West Nile rebellion of Uganda's northwest. The epicenter of the war later shifted to the
Luwero Triangle north of
Kampala. The first group to initiate hostilities were the Amin loyalists who launched a rebellion against the UNLF government in the autumn of 1980. Their 7,100-strong force never adopted an official name, but is generally called "Uganda Army" as it consisted for the most part of old troops of Amin's Uganda Army (it was also known as "West Front" or "Western Nile Front"). The rebels were not truly unified but split into several bands that were loyal to numerous officers who had previously served under Amin such as
Emilio Mondo,
Isaac Lumago,
Isaac Maliyamungu,
Elly Hassan,
Christopher Mawadri, and
Moses Ali. Amin arranged for the group to receive money from Saudi Arabia in preparation for a large-scale attack across the border against the
West Nile sub-region. On 6 October, one week before the offensive was to commence, about 500 rebels
crossed the border and attacked the town of
Koboko. The 200-strong UNLA garrison was on parade at the time and was unarmed; the rebels massacred the soldiers. Word of the attack spread to other UNLA garrisons in West Nile, who quickly fled to the Nile River, leaving the Uganda Army's advance unopposed. They were welcomed by the local population, which had tense relations with the UNLA. As the rebels knew that they could not hold the captured territory against a full UNLA counter-offensive, they mostly retreated back into Sudan after a few days with a large amount of loot. The UNLA began its
counterattack on 12 October accompanied by Tanzanian forces. The only significant resistance they encountered was in
Bondo, where six Tanzanians were killed. The UNLA forces, considering the local population hostile, engaged in a campaign of destruction and looting across the West Nile, as Tanzanian officers tried in vain to restrain them. They leveled the town of
Arua, killed over 1,000 civilians, and provoked the flight of over 250,000 refugees to Sudan and Zaire. The brutality of the UNLA inspired further unrest, as peasants and ex-soldiers took up arms to defend their lands from the government forces. The Uganda Army launched its next offensive just before the
Ugandan national elections in December 1980. In one of their most daring actions, the rebels ambushed Obote as he was touring the West Nile region. They almost killed him and
Tito Okello, a high-ranking UNLA commander. This time, the Uganda Army also held the areas it captured in West Nile, and set up a parallel government after retaking Koboko. After about one month of combat, the insurgents had captured most of West Nile, leaving only some towns under UNLA control. However, many rebels focused more on looting the area and taking the plunder back to Zaire and Sudan than on fighting the UNLA. The West Nile rebellion was weakened by internal divisions as parts of the Uganda Army remained loyal to Idi Amin, whereas others wanted to distance themselves from the unpopular old dictator. The latter part of the insurgent army split off, forming the "
Uganda National Rescue Front" (UNRF) under Moses Ali, whereas the remaining Amin loyalists were still called the "Ugandan Army" until becoming known as "Former Uganda National Army" (FUNA). The West Nile rebels soon started to fight each other. Furthermore, southwestern Uganda experienced a resurgence of the
Rwenzururu movement which wanted self-determination for the
Konjo and
Amba peoples. The movement had been largely dormant since the 1960s, but managed to take control of weapon stockpiles that had been left unguarded when Amin's government collapsed in 1979. They thus resumed their insurgency, and the security situation in the mountainous border areas of the southwest quickly deteriorated in 1980. Meanwhile, the UNLF government experienced its own divisions. As the UNLA was being transformed from a loose alliance of various anti-Amin insurgent groups into a regular army, the different political factions attempted to ensure that their own loyalists would be present and dominant in the new military. Obote outmaneuvered his rivals, most importantly
Yoweri Museveni, and made his 5,000-strong
Kikosi Maalum group the core of the UNLA. In contrast, just 4,000 out of Museveni's 9,000
FRONASA fighters were allowed to join the new army, and these were distributed across several units. Furthermore, FRONASA was forced to give up its own weaponry. At the same time, the UNLA was rapidly expanded; most of the new recruits came from ethnic groups that supported Obote. As result, power shifted to pro-Obote elements in the government and the army.
