The
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (
CAPPS II) was a proposal for a new CAPPS system, designed by the Office of National Risk Assessment (ONRA), a subsidiary office of the TSA, with the contracted assistance of
Lockheed Martin. CAPPS II searched through information stored in
government and commercial
databases and assigned a color-coded level of risk to each passenger.
U.S. Congress presented the TSA with a list of requirements for a successor to CAPPS I. Some of those requirements were: • The government, not the airlines, would control and administer the system • Every ticketed passenger would be screened, not just those who check bags • Every airline and every airport would be covered by the system Like its predecessor, the CAPPS II proposal would rely on the PNR to uniquely identify people attempting to board aircraft. It would expand the PNR field to include a few extra fields, like a full street address, date of birth, and a home telephone number. It would then cross-reference these fields with government records and private sector databases to ascertain the identity of the person, and then determine a number of details about that person. Law enforcement would be contacted in the event that the person was either present on a terrorist or most-wanted list or had outstanding federal or state arrest warrants for a violent crime. Otherwise, the software would calculate a "risk score" and then print a code on the boarding pass indicating the appropriate "screening level" for that person: green (no threat) indicates no additional screening, yellow (unknown or possible threat) indicates additional screening, and red (high-risk) indicates prevention from boarding and deferral to law enforcement. Exactly how this risk score would be calculated was never disclosed nor subject to public oversight of any kind outside of the TSA. CAPPS II grounded innocent
Americans due to false positives. One notable example is the grounding of Senator
Ted Kennedy in 2004. The CAPPS II system was criticized in a report by the United States
General Accounting Office in early 2004, and faced increased opposition from watchdog groups like the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
ReclaimDemocracy.org,
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). These advocacy groups expressed concern that the system violated people's
privacy rights and that it was possibly
unconstitutional. They also believed it could actually undermine safety, as terrorists could use it to their advantage.
Cancellation CAPPS II was cancelled by the TSA in the summer of 2004 due to privacy concerns with the intent of creating a new system. Shortly thereafter, the TSA announced a successor program, called
Secure Flight, that would work in a way similar to CAPPS II. TSA hoped to test Secure Flight in August 2005 using two airlines, but it was blocked by Congress until the government could prove that the system can pass 10 tests for accuracy and privacy protection as follows: • Redress process - A system of due process exists whereby aviation passengers determined to pose a threat are either delayed or prohibited from boarding their scheduled flights by TSA may appeal such decisions and correct erroneous information contained in CAPPS II or Secure Flight or other follow-on/successor programs. • Accuracy of databases and effectiveness of Secure Flight - The underlying error rate of the government and private databases that will be used to both establish identity and assign a risk level to a passenger will not produce a large number of false positives that will result in a significant number of passengers being treated mistakenly or security resources being diverted. • Stress testing - TSA has stress-tested and demonstrated the efficacy and accuracy of all search technologies in CAPPS II or Secure Flight or other follow-on/successor programs and has demonstrated that CAPPS II or Secure Flight or other follow-on/successor programs can make an accurate predictive assessment of those passengers who may constitute a threat to aviation. • Internal oversight - The Secretary of Homeland Security has established an internal oversight board to monitor the manner in which CAPPS II or Secure Flight or other follow-on/successor programs are being developed and prepared. • Operational safeguards - TSA has built in sufficient operational safeguards to reduce the opportunities for abuse. • Security measures - Substantial security measures are in place to protect CAPPS II or Secure Flight or other follow-on/successor programs from unauthorized access by hackers or other intruders. • Oversight of system use and operation - TSA has adopted policies establishing effective oversight of the use and operation of the system. • Privacy concerns - There are no specific privacy concerns with the technological architecture of the system. • Modifications with respect to intrastate travel to accommodate states with unique air transportation needs - TSA has, in accordance with the requirements of section 44903 (j)(2)(B) of title 49, United States Code, modified CAPPS II or Secure Flight or other follow-on/successor programs with respect to intrastate transportation to accommodate states with unique air transportation needs and passengers who might otherwise regularly trigger primary selectee status. • Life-cycle cost estimates and expenditure plans - Appropriate life-cycle cost estimates, and expenditure and program plans exist. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assume from aircraft operators the function of conducting pre-flight comparisons of airline passenger information to federal government watch lists for international and domestic flights. TSA published the Secure Flight Final Rule on October 28, 2008, which went into effect on December 29, 2008, creating the
Secure Flight program. == See also ==