Recruitment problems After the crews of the old navy had been paid off in February 1795, remanning the fleet became an urgent need. Re-enlistment of some previous naval personnel was helped by the fact that due to the dire economic situation of the shipping industry there was widespread unemployment under able seamen. However, recruitment turned out to be slow. The Dutch navy had never used
impressment, like the Royal Navy, and
conscription, both for the navy and the army, would only be introduced in the Netherlands after the annexation by the
French empire in 1810. So the Batavian navy had to use moral suasion (an appeal to the patriotism of the citizens) and high enlistment bonuses to persuade suitable candidates to enlist. This attracted many foreign sailors, who had been employed by the Dutch
merchant marine, but were now unemployed. Dutchmen needed more encouragement, so the navy was forced to use many less-suitable candidates, like the pupils in the orphanages. Also the government decided to force a number of the mercenaries of the Batavian army to transfer to the navy, a very unpopular policy, that caused the desertion rates in the army to increase. The dearth of professional non-commissioned officers was especially pressing. These career navy personnel, like
bosuns and bosun's mates, and specialists like, gunners and gunner's mates could only be found among the ranks of personnel of the old navy. But these people were among the most pro-Orangist and anti-Patriot groups in the country, and therefore either unwilling to re-enlist, or if they did (because of economic necessity), they formed an unreliable element among the ship's crews. That unreliability was particularly important, because these NCOs and specialists formed the intermediary layer between officers and common seamen, and as the "natural leaders" of the men had a special influence on opinion formation. Repeatedly, these key personnel proved to be either Orangist "agitators" themselves, or at least to turn a blind eye to political agitation, that would foment mutinies at crucial moments. The first consequence of this recruitment problem was that the newly-operational ships had to stay in port, due to lack of personnel to sail in them. The government, therefore, intensified its efforts to make enlistment more attractive. A propaganda effort was mounted, a commission of notables promoted enlistment, and most importantly, financial incentives were given or at least promised, and this finally got the stream of enlistees going, so that in the Spring of 1796 the fleet was sufficiently manned, to at least put the ships to sea. But then the government did something in March 1796 that undermined the morale of the new crews. Up to that moment, the Batavian Republic had still used the flag of the old Republic, known as the
Prince's Flag. But the authorities now decided to do away with this symbol of the old regime, and to issue a proclamation by which a new flag design was instituted (see illustration at the top of this article). This measure was, of course, popular with the partisans of the government, but very unpopular with the Orangists in the country, many of whom belonged to the groups in the population from which the navy recruited its enlistees. The new flag therefore mainly served to undermine the morale of the sailors in the fleet, which would prove to have dire consequences in the future.
The Saldanha Bay capitulation The
Dutch Cape Colony had been captured by the British in September 1795. This put the communication lines to the
Dutch East Indies (which had become the responsibility of the Batavian government after the
VOC went bankrupt and was nationalized) in jeopardy. The government, therefore, felt constrained to mount an expedition in early 1796 that was charged with the reconquest of the Cape Colony, and subsequently would sail on to the Indies. A fleet, commanded by captain
Engelbertus Lucas Sr., of three ships of the line, five frigates and an
armed merchantman (with
letters of marque), 340 guns and 1972 men, set sail on 23 February 1796 (together with another fleet under Vice-Admiral Adriaan Braak, destined for the
Dutch Caribbean). After sailing around Scotland the two fleets split up. Lucas followed the usual route to the
Canary Islands, and from there to
Brazil, to take advantage of the westerlies toward the
Cape of Good Hope. The fleet stayed no less than 34 days at the bay of La Luz,
