Preface In this part, the author explains what the book is about: He goes on to name many people with whom he associated, such as
Paul D. Wolfowitz, Wolfowitz' teacher
Albert Wohlstetter, Fukuyama's own teacher
Allan Bloom and Bloom's teacher
Leo Strauss, his former classmate
William Kristol and his father
Irving Kristol, for whom Fukuyama had written many articles in his magazines (
The National Interest,
The Public Interest,
Commentary). Fukuyama became more aware of his disagreements with the movement when, in February 2004, he attended the annual dinner at the
AEI and listened to a speech by
Charles Krauthammer which "treated the 2003 invasion of Iraq|[Iraq] war as a virtually unqualified success". Fukuyama subsequently wrote a reaction to the speech and concluded "that
neoconservatism, both as a political system and a body of thought, has evolved into something that I can no longer support." It had also declared a policy of
preventive war and deposed the
Saddam Hussein regime because it was believed
Saddam Hussein had or planned to acquire
WMDs. He states the first set of policies were inevitable, but the preventive war doctrine and Iraq war were "not obvious responses" and were based on an over-militarized interpretation of neoconservatism, linked to "concepts like preemption, regime change, unilateralism, and benevolent hegemony". He asserts a new school of
American foreign policy is needed next to the
neoconservative, the "
Kissingerian"
realist,
liberal internationalist and "
Jacksonian"
nationalist. 'Realistic Wilsonianism' would differ from
realism because of its support for
nation-building and
democracy promotion, and from
neoconservatism and
Jacksonian nationalism as it would take
international institutions seriously. The
state would still be the source of
accountability and
power (thus differing from
liberal internationalism, that would like to transcend the
nation-state and
power politics). Both the challenges of
development and a
multi-institutional global order are not adequately responded to by the traditional schools, the author claims.
The neoconservative legacy In this part, Fukuyama traces back the
intellectual roots of
neoconservatism and its subsequent evolution. First, Fukuyama discusses the "enormous amount of ink [that] was spilled on the subject of neoconservatives and their alleged capture of the
Bush administration." The author claims all kinds of
conspiracy theories were launched by many political
rivals of the
Iraq War, such as
Elizabeth Drew. Fukuyama claims that the fact that many
neoconservatives in
the Bush Administration were Jewish, like
Wolfowitz and
Feith, made many critics believe the invasion of Iraq was in Israel's interest while others claimed that
Strauss – who was a major inspiration of the movement – had defended the idea of "the
noble lie" and that elites were thus allegedly allowed to lie in the public interest, which the neocons did, according to this reasoning, in the case of
Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. Fukuyama says this is all wrong, and that
neoconservatism was strongly rooted in several
American traditions and that there was
diversity of ideas within the movement itself. He names and describes the roots of the movement: •
City College: a group of largely Jewish
New York intellectuals of the
Anti-Stalinist left attended
CCNY from the 1930s to the early 1940s. These include people like
Irving Kristol,
Seymour Martin Lipset,
Daniel Bell,
Nathan Glazer and several others. They eventually became
anticommunists as they "came to realize that "
real existing socialism" had become a monstrosity of
unintended consequences that completely undermined the idealistic goals it espoused." The revelations of
Stalinist Terror and the
American participation in World War II, that proved that the capitalist US could wield its
power for
moral purposes, pushed them further to the
political right. •
The Public Interest: a magazine founded by
Irving Kristol and
Daniel Bell (soon replaced by
Nathan Glazer), it attracted many contributors such as
James Q. Wilson,
Moynihan and
Charles Murray in the 1960s when the
New Left and
Counterculture became popular among
students radicals who
protested the Vietnam War. They supported initiatives like
the Great Society and were often sympathetic to
communist regimes like
North Vietnam and
Cuba, Fukuyama claims. These contributors were critical of
large-scale social engineering and eventually contributed to the
domestic policy and
welfare reforms like the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. has written a better account of
Strauss' philosophy. Fukuyama claims there is little
Direct Influence of
Bush Administration people and policy and
Strauss: Strauss didn't write about
political issues, but was interested in the "
theological-political problem" of claims of 'the good life' and tried to respond to
modern moral relativism by bringing back
premodern Greek philosophy. Later generations of Strauss students did (try to) interpret his thought to prescribe policies or take positions in socio-political issues. He thus provided the
neoconservative movement with "a much deeper understanding of the sources of weakness of contemporary liberal democracy." But, Fukuyama claims, a profound understanding would have warned the
Bush Administration of the difficulty of this
democratic transition, as informal habits play a fundamental role too. He had worked at the
RAND Corporation and later was a professor at the
University of Chicago. He had two major concerns: (1) extended
deterrence, which meant that having a minimal nuclear deterrent isn't enough so that further investment was needed to have
second-strike capabilities – an important part of
Cold War deterrence theory; (2)
nuclear proliferation and a skepticism towards the
1968 Nonproliferation Treaty which maintained the right to enrich uranium for civilian use while, in his view, a sharp distinction between civilian and military use was impossible to make in practice. These two concerns and his views drove him to be skeptical of
MAD and he argued that, in a
counterforce scenario, the
Soviet Union could be willing to accept massive
casualties for political ends, thus neglecting
deterrence. These views were incorporated in the
Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s, Fukuyama claims.
