Another primary objective was to realize Russia's long-standing goal of opening (i.e., permitting free transit, without prior conditions; and in exclusive right to Russia) the
Bosporus and the
Dardanelles (known jointly as the "Straits") to Russian warships, giving Russia free passage to the Mediterranean and making it possible to use the
Black Sea Fleet not just in the coastal defense of her Black Sea territory; but also in support of her global interests. In one of the secret articles of the renewed
League of the Three Emperors of 1881, Austria-Hungary had asserted the right 'to annex
Bosnia and Herzegovina at whatever moment she shall deem opportune', and the claim was repeated intermittently in Austro-Russian agreements. This was not contested by Russia, but St Petersburg maintained the right to impose conditions. Izvolsky, with the support of Tsar Nicholas II proposed that the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina be exchanged for Austro-Hungarian support for improved Russian access to the Turkish Straits. Izvolsky met with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Baron (later Count)
Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, at the
Moravian castle of
Buchlov on September 16, 1908, and there agreed to support Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in exchange for Austria-Hungary's assent to the opening of the Straits to Russia; and to support such an opening, at any subsequent diplomatic conference. Aehrenthal's announcement of the
annexation on 5 October 1908, secured through alterations of the terms of the
Treaty of Berlin at the expense of the
Ottoman Empire, occasioned a major European crisis. Izvolsky denied having reached any agreement with Aehrenthal. He subsequently denied any foreknowledge of Aehrenthal's intentions and tried unsuccessfully to have a meeting called to deal with the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
impasse in diplomacy was resolved only by the
St Petersburg note of March 1909 in which the
Germans demanded that the Russians at last recognize the annexation and urge
Serbia to do likewise. If they did not, German Chancellor
Bülow suggested, there was the possibility of an Austrian war on Serbia and the further direct possibility that the Germans would release the documents proving Izvolsky's connivance in the original annexation deal. Izvolsky backed down at once. Reviled by Russian
pan-Slavists for "betraying" the Serbs, who felt Bosnia should be theirs, the embittered Izvolsky was eventually dismissed from office. Historiography has traditionally laid most blame for the annexation crisis at Aehrenthal's door. The historian
Christopher Clark however, in his 2012 study of the causes of the
First World War The Sleepwalkers, has challenged this view: "the evidence suggests that the crisis took the course it did because Izvolsky lied in the most extravagant fashion in order to save his job and reputation. The Russian foreign minister had made two serious errors of judgement [firstly] that London would support his demand for the opening of the Turkish Straits to Russian warships - [and] he grossly underestimated the impact of the annexation on Russian nationalist opinion - [when] - he got wind of the press response in St Petersburg, he realized his error, panicked, and began to construct himself as Aehrenthal's dupe." The years following the annexation crisis, with an atmosphere of increased 'chauvinist popular emotion' and with a sense of humiliation in a sphere of vital interest, saw the Russians launch a substantial programme of military investment. == Later life ==