Gran Canaria to take in water and supplies. During that period two events happened that would have a great influence on further developments. First, a frigate was observed, that was probably , that would warn the British forces of the imminent arrival of the Batavian force. But Lucas did not have the ship pursued. Next, a ship of the line, flying the Spanish flag was observed sailing past the bay, but again Lucas did nothing, despite the protest of his captains. This may have been under Rear-Admiral
Thomas Pringle, convoying a flotilla of transports with British troops for the Cape on board. After crossing the
Tropic of Cancer on 21 May, Lucas hoisted his rear-admiral's pennant, as his promotion now came into effect. After consulting his officers he set sail for
Praia on
Cape Verde, and from there to
Rio de Janeiro, where he omitted, however, to take in water, as by then he apparently had already privately decided to sail directly to
Saldanha Bay in the Cape colony, despite the fact that he knew that the Cape was in British hands. He had secret instructions to sail on to
Mauritius in case the Cape were securely in British hands (which had been uncertain when the fleet sailed, but had now been confirmed), but he did not inform his council of war of this, so his officers agreed with the plan to go to the bay, also because the lack of water became pressing. The fleet arrived in the bay on 6 August, without having met British ships. What happened next, therefore, was for a large part the fault of Rear-Admiral Lucas and his neglectful conduct. He was soon confronted by a superior British force, both at sea and on land even though he had been warned by people living nearby that an appreciable British infantry force was nearing. The work of taking in water was going forward very slowly, as it had to be obtained from far inland, so the fleet lost several days in which it would still have been able to get away. The sailors who went ashore showed a disturbing tendency to desert or defect to the enemy. Meanwhile, Lucas did not make haste, mostly because he discounted news of a British fleet coming near. Departure had been set for 16 August, but again was delayed. And by then it was too late and the fleet was surrounded both on land, and by sea. Lucas at first prepared to fight at anchor, but mutinies broke out aboard the ships of the line
Revolutie and
Dordrecht, and the frigate
Castor. The mutineers, apparently led by their "deck officers" (
NCOs), threatened to shoot the officers if they would open fire on the British ships. General
James Craig, commanding the British troops on land, threatened to
deny quarter if attempts were made by the Batavians to beach or otherwise sabotage their ships. Lucas and his council of war then decided to capitulate more or less unconditionally, after Vice-Admiral
George Elphinstone refused offers of conditional surrender. After the fleet had surrendered, the Batavian officers entreated the British to take possession of the ships as soon as possible, and to disarm the mutineers, as they were in fear of their lives. After the British had taken possession, all military discipline aboard the Batavian ships collapsed. Drunken sailors, shouting Orangist slogans, trampled the Batavian flag, and officers and sailors of known Patriot sympathies were assaulted, and had to defend themselves with their
side arms. Stores of victuals and especially liquor, were looted. This went on until the British intervened and arrested the ringleaders. Most of the crew members defected to the British. The officers were transported to the Batavian Republic in a
cartel ship, after having given their
parole. After Lucas returned to the Netherlands, he was arrested by the Naval Affairs Committee, and imprisoned in the
Huis ten Bosch palace, pending his court-martial. During this imprisonment his health deteriorated so fast, that he had to be allowed to go home, and he died soon afterward, on 21 June 1797. Exceptionally, the
National Assembly of the Batavian Republic decided to impanel a
Hoge Zeekrijgsraad (High Naval Court) itself (19 May 1797).
Jacobus Spoors was appointed prosecutor. As Lucas had died, he could no longer be tried, however. So it was decided to commission Spoors to conduct an investigation into Lucas' conduct, and write a report. This report was eventually adopted by the Court, and presented to the National Assembly. As the report put the main responsibility for the loss of the fleet on Lucas, the other officers were acquitted of dereliction of duty. Spoors' report was (with some redactions because of national security) published in 1798.
