Planning and operations The major decisions 1867–1895 were made by
Archduke Albrecht, Duke of Teschen, who was the cousin of the Emperor Franz Joseph and his leading advisor in military affairs. According to historians
John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft: : He was a firm conservative in all matters, military and civil, and took to writing pamphlets lamenting the state of the Army's morale as well as fighting a fierce rearguard action against all forms of innovation…. Much of the Austrian failure in the First World War can be traced back to his long period of power…. His power was that of the bureaucrat, not the fighting soldier, and his thirty years of command over the peacetime Habsburg Army made it a flabby instrument of war. In the wake of defeat in the 1866
Austro-Prussian War Austria-Hungary avoided major wars in the era between 1867 and 1914 but engaged in a number of minor military actions. Nevertheless, the general staff maintained plans for major wars against neighboring powers, especially Italy, Serbia and Russia. By contrast, the main enemies Russia and Serbia had engaged in large scale warfare in the decade before the First World War. In the late 19th century the army was used to suppress unrest in urban areas of the empire: in 1882 and 1887 in Vienna and notably against German nationalists at Graz and Czech nationalists in Prague in November 1897. Soldiers under the command of Conrad von Hotzendorf were also used against Italian rioters in
Trieste in 1902. The most significant action by soldiers of the Dual Monarchy in this period was the
Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 1878. When troops under the command of
Josip Filipović and
Stjepan Jovanović entered the provinces expecting little or no resistance, they were met with ferocious opposition from elements of both Muslim and Orthodox populations there. Despite setbacks at
Maglaj and
Tuzla,
Sarajevo was occupied in October. Austro-Hungarian casualties amounted to over 5,000 and the unexpected violence of the campaign led to recriminations between commanders and political leaders.
Size and ethnic and religious composition In 1868, the number of active-duty troops in the army was 355,000, and the total could be expanded to 800,000 upon mobilization. However, this was significantly less than the European powers of
France, the
North German Confederation and
Russia, each of which could field more than one million men. Though the population of the empire had risen to nearly 50 million by 1900, the size of the army was tied to ceilings established in 1889. Thus, at the start of the 20th century, Austria-Hungary conscripted only 0.29% of its population, compared to 0.47% in
Germany, 0.35% in Russia, and 0.75% in
France. The 1889 army law was not revised until 1912, which allowed for an increase in annual conscriptions. The ethnic make-up of the enlisted ranks reflected the diversity of the empire the army served; in 1906, out of every 1000 enlisted men, there were 267
Germans, 223
Hungarians, 135
Czechs, 85
Poles, 81
Ruthenians, 67
Croats, 64
Romanians, 38
Slovaks, 26
Slovenes, and 14
Italians. To aid communication between the multitude of ethnicities, the army developed a simple language called
Army Slavic, based primarily on Czech. From a religious standpoint, the Austro-Hungarian army officer corps was dominated by
Catholics. In 1896, out of 1000 officers, 791 were Catholics, 86
Protestants, 84
Jews, 39
Greek-Orthodox, and one
Uniate. Of the pre–World War military forces of the major European powers, the Austro-Hungarian army was almost alone in its regular promotion of Jews to positions of command. While the Jewish population of the lands of the Dual Monarchy 4.4% including
Bosnia and Herzegovina), Jews made up nearly 18% of the reserve officer corps. There were no official barriers to military service for Jews, but in later years this tolerance eroded to some extent, as important figures such as
Conrad von Hötzendorf and
Archduke Franz Ferdinand sometimes expressed anti-Jewish sentiments. Franz Ferdinand was also accused (by Conrad) of discriminating against Protestant officers.
Linguistics and translations , after the signing and translation of the
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 The
Austro-Hungarian Empire often suffered from a lack of military
interpreters, and this proved to be a major force in the partial
dysfunctioning and blunders of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Nearly all officers of the upper ranks spoke
German (specifically
Austrian German), and because only a
fraction of soldiers spoke German, this produced a
logistical obstacle for
organizing the military. Likewise the lack of
mutual intelligibility between speakers of
Hungarian and
German led to a feeling of resentment by many non-Austrian soldiers. The delivery of
orders was particularly ineffective, and the
bureaucratic and
dysfunctional system led to individual
ethnic units becoming isolated from the overall
high command. This in turn led to
ethnic tensions and
political violence in the empire, as such language battalions began instigating
mutinies and
revolts against the Austrian commanders, whom they saw as out of touch.
Desertions and revolts were most common amongst Slavic battalions, particularly the
Czech-
Slovakian battalions; however, all battalions during the
war suffered from these logistical challenges. The battalions' use of languages that were not understood by the
Austrian commanders also led to it being extremely difficult to impossible to discover attempts at desertion or revolt.
Funding and equipment '' in 1914 Following the 1867 constitutional arrangements, the
Reichsrat was dominated by German Liberals, who generally regarded the army as a relic of feudalism. In Budapest, legislators were reluctant to authorize funds for the joint army but were generous with the Hungarian branch of the army, the
Honvédség. In 1867 the military budget accounted for about 25% of all government spending, but the economic crash of 1873 hit Austria-Hungary hard and foreign observers questioned whether the Dual Monarchy could manage a major war without subsidies. Despite increases throughout the 1850s and 1860s, in the latter half of the century Austria-Hungary was still spending less on its army than were other major European powers. While the budget continued to rise—from 262 million crowns in 1895 to 306 million in 1906—this was still far less
per capita than for other major European states, including Italy, and about on par with Russia, which had a much larger population. Further contributing to the monarchy's military weakness was the low rate of conscription: Austria-Hungary conscripted only 0.29% of its population annually, compared to 0.47% in Germany and 0.75% in France. Attempts to increase the yearly intake of recruits were proposed but repeatedly blocked by officials in Budapest until an agreement was reached in 1912. In the emerging field of
military aviation, Austria-Hungary lagged behind other European states. While
balloon detachments had been established in 1893, they were mostly assigned to the fortress artillery, except for a brief period from 1909 to 1911 when they were under command of the multifaceted Verkehrs Brigade. Realization that heavier-than-air machines were necessary or useful came late, and Austria-Hungary acquired only five airplanes by 1911. In 1914 the budget for military aviation was approximately th the amount spent by France. Austria-Hungary entered the war with only 48 first-line aircraft. == Command Structure ==