1980 elections and outbreak of the southern rebellions The elections of December 1980 were officially won by Milton Obote's
Uganda People's Congress, effectively making him president of Uganda again. However, the results were strongly disputed by other candidates, resulting in increasing strife. Several political factions claimed
electoral fraud, and believed themselves to be proven correct when Obote immediately launched a campaign of political repression. As the UNLA was dominated by pro-Obote forces, a coup was impossible, so the opposition instead launched armed rebellions against Obote's government: Museveni's followers created the
Popular Resistance Army (PRA),
Yusuf Lule formed the
Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF),
Andrew Kayiira armed his Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), and the
Communist "
Gang of Four" organized an armed group known as the
Uganda National Liberation Front – Anti-Dictatorship (UNLF-AD). The latter group was temporarily supported by
Yugoslavia until
Josip Broz Tito's death. On 6 February 1981, hostilities began in the south with a
PRA attack on the Kabamba Military Barracks in the central
Mubende District. The attack aimed at capturing weaponry; although the operation failed to capture the armoury, Museveni's group of fighters managed to take a few guns and several vehicles before retreating. The PRA had more success during a series of attacks on police stations during the next days. Regardless, the small rebel group also came under pressure from UNLA and TPDF counter-insurgency operations, and still lacked a proper base. Museveni was familiar with
guerrilla warfare, having fought with the
Mozambican Liberation Front in Mozambique. He also had commanded his own
Front for National Salvation to fight the Amin regime and had continued to campaign in rural areas hostile to Obote's government, especially central and western
Buganda and in the western regions of
Ankole and
Bunyoro. As a result, he employed the tactics of a
people's war to keep his small force active. In this regard, the PRA succeeded, as it won over many locals in the area around Kampala who considered Obote's government a regime which solely served the northerners. Without extensive support by sympathetic civilians during their early insurgency, Museveni's troops would have been easily crushed in 1981. The PRA also enjoyed very limited foreign support. Some believed that Museveni was aided by his old
Mozambican allies, resulting in tensions between Obote's government and Mozambique. Most attacks by Museveni's force involved small mobile units called
"coys" under the command of
Fred Rwigyema, and Museveni's brother,
Salim Saleh, with "A" Coy led by Steven Kashaka, "B" Coy by
Joram Mugume, and "C" Coy by Pecos Kuteesa. There were three small zonal forces: the Lutta Unit operating in
Kapeeka, the Kabalega Unit operating near
Kiwoko, and the Nkrumah Unit operating in the areas of Ssingo. Many of the early members of the PRA like Rwigyema and
Paul Kagame were actually Rwandan refugees living in Uganda. They later organized the
Rwandan Patriotic Front. In contrast to Museveni's forces and the West Nile rebels, Andrew Kayira's UFM mostly consisted of relatively well-trained ex-soldiers and was focused on high-profile urban operations. The group hoped to destabilize Obote's government through direct attacks, a strategy which "doomed it to fail from the beginning" according to historians Tom Cooper and Adrien Fontanellaz. The UFM was not strong enough to challenge the UNLA head-on, suffered from leadership rivalries, lacked a firm organization, and was prone to being infiltrated by pro-government spies.
Early rebel successes, and emergence of the NRA under
Kim Il Sung (pictured) was one of Obote's foreign allies during the Bush War, and provided military equipment as well as advisors. As the war escalated, foreign support became vital for the survival of Obote's government. The Tanzanians initially helped to defend his regime and kept some order through the presence of about 10,000
Tanzania People's Defence Force soldiers and 1,000 policemen. Nevertheless, the unsustainable costs of these troops led Tanzanian President
Julius Nyerere to gradually withdraw most of his forces from Uganda. By June 1981, just 800 to 1,000 Tanzanian advisors remained in the country. These advisors remained of crucial importance for the UNLA, but the Tanzanian withdrawal greatly weakened Obote's position. To compensate, he tried to enlist further foreign aid: He hired a British
private military company, and convinced the
Commonwealth of Nations (including Great Britain, Canada, and Australia) as well as the
United States to send small teams of security advisors. One of Obote's most important allies was
North Korea. The Ugandan President visited the country in late 1981 and signed a cooperation agreement which included military support for his regime. At least 30 North Korean officers were subsequently sent to