The "Enterprise of Ireland" , commander-in-chief of the Batavian fleet Mutiny was not only a problem for the Batavian navy. In April and May 1797 (barely a half year after the mutiny at Saldanha Bay) the British fleet mutinied at
Spithead and Nore. In both cases, politically motivated unrest was behind the mutinies. In the Dutch case, it was the adherents of the conservative, even reactionary, ideology of Organism, who proved to be unreliable. In the British case, on the other hand, the initiative for the mutinies came from the partisans of the ideas of the
French Revolution. Those ideas also inspired revolutionaries in Ireland, who already in 1796 appealed to the
French Directory to support a revolution in Ireland. This idea appealed to the French, because they saw Ireland as the strategic backdoor to Great Britain. This resulted in the failed
expedition to Ireland at the end of 1796. After this defeat the French did not give up, but started planning for an even more grandiose enterprise, that would consist of a two-pronged invasion of Ireland. The southern prong would take a Franco-Spanish fleet to the South of Ireland, while the northern prong would have the Batavian fleet convoy a fleet of transports with 25,000 French troops (conveniently located in the Batavian Republic as the French army of occupation) aboard around the north of Scotland, toward Northern Ireland. The
battle of Cape St. Vincent in February 1797 knocked the Spanish fleet out of the race, and the victory of the French royalists in the April 1797 French elections temporarily cooled the ardor of the radicals in the Directory. However, their radical colleagues in the Batavian Commission on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly were still keen to show their dedication to the revolutionary cause (and incidentally prove to the French Directory that an independent Batavian Republic was worth supporting). So the "northern" prong of the planned invasion in Ireland was kept alive, with the 25,000 French troops replaced with 15,000 troops from the Batavian army under command of the Batavian revolutionary hero, Lt.-General
Herman Willem Daendels. These troops were embarked in a fleet of transports, lying in the Texel roadstead, in June. They spent the summer of 1797 in steadily increasing misery aboard the ships, while the Batavian fleet was kept in the roadstead by the seasonal westerly winds, which prevented it from sailing out. In this frustrating time interval the Channel squadron of Admiral
Adam Duncan became operational again after the spring mutinies; Great Britain amassed an army of 80,000 troops in Ireland; General
Lazare Hoche, the great promoter of the plan for the invasion died; and the Irish revolutionary
Wolfe Tone, who spent the summer aboard
Vrijheid, Admiral de Winter's flagship, lost heart. The Commission on Foreign Affairs, therefore, decided to cancel the operation at the end of the summer, and ordered the debarkation of the troops on 9 September 1797.
The Battle of Camperdown and its aftermath Five day earlier the
Coup of 18 Fructidor took place in France, once again putting the radicals in the Directory in charge. For their allies in the Batavian Commission on Foreign Affairs this was an extra motivation to have the fleet in the Texel "do something, anything" to promote the cause of Revolution and harm the cause of Reaction, and to erase the shame of Saldanha Bay. The plan this time was to have the fleet in the Texel make a sortie with the objective of freeing the ship of the line
Kortenaer, that (together with the frigate
Scipio) was blockaded in the roadstead of
Hellevoetsluis by a British flotilla, and possibly surprising that flotilla. This should be an easy victory that would stimulate national morale in the Batavian Republic no end. Waxing even more ambitious, the Commission (repeating the secret instructions it had given him on 9 July) ordered Admiral de Winter to accept battle from even stronger British forces, as long as they were not obviously superior (an order that would have disastrous consequences). De Winter was understandably very dubious about this rash command, but when the Commission waved away his objections, he started to make serious preparations to execute it. But again, adverse winds prevented the immediate sailing of his fleet of sixteen ships of the line and ten frigates and brigs. This prompted an acrimonious exchange of express-letters between the Commission and the Admiral, in which the Commission ordered the admiral ever more stringently to stop dallying and get out to sea. This exchange proved very embarrassing to the Commission when the political Opposition in the National Assembly got hold of them after the battle. The obstructing westerly winds finally abated and at 9:30am on October 7, 1797 the fleet weighed anchor and left the Texel anchorage. De Winter plotted a course for the Meuse estuary in the expectation that his order to the commander of
Kortenaer to leave his anchorage would be obeyed, but adverse winds again prevented this. The fleet, therefore, spent the next few days cruising up and down that area of the Dutch coast and futilely chasing the squadron of captain
Henry Trollope that was observing him from a tantalizingly close distance. The Batavian ships were too slow, however. Meanwhile,
Duncan was re-victualing in
