a division commander, of 36th Ugda, Brigadier General Eitan stopped the Syrian attack into the
Golan Heights during the October 1973
Yom Kippur War. After the war, he was appointed to commander of the northern command and promoted to the rank of
Major General.
Chief of Staff , Maj.
Ariel Sharon, Lt. Gen
Moshe Dayan, Capt.
Dani Matt, Lt. Moshe Efron, Maj. Gen
Asaf Simchoni; On ground, l to r: Capt.
Aharon Davidi, Lt. Ya'akov Ya'akov, Capt. Rafael Eitan. On 1 April 1978, Eitan was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and was appointed by
Ezer Weizman to be the
Chief of Staff of the
Israel Defense Forces. during the
Six-Day War Eitan opened his term with symbolic steps to increase
discipline and efficiency in the IDF. He required soldiers to wear the military beret and to collect spent
cartridges after rifle range practice. Eitan oversaw the redeployment of the IDF outside of the
Sinai Peninsula after the peninsula was handed back to
Egypt. He and Sharon demolished the Israeli town of
Yamit in Sinai in April 1982 after the Egyptians refused to pay for its infrastructure. As chief of staff, Eitan initiated a project that was known as "
Raful Youth" (
Na'arei Raful), in which young persons from low
socio-economic background were integrated into the IDF and were trained for professions that allowed them to come out of poverty and avoid getting involved in crime. The IDF also helped those youth to complete their high school studies. He was chief of staff at the time of the Israeli
air attack on
Iraq's
Osirak nuclear reactor complex on 7 June 1981. In April 1982 he initiated a new policy in the
Occupied Territories which in Israeli army slang became known by the
Hebrew word
tertur. One document from his office stated: After the trial of seven members of the Israeli army in December 1982, an Israeli operations officer was quoted as described
tertur: "In addition to this business where you work to discover the provocateurs, you
tertur the population. Population
tertur does not mean that you punish those who did something, but you simply round up everyone, just like that."
Lebanon War In 1981 it became public knowledge the Israel was arming and forming an alliance with the Lebanese
Phalangist militia. In May it was revealed that Eitan had recently visited
Jounieh several times and met with the militia leadership. The previous month, at a meeting in Damascus, the Lebanese government had come to an agreement with
UNIFIL to deploy
Lebanese Army soldiers into the areas that the
UN forces were stationed in
Southern Lebanon. This was followed by an increase of
IDF activity in Lebanon which culminated in a crisis over the positioning Syrian antiaircraft missiles. Operations included a nighttime commando raid on five Palestinian targets in Southern Lebanon, 9–10 April; the shooting down of two Syrian Army helicopters in the
Beqaa valley, 28 April; a commando raid near
Damour in which four Libyan and two Syrian soldiers were killed, 27 May. On 3 June 1982,
Abu Nidal's militant group gravely wounded Israel's ambassador in London,
Shlomo Argov, in an assassination attempt. In response, the
Israeli Air Force bombed
Palestinian refugee camps in
Lebanon. The Palestinian militants shelled Israel's northern settlements in retaliation and resulted in the Israeli government's 4 June order to begin the
1982 Lebanon War. The operation was launched on 6 June and soon became a full-scale
invasion. The Israeli plan was to drive the
PLO away from the Israeli border and help
Bachir Gemayel's Phalangist militia take control of south Lebanon. During the war, the IDF faced the
Syrian military, Palestinian militants and various
militias. The IDF engaged in
urban warfare and shelled
Beirut to hit PLO headquarters. The IDF achieved some impressive military results – such as wiping out the entire Syrian air defense system in the first days of the war, under the command of
IAF Major general David Ivri. But it also had some failures, such as the
Battle of Sultan Yacoub. The operation was designed to be limited – both in time and area – but the IDF advanced far beyond the planned "40 kilometers" under the command of Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon. The mounting Israeli casualties in Lebanon, combined with the
Sabra and Shatila massacre, resulted in mass protests by the Israeli public against the war – which resulted in a cease-fire agreements and the establishment of the
Kahan Commission to investigate the massacre.
Kahan Commission In concluding that Eitan was "in breach of duty that was incumbent on the Chief of Staff" the Commission focused on two points: Firstly, that he did not take into consideration the "danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed" when he, with the
Minister of Defence, decided to send the
Phalangist militia into the refugee camps. The commission argued that it was "common knowledge ... that there was a possibility of harm to the population in the camps at the hands of the Phalangists", particularly in the aftermath of the assassination of their leader, the newly elected President of Lebanon,
Bashir Gemayel. Secondly they found that he was in dereliction of duty for not following up reports of acts of killings which had become known within hours of the Phalangist entry into Shatila camp. They record that he had a meeting with the Phalangist leaders on the following day in Beirut and did not raise the issue. At this meeting he expressed satisfaction with the Phalangist operation and agreed to provide further support. In its recommendations the commission noted that Eitan was due to retire in April 1983 and therefore resolved "that it is sufficient to determine responsibility without making any further recommendation." In a book co-authored by
Ze'ev Schiff, military correspondent of ''
Ha'aretz'', and
Ehud Ya'ari, Middle East Affairs correspondent for
Israeli television, published a year after the Kahan Report, new information came to light, that suggested that Eitan was aware of the feelings of the Phalangists before he and Sharon decided to send the militia into the refugee camps. During a minuted meeting at the Defense Minister's office at 5 pm on Thursday 16 September 1982 between US diplomats including
Morris Draper and Sharon, Eitan, Saguy, and two other senior Defense Ministry staff, Draper was informed of the Israeli plan to send the Phalangists into the camps. A heated exchange followed, centering on which Lebanese force was to enter the camps. Draper insisted that it should be the regular Lebanese army. At this point Eitan broke into the discussion: They're not up to it. Let me explain to you. Lebanon is at a point of exploding into a frenzy of revenge. No one can stop them. Yesterday we spoke with the Phalange about their plans. They don't have a strong command.... They're obsessed with the idea of revenge. You have to know the Arabs well to sense something like that. If Amin tells the Phalangists to wreak their vengeance, he'll legitimize what's going to happen. I'm telling you that some of their commanders visited me, and I could see in their eyes that it's going to be a relentless slaughter. A number of incidents already happened today, and it's a good thing we were there, rather than the Lebanese army, to prevent it from going further. Schiff and Ya'ari continue: "To hear Eitan tell it, the IDF was the last obstacle to a bloodthirsty rampage by the Phalange. Of course, he neglected to state that the Phalange forces were waiting outside Shatila at that very moment, because he, among others, had encouraged them to fight in the camps". ==Political career==