During the Phoney War Its first meeting was at
Abbeville on 12 September 1939 (the
Abbeville Conference) with Britain represented by the Prime Minister,
Neville Chamberlain, and Lord
Chatfield, the French delegation headed by the Prime Minister,
Édouard Daladier, and General
Maurice Gamelin. The participants assessed the consequences of
German invasion on Poland and ultimately decided to leave Poland with no military assistance. The next meeting took place at
Hove on 22 September 1939. At both meetings, discussion centred on Italy and whether it would be possible to deploy military force at
Salonika or
Istanbul without provoking
Benito Mussolini. With their huge army mobilised but idle, the French feared an ebbing of military morale and were accordingly bellicose and impatient for action; Britain, on the other hand, shrank from such measures. At the Hove meeting there was also discussion about munitions production and reinforcements to the air and anti-aircraft defences in France. The British party at Hove consisted of
Neville Chamberlain (prime minister),
Lord Halifax (Foreign Secretary), Sir
Alexander Cadogan (Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office) and
Edward Bridges (Cabinet Secretary). France was represented by
Édouard Daladier (prime minister), General
Maurice Gamelin, Admiral
François Darlan (C-in-C French Navy),
Raoul Dautry (minister of munitions), and
Jean Monnet (chairman of the Franco-British Economic Co-ordination Committee). Chamberlain stated that the Allies could not prevent a German intervention into
Yugoslavia. Here, the British rejected France's proposal for an expedition to
Petsamo in Finland to help the Finns in the
Winter War for fear that this would provoke the Soviet Union. Sir
Alexander Cadogan, the
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, described it as a "silly scheme". However, a French plan to send forces to
Narvik was approved, dependent on agreement from Norway and Sweden. The meeting was described by
General Ironside as having been harmonious with "everyone purring with pleasure. Wondered if we should all be in the state if we had a little adversity to touch us up." In the event, Norway and Sweden, fearful of compromising their neutrality, did not consent to the Narvik plan. The Scandinavian view was interpreted differently by Britain and France. Britain took the view that the operation should be cancelled, but France maintained that it had been agreed that the operation should proceed regardless of opposition. However, events overtook the impasse, when, on 13 March, the Finns agreed an armistice with the Soviet Union. The sixth meeting of the SWC was held in London on 28 March 1940 with Britain represented by the Prime Minister,
Neville Chamberlain,
Lord Halifax,
Winston Churchill,
Oliver Stanley and Sir
Kingsley Wood. It was the first to be attended by
Paul Reynaud, the new French prime minister, who was accompanied by
César Campinchi, the naval minister,
Victor Laurent-Eynac the aviation minister, M.
Charles Corbin (the French ambassador),
M. Alexis Léger, General
Maurice Gamelin,
Admiral Darlan, General
Joseph Vuillemin and General Koeltz. The British were firmly opposed to French plans to bomb Russian oil fields in the
Caucasus in order to deprive Germany of Soviet oil supplies. The French agreed to what later became known as
Operation Royal Marine, the floating of mines up the
Rhine to damage bridges and disrupt barge traffic. However, Reynaud was unable to obtain the approval of his cabinet for such a mining of the Rhine; accordingly, the British refused to go along with the plan to mine the waters off the Norwegian coast at Narvik. Politically, the main thrust of this meeting was a joint communiqué declaring, "Both Governments mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. They undertake to maintain after conclusion of peace a community of action for so long as may be necessary". In Paris, on 5 April, at a meeting not of the SWC, Churchill pressed for
Operation Royal Marine, but, fearing German reprisals, the French refused to countenance any mining of the Rhine. Churchill, therefore, decided that Britain alone would undertake the mining off Narvik; this action (
Operation Wilfred) was planned for 8 April. However, in the meantime, the Germans had launched
Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway and Denmark. Paul Reynaud, Édouard Daladier and Admiral Darlan flew to London for an emergency meeting of the SWC on 9 April. Here, it was resolved that an Anglo-French task force would be sent to Norway, but the operation (
Plan R 4) was a failure. Not only did it prove impossible to stop the export of iron ore from Scandinavia to Germany but also the troops had to be evacuated, in what was known as
Operation Alphabet. A further meeting of the council took place in Paris on 22 and 23 April, when it was agreed that the Allies would stand fast in Norway;
Trondheim and
Narvik would continue to be the main objectives. It was also decided that the RAF would, without further discussion, bomb the
Ruhr if the Germans were to invade the Netherlands or Belgium. When the Supreme War Council met on 27 April, the French mistakenly hoped that Britain would postpone the evacuation of Norway. Reynaud was furious, deploring "the old men [in London] who do not know how to take a risk" and returning to Paris with influenza. There was acrimony on both sides; the French convinced that
Albion was indeed
perfidious and the British stereotyping their ally as "temperamental".