Yarmouth with his fleet of about equal strength, but he soon returned to the Texel in the expectation that de Winter would not be too far away. In the morning of October 11 the two fleets discovered each other on the latitude of the village of
Camperduin on the Dutch coast. The wind was NW and the weather blustery. Duncan had the
weather gage which gave him a distinct
tactical advantage. De Winter decided that in view of his instructions from the Commission he had to accept battle and at 9am hoisted signal No. 655 of the Dutch General Signal book: come to line of battle, close-hauled on the port tack, behind your assigned predecessors. Due to the limitations of
square-rigged ships, which generally could not get closer to the wind than under an angle of 70 degrees with the wind direction, this worked out as a compass course of NE. The Batavian fleet had been sailing with "short sail" in three divisions: the future vanguard under Rear-Admiral Bloys van Treslong in
Brutus to
windward; the center division under Rear-Admiral
Samuel Story in
Staten Generaal, including the flagship
Vrijheid of Vice-Admiral de Winter himself, in the middle; and the future rearguard under Vice-Admiral Reintjes in
Jupiter to leeward. De Winter had issued a directive about the order of battle, giving the sequence in which the ships were supposed to form the line of battle, on 6 July. But he issued a slightly different directive on 17 July, just for the case the fleet would be attacked while exiting the roadstead of Texel, and had to form the line of battle then. This nuance had not been adequately communicated by his staff, and this caused Rear-Admiral Bloys van Treslong to assume that the directive of 17 July was in force, while de Winter intended the directive of 6 July. Though the rest of the van assumed the correct positions,
Brutus and
Tjerk Hiddes held back, and assumed positions behind
Vrijheid in the center division. De Winter ordered
Tjerk Hiddes forward to the back of the van, but he somehow omitted to do this for
Brutus. The consequence of this error was that the vanguard missed both a flag officer to lead it, and a strong ship of the line. De Winter later asserted that this was one of the main reasons why he lost the battle. Likewise, the order of battle of the rearguard differed from the intended one, as
Delft (which ship had been sent to investigate a number of sails to leeward, and therefore had difficulty rejoining the fleet in time) was directed by Admiral Reintjes to take up the last position in the line. The strength of the rearguard was thereby weakened, in the opinion of the commander of
Delft, and many others, as this ship was one of the two most-lightly armed of the Batavian ships. Finally, two of the ships:
Wassenaar and
Haarlem, were notoriously
onbezeild (difficult to handle, due to a bad trim), and therefore had difficulty maintaining their position in the line. This caused two "gaps" in the line, in front of both ships mentioned, which de Winter tried to correct, but not in time. These gaps were later exploited by the British fleet. Meanwhile, Admiral Duncan apparently had some difficulties with his own battle formation. But he had the luxury of having the weather gage, which allowed his ships to approach the Batavian line of battle before the wind, and to select more or less freely where they would engage that line, so the fact that the British fleet did not form a nice, evenly spaced, line-abreast formation, but was eventually divided into two ragged divisions, one of nine ships total, under Rear-Admiral
Onslow in HMS
Monarch, to windward of the British formation, and one consisting of the remaining British ships under Admiral Duncan, in HMS
Venerable, to the British lee, made no real difference to the outcome of the battle. Onslow fell onto the Batavian rearguard, apparently aiming for Admiral Reintjes' flag in
Jupiter, as he went through the gap between
Jupiter and
Haarlem, thereby "breaching" the Batavian line-of-battle. This enabled him to luff up to leeward of
Jupiter and engage that ship from a position that Reintjes had difficulty covering, as his leeward battery could not be brought to bear.
Jupiter therefore had to bear away to lee, widening the break in the Batavian line. According to the experts in the naval court martial that was held after the battle this already was the moment on which the battle was lost for de Winter, as from this time on his line of battle started to unravel, leading to a
melee, which the line of battle, as a tactical formation was designed to prevent. , de Winter's personal surrender aboard HMS
Venerable Because in a melee the enemy could deal with each ship at his leisure, creating "local superiority of forces" by surrounding the victims with two or more ships, and overwhelming them with broadsides from all sides. This is what happened time and again in the remainder of the battle, and the fact that Duncan in HMS
Venerable repeated the breach of the line of battle through the gap between
Staten General and
Wassenaar a quarter of an hour later, is mere detail. We can dispense with the tales of the individual duels, except for that between
Vrijheid and a number of British ships, among which HMS
Ardent and HMS
Venerable, as in a way it was emblematic for the stoic heroism displayed on both sides. After
Venerable had driven