Gulu in northern Uganda, where they trained UNLA soldiers and repaired military equipment. By 1984, the number had risen to about 50 North Koreans who acted as security, intelligence, and military advisors. Museveni claimed that over 700 North Koreans were ultimately used by the UNLA; Obote maintained that only about 170 were present in Uganda. According to one study, the North Korean officers actively participated in and even led counter-insurgency operations for Obote. A
Central Intelligence Agency report stated, however, that the North Koreans refused to actually venture to the frontlines. The Ugandan military also sent some officers and
non-commissioned officers to North Korea for advanced trainings. Obote's government also organized various paramilitary groups to assist the UNLA. The "People's Militia" consisted of
Langi,
Acholi and
Teso tribesmen, and was mostly loyal to UNLA chief of staff
David Oyite-Ojok. It became increasingly powerful, and garnered a reputation as a fierce and brutal force. In addition, there was the "National Youth Army" (NYA), various tribal militias, and the UPC youth paramilitaries. . Meanwhile, the conflict in the south became more serious. Another rebel group emerged, the so-called "Uganda Liberation Movement" which threatened to kidnap and kill
United Nations personnel, as the latter was supporting Obote's attempts at restabilizing Uganda. The threats worked, and the U.N. stopped its training programme for the Ugandan police. The PRA also continued its hit-and-run operations with mixed successes: It
overran a UNLA outpost at Kakiri on 5 April 1981, and captured important weaponry, but had to hastily retreat when a TPDF unit responded to the attack. The Tanzanian forces consequently conducted a counter-insurgency sweep, catching a PRA column under Elly Tumwine off-guard and recapturing some of the captured guns. Despite this, the PRA successfully recruited more volunteers, growing to about 200 fighters by early May. In the next month, Museveni travelled to Nairobi where he met with Lule; the two agreed to unite the PRA and UFF into a unified opposition group. The umbrella organization was dubbed the "
National Resistance Movement" (NRM) and its armed wing was termed the "
National Resistance Army" (NRA). Lule was appointed overall NRM Chairman, while Museveni became vice-chairman of the National Resistance Council and Chairman of the High Command of the NRA. The merger profited both sides: The UFF was extremely weak, and Lule finally gained an actual armed following, while Museveni was provided with important legitimacy, as Lule remained much respected among Uganda's southern population. This was especially important because a strategically important region near Kampala, known as
Luwero Triangle, was mostly inhabited by
Baganda. So far, the PRA had mostly consisted of non-Baganda, but Lule provided the newly formed NRA with backing from the Baganda, allowing Museveni to expand his envisioned "people's war". The Luwero Triangle consequently became the NRA's main operations area, although the group's center of recruitment remained Ankole in the west. Soon after the merger, Museveni implemented a strict code of conduct for fighters, allowing the NRA to remain highly disciplined and focused despite gradually growing in numbers and absorbing other insurgent factions such as the remnants of the "Gang of Four". In contrast, Obote opted for a more conciliatory approach with the Rwenzururu movement. Following negotiations, the Ugandan government signed a peace agreement with the rebel group's leadership in return for payments and other benefits to the latter. Furthermore, Obote granted the
Rwenzururu region some limited autonomy. By late 1981, the UNLA was already in a critical situation. Its rapid expansion to over 15,000 troops by December 1981 resulted in a majority of its troops being untrained, badly armed and often unpaid. Corruption became rampant, and great differences emerged between UNLA units. Some, like those that were active in northern Uganda, were given preferential treatment and became relatively reliable. In contrast, the Central Brigade which mostly fought the NRA mostly consisted of barely-trained militiamen. These troops were considered to be "cannon-fodder" by their own commanders. The counter-insurgency operations against the West Nile rebels were thus much more successful than those against the NRA. Overall, the UNLA already showed signs of great strain at this point, and would have probably collapsed without Tanzanian support by the end of 1981. Regardless, UNLA continued to hold the rebels at bay and even scored several major victories. On 23 February 1982, UNLA fended off a large-scale raid by UFM on Kampala, and then managed to inflict high casualties on the routed insurgents. The UFM attempted to reorganize, but retreated into NRA-held areas. It hoped to convince some of Museveni's followers to defect. Instead, a UFM commander defected with a significant stock of weaponry to the NRA, further weakening the UFM.
