Malaya London. Among the collection are a Japanese
Good Luck Flag, operational map (numbered 11), photographs of Force 136 personnel and guerillas in Burma (15), a
katana that was surrendered to a
SOE officer in Gwangar,
Malaya in September 1945 (7), and rubber soles designed by SOE to be worn under agents boots' to disguise footprints when landing on beaches (bottom left). and
Lim Bo Seng, during their commando training in India with the
SOE. Both, along with other Force 136 operatives under the Operation Gustavus were later dispatched via submarine into Malaya to set up an espionage network in Malaya and Singapore. The Oriental Mission of SOE attempted to set up "stay-behind" and resistance organisations from August 1941, but their plans were opposed by the British colonial governor, Sir
Shenton Thomas. They were able to begin serious efforts only in January 1942, after the
Japanese Invasion of Malaya had already begun. An irregular warfare school, 101 Special Training School (STS 101), was set up by the explorer and mountaineer
Freddie Spencer Chapman. Chapman himself led the first reconnaissances and attacks behind Japanese lines during the
Battle of Slim River. Although the school's graduates mounted a few operations against the Japanese lines of communication, they were cut off from the other Allied forces by the fall of Singapore. An attempt was made by the Oriental Mission to set up a HQ in
Sumatra but this island too was overrun by the Japanese.
Malayan Communist Party Before the Japanese attacked
Malaya, a potential resistance organisation already existed in the form of the
Malayan Communist Party. This party's members were mainly from the Chinese community and implacably anti-Japanese. Just before the fall of Singapore, the party's Secretary General,
Lai Teck, was told by the British authorities that his party should disperse into the forests, a decision already made by the party's members. In isolation, the Communists formed the
Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). Their first arms and equipment were either donated by STS 101 before they were overrun or recovered from the battlefields or abandoned British Army depots. The MPAJA formed rigidly disciplined camps and units in the forest, supplied with food by networks of contacts among displaced Chinese labourers and "squatters" on marginal land. Chapman had remained in Malaya after Singapore fell, but had no radio or means of contacting Allied forces elsewhere. Nevertheless, the MPAJA still regarded Chapman as the official British authority, and
Chin Peng was appointed as a liaison officer with Chapman. In 1942, Singaporean World War II hero
Lim Bo Seng had returned to Malaya from Calcutta and recruited some agents who had made their way to India by 1943. His second-in-command was CPT Tham Sien Yen. Force 136 attempted to regain contact with Chapman in Operation Gustavus, by infiltrating parties which included Lim Bo Seng and former STS 101 members
John Davis and Richard Broome by sea into the area near
Pangkor Island. Their radio was unable to contact Force 136 HQ in Ceylon and the MPAJA contacts on Pangkor Island were betrayed to the Japanese. In February 1945, the radio brought in by
Gustavus was finally made to work. Chapman was able to visit Force 136 HQ in Kandy and report. By this time, Force 136 had substantial resources, and in the few months before the end of the war, they were able to send 2,000 weapons to the MPAJA and no less than 300 liaison personnel. About half of these were British who had worked or lived in Malaya before the war, the others were Chinese who had made their own way to India or who had been taken there by Force 136 for training. With these resources, the MPAJA was built up to become a substantial guerilla army with about 7,000 fighters. However, Japan surrendered before it had a chance to stage a major uprising. In isolation in jungle camps for several years, the MCP and MPAJA had purged themselves of many members suspected of treachery or espionage, which contributed to their post-war hard-line attitude and led in turn to the insurgency known as the
Malayan Emergency.
Kuomintang The
Kuomintang (KMT) also had a widespread following in the
Malayan Chinese community in the days before the War, but were unable to mount any significant clandestine resistance to the Japanese. This was partly because they were based mainly among the population in the towns, unlike the MCP which drew much of its support from mine or plantation workers in remote encampments or "squatters" on the edge of the forest. Most of the KMT's supporters and their dependents were therefore hostages to any Japanese mass reprisal. When Lim Bo Seng and other agents from Force 136 attempted to make contact with Kuomintang networks in
Ipoh as part of Operation Gustavus, they found that the KMT's underground actions there were tainted by corruption or private feuding.
Malay resistance forces Three local Malay resistance forces were established by Force 136 after they reached Malaya. Each force was assisted by British Liaison Officers (LOs) and agents from the SOE.