During the Battle of France Crisis meetings in Paris At 7.30 on the morning of 15 May, Winston Churchill, who had been prime minister for just five days, received a desperate telephone call from Paul Reynaud announcing that "the French were beaten ... that they had lost the battle." Reynaud begged for all the aircraft and troops that could be spared. The British Prime Minister agreed to fly to Paris the following day to attend what would be the first crisis meeting of the SWC. On 16 May, Churchill flew to Paris, with Sir
John Dill, vice-chief of the
Imperial General Staff, General
Hastings Ismay, his deputy as defence minister, and Air Marshal
Joubert de la Ferté, deputy chief of the Air Staff. The delegation arrived in Paris during the afternoon and found the French in a state verging on paralysis. General
Maurice Gamelin explained that the Germans had broken through on a 50 km front and had already advanced 60 km inward from
Sedan. When Churchill asked about the strategic reserve, Gamelin replied that there was none. Churchill then inquired when and where Gamelin proposed to attack the flanks of the bulge. Gamelin replied with a hopeless shrug and the famous words: "Inferiority of numbers, inferiority of equipment, inferiority of method." Six more squadrons were requested for France, above the four additional RAF squadrons which had already that morning been authorised. If the French request were heeded, it would leave just 25 squadrons for home defence, the final limit. Churchill explained that a minimum of 39 fighter squadrons was needed to defend British war industries. Bomber aircraft, he argued, would be better employed attacking the
Ruhr; they were unsuitable against tanks. However, the same evening, Churchill warned his
War Cabinet that more aircraft should be committed for fear that French resistance would crumble as swiftly as that of the Poles. French morale was accordingly raised, but matters were not as they seemed. The six extra squadrons were to be based in
Kent and would operate from French airfields only during daylight hours. Moreover, three would fly in the mornings and three in the afternoons, and three had already been committed to France as part of
Lord Gort's air power. Over the coming three to four days, the strength of the British
Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) would be further reduced. There was a meeting of the SWC in Paris on 22 May 1940. A private meeting between Churchill and Reynaud took place over lunch in London on 26 May. Both men deal with the meeting in their memoirs, but the precise details are confused. Churchill says that the French prime minister "dwelt not obscurely with the possible French withdrawal from the war". Reynaud pressed for more British air support and warned that if the Battle of France were lost, Pétain would urge strongly for an armistice. However, it seems that Reynaud did not directly ask Britain to release France from its promise made on 28 March not to enter into a separate armistice with Germany. Another meeting was held later the same day, now with Churchill, Chamberlain, Attlee, and
Anthony Eden. At this meeting, a suggestion was discussed which had previously been voiced by
Lord Halifax, the involvement of Italy in a peace conference. If
Benito Mussolini would help to safeguard the independence of Britain and France, it would be possible to discuss Italian claims in the Mediterranean. The latter involved the coast of
French Somaliland,
Djibouti and the
Addis Ababa railway; another concession would be the internationalisation of
Malta,
Gibraltar and
Suez. However, the British opposed such concessions, and Churchill confirmed as much in a telegram to Paris the same evening. Despite a great deal of internal opposition, the French made an approach to Mussolini at the end of the month, but it was scornfully ignored by Rome anyway. On 31 May 1940, Churchill flew again to Paris for a meeting of the SWC, this time with
Clement Attlee and Generals
John Dill and
Hastings Ismay. Discussions were held at the French Ministry of War on the deteriorating military situation with a French delegation consisting of Reynaud,
Philippe Pétain and
Maxime Weygand. Also present was Churchill's personal representative to the French Prime Minister, General Sir
Edward Spears. Three main points were considered:
Narvik, the
Dunkirk evacuation and the prospect of an Italian invasion of France. Reynaud complained that at the evacuation,
Operation Dynamo, more British troops had been taken off than French. Churchill promised to do everything to redress the balance. During discussions after the meeting, a group formed around Churchill, Pétain and Spears. One of the French officials mentioned the possibility of a separate surrender. Speaking to Pétain, Spears pointed out that such an event would provoke a blockade of France by Britain and the bombardment of all French ports in German hands. Churchill declared that Britain would fight on whatever happened.