Government counter-offensives of 1982–83 Fighting in the West Nile region occasionally spilled over into Sudan as UNLA troops pursued rebels over the border. This first occurred in April 1982, when UNLA troops crossed the frontier near
Nimule and opened fire on a
Sudanese Army unit; the Sudanese troops subsequently detained about 20 Ugandan soldiers. In contrast to other belligerents in the area, the Sudanese Army garrisons in south-eastern Sudan were generally well-disciplined and refrained from attacking civilians. , central Uganda). By November 1982, the National Resistance Army, Uganda Freedom Movement, Uganda National Rescue Front, and the Nile Regiment had formed an alliance, called the "Uganda Popular Front" (UPF). Exiled politician
Godfrey Binaisa was appointed head of the UPF. While being based in
London, Binaisa decided to organize an invasion from
Zaire to topple Obote. He attempted to enlist the aid of white mercenaries for this plot, but his plans fell through and were revealed when he was unable to pay for the operation. The entire plot discredited Binaisa. In December 1982, John Charles Ogole was appointed new commander of the UNLA's 11th Battalion in Arua. Ogole reorganized his troops, strengthened morale and discipline, and then launched another counter-insurgency campaign against the West Nile rebels. Ogole's tactics proved highly successful, and ousted most insurgents from the West Nile Region within months. Rebel leader Barnabas Kili was also captured. Meanwhile, the Ugandan government decided "to teach the Karamojong a lesson" after raiders had taken advantage of Oyite-Ojok's death to attack his farm and kill over 100 militiamen in the northeast. In cooperation with the Kenyan government, UNLA and allied militias launched a campaign which largely destroyed or seized the Karamojong's food sources in the form of cattle and fields. This left the nomads almost totally dependent on international aid agencies like the
World Food Programme and
UNICEF for survival. In particular, Kembogo represented one of the worst UNLA losses up to this point, and greatly impacted the military's morale and cohesion. The unrest in the UNLA eventually escalated when Acholi troops mutinied in Jinja and other locations in late June 1985. Rifts subsequently erupted in the government and some political groups such as the
Democratic Party attempted to exploit the chaos by gaining control over the military. The news also reached
Gulu, where Lieutenant General
Bazilio Olara-Okello, an Acholi, was stationed. Fearing that a new government in Kampala might purge the Acholi, he revolted. Olara-Okello gathered a force dominated by Acholi mutineers, and won the support of ex-Amin loyalists from the West Nile and Sudan. Using these troops, he conquered
Lira, and then marched on Kampala. The capital fell after a short battle in July 1985, but Obote had already fled to Tanzania. He later relocated to
Kenya and finally
Zambia. After the successful coup, General Tito Okello was installed as president; this marked the first time in Uganda's history when Acholi had achieved state power. The coup had catastrophic consequences for the UNLA. The new Acholi leadership promptly began to use their new power to disempower and exploit other ethnic groups including Langi, resulting in the collapse of discipline and order among many military units. From then on, the UNLA gradually devolved into "marauding bands" and declined in numbers to about 15,000 troops by late 1985. Some commanders such as Ogole fled into exile. Okello's regime effectively ended when
Kampala was captured by the NRA on 26 January 1986. Yoweri Museveni was subsequently sworn in as president on 29 January, and the NRA became the new
regular army of Uganda. Tito Okello fled to Sudan. Despite this massive defeat, the UNLA attempted to rally once more, and intended to defend its remaining holdings in northern Uganda. These holdouts were led by Bazilio Olara-Okello, who ordered a mass mobilization in
Gulu and
Kitgum. Everyone who could hold a rifle, including women and girls, was armed and provided with an
ad hoc training. Meanwhile, the NRA
continued its offensive, capturing Jinja by late January, followed by
Tororo in early February. At this point, the UNLA attempted one last time to stem the rebel advance. It counter-attacked at Tororo, but was repelled. The NRA proceeded to assault the fortified crossings of the Nile, encountering particularly heavy resistance by the UNLA and allied West Nile militias at
Karuma and
Kamdini. After bitter fighting, the NRA overcame the UNLA's defenses, inflicting "catastrophic losses" on the Acholi troops. With effective resistance no longer possible, the UNLA disintegrated and its remnants fled into exile, along with many former government officials. The NRA captured Gulu and Kitgum in March 1986, while the defeated Acholi soldiers mostly returned to their villages. The war appeared to be over. ==Aftermath==