Staten General out of the line of battle with the same tactic HMS
Monarch earlier used against
Jupiter, she engaged
Vrijheid on her leeward, while that ship at the same time was engaged with HMS
Ardent on her windward. There may have been one other British ship involved. De Winter, being in the minority, tried to signal the remainder of the center division (
Brutus,
Leyden and
Mars) under Rear-Admiral Bloys van Treslong, to come to his aid, but his signal-rigging was shot away repeatedly While the four ships were busy firing at each other, with much loss of life, but no decisive effect, they suddenly encountered the flaming wreck of the Batavian ship
Hercules (which had earlier been set on fire by a
carronade salvo of HMS
Triumph). As this posed a mortal danger for all ships in its neighborhood,
Vrijheid was able to use the temporary "truce" that all were forced to observe to break off the fight, bear away to leeward,
jibe, and sail back along the line with the intent to take up a new position behind
Mars. However, he encountered HMS
Director (captain
Bligh) who came barreling down to her from windward; gave her a devastating broadside, which shot down both the foremast and main mast of
Vrijheid; jibed behind her, came up on her other side, and shot down the
mizzen also. Thus completely dismasted,
Vrijheid endured the broadsides from
Director and other ships, among whom also
Venerable, who had followed
Vrijheid, for another half hour, before her batteries were silenced. De Winter was brought from
Vrijheid to HMS
Venerable, on whose quarterdeck he offered his sword to Duncan. According to legend Duncan refused to accept it in a gesture of respect and gallantry. This ended the battle. Rear-Admiral Story in
Staten General, who had only briefly participated in the battle, when
Venerable forced him to bear away remained a safe distance away to leeward, where he kept cruising while other stragglers from the battle, and the frigates and other smaller ships, that had maintained a parallel course to leeward of the main line of battle, joined his flag. In this way he saved about half of de Winter's fleet. The Batavian navy lost nine of the sixteen ships of the line, and one frigate. The losses could have been even larger if Duncan had pursued Story's ragtag fleet-remnant, but Duncan declared in his dispatch to the Secretary of the Admiralty of 13 October 1797 that he felt that he was getting too close to the Dutch shore and shallows to safely do this. The losses on both sides were relatively heavy. British historians are able to give a rather precise number of British casualties, but the numbers of casualties on the Batavian side are imprecise. De Jonge says that those losses amounted to 1200 casualties in total, of which 400 immediately killed, and 600 wounded, on the captured ships alone. Among the casualties were Vice-Admiral Reintjes (died in captivity), and Rear-Admiral Bloys van Treslong (lost an arm), and several of the captains of the ships. Among the officers made prisoner of war were, beside de Winter himself, cdr. Holland of
Wassenaar (who like de Winter survived, though the British historian
William James declared them both dead) and Rear-Admiral Meurer, and the captains of
Delft,
Alkmaar, and
Gelijkheid who were all treated very gallantly by the British. They had earned the respect of the British, as James remarks "Respect of the enemy" and "admiration of the world" were, however, cold comfort to the members of Commission on Foreign Affairs (though they certainly craved those encomiums), who now faced the wrath of the "radical" opposition in the National Assembly, who painted the defeat as the direct result of the chaos "eating away at the heart of the government". Certainly, even objective observers, like de Jonge, fifty years later, blame primarily the rashness of the Commission in forcing de Winter's hand for the debacle. Nevertheless, the National Assembly, after lively debate, accepted the explanation of the Commission. So the focus of the Batavian public's demand for Answers became de Winter and his officers. All were initially hailed as Heroes, especially de Winter, but inevitably more critical questions were eventually raised, prompting the admiral after his return from captivity in 1798 (he and his officers were let go on giving their
paroles) to demand that a
Hoge Zeekrijgsraad judge his, and his officers', conduct before, during and after the battle. The ensuing controversy, with the finger pointing and acrimony between the admiral, and most of his officers, did almost as much damage to the Batavian officer corps, as the battle itself had done. De Winter felt "betrayed" by especially Rear-Admiral Bloys van Treslong, but also by Rear-Admiral Story and the combination Vice-Admiral Reintjes/Rear-Admiral Meurer (not to speak of the captains who had really acted in a cowardly way, like cdrs. Souter of
Batavier and Jacobsson of
Cerberus). De Winter was himself acquitted of dereliction of duty (but only with a 4-3 majority), and Bloys van Treslong and Meurer convicted. So of the flag officers who had started in the battle only Story remained in a position to lead the Batavian navy (de Winter could no longer serve, as he was considered a "not-exchanged" prisoner of war, who had given his word not to fight against Great Britain "for the duration of the war").
