Early history The first local organizations of the league were established in May 1920 prior to the
establishment of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. In May 1922, the 1st National Congress () of the League was held under the leadership of the CCP, and therefore became a unified organization in China named the Socialist Youth League of China (). In the
3rd Party National Congress in January 1925, the Chinese Socialist Youth League was renamed as the Chinese Communist Youth League. After the
Second Sino-Japanese War, in order to adapt to the new social and political situation, it was officially renamed as the Chinese New Democracy Youth League () in April 1949.
Mao Zedong era Later in May 1957, its name as the Chinese Communist Youth League was resumed, historically combining the congresses of all three leagues (the Chinese Socialist Youth League, the Chinese Communist Youth League as well as the Chinese New Democracy Youth League). Prior to the
Cultural Revolution, the CYLC was a major mass organization which had an important role in political mobilization and implementing party-state policies. During the Cultural Revolution, the CYLC was accused of
revisionism and stopped operating in 1966. Various local CYLC operations began resuming after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the CYLC resumed national operations in 1978.
Reform and opening up Following the Mao era, the CYLC has been a major path to CCP membership. This became especially true after the 1982 establishment of the "Recommendation of Outstanding CYL Members" system, which emphasized that those under the age of 28 who wish to join the CCP should be recommended by the CYLC. In 1988, reformist Chinese policymakers proposed a project to loosen CCP control of the CYLC and make the organization more independent. However, CCP leadership set aside the reform proposal following the
1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. In an attempt to increase the relevance of the CYLC and make it more "responsive", the CYLC diversified its activities, beginning to organize classes for CCP applicants and hosting leisure activities in addition to the CYLC's political activities. Along with university student unions, the CYLC began hosting on-campus cultural activities like singing, poetry, and sports competitions. In 1989, the CYLC's central body organized a national "challenge cup" science competition, which was later also adopted by various universities. After Tiananmen, community service activities expanded in the 1990s. In 1993, the CYLC started The Young Volunteers Operation. Through this program, the CYLC has channeled millions of volunteers into poverty alleviation, educational assistance, and environmental protection projects. The CYLC has also mobilized university student volunteers to participate in the China Youth Development Foundation's
Project Hope, which focuses on educational assistance to primary school children in China's least developed regions. In 2003, the CYLC started the “plan for university graduates voluntary service to the West” (
daxuesheng zhiyuan fuwu xibu jihua, 大学生志愿服务 西部计划) as part of its effort to promote volunteer service. If accepted into the program after passing an exam, university graduates work for three years in underdeveloped parts of
western China. speaks at the Communist League conference in February 1962 The Communist Youth League has contributed a number of top echelon leaders of the CCP-led government of the People's Republic of China. The proliferation of leaders with a Youth League background has led to the informal name "
Tuanpai" (abbreviation for "Youth League faction") being used to describe certain members of the leadership at different times. The first "Youth League faction" was represented by
Hu Yaobang. The second "Youth League faction" is represented by
Hu Jintao. While there is no direct political lineage between the two Hus, Hu Jintao's administration formally elevated the memory of the earlier Hu. In 2005, the 90th anniversary of Hu Yaobang's birth, a new museum and a series of commemorative books and television programs were launched. During the Hu Jintao era, CYLC membership expanded as the organization recruited broadly. During the
2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, the CYLC mobilized 1.7 million volunteers to assist with the Olympics. The death of the son of
Ling Jihua and Gu Liping, a couple associated with the Communist Youth League, may have tarnished the reputation of the organization as a path to power.
Xi Jinping era In 2013,
CCP general secretary Xi Jinping criticized the leadership of the CYLC, stating that "All they [cadres] can do is just repeat the same old bureaucratic, stereotypical talk". He lambasted the CYLC as being a slogan-touting "hollow shell" that was bureaucratic, arrogant, ill-informed, elitist, and hedonistic. He criticized CYLC officials for using the organization as a launchpad for their political careers, and said it must experience hardship and reorient itself toward vulnerable groups such as the rural poor, migrants, the disabled, and women and children left behind in the countryside.
South China Morning Post states, "Wu Qiang, a former political science lecturer at Tsinghua University in Beijing, said Xi's trenchant criticism of the youth league reflected his intention to transform it from a bureaucracy to an organisation that can mobilise the masses – much in line with the party's rekindled '
mass line' campaign, developed by Mao Zedong, to reconnect with the public." Political commentators have noted that the diminishing of the
Tuanpai curtailed the influence of former
paramount leader Hu Jintao, solidifying Xi's own political faction. Xi effectively closed the Central School of China Communist Youth League, folding it into the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. During the Xi-era, the CYLC's rule that non-cadre over the age of 28 must leave the organization has been more strictly enforced. Beginning in March 2016, the CYLC and
Alibaba began a collaboration to promote online entrepreneurship among
rural Chinese youth. In 2020, the CYLC began asking its 74 million members to "regularly report personal situations" while studying abroad. In 2021, the CYLC criticized what it called the "patriotism industry," referring to
content creators who used patriotism as a tool to obtain more online views and 'likes' in order to advance their profit motive. At the CYLC's centennial in May 2022, Xi described the organization as the "party's loyal assistant and reliable reserve force." == Structure ==