Return to the Cibao After the formation of the
First Dominican Republic, Mella was acquired by the Central Government Board, with Sánchez serving as president. On March 2, 1844, Mella sent a letter to Duarte, Pérez, and Pińa, all of whom were in Curaçao, informing them of the success of the revolt and of affairs of the new state. A few days later, Mella left for the
Cibao in order to direct the defense against the
Haitians and proceed to the organization of the new state in said region, the most important in the country from the economic wealth and the size of its population. With the rank of colonel and delegate of the board, Mella proposed to organize the defense around the city of Santiago, believing that the city would prove to be vital in the war. Mella was aware that if the city was captured, the road to the capital would be clear for the enemy troops. Upon reaching the city, he replaced the weapons commander. He then realized then the city lacked soldiers, so he left a command chart and a combat plan before marching towards
San José de Las Matas, (then known as La Sierra), to recruit more soldiers. He also left the instruction of forcing the characters to subordinate themselves to the influential leaders, from the northwest line, of the new government who were still hesitating, avoiding actions of small conflicts against the Haitians and concentrating all resources to defend Santiago, since defending the city was an easier tactic. Mella even considered the fact that since Santiago was far from the border, the invading troops would have to endure an exhausting march as well as supply difficulties. He used that time to enlist
José María Imbert, from
Moca, as second in command of the newly constituted National Army, which would later become the Liberation Army. Mella would also assume the position of governor of Santiago and delegate of the Central Government Board, acting as chief political and general for the army. When leaving Santiago in the direction of La Sierra, Mella did not calculate the enemy's maneuverability. The governor of the Department of Northern Haiti, General
Jean-Louis Pierrot, at the head of 10,000 men, was approaching Santiago by forced marches. This was facilitated by the fact that he registered almost no opposition due to numerical superiority and Mella's directive to concentrate all available resources in Santiago. In a panic, Mella embarked on his journey back to Santo Domingo to warn his comrades, but not before giving instructions to Imbert, who was now the lieutenant, to combat the upcoming attack. The forecasts made by Mella and the competent leadership of Imbert resulted in a crushing defeat being inflicted on the Haitians in the
Battle of Santiago, who had hundreds of dead, while, apparently, few Dominicans lost their lives. The confusion for the Haitians was so great that Pierrot accepted a truce and decided to return hastily to
Cap-Haïtien when he was shown a flyer containing the false news that President Hérard had died in Azua. This withdrawal guaranteed the safety of the
Cibao. Over the next two months, Mella dedicated himself to consolidating the defense of the region and ordered the advance of Dominican troops to the border. As a representative of the liberal
Trinitarios, Mella faced opposition from conservative sectors of the region, who obeyed the guidance of the majority of the Government Board. Despite this, Mella obtained broad support, which was a sign that liberal positions found greater acceptance in Cibao than in Santo Domingo. (The capital was the focus of the conservative group, as the residence of the leading sectors of the country. On the other hand, in the southern region, there were social relations that largely had their origin in colonial times, especially extensive livestock farming. On the other hand, in the surroundings of Santiago, tobacco production had been developing, allowing the emergence of a peasantry linked to the market and a more modern and dynamic urban middle class than that existing in Santo Domingo). On one hand, in the South Band, there were social relations that largely had their origin in colonial times, especially extensive livestock farming. On the other hand, in the surroundings of Santiago, tobacco production had been developing, allowing the emergence of a peasantry linked to the market and a more modern and dynamic urban middle class than that existing in Santo Domingo. But by now, Sánchez was no longer in power. The board was under the presidency of Bobadilla that the organization proposed, through the letter of March 8, 1844, addressed to
Auguste Levasseur, the French diplomat, a French protectorate, which evidently implied a return to the Levasseur Plan. Apparently, Bobadilla, Sánchez,
José María Caminero, and various other politicians had signed this letter. But Mella's signature does not appear there: on that date, he was still active trip to Cibao. Bobadilla had not yet assumed the Presidency of the Board, when it agreed to send the schooner “Leonor” to Curaçao in search of Duarte, who arrived in the capital on March 14, 1844, and was immediately incorporated into the Central Government Board. After learning of Bobadilla's annexationist plans, Duarte decided to stage a military uprising to stop it. On June 9, 1844, representatives of the “protectionist” sector