Surrender in the Vlieter by
Robert Dodd The National Assembly, and the French Directorate, felt that the losses of Camperdown needed to be made good as soon as possible. This necessitated a fresh dose of "extraordinary taxation". The Committee on Finance of the National Assembly, therefore, proposed an eight percent tax on income, based on a sliding scale, and starting with annual incomes over 300 guilders, in November 1797. This was a complete novelty, as this was to be a
national tax, whereas heretofore all taxes were apportioned and levied at the provincial level. This novelty was only possible because the defeat at Camperdown had caused a "national emergency". This proposal was as gasoline on the already raging fire of the fight between
Unitarists and
Federalists for the soul of the Batavian Republic. The tax was adopted on 2 December 1797, but the fight exacerbated the already strained relations between "radicals" and "conservatives", which eventually led to the Coup of 21–22 January 1798. The Committee for Naval Affairs took the necessary steps to rebuild the navy. The ships that had returned to the Texel were repaired; two coastal-defense guard ships were converted to ships of the line; the new ships that were still in the stocks were ordered to be expeditiously finished; the construction of four new ships of the line of 68 guns was ordered; and three new frigates started. Early in the Spring of 1798 two ships of the line of 76 guns, seven of 68 guns, two of 56 guns, and two
razees of 44 guns, six frigates of 22 to 36 guns, and four brigs of 16 to 18 guns were operational. And in the course of 1798 several more ships of the line were launched. Despite these good results, after the Coup of January 1798 the new
Uitvoerend Bewind (Executive Authority) decided to replace the Committee for Naval Affairs (like all standing committees of the National Assembly) with a so-called
Agent for the Navy (like other
Agents were appointed to lead other government departments), with which the organizational structure of a government department under a Minister was for the first time introduced for the Dutch navy (as this structure was retained under later regime changes). The first
Agent was
Jacobus Spoors, who was, however, very reluctant to assume the new office. The first task for the new fleet would be the support of General
Napoleon Bonaparte's project of an invasion of England in 1798. However, the general had other ambitions. He decided to give priority to his
invasion of
Egypt, and so the Batavian navy spent a lot of money and effort in vain on a project that did not go ahead. Similar projects: another planned invasion of Ireland in early 1799, and when that plan was cancelled, an expedition to the Dutch East Indies with the same ships and troops, were also cancelled by early 1799. But then rumors of an impending Anglo-Russian invasion of the Batavian Republic began to circulate. This convinced the
Uitvoerend Bewind that any foreign adventures had to be abandoned until this danger had been averted. The rumors eventually proved to be more than rumors, and the
invasion took place in August of 1799, beginning with the
British amphibious landing at
Callantsoog, covered by a British fleet under Admiral
Andrew Mitchell. Unbeknownst to the Batavians, Admiral Mitchell had a "secret weapon" on board his
flagship, in the person of the
Erfprins (Hereditary Prince of Orange), the future
King William I of the Netherlands and eldest son of the Stadtholder
William V. This "
Serene Highness", though a former general commanding troops in battle, at this point in time was no more than an
émigré, who had joined forces with the
British government of Foreign Secretary
William Grenville. Grenville in his turn had high hopes of an easy military victory, as he expected the
Dutch populace to reject the ideological trappings of the French-imposed Batavian authorities. Though a
Foxite himself, and so relatively enlightened, Grenville was very
conservative, in the mold of Irish statesman
Edmund Burke, compared to the politicians in the Batavian Republic. The
Erfprins and he felt a certain philosophical and political affinity, which made him believe that that person would be a reliable manager of national interests in the Netherlands when "normalcy" (in the sense of the
Act of Guarantee and
Triple Alliance) would have been restored in that country. Grenville expected the Dutch populace to share his distaste for the "revolutionary evils" that had befallen the Netherlands since 1795, and he thought that, given the chance, the soldiers and sailors of the Batavian armed forces would go over to the forces of the
Coalition to the last man, and the population would erupt into armed insurrection, as soon as the Orange standard had been raised. But there was more than just this ideological predilection. Orangist secret agents, like Charles Bentinck, had brought tales of disaffection under the Dutch population, that tended to confirm what Grenville already believed, and thus reinforce Grenville's optimism. There were also stories about the weakness of the defending forces (that later proved incorrect), and of the unreliability of those forces, like the National Guard, and of course, the navy. It was therefore with some confidence that the Secretary for War
