Yugoslav foreign policy, 1945–1947 was a nominally independent territory centered on the
Adriatic city of
Trieste. It was claimed by Italy and Yugoslavia, and became a source of conflict between Yugoslavia and the Western Allies. Prior to its dissolution, the territory consisted of Zones A and B, administered by the Western Allies and Yugoslavia, respectively. The Yugoslav zone was ultimately divided between the federated republics of
Croatia and
Slovenia. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia signed a friendship treaty when Tito met with Stalin in Moscow in April 1945. They established good bilateral relations despite differences in opinion on how to bring about a communist or socialist society. In 1945, Yugoslavia relied on
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration aid as it experienced food shortages, but it gave much greater internal publicity to comparably smaller Soviet assistance. On 10 January 1945, Stalin called Yugoslavia's foreign policy unreasonable because of its
territorial claims against most of its neighbours, including Hungary, Austria, and the Free Territory of Trieste, which had been carved out of pre-war Italian territory. Tito then delivered a speech criticising the Soviet Union for not backing his territorial demands. The confrontation with the Western Allies became tense in August 1946 when
Yugoslav fighter aircraft forced a
United States Army Air Forces Douglas C-47 Skytrain to crash-land near
Ljubljana and shot down another above
Bled, capturing ten and killing a crew of five in the span of ten days. The Western Allies incorrectly believed that Stalin encouraged Tito's persistence; Stalin actually wished to avoid confrontation with the West. Tito also sought to establish regional dominance over Yugoslavia's southern neighbours—
Albania, Bulgaria, and
Greece. The first overtures in this direction occurred in 1943 when a proposal for a regional headquarters to coordinate national Partisan actions fell through. Tito, who saw the Yugoslav component of the Partisans as superior, declined to go ahead with any scheme that would give other national components equal say. The pre-war partition of
Macedonia into
Vardar,
Pirin, and
Aegean Macedonia—controlled by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece respectively—complicated regional relations. The presence of a substantial ethnic Albanian population in the
Yugoslav region of Kosovo further impeded relations. In 1943, the PKSH had proposed the transfer of Kosovo to Albania, only to be confronted with a counterproposal: incorporating Albania into a
future Yugoslav federation. Tito and PKSH first secretary
Enver Hoxha revisited the idea in 1946, agreeing to merge the two countries. After the war, Tito continued to pursue dominance in the region. In 1946, Albania and Yugoslavia signed a treaty on mutual assistance and customs agreements, almost completely integrating Albania into the Yugoslav economic system. Nearly a thousand Yugoslav economic development experts were sent to Albania, and a KPJ representative was added to the PKSH Central Committee. The two countries' militaries also cooperated, at least in the
mining of the Corfu Channel in October 1946—an action which damaged two
Royal Navy destroyers and resulted in 44 dead and 42 injured. Even though the Soviet Union had previously indicated it would only deal with Albania through Yugoslavia, Stalin cautioned the Yugoslavs not to pursue unification with haste. In August 1947, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia signed a
friendship and mutual assistance treaty in Bled without consulting the Soviet Union, leading Soviet Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov to denounce it. Despite this, when the
Cominform was established in September to facilitate international Communist activity and communication, the Soviets openly touted Yugoslavia as a model for the
Eastern Bloc to emulate. From 1946, internal reports from the Soviet embassy in Belgrade began to portray Yugoslav leaders in increasingly unfavourable terms.
Integration with Albania and support for Greek insurgents The Soviet Union began sending its own advisors to Albania in mid-1947, which Tito saw as a threat to the further integration of Albania into Yugoslavia. He attributed the move to a power struggle within the PKSH Central Committee involving Hoxha, the interior minister
Koçi Xoxe, and the economy and industry minister,
Naco Spiru. Spiru was seen as the prime opponent of links with Yugoslavia and advocated closer ties between Albania and the Soviet Union. Prompted by Yugoslav accusations and urged on by Xoxe, Hoxha launched an investigation into Spiru. A few days later, Spiru died in unclear circumstances; his death was officially declared a suicide. Following Spiru's death, there were a series of meetings of Yugoslav and Soviet diplomats and officials on the matter of integration, culminating in a meeting between Stalin and KPJ official
Milovan Đilas in December 1947 and January 1948. By its conclusion, Stalin supported the integration of Albania into Yugoslavia, provided it was postponed for a more opportune time and carried out with the consent of the Albanians. It is still unclear if Stalin was sincere in his support or if he was pursuing a delaying tactic. Regardless, Đilas perceived Stalin's support as genuine. Yugoslav support to the
Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and KKE-led
Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) in the
Greek Civil War indirectly encouraged Albanian support for closer ties with Yugoslavia. The civil war in Greece reinforced the Albanian perception that the Yugoslav and Albanian borders were threatened by Greece. Furthermore, the DSE promised to cede Aegean Macedonia to Yugoslavia in return for the Yugoslav support when it comes to power in Greece. There was a United States intelligence-gathering operation in the country. In 1947, twelve British
Secret Intelligence Service-trained agents
were airdropped in central Albania to start an insurrection, which did not materialise. The Yugoslavs hoped that the perceived Greek threat would increase Albanian support for integration with Yugoslavia. Soviet envoys to Albania deemed the effort successful in instilling Albanians with a fear of Greeks along with a perception that Albania could not defend itself on its own, although Soviet sources indicated there was no actual threat of a Greek invasion of Albania. Tito thought, since many DSE fighters were
ethnic Macedonians, cooperating with the DSE might allow Yugoslavia to annex Greek territory by expanding into Aegean Macedonia even if the DSE failed to seize power. Shortly after Đilas and Stalin met, Tito suggested to Hoxha that Albania should permit Yugoslavia to use military bases near
Korçë, close to the Albanian–Greek border, to defend against a potential Greek and Anglo–American attack. By the end of January, Hoxha accepted the idea. Moreover, Xoxe indicated that the integration of the Albanian and Yugoslav armies had been approved. Even though the matter was supposedly conducted in secrecy, the Soviets learned of the scheme from a source in the Albanian government.
