From November 1931 to November 1937, Wang worked and lived in
Moscow as director of the CCP's delegation to the Comintern. During that period, he was elected as Executive Commissioner, member of the Presidium, and Alternate General of the Comintern. This indicated his prominence and popularity in the Comintern. During this period, the CCP suffered major defeats in both urban and rural areas against the KMT and made a strategic retreat in the
Long March. At the
Zunyi Conference, Wang and the 28 Bolsheviks lost the support of key party and Red Army leaders; Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai and Otto Braun were criticized for their poor strategy.
Zhang Wentian succeeded Bo Gu as provisional party leader. Mao emerged from Zunyi as the
politburo's dominant member with the support of the army and his opponents discredited. The
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in November 1931 posed a clear threat to both sides of the Chinese Civil War (as well as to the Soviet Union), but it did not lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities. The failure of the
First United Front four years previously had created deep, lasting distrust. Chiang Kai-shek articulated his policy as "first internal pacification, then external resistance." The CCP called for simultaneously "Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang". But by 1935, the Comintern had decided that the threat posed by Japan in Asia and the
rise of Adolf Hitler in Europe called for a less dogmatic response. The
7th World Congress of the Comintern called for Communist parties to participate in "anti-fascist united fronts" across the globe. In July 1935, Wang had begun work on a document that explained how the new policy would apply to China. This was published in October, but was dated August 1, and subsequently became known as the "
1 August Declaration". It called on all parties in China to form a united front against Japanese Imperialism and proposed creating a united government of national defense. Importantly, though, the offer did not extend to Chiang himself; Wang and the rest of the CCP delegation still considered him and his central government the "running dog" of the Japanese. However, the attitude of Wang Ming and the Comintern towards Chiang began to shift when the full details of the
Long March and the CCP's devastating defeats in south China reached Moscow. Wang Ming even published a series of articles where he called for Chiang to either join an anti-Japanese united front or be overthrown by KMT patriots. But historians disagree on how seriously to take this change in tone: Michael Sheng dismisses the articles as propaganda intended to encourage anti-Chiang dissent in the KMT, whereas
Gao Hua argues that Wang sincerely believed that Chiang could and should be brought into a united front. In either case, this propaganda line was abandoned after Chiang suppressed the
December 9th Movement. The CCP itself (cut off from radio communication with Moscow) learned of the 1 August Declaration in November 1935. Party leaders held a conference at Wayaobu in December to discuss the implications of this new policy. Their
Wayaobu Manifesto marked an important retreat from the hardline positions they had held during the early civil war. It called for "the most broad national united front" to resist Japan, and announced that the CCP would suspend class conflict in the interests of cross-class collaboration. However, it also made clear that they did not want to give up their military strength. As a basis from which to resist the Japanese, the Manifesto called for the Red Army to be expanded to 1 million men and for the Chinese Soviet to dramatically increase its land area. Over the course of the year, the Comintern became more convinced that the united front should include Chiang. Wang Ming was reluctant to accept this idea. In March, when the Comintern abandoned the slogan "resist Japan and oppose Chiang", he suggested replacing it with "resist Japan and oppose the villain". In June, when the
Liangguang Incident took place, Wang Ming supported the uprising against Chiang even after
Pravda condemned it. In late June, the CCP re-established radio communications with Moscow. They transmitted the Wayaobu Manifesto and informed the Comintern of their alliance with Zhang. They asked for assistance in carrying out their plan to form an anti-Japan, anti-Chiang base. The Comintern responded with a telegram on August 15 admonishing the CCP for continuing to oppose Chiang. The Comintern did approve the other provisions of the Wayaobu Manifesto, agreeing that neither soviet power nor the independence of the Red Army should be sacrificed. But they absolutely vetoed the CCP's plan to form a base in the northwest, knowing that such a move would scuttle any chance for a united front with the KMT. The CCP accepted the new directive from the Comintern. They adopted the new slogan "compelling Chiang to resist Japan," and
Pan Hannian was sent to Nanjing to begin negotiating a truce with
Chen Lifu. When the Soviets sharply criticized the CCP for failing to include Chiang in their plans for a united front, Wang joined in their criticisms. However, head of the Comintern
Georgi Dimitrov pointed out that many of the criticisms Wang was making against the CCP could just as easily be made against Wang's attitude for the past few months. The Soviets asked the CCP to send a replacement for Wang, although he remained on for almost a year until his replacement arrived. , Wang Ming and
Zhou Enlai at the Yangtze River Bureau of the CCP Central Committee in Wuhan in 1938 With the occurrence of the
Xi'an Incident in 1936, the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Shanghai Hongqiao Airport Incident in 1937, a general war between China and Japan was unavoidable. Wang's blueprint for a united front against Japan was under construction, with the Red Army of the CCP transferred into the
Eighth Route Army and the
New Fourth Army fighting against Japan. Wang was sent back to Yan'an in July 1937 when Wang Jiaxiang arrived to take up his place. After the return of Wang, Mao expressed his respect for Wang as an envoy of the Comintern and for his great influence for putting forward the concept of United Front against Japan. Mao possibily wanted to appeal to the Comintern and Soviet Union behind Wang, from whom Mao desperately needed support both in money and weaponry. When Wang brought forward a new list of leaders of CCP, Mao showed his humility by putting Wang in the first place. Wang demoted his former ally Zhang Wentian from the number 1 place to the number 7 place, which weakened his own camp and created new opponents by driving Zhang to Mao's group. Wang,
Kang Sheng and
Chen Yun were elected into the new politburo, with Wang as secretariat for the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP which was in charge of the daily operation of CCP headquarters. Chen was in charge of organization and Kang in charge of security, but oddly enough, Chen and Kang turned to Mao's camp, and as a result, Wang lost two important potential supporters. Moreover, when Wang passed by
Xinjiang during his trip to China, he ordered Deng Fa, the notorious security boss for CCP, to arrest senior leaders of CCP Yu Xiusong, Huang Cao, Li Te and two others, who were his former opponents now working for the warlord Sheng Shicai under the direction of CCP. Five of them were tortured and executed in the prison of Sheng, accused of being
Trotskyists. When Wang boasted about his dirty work to Zhang Guotao, Zhang, who was regarded as dissident himself, was greatly irritated, for he had known these old CCP members quite well and worried about being persecuted himself. After this incident, Zhang despised Wang and would never support him. (From left to right in the front row: Kang Sheng, Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhu De, Xiang Ying, Wang Ming; from left to right in the back row: Chen Yun, Bo Gu, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian) When Wang returned to Yan'an, he was admired by most of the CCP members as a talent of Marxism for his erudition and deep insights into Marxism and Leninism. Some senior CCP leaders, including Zhou Enlai and
Peng Dehuai, showed their respect for Wang, which reportedly made Mao jealous and irritated. Furthermore, Wang began to disagree with Mao over major issues on the United Front. Wang believed all CCP work should be carried out within the framework of the United Front; Mao insisted CCP should maintain its independence from the United Front instead. In order to enforce his policy, Wang made the mistake of leaving the position of Secretariat of the CCP in charge of the daily operations of the CCP headquarters, and went for the position of General Secretary of the
Yangtze Division of CCP to handle United Front issues with the KMT in Wuhan, which meant Wang had left the power base in Yan'an, with Mao now able to use all means to strengthen his power grip without any interference. ==Decline==