Major Tengku Mahmood Mahyideen, a member of the royal family, traveled to Britain, India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq to recruit
Malays who were working or studying overseas before World War II to serve as Force 136 agents. In September 1942, at a hotel in New Delhi, Tengku Mahmood Mahyideen held a special meeting with
Captain Ibrahim bin Ismail (later General Tun) of the
Johore Military Forces, who was undergoing cadet officer training at the
Indian Military Academy in
Dehra Dun, and successfully persuaded him to join Force 136. With this unit established, Major Tengku Mahmood grew increasingly confident in his team's ability to achieve their objectives and, assisted by British officers, was tasked with instructing members in combat techniques including weaponry, jungle operations, espionage, and sabotage. Major Tengku Mahmood Mahyideen served as the Chief Advisor on matters related to the Malay Peninsula. ;Ulu Perak On 16 December 1944, a group consisting of five Malay SOE Agents, including Bahari Sidek (a Malay student studying in
Mecca before the war), ;Kedah A team of two operatives,
Tunku Osman (who later became the 3rd
Malaysian Chief of Defence) and Major Hasler parachuted into Kg. Kuala Janing,
Padang Terap,
Kedah on 1 July 1945, as part of Operation Fighter. Their main goal was to set up a guerrilla force in the Northern Malay Peninsula region. They made contact with
Tunku Abdul Rahman (later the first
Prime Minister of Malaysia), who was the Padang Terap's DO during the pre-war British Administration and established a guerrilla force in Kedah. ;Pahang A team consisting of two Malay SOE Agents, Osman Mahmud and Jamal, a Wireless Telecommunication (W/T) operator, Mat Nanyan, and their LO, Major J. Douglas Richardson parachuted into
Raub, Pahang, as part of Operation Beacon. Their main goal was to set up wireless communications between the east coast of the
Malay Peninsula and the main Force 136 communication hub in Kuala Kangsar. Their secondary goal was to set up guerrilla forces for East Coast Malaya. After landing, the team made contact with
Yeop Mohidin, who was the
Kuala Lipis's Assistant DO during the pre-war British Administration, and they established a guerrilla force named Force 136 Pahang, also known as
Wataniah Pahang. The
Wataniah Pahang was the predecessor for the
Rejimen Askar Wataniah ('Territorial Army Regiment'), that was established in 1985. ;Terengganu A team of three agents, including
Ibrahim Ismail, parachuted into the western coast of
Terengganu, as part of Operation Oatmeal. They failed in their mission after being betrayed, and were later captured by the Japanese.
China From 1938, Britain had been supporting the
Republic of China against the Japanese, by allowing supplies to reach the Chinese via the
Burma Road running through Burma. SOE had various plans regarding China in the early days of the war. Forces were to be sent into China through Burma and a Bush Warfare School under
Michael Calvert was established in Burma to train Chinese and Allied personnel in irregular warfare. These plans came to an end with the
Japanese conquest of Burma in 1942. Strictly speaking, SOE was not tasked to operate inside China after 1943, when it was left to the
Americans. However, one group,
Mission 204, formally known as 204 British Military Mission to China and also known as Tulip Force attempted to provide assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Army. The first phase achieved very little but a second more successful phase was conducted before the
Ichi-Go offensive forced their withdrawal in 1944. The
British Army Aid Group under an officer named
Lindsay "Blue" Ride did operate near Hong Kong, in territory controlled by the
Chinese Communist Party. In Operation Remorse, a businessman named
Walter Fletcher carried out covert economic operations such as trying to obtain smuggled rubber, currency speculation and so on, in Japanese-occupied China. As a result of these activities, SOE actually returned a financial profit of GBP 77 million in the Far East (aided by an accountant at SOE HQ in London, John Venner). Many of these funds and the networks used to acquire them were subsequently used in various relief and repatriation operations, but critics pointed out that this created a pool of money that SOE could use beyond the oversight of any normal authority or accountability.
Thailand On 21 December 1941, a formal military alliance between Thailand under Field Marshal
Plaek Pibulsonggram and Japan was concluded. At noon on 25 January 1942, Thailand declared war on the United States and Great Britain. Some Thais supported the alliance, arguing that it was in the national interest, or that it was better sense to ally oneself with a victorious power. Others formed the
Free Thai Movement to resist. The Free Thai Movement was supported by Force 136 and the OSS, and provided valuable intelligence from within Thailand. Eventually, when the war turned against the Japanese, Phibun was forced to resign, and a Free Thai-controlled government was formed. A coup was being planned to disrupt the Japanese occupying forces in 1945 but was forestalled by the ending of the war.