were toppled, and Sánchez was reinstated. The new Board withdrew the powers of that Commission, and Mella felt free to act. He then concentrated his efforts on promoting a movement aimed at bringing Duarte—in whom he continued to see the immaculate teacher—to the Presidency of the Republic. Faced with such a situation of divergence, the Trinitarios, who were now in control of the government, decided to send Duarte to Cibao, in order to reinforce Mella's authority. This promoted Duarte being treated in a godlike way in all the towns he passed through. In Santiago, the troops and people gathered together and hailed Duarte as president of the Dominican Republic. Even though Mella may have promoted the pronouncement, there is no doubt that Duarte was considered the father of the country and acted as an interpreter of popular sentiment, contrary to what some historians have stated, who maintain that the Trinitarios lacked influence in those critical moments. Far from having been a mistake, Duarte's proclamation to the presidency demonstrates Mella’s influence; and shows that he captured in all its intensity the greatness of the father of the country and what he represented against the annexationism of the conservatives. Mella showed that he was endowed with superior ideas and showed signs of courage and audacity, traits that allowed him a significant role in the independence process. However, Duarte's proclamation of the presidency lacked practical consequences in resolving the debate between conservatives and liberals. Despite its economic and demographic weight, the Cibao region lacked power mechanisms, especially in the military aspect, as there were no command systems that could compete with those of Santo Domingo. A considerable part of its leaders – although they were not supporters of Santana and the conservatives – came to the conclusion that it was impossible to oppose them because it introduced the risk of a civil war, in which they would probably be defeated and open the doors upon the return of the Haitians. The fear of the Cibaeño leaders of civil war, which led them to lean towards an agreement with the authority established in Santo Domingo, meant the defeat of the region against the centralism of Santo Domingo, which would be reiterated on subsequent occasions. When Baez became president in September 1849, Mella was appointed Secretary of State for Commerce and the Treasury. He even briefly served as
Minister of Finance of the Dominican Republic from 1849 to 1850. After serving his term, Mella once again retired to his home in Puerto Plata. For unknown reasons, Mella did not reconcile with Báez, instead choosing to align himself with Santana. Thus, upon Santana's return to power, Mella denounced Báez and even advocated to banished him. This mission he was on lasted for six months. He arrived in the old metropolis at the beginning of February 1854 and during the following months, he held negotiations with Spanish officials, without any consequences. At that time, Spain had no interest in taking charge of a protectorate over the Dominican Republic and refused to recognize independence because it considered that it did not bring it any advantages. Secretly, Mella, still holding onto the morals of the Trinitarios, had anticipated Spain to agree to recognize Dominican independence. However, in one of the documents that he presented to the Spanish government, he stated that Spain was the legitimate owner of the territory of the Dominican Republic and that the protectorate over the latter meant for the old Metropolis one more guarantee, over those it may have today to be preserved indefinitely in the
Caribbean. By 1856, there was another threat to Dominican sovereignty. The Spanish consul,
Antonio María Segovia, conspiring with Báez, carried out a plan to destabilize Santana's administration. This was due to the fact that Mella's mission in Madrid had failed, causing Santana to turn his attention to the United States for a protectorate. Alarmed, Spain agreed to the recognition of Dominican independence through the
Dominican–Spanish Treaty (1855), to cease detrimental effects on its control of Cuba, an island that the United States aspired to annex. This resulted in a political scandal known as
Segovia Registration Scandal. Báez's supporters registered at the consulate and took advantage of their status as Spaniards to deploy an active opposition. At one point Mella proposed to exercise dictatorship in order to counteract the Spanish consul, but he did not accept, and advocated for Segovia to be expelled from the nation. During a meeting at the
Dominican National Palace, Mella exclaimed with the following: "The Constitutional Government has enough force of law to be respected and save the Nation. I, the Government, take Segovia, I wrap him in his flag, and expel him from the country
." Santana, however, did not share his views.
Cibaeño Revolution and aftermath When the
revolution against Buenaventura Baez began in Santiago on July 7, 1857, who with his economic mistakes had led the country to the threshold of a financial catastrophe, Mella was one of the first to join that movement of liberal and neo-Duartist orientation. In this famous civil war, Mella consolidated his immense military prestige with the audacious seizure of Plaza de Samaná, which he personally directed at the beginning of May 1858. Because of this action, he received one of the most brilliant and jubilant receptions that the people of Santiago gave him, of which the government was headed by
José Desiderio Valverde. Although they did not coincide in frontal combat, the revolution put Mella and his old friend, Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, on opposing sides. Mella remained related to Santana after he took the presidency of the Dominican Republic for the last time in August 1858, after Báez's flight. Despite the consideration that President Valverde had shown him, Mella supported Santana's coup d'état, who again appointed him commander of arms of Puerto Plata. After the revolution, Mella retired to the countryside, while still remaining active in the national affairs of the country. It was around those days that
Jean-François-Maxime Raybaud, Consul General of France in Port-au-Prince, and already known as a sympathizer of the Dominicans, (like his predecessor Levasseur), appeared in the country to propose to President Santana to accept Emperor Soulouque's demands to merge the country with Haiti. Santana, outraged, not only rejected the proposal, but even sent Raybaud his passport so that he could immediately leave the Dominican Republic. The military authorities throughout the country adhered to Santana's attitude, and Mella, in Puerto Plata, led such a demonstration. ==Final struggle for independence==