Meeting at Briare near Briare The penultimate session was in France, on 11/12 June at the Chateau du Muguet near
Briare, where the French army headquarters had withdrawn.
Winston Churchill,
Anthony Eden, General Sir
John Dill (
chief of the Imperial General Staff), General Ismay and other staff officers, including General Sir
Edward Spears, met the French leader. Reynaud and his cabinet had been forced to leave Paris and the meeting took place at the chateau which was HQ of General
Maxime Weygand. Also present was General
Charles de Gaulle; Spears had not met him before and was impressed with his bearing. As wrangling continued over the level of support from Britain, Spears suddenly became aware that "the battle of France was over and that no one believed in miracles". The next day, Weygand's catastrophic account of the military situation reinforced his pessimism. Despite assurances from Admiral
François Darlan, the British were worried that the powerful French fleet might fall into German hands.
Last-ditch talks at Tours What would prove to be the final meeting of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council took place at the
préfecture in Tours on 13 June. The British delegation was composed of Churchill,
Lord Halifax,
Lord Beaverbrook, Sir
Alexander Cadogan, General "Pug" Ismay and General Spears. The French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, was accompanied by
Paul Baudouin, a member of the War Committee. Spears found the atmosphere quite different from that at Briare, where Churchill had expressed goodwill, sympathy and sorrow; now, it was like a business meeting, with the British keenly appraising the situation from its own point of view. Reynaud declared that unless immediate help was assured by the US, the French government would have to give up the struggle. He acknowledged that the two countries had agreed never to conclude a separate peace at a meeting of the SWC London on 28 March 1940, but France was physically incapable of carrying on. The news was received by the British with shock and horror. Churchill said with determination, "We must fight, we will fight, and that is why we must ask our friends to fight on." Prime Minister Reynaud acknowledged that Britain would continue the war, affirming that France would also continue the struggle from North Africa, if necessary, if there were a chance of success. That success could come only if America were prepared to join the fray. The French leader called for British understanding, asking again for France to be released from her obligation not to conclude a separate peace now that she could do no more.
Churchill fails to address French cabinet The day ended in confusion; Churchill flew back to London without speaking to the French cabinet, as had been promised by Reynaud. The ministers were dismayed and angry; Spears was depressed, realising that "an opportunity that might not recur had been missed". He was at a loss to understand why a meeting had not taken place: had Reynaud simply forgotten? Did Reynaud wish to be the one to explain the situation to the ministers? In any event, his ministers were disillusioned and felt abandoned. Spears believed that the event played its part in swaying the majority of the cabinet towards surrender. He was sure that "by the night of 13 June, the possibility of France remaining in the war had almost disappeared". The only hope rested on the decision of President Roosevelt on if America now join the war. ==Military participation==