Burma Burma (now known as
Myanmar) was the theatre in which the major Allied effort was made in South East Asia from late 1942 onwards, and Force 136 was heavily involved. Initially, it had to compete with regular formations such as the
Chindits and other irregular organisations for suitable personnel, aircraft and other resources. It eventually played a significant part in the liberation of the country by slowly building up a national organisation which was used to great effect in 1945. Two separate sections of SOE dealt with Burma. One concentrated on the minority communities who mainly inhabited the frontier regions; the other established links with the nationalist movements among the majority
Bamar peoples in the central parts of the country and the major cities. It has been argued that this division of political effort, although necessary on military grounds, contributed to the inter-community conflicts which have continued in Burma (Myanmar) to the present day. There were Indians and Afghans who were part of Force 136 and were heavily involved in Burmese operation, like C. L. Sharma, an Indian professor of linguistics at British Army Headquarters in India who later became an active member of Force 136 and spent almost 6 years mainly in various missions of the Force in Burma.
Karens, Chins, Arakanese and Kachins The majority community of Burma were the
Bamar. Among the minority peoples of Burma, including
Chins,
Karens and
Kachins, there were a mixture of anti-Bamar, anti-Japanese and pro-British sentiments. In 1942, the pro-Japanese
Burma Independence Army raised with Japanese assistance, attempted to disarm Karens in the
Irrawaddy River delta region. This created a large-scale civil conflict which turned the Karens firmly against the Japanese. The Karens were the largest of the minority communities. Although many lived in the Irrawaddy delta, their homeland can be considered to be the "Karenni", a mountainous and heavily forested tract along the border with Thailand. They had supplied many recruits to the
Burma Rifles (part of the British forces in Burma during the early part of the war), and in the chaos of the British retreat into India, many of them had been given a rifle and ammunition and three months' pay, and were instructed to return to their home villages to await further orders. The presence of such trained soldiers contributed to the effectiveness of the Karen resistance. A few British army officers had also been left behind in the Karenni, in a hasty attempt to organise a "stay-behind" organisation. In 1943, the Japanese made a ruthless
punitive expedition into the Karenni, where they knew a British officer was operating. To spare the population, a British liaison officer,
Hugh Seagrim, voluntarily surrendered himself to the Japanese and was executed along with several of his Karen fighters. However, Force 136 continued to supply the Karens, and from late 1944 they mounted
Operation Character, in execution similar to
Operation Jedburgh in Nazi-occupied France, in which three-man teams were parachuted to organise large-scale resistance in the Karenni. Some of the
Character teams had previously served on
Jedburgh, others had previously served in the
Chindits. In April 1945, Force 136 stage-managed a major uprising in the region in support of the Allied offensive into Burma, which prevented the Japanese
Fifteenth Army forestalling the Allied advance on
Rangoon. After the capture of Rangoon, Karen resistance fighters continued to harass Japanese units and stragglers east of the
Sittang River. It was estimated that at their moment of maximum effort, the Karens mustered 8,000 active guerrillas. or "levies" (some sources claim 12,000), plus many more sympathisers and auxiliaries. SOE had some early missions to
Kachin State, the territory inhabited by the Kachins of northern Burma, but for much of the war, this area was the responsibility of the American-controlled
China-Burma-India Theater, and the Kachin guerrillas were armed and coordinated by the American liaison organisation,
OSS Detachment 101. The various ethnic groups (Chins, Lushai, Arakanese) who inhabited the border areas between Burma and India were not the responsibility of Force 136 but of
V Force, an irregular force which was under direct control of the Army. From 1942 to 1944, hill peoples in the frontier regions fought on both sides; some under V Force and other Allied irregular forces HQ, others under local or Japanese-sponsored organisations such as the
Chin Defence Force and
Arakan Defence Force.