Neocons generally shared an opposition to
political realism such as implemented by
Henry Kissinger in the 1970s who tried to have a '
détente' with the
USSR, Fukuyama writes.
Realists generally believe
communist or nondemocratic regimes are not necessarily superior to
liberal-democratic regimes, because all
states just desire
power, Fukuyama claims.
Neocons then integrated in the
conservative movement, both because
conservatives in general took over neoconservative opinions and because
neoconservatives took over 'traditional'
conservative ideas, such as support for
free-market economics, Fukuyama states. or "
Wilsonianism minus
international institutions". Fukuyama says their
interpretation has come to define
neoconservatism, and that "it is an uphill struggle to try to redefine neoconservative foreign policy after the fact." and endorsed by Fukuyama and that only a small number of
Muslims would support
jihadi terrorism and that
suicide terrorism is not inherent to
Islam as a religion, but because of the process of
modernisation that the
Greater Middle East and
Muslim minorities in Europe are confronted with in which
alienated Muslims struggle about their
identity (as posited by
Olivier Roy and
Gilles Kepel). Fukuyama thus advises smaller scale military activities and "
a battle for hearts and minds" of Muslims instead of '
World War IV' or '
Clash of Civilizations'
rhetoric. Fukuyama also states there were several alternative cases for the
Iraq War (other than
WMDs, an
al-Qaida connection or
democracy promotion), such as the untenability of the
sanctions regime or arguing it was a
global public good to prevent the
nuclear proliferation of the Middle East. These were not used, Fukuyama claims. Instead, the Bush Administration outlined a policy of '
preemption' – however, Fukuyama claims the
Iraq War was rather a
war of prevention, where a lot of mistakes can be made (as he cites
Ken Jowitt American exceptionalism and international legitimacy The author focuses on the problem of "
American exceptionalism" – a form of
US-centrism – which had made the
Bush Administration blind to
world public opinion and the structural
anti-Americanism in the
international system, Fukuyama writes.
Social engineering and the problems of development Fukuyama posits that two fundamental principles of neoconservatism may collide in the area of
political and
economic development: on the one hand, neoconservatives are concerned about the
internal character of a regime, thus
democracy-promotion and human rights are important considerations in foreign policy (unlike for
political realists); on the other hand, there is a danger in large-scale
social engineering which could have unintended consequences as a result. On the
domestic front, neocons like
James Q. Wilson had warned about extensive
social programs and the
Bush Administration should have put this principle into practice in foreign policy as well, Fukuyama asserts. Fukuyama cites an interview by Dick Cheney in which the Vice President said: "to suggest we need several 100.000 troops there, after the conflict ends, I don't think it's accurate... I really do believe we will be greeted as liberators." President
George W. Bush remarked at a speech that democratic desires are a human universal, but Fukuyama contrasts this to his own thesis of "
The End of History" and caution: "One can argue that there is a
universal human
desire to be free of
tyranny and a
universalism to the appeal of life in a prosperous
liberal democracy. The problem is one of timeframe involved. It is one thing to say that there is a broad, centuries-long trend towards the
spread of liberal democracy – something that I myself have strongly argued in the past- and another to say that either democracy or prosperity can emerge in a given society at a given time. There are certain critical intervening
variables known as
institutions. And if there is one thing that the
study of
democratic transition and
political development teaches, is that institutions are very difficult to establish."
Neoconservatives ignored by and large
development and put too much emphasis on defense.
Economic development The author talks about the history and challenges in economic development aid, beginning with the 1940s
Harrod-Domar growth model through the
Cold War struggle over influence and
economic orthodoxy in the 1980s to 1990s and (in 2006 present day) 2000s debates on
development, especially involving institutions (a
subject he would tackle in his 2011 book
The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman times to the French Revolution and 2014 book
Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy) and
institutional economics.
Political development Debate on political development and the creation and evolution of institutions.
Rethinking institutions for world order Here, the author discusses international institutions: their importance, complexity and diversity and the evolution towards a multi-institutional world order.
Adifferent kind of american foreign policy Here, Fukuyama proposes a
demilitarisation of
US foreign policy, a
counterinsurgency campaign against
Global Jihadism (rather than "World War IV" or militarised rhetoric), support for good governance and suggests
Otto von Bismarck is a good inspiration for the US if it wants a good balance between
power projection and
international legitimacy. ==Publication history==