By mid-1944, American forces were only southeast of
Mindanao, the largest island in the southern Philippines – and able to
bomb Japanese positions there using long-range
bombers. American forces under
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had advanced across the
Central Pacific Ocean, capturing the
Gilbert Islands, some of the
Marshall Islands, and most of the
Marianas Islands, bypassing many Japanese Army garrisons and leaving them without hope of resupply or reinforcement. American
carrier aircraft were already conducting
air strikes and
fighter sweeps against the Japanese in the Philippines, especially focusing on IJA and IJN
airfields.
U.S. Army and
Australian Army troops under the American
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the
Southwest Pacific Theater of Operations, had either overrun, or else isolated and bypassed, all remaining Japanese Army units on
New Guinea and the
Admiralty Islands. Before the invasion of the Philippines, MacArthur's northernmost conquest had been at
Morotai in the
Dutch East Indies on 15–16 September 1944. This was MacArthur's only base within bomber range of the southern Philippines.
U.S. Navy,
Marine Corps, and Army as well as Australian and
New Zealand forces under the commands of General MacArthur and Admiral
William F. Halsey Jr. had previously isolated the large Japanese South Pacific base at
Rabaul,
New Britain, during
Operation Cartwheel. Allied forces had captured more lightly defended islands surrounding Rabaul, and then constructed
air bases on them from which to bomb and
blockade the Japanese forces at Rabaul into combat ineffectiveness, while avoiding a costly battle against the large IJA garrison there. Following victories in the
Marianas campaign (on
Saipan, on
Guam, and on
Tinian, from June–August 1944), American forces were drawing close to Japan itself. From the Marianas, long-range
B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers of the
U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) could bomb the Japanese home islands from well-supplied air bases that enjoyed direct access to supplies via cargo ships and tankers. The earlier phase of long-range B-29 raids against Japan had been carried out from the end of a circuitous
supply line via
British India and
British Burma, which proved to be inadequate in sustaining an effective bombing campaign. All B-29s were transferred to the Marianas during the fall of 1944. Although Japanese decisionmakers recognized that Japan was losing the war at this stage, the
Japanese Government, as well as the
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, refused to entertain the prospect of surrender. There had been a close relationship between the people of the Philippines and the United States since 1898, with the Philippines becoming the
Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935, and promised independence in mid-1946. Furthermore, an extensive series of air attacks by the American
Fast Carrier Task Force under Admiral William F. Halsey against Japanese airfields and other bases on the Philippines had encountered little opposition from land-based Japanese aircraft. Upon Admiral Halsey's recommendation, the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, meeting in Canada, approved a decision not only to move up the date for the first amphibious landing in the Philippines, but also to move this landing north from the southernmost island of Mindanao to the central island of
Leyte. The new date set for the landing on Leyte, 20 October 1944, was two months before the previous target date to land on Mindanao. By late 1944 the
Filipino people were anticipating an American invasion. After the defeat of American forces on the islands in April 1942, the Japanese had occupied the entirety of the island chain. The Japanese occupation was harsh, accompanied by atrocities and with large numbers of Filipinos pressed into
slave labor. From mid-1942 through mid-1944, MacArthur and Nimitz supported the
Filipino guerrilla resistance via U.S. Navy
submarines supply runs and a few parachute drops, so that the guerrillas could harass the Japanese Army and take control of the rural jungle and mountainous areas, which amounted to about half of the archipelago. While remaining loyal to the United States, many Filipinos hoped and believed that liberation from the Japanese would bring them freedom and their already-promised independence. The Australian government offered General MacArthur the
First Corps of the Australian Army to support the liberation of the Philippines. MacArthur suggested that two Australian
infantry divisions be employed, each of them attached to a different U.S. Army
Corps, but this idea was not acceptable to the
Australian Cabinet, which wanted to have significant operational control within a certain area of the Philippines, rather than simply being part of a U.S. Army Corps. No agreement was ever reached between the Australian Cabinet and MacArthur – who might have wanted it that way. However, units from the
Royal Australian Air Force and the
Royal Australian Navy, such as the heavy cruiser , were involved. In addition to rejecting Australian ground troops, MacArthur also rejected the use of Marines for major ground combat operations during all 10 months of the Philippines campaign. The only contributions by the U.S. Marine Corps in this campaign were USMC aircraft and aviators, who provided air cover for U.S. Army ground units and assisted U.S. Army Air Forces aircraft, as well as one small USMC artillery unit,
V Amphibious Corps (VAC) Artillery, commanded by Brigadier General
Thomas E. Bourke. These 1,500 USMC artillerymen only fought in the Philippines during the Battle of Leyte from 21 October to 13 December. This small artillery contingent was the only USMC ground combat unit that served in the Philippines in 1944-45. During the Allied re-conquest of the Philippines, Filipino guerrillas began to strike openly against Japanese forces, carried out reconnaissance activities ahead of the advancing regular troops, and fought alongside advancing American divisions. ==Leyte==