Burmese political links The Burma section of Force 136 was commanded by
John Ritchie Gardiner, who had managed a forestry company before the war and also served on the Municipal Council of
Rangoon. He had known personally some Burmese politicians such as
Ba Maw who had later formed a government which, although nominally independent, collaborated through necessity with the Japanese occupiers. In 1942, when the Japanese invaded Burma, the majority Bamar (Burman) people had been sympathetic to them, or at least hostile to the British colonial government and the Indian community which had immigrated or had been imported as workers for newly created industries. Bamar volunteers flocked to the
Burma Independence Army which fought several actions against British forces. During the years of occupation, this attitude changed. The Burma Independence Army was reorganised as the Burma National Army (BNA), under Japanese control. In 1944,
Aung San, the Burmese nationalist who had founded the BIA with Japanese assistance and had been appointed Minister of Defence in Ba Maw's government and commander of the Burma National Army, contacted Burmese communist and socialist leaders, some of whom were already leading insurgencies against the Japanese. Together they formed the
Anti-Fascist Organisation (AFO) under the overall leadership of
Thakin Soe. Force 136 was able to establish contact with this organisation through links with Burmese communist groups. During the final
Allied offensive into Burma in 1945, there were a series of uprisings in Burma against the Japanese, which Force 136 supported although it had little control or even influence over the rebellious BNA and its supporters. The first rebellion involved a locally recruited force known as the Arakan Defence Army turning on the Japanese in
Arakan. The second involved an uprising by BNA units near
Toungoo in Central Burma, beginning on 8 March 1945. The final uprising occurred when the entire BNA changed sides on 27 March. The forces of the AFO, including the BNA, were renamed the
Patriotic Burmese Forces. They played a part in the final campaign to recapture
Rangoon, and eliminate Japanese resistance in Central Burma. The BNA's armed strength at the time of their defection was around 11,000. The Patriotic Burmese Forces also included large numbers of communists and other irregulars with loyalty to particular groups and those Karens who had served in the BNA and Karen resistance groups in the Irrawaddy Delta. In arranging the acceptance of Aung San and his forces as Allied combatants, Force 136 was in direct conflict with the more staid Civil Affairs Service Officers at
South East Asia Command's headquarters, who feared the postwar implications of handing out large numbers of weapons to irregular and potentially anti-British forces, and of promoting the political careers of Aung San or the communist leaders. The AFO at the time of the uprising represented itself as the provisional government of Burma. It was eventually persuaded to drop this claim after negotiations with South East Asia Command, in return for recognition as a political movement (the
AFPFL).
Indian National Army Another force operating under Japanese command in Burma was the
Indian National Army, a force composed of former
prisoners of war captured by the Japanese at
Singapore and some
Tamils living in
Malaya. However, Force 136 was prevented from working with anyone in the Indian National Army, regardless of their intentions. The policy towards the INA was formed and administered by the
British Indian Army, a British rather than an Allied organisation.
Field Operations Force 136 was also active in more conventional military-style operations behind Japanese lines in Burma. Such an operation could comprise a group of up to 40 infantry with officers and a radio operator, infiltrating Japanese lines on intelligence and discretionary search and destroy missions. Such missions, which could last several weeks (supplied by
C47 transport aircraft) kept close wireless contact with operational bases in India, using high-grade cyphers (changed daily) and hermetically sealed wireless/morse sets. Every day (Japanese permitting) at pre-arranged times, the radio operator (with escorts) climbed to a high vantage point, usually necessitating a gruelling climb to the top of some slippery, high, jungle-clad ridge, and sent the latest intelligence information and the group's supply requests etc., and received further orders in return. The radio operator was central to a mission's success and his capture or death would spell disaster for the mission. To avoid capture and use under duress by the Japanese, every SOE operative was issued a cyanide pill. One such radio operator was James Gow (originally from the
Royal Corps of Signals), who recounted his first mission in his book
From Rhunahaorine to Rangoon. In the summer of 1944, the Japanese push toward India had been stopped at the
Battle of Kohima. In the aftermath of the battle, Japanese forces split up and retreated deep into the jungle. As part of the initiative to find out if they were reforming for a further push, he was sent from
Dimapur with a 40-strong group of Gurkhas, to locate groups of Japanese forces, identify their strengths and their organised status. Discretionary attacks on isolated Japanese groups were permitted (no prisoners to be taken), as was the destruction of supply dumps. One particular Gurkha officer under whom James Gow operated was Major William Lindon-Travers, later to become
Bill Travers, the well-known actor of
Born Free fame.