Federation with Bulgaria In late 1944, Stalin first proposed a Yugoslav–Bulgarian federation, involving a dualist state where Bulgaria would be one half of the federation and Yugoslavia (further divided into its republics) the other. The Yugoslav position was that a federation was possible, but only if Bulgaria were one of the seven federal units and if
Pirin Macedonia was ceded to the nascent Yugoslav
federal unit of Macedonia. Since the two sides could not agree, Stalin invited them to Moscow in January 1945 for arbitration—first supporting the Bulgarian view—and days later switching to the Yugoslav position. Finally, on 26 January, the British government warned the Bulgarian authorities against any federation arrangement with Yugoslavia before Bulgaria signed a peace treaty with the Allies. The federation was shelved, to Tito's relief. Three years later, in 1948, when Tito and Hoxha were preparing to deploy the
Yugoslav People's Army to Albania, the Bulgarian Workers' Party leader
Georgi Dimitrov spoke to Western journalists about turning the Eastern Bloc into a federally organised state. He then included Greece in a list of "people's democracies", causing concern in the West and in the Soviet Union. Tito sought to distance Yugoslavia from the idea, but the Soviets came to believe that Dimitrov's remarks were influenced by Yugoslavia's intentions in the Balkans. On 1 February 1948, Molotov instructed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders to send representatives to Moscow by 10 February for discussions. On 5 February, just days before the scheduled meeting with Stalin, the DSE launched its general offensive, shelling
Thessaloniki four days later.
February 1948 meeting with Stalin met Yugoslav officials in Moscow in February 1948, shortly before the split. In response to Molotov's summons, Tito dispatched Kardelj and President of the
Executive Council of the People's Republic of Croatia Vladimir Bakarić to Moscow, where they joined Đilas. Stalin berated Yugoslavia and Dimitrov for ignoring the Soviet Union by signing the Bled Agreement, and for Dimitrov's call to include Greece in a hypothetical federation with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. He also demanded an end to the insurrection in Greece, arguing that any further support for the Communist guerrillas there might lead to a wider conflict with the United States and the United Kingdom. By limiting his support to the DSE, Stalin adhered to the
Percentages Agreement, an informal deal Stalin and Winston Churchill had struck in Moscow in October 1944, which placed Greece in the British sphere of influence. Stalin also demanded an immediate federation consisting of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. According to Stalin, Albania would join later. At the same time, he expressed support for similar unions of Hungary and Romania and of Poland and
Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav and Bulgarian participants in the meeting acknowledged mistakes, and Stalin made Kardelj and Dimitrov sign a treaty obliging Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to consult the Soviet Union on all foreign policy matters. The KPJ politburo met in secret on 19 February and decided against any federation with Bulgaria. Two days later, Tito, Kardelj, and Đilas met with
Nikos Zachariadis, the general secretary of the KKE. They informed Zachariadis that Stalin was opposed to the KKE's armed struggle but promised continued Yugoslav support, nonetheless. The
KPJ Central Committee met on 1 March and noted that Yugoslavia would remain independent only if it resisted Soviet designs for the economic development of the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet Union viewed the Yugoslav five-year development plan unfavourably because it did not align with the needs of the Eastern Bloc but prioritised development based solely on local development needs. The Central Committee also dismissed the possibility of a federation with Bulgaria, interpreting it as a form of
Trojan horse tactic, and decided to proceed with the existing policy towards Albania. Politburo member and government minister
Sreten Žujović, who was not present at the meeting on 19 February, attended the 1 March meeting and informed the Soviets. In Albania, Xoxe purged all anti-Yugoslav forces from the PKSH Central Committee at a plenum of 26 February–8 March. The PKSH Central Committee adopted a resolution that official Albanian policy was pro-Yugoslav. The Albanian authorities adopted an additional secret document detailing a planned merger of the Albanian and Yugoslav armies, citing the threat of a Greek invasion and arguing that having Yugoslav troops at the Albanian-Greek border was an "urgent necessity". In response to these moves, Soviet military advisers were withdrawn from Yugoslavia on 18 March. ==Stalin's letters and open conflict==