Henry Dundas could instruct General
Ralph Abercromby, the officer commanding the army forces in the invasion in a letter dated 5 August 1799, not only on the military, but also on the
political approach he was to take after he had made his landing, and he was encouraged to make use of the services of the supporters of the "antient constitution"(sic), wherever he could find them. To set these political effects in motion, the general was to promulgate a Proclamation, that had been issued for the occasion by the
Erfprins in the name of his father, which in peremptory terms
commanded the Dutch people to rally to the cause of the House of Orange. Dundas had counselled the Prince to sweeten his tone with some conciliatory language, and hints at reform, but in his arrogance the Prince opted for clear language, which only served to alienate the population, as soon turned out. As far as the Batavian fleet in the Texel roadstead was concerned, Orangist agents actively suborned a number of naval officers in that fleet, like
Aegidius van Braam and
Theodorus Frederik van Capellen, respectively the captain of
Leyden and Rear-Admiral Story's flag captain on
Washington who were among the officers from the old navy, who had been let go in 1795, but had been recommissioned after Camperdown to fill the many vacancies in the officer corps. They frequently appear in the correspondence of secret agent Charles Bentinck about Batavian officers he deemed pro-Orangist, and willing and able to lead a mutiny in the fleet. It is against this background that we need to see the series of events around the squadron of Rear-Admiral Story, consisting of the ships of the line
Washington (cap. Van Capellen),
Leyden (cap. Van Braam),
Cerberus (cap.de Jong),
Utrecht (cap. Kolff),
de Ruyter (cap. Huys),
Gelderland (cdr. Waldeck),
Beschermer (cap. Eylbracht), and
Batavier (cap. Van Senden); the frigates
Amphitre (cdr. Schutter),
Mars (cdr. Bock),
Embuscade (cdr. Rivert), and the brig
Galathee (lt. Droop) that started with the arrival of the British fleet before the Texel on 19 August, and was followed by the visit of three
parlimentaires, col.
Frederick Maitland, cap.
Robert Winthrop, and Lieutenant
George Collier, to Admiral Story aboard
Washington on 21 August. They were sent by General Abercromby and Admiral Duncan to demand that Story and his squadron "come over" to the
Erfprins, in which case they would be able to sail out to the British fleet unmolested and join that fleet. The visit was certainly irregular, in the sense that the
pilot boat in which the parlimentaires traveled was allowed to pass the guard line, maintained by
Amphitre and
Embuscade, without warning Story, and they boarded
Washington without his permission. This misplaced leniency was later held against Story at his court-martial, because it allowed the parlimentaires to spy out the strengths and weaknesses of the fleet, and even contact members of crews. The latter was allowed to happen when the parlimentaires had to wait for the arrival of the officer commanding the shore batteries at Den Helder, col. Gilquin, who Maitland wanted to hand the ultimatum to in person. Cap. Van Capellen even accompanied them on board
Washington, allowed them to address members of the crew, and to hand out copies in both English and Dutch of the proclamation of Abercromby and the
Erfprins. In this way the crew of the
Washington (and probably also
Embuscade) received knowledge of the approach of the British fleet, with the
Erfprins on board, and also of the coming Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland. This information appears to have made a profound impression on the crew of
Washington (and other ships), especially as "agitation" already appears to have been going on. Story might have stopped the rot by kicking the parlimentaires of his ship for this "unparlimentairy" conduct, and by punishing Capt. Van Capellen, but he did nothing. Story and Gilquin limited themselves to rejecting the ultimatum. The
landing at Callantsoog started on 23 August, and eventually the defending Batavian troops under General Daendels were defeated, which prompted the latter to over-hastily order the strategic retreat of the troops manning the shore batteries at Den Helder (of course after
spiking the guns). Those batteries had recently been augmented to about 80 heavy pieces of artillery, that together with the artillery on the fleet in the roadstead, should have been adequate to defend the anchorage from a naval incursion. Four days before the British landing the
Agent for the Navy, Spoors, had sent Story an order, allowing him to retreat to the nearby anchorage of the
Vlieter (a tidal trench between sandbanks near what is in our days the western end of the