Korean Liberation Army In June 1943, chief-in-command Lee Chung-chun had a bilateral agreement between the
Korean Independence Army and Britain, with Chief Intelligence Officer Mackenzie, Commander-in-Chief, British Forces Southeast Asia. The following are the terms of the agreement: ① The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea will dispatch a task force of the Liberation Army to the British army under the leadership to cooperate with the United Kingdom and against Imperial Japan. ② The number of operation dispatchers shall be set to 10 to 25, with the captain wearing the same military uniform as the British army and using the name KNALU. ※ The Korean National Army Liaison Unit (KNALU). ③ This maneuvering includes enemy document translation and propaganda against Japan. ④ The service period of this task force shall be determined as the first six months, and the continuous service shall be extended by mutual agreement. ⑤ At the request of the Korean Liberation Army or the British Army, some or all personnel shall return to their original position in the duty performance. ⑥ The captain of KNALU should be treated as the British army's. And those who have made contributions among the squad members shall receive special treatment by judging and commendation. ⑦ The Korean Liberation Army may send a resident representative to India for an effective operation with the Korean Liberation Army and a close joint operation with the British army. ⑧ The Korean Liberation Army Operations Corps trains Korean prisoners captured by British troops as needed. ⑨ The British military shall bear all expenses related to the transfer and summons of the Korean Liberation Army Corps and representatives. ⑩ The movement and equipment of Korean Liberation Army operatives shall be equivalent to British military officers. ⑪ Members working in New Delhi, India, are provided with free accommodation. However, if there are any hotels to live in, the monthly accommodation fee of less than 100 rupees (RS) is deducted from their salary. ⑫ The representative of the Korean Liberation Army's operations team resides in New Delhi, and all expenses shall be provided by the British army. According to the above military mutual agreement, the Korean Liberation Army's maneuvering team was officially decided to dispatch the Korean Liberation Army's maneuvering team to the Southeast Asian General Headquarters of the British Army in India.
Other SOE's French Indo-China Section (1943–1945) Force 136 played only a minor part in attempts to organise local resistance in
French Indochina, led mainly by
Roger Blaizot, commander of the
French Far East Expeditionary Corps (
FEFEO) and General Eugène Mordant, chief of the military resistance. From 1944 to 1945 long-range
B-24 Liberator bomber aircraft attached to Force 136 dropped 40
"Jedburgh" commandos from the French intelligence service
BCRA, and agents from the ''
Corps Léger d'Intervention'' also known as "
Gaur", commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Huard, into North Indochina. The French however were not able to counter the
Japanese coup in March 1945 and thus some were either captured or forced to withdraw. Indochina was also not originally part of the South-East Asian theatre, and therefore not SOE's responsibility. Notable French Force 136 members dropped in French Indochina in 1945 include:
Jean Deuve (22 January),
Jean Le Morillon (28 February),
Jean Sassi (4 June),
Bob Maloubier (August). Together with the complexities of the relationships between the Vichy-leaning officials in Indochina, and the rival
Giraudist and
Gaullist resistance movements, this made liaison very difficult. SOE had few links with the indigenous Viet Minh movement.
Dutch East Indies and Australia Except for the island of
Sumatra, the
Dutch East Indies were also outside South East Asia Command's area of responsibility until after the Japanese surrender. In 1943, an invasion of Sumatra, codenamed
Operation Culverin, was tentatively planned. SOE mounted some reconnaissances of northern Sumatra (in the present-day province of
Aceh). In the event, the plan was cancelled, and nothing came of SOE's small-scale efforts in Sumatra. During September 1945, after the Japanese surrender, up to 20 small teams (normally 4 men, an Executive Officer, a signaller, a medical officer and a medical orderly) were parachuted into the islands of the Dutch East Indies, 6 weeks ahead of any other allied troops. Known as
RAPWI (Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees) Teams, they were tasked with locating and arranging care for all those who had been held in camps. Using Japanese Surrendered Troops, they arranged food, quarters and medical supplies for the tens of thousands of POW and internees, saving many lives. Many of the Executive Officers were members of the Anglo Dutch Country Section (ADCS) of Force 136. Another combined Allied intelligence organisation,
Special Operations Australia (SOA), which had the British codename Force 137, operated out of Australia against Japanese targets in Singapore, the other islands of the
Dutch East Indies, and
Borneo. It included
Z Special Unit, which carried out a successful attack on shipping in Singapore Harbour, known as
Operation Jaywick. ==Methods of transit==