On 3 January 2001, the White House released an official statement which stated that both sides had accepted the President's parameters with reservations. According to Bill Clinton and Dennis Ross, Barak's reservations were "within" the Parameters, while Arafat's reservations were "outside" them. According to Jeremy Pressman, however, the Israeli reservations were in contradiction with the Parameters, notably Barak's rejection of Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Moreover, the Israelis demanded a route between East Jerusalem and the Jordan River and probably an additional one from Ariel, which would cut the West Bank into pieces. On the other hand, from the Palestinian reservations, only the refugee point seemed fundamental. Ross quoted Saudi Prince
Bandar as saying while negotiations were taking place in December: "If Arafat does not accept what is available now, it won't be a tragedy; it will be a crime."
Israel The Parameters received a mix of support and criticism within Israel, with some in the Israeli government, as well as the Mayor of
Jerusalem opposing them. There were also fears that the Parameters would not be approved in a public referendum, and that the Palestinians might violate their terms of the agreements. Despite some provisions on
Jerusalem being contrary to the election promises of Prime Minister
Ehud Barak, the Parameters received wide support in the
Israeli cabinet, which voted early on 28 December with 10 votes to 2 to accept them, but with reservations and on condition the Palestinians would accept them as well. Only Cabinet Minister
Roni Milo resigned over his objection to the Cabinet's approval of the plan.
IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz strongly opposed the Clinton Parameters, warning that an Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley (even if replaced by an international security force) threatened the security of Israel. On 31 December, Barak declared that Israel had accepted Clinton's proposals, but will not accept the Palestinian right of return to Israel and sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Although he chose to accept the plan, Barak sent Clinton a 20-page letter of "reservations". The two main points were that he "would not sign any document that transfers sovereignty on the Temple Mount to the Palestinians", and that "no Israeli prime minister will accept even one refugee on the basis of the right of return." Minor reservations were also made with regard to security arrangements, deployment areas, and control over passages. In a phone conversation with Clinton, Prime Minister Barak also demanded that Israel be allowed to retain sovereignty over the "sacred basin"—the whole area outside the Old City that includes the
City of David and the Tombs of the Prophets on the road to the
Mount of Olives, which was not mentioned in the Parameters. According to
Ahron Bregman, three days after accepting the Clinton Parameters, Barak telephoned President Clinton and told him "I do not intend to sign any agreement before the elections."
Palestinians In a letter of 27 December 2000, Arafat asked for some clarification of the proposals: Mr. President, please allow me address you with all the sincerity emanating from the close friendship that ties us, and the historical importance of what you are trying to do. I want to assure you of my will to continue to work with you to reach a peace agreement. I need your help in clarifying and explaining the basis of your initiative. I need clear answers to many questions relating to calculation of land ratios that will be annexed and swapped, and the actual location of these territories, as well as the basis for defining the Wailing Wall, its borders and extensions, and the effect of that on the concept of full Palestinian sovereignty over al-Haram al-Sharif. We understand that the idea of leasing additional territory is an option we have the right to reject, and is not a parameter of your bridging proposals. We also presume that the emergency Israeli locations are also subject to negotiations and to our approval. I hope that you have the same understanding. I have many questions relating to the return of refugees to their homes and villages. I have a negative experience with the return of displaced Palestinians to the West Bank and Gaza during the Interim Period. Because the modalities remained tied to an Israeli veto, not one refugee was allowed to return through the mechanism of the interim agreement, which required a quadripartite committee of Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Palestine to decide on their return. Equally, I don't see a clear approach dealing with compensation of the refugees for their land, property and funds taken by Israel under the aegis of the Israeli custodian of absentee property. I feel, Mr. President, that the period for Israeli withdrawal specified in your initiative is too long. It will allow the enemies of peace to exploit the time to undo the agreement. I wonder if the "Period" is one of the fixed parameters of your proposal; a "basis" that cannot be changed. Mr. President, I have many questions. I need maps, details, and clarifications that can help me take the necessary decisions with my leadership and people. I would like you to appreciate that I do not want to procrastinate or waste time. We need a real opportunity to invest once more your determination and creativity to reach a fair and lasting peace with you efforts and during your presidency. I remain, Mr. President, ready to pay you a visit at the White House, in the shortest possible time if you find this visit appropriate, to discuss with you the bridging proposals and to exchange views on ways to develop them further. Please accept my highest regards and best wishes, Yasser Arafat According to Clayton Swisher, Arafat's letter "puncture[s] yet another myth of Palestinian rejectionism ... that Israel accepted [the parameters] while the Palestinians rejected them... Ross diligently spread this fairy tale, as did the president himself." A summit with Arafat and Barak the next day in Egypt was cancelled. On 1 January, the Palestinian Negotiating Team (NAD) published an open letter, explaining why the proposals would "fail to satisfy the conditions required for a permanent peace". They claimed that the parameters divided the Palestinian state, including East Jerusalem, into separate cantons and unconnected islands, and protested the surrender the right of return of Palestinian refugees and lack of clarity and details. Clinton's proposal was not accompanied by a map; only the Israelis presented a map, which would allegedly render the Palestinian state unviable and lacking direct access to international borders. The Palestinians opposed the Israeli annexation of settlement blocs in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which they claimed subordinated the contiguity of the Palestinian state. They also protested that Israel would gain control over their natural resources, and was planning on ceding them less valuable land on the outskirts of West Bank and Gaza in exchange. While Arafat flew to Washington to meet with President Clinton, the newspaper
Al-Ayyam published in Arabic a letter to Clinton with the Palestinian reservations. On 2 January 2001, at a meeting in the White House, Arafat gave his qualified agreement to the Parameters with reservations. In a memorandum, his Negotiations Support Unit (NSU) had warned him "that the proposals in general are too vague and unclear to form an acceptable framework for an agreement". The negotiation team opposed the use of percentages. First, the Israelis were to make clear which reasonable needs they had in specific areas; without a map, the percentages given were also ambiguous, as the Israelis did not include all disputed land or part of the Dead Sea, and it was unclear where the 80% proportion of settlers would remain. All Israeli settlers taken together occupied around 1.8% of the West Bank. The Palestinian concerns about lack of contiguity were largely related to Israeli control over large swaths of land in key development areas such as Jerusalem and Bethlehem, due to the large settlement blocs. Palestinians would be unable to move without restriction within their own state. The Palestinian position about the right of return was, as it has always been, that it is an individual universal right which can never be set aside. This right they see acknowledged in
UN resolution 194. ==Public opinion==