Afsluitdijk), in case the anchorage would have become indefensible, but he had retracted that order a few days later, and ordered Story to defend against a naval incursion with the fleet in the Texel anchorage. However, Story later vehemently denied having received that second order. Seeing that the loss of the shore batteries had indeed made the Texel anchorage indefensible, Story now made the fateful decision to retreat to the
Vlieter. The fleet left the Texel anchorage in the morning of 28 August, to make the short trip to the new anchorage, but because of the southerly wind, was forced to anchor before the trench, instead of inside it. Story later defended taking this unfavorable position (if he had anchored at the narrowest point of the channel, his position would have been far stronger), because he intended to return to the Texel anchorage as soon as the British transports would have entered that anchorage, to attack that fleet in a vulnerable state. But as the wind now turned north he could not execute this plan, so he decided to take up the position in the channel after all, where he had the fleet go into line of battle on 29 August. Then the wind turned southwest in the morning of 30 August, enabling the British fleet to enter the Texel roadstead and to sail toward the Batavian fleet in the
Vlieter, leaving Story no other options than to defend an unfavorable position, or to surrender. Meanwhile the crews on several of the ships had given indications of disaffection and disobedience, that did not yet amount to mutiny (except on
Washington, where the crew had put unauthorized guards on the doors of the powder room in the night of 29 August, because rumors were circulating that the officers intended to blow up the ship), but were sufficiently serious to worry Story. However, he neglected to take steps to nip the impending mutiny in the bud, fearing that taking forceful action would only make matters worse (a standpoint shared by the other officers). The British squadron under Admiral Mitchell aboard HMS
Isis (with a "double prince's flag" on the main mast), that sailed toward the
Vlieter consisted of eleven ships of the line, seven frigates, five
corvettes, armed with 16 32-pdr carronades, and numerous smaller ships with heavy artillery. Even though it was just a part of the British fleet, its force was far superior to that of Story's fleet. To win time (as he later asserted) to restore order among his crews, Story now sent captains Van Capellen and de Jong as
parlimentaires to
Isis to warn that he intended to defend himself to the death, which probably would result in the total annihilation of the ships Mitchell had earlier said he hoped to acquire for his navy. This ambiguous message did not impress Mitchell, who countered with an ultimatum to hoist the Prince's flag, and surrender the fleet, or Mitchell's fleet would be ordered to engage. Mitchell gave Story an hour to weigh his options and make his decision. Meanwhile, things had gotten out of hand on
Washington. The crew stormed the quarterdeck, threatened the officers, declared that they would refuse orders to fight, and even started to throw ammunition overboard. Instead of repressing this mutiny, Story signaled the captains of the other ships aboard for a council of war. He told the assembled captains of the ongoing mutiny, and told them that he would be unable to make his ship take part in the fight. Many of the other captains then told of similar problems on their own ships, equally preventing their ships from taking part in the impending battle. The council of war therefore unanimously decided to surrender the fleet, making it clear that they did not hand it over, as Mitchell had demanded, but gave in to superior power, and considered themselves prisoners of war. The captains Van Capellen and de Jong were again sent out to convey the message to Admiral Mitchell. At the news of the surrender the crews burst out in an orgy of joy and mayhem. Batavian flags were mutilated and trampled; known Patriot sympathizers molested (one was even thrown overboard from
Embuscade), and generally the riots that had occurred at Saldanha Bay were repeated, until the British restored order. Mitchell took over the ships, had the prince's flag hoisted, and had the ships sailed over to England, mostly with their own crews and officers. Most of the crew members, being Scandinavian and German mercenaries, went into British service, as did some of the officers. Everybody the Batavian authorities could put their hands on (some officers returned voluntarily) were arrested and brought before a
Hoge Zeekrijgsraad. Rear-Admiral Story and captains Van Braam and Van Capellen remained abroad. They were
tried in absentia, just like Capt. Kolff, who managed to escape from prison. Most received severe sentences. Story was sentenced to death by
decapitation; captains Van Braam, Van Capellen, and Kolff to death by firing squad. As they were outside the reach of Batavian justice, this amounted to perpetual banishment. Those still alive in 1813 were pardoned by the former
Erfprins, future king William I in his capacity of "Sovereign Prince" of the Netherlands. ==Return to the Dutch Navy==