Political considerations While at Nivelles Wellington issued
a general order in which he made it clear to those under his command: Wellington's reasoning for this was that it was in the interests of the powers of the Seventh Coalition, because he realised that it was expedient to persuade the bulk of the French nation that the Coalition armies came as liberators from the tyranny of Napoleon's rule and not as conquerors. If the coalition forces were to treat the French and France as a hostile nation then the horrors which generally follow in the train of a victorious and lawless soldiery over the face of an enemy's country would make the subjugation of France more difficult and the French people were then likely to view a restored
Louis XVIII as a puppet of the victors rather than a legitimate government ruling with their consent. An unstable France would make a future war more likely.
Anglo-allied advances On the same day (20 June), Wellington, in consequence of a report received by him from Lieutenant-General
Lecoq, and of a previous communication made to him by King
Frederick Augustus I of Saxony, consented to take command of the Saxon Corps, amounting to nearly 17,000 men. He directed Lecoq to march these troops to Antwerp, and there await further orders. The Anglo-allied army marched to
Binche and
Mons. The British cavalry moved into villages between
Roeulx and Mons. The
6th (Hussar) Brigade (
Vivian's) took on the outpost duties on the Sambre. The Hanoverian Cavalry furnished outposts towards
Maubeuge. Wellington placed his headquarters at Binche.
Prussian advances and French retreats Blücher, having secured the passage of the river Sambre in the neighbourhood of Charleroi, continued his pursuit of the French, and crossed the French frontier on 20 June. He directed
Zieten to march the I Corps from Charleroi to
Beaumont to throw forward his vanguard as far as
Solre-le-Château, to detach a party of observation to the south-east (left) towards
Florennes, and to watch the road from Philippeville to Beaumont. As the I Corps advanced, it discovered at every step fresh proofs of the extreme disorder in which the French army had retreated; and found twelve pieces of artillery which they had hitherto contrived to save from the great wreck at Waterloo but had now abandoned to their pursuers. On arriving at
Beaumont, the Corps took up a bivouac. Its vanguard, under General
Jagow, consisting of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, the 1st Silesian Hussars, and a horse battery, reached Solre-le-Château upon the road to
Avesnes. Blücher, at the same time, ordered
Bülow to move the IV Corps as far as
Colleret, where the road to
Thuin intersects the high road from Beaumont to
Maubeuge, and to push on his vanguard to
Beaufort, Nord. Bülow accordingly directed General
Sydow to proceed with a vanguard, consisting of a cavalry brigade, a horse battery, and two battalions of infantry, which had the day before reached Leernes on the road to Thuin, and to ascertain very particularly whether the French had established themselves on the river Sambre, to secure the bridges both here and at
Lobbes, and further, to restore these passages, should they have been destroyed by the French. Another detachment, under Colonel Eicke, consisting of two fusilier battalions, the two squadrons of cavalry attached to the 13th Brigade, and of the 2nd Silesian Hussars, was sent forward to take possession, in the first instance, of the passages of the river Sambre, and then to join General Sydow; who, proceeding by
Colleret towards Beaufort, was to form both detachments into a vanguard on reaching the latter place. In the meantime, the mass of the IV Corps, headed by the reserve cavalry under
Prince William of Prussia, followed in one column. The progress made by this portion of the Prussian army on 20 June was not so rapid as was desirable. Considerable delay arose in consequence of the degree of caution imparted to the movements by the impression which Bülow entertained that the French would defend the passages, and endeavour to maintain himself along the opposite side of the river. Hence the vanguard of the Corps only reached
Ferrière-la-Petite; part of the main body proceeded as far as
Montignies, and the remainder with the reserve artillery, did not get farther than the bridges across the Sambre. The 5th Brigade (belonging to the II Corps) had started at daybreak from its bivouac at Anderlues, near Fontaine-l'Évêque; and directed its march, by Binche, upon
Villers-Sire-Nicole towards Maubeuge. The brigade was reinforced by 100 dragoons under Major Busch, and half a horse battery, which detachment arrived at Villers-Sire-Nicole at 17:00. This cavalry was employed in observing the
Fortress of Maubeuge, from the Mons road, as far as the Sambre; and the brigade bivouacked at Villers-Sire-Nicole. A Hanoverian regiment of hussars also observed the fortress on the right of the Prussian cavalry upon the
Bavay road. The left wing of the Prussian army, comprising the III, and part of the II Corps, came into contact with the French, while pursuing that part of the French army which was under Grouchy. Thielmann, having learned that the latter had commenced his retreat on
Gembloux, marched at 05:00 from
Sint-Agatha-Rode to Wavre; where he further ascertained that already on the afternoon of 19 June, the French had effected their retreat across the river Dyle, leaving only a rearguard on the left bank of the river. Grouchy, when he decided on retiring upon Namur, ordered General
Bonnemains to move on rapidly, by Gembloux, with the 4th and 12th dragoons, as a vanguard, and to reach that town as soon as possible, and secure the passage of the Sambre. They were followed by the remainder of
Excelmans' cavalry, and the reserve artillery, together with the wounded. The infantry was put in motion in two columns: the one, consisting of the II Corps, proceeding by Gembloux; and the other, comprising the IV Corps, passing more to the right, and falling into the Namur road in rear of
Sombreffe. The light cavalry was principally with the rearguard. To deceive Thielmann, Grouchy left his rearguard in Wavre and
Limale, with cavalry
vedettes thrown out towards the Prussians, until near evening, when it followed the main body to Namur. Thielmann, having placed the whole of his cavalry, with eight pieces of horse artillery, at the head of his column, now ordered them to move on at a trot, for the purpose of overtaking the French; but it was not until they had passed Gembloux that they discovered the rearguard of Grouchy's force, consisting of a few regiments of cavalry. These, however, now made so rapid a retreat, that it was impossible to bring them to action.
Action at La Falize At length, on arriving near the village next to the
Château La Falize (within about from Namur), the Prussians found
Vamdamme's III Corps' rearguard posted on the brow of the declivity at the foot of which lay the town, in the valley of the river
Meuse. It presented about two battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and four guns; and was formed to cover the retreat of the French troops. The Prussian battery immediately opened a fire; during which Colonel Marwitz, moving out to the right, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and
Count Lottum to the left, with the 2nd, turned the French in both flanks. The latter brought forward a reserve of cavalry, when the 8th Prussian
Uhlans, under Colonel
Count Dohna, at the head of the column that turned the French left, made a most gallant attack upon the French dragoons, who met it with a volley from their carbines, but were overthrown. The 7th Uhlans and a squadron of the 12th Hussars also charged on this occasion, and captured three pieces of French horse artillery which were in the act of moving off, and also fifty cavalry horses. The French infantry now threw itself into the adjacent wood, with which the declivities that here lead down into the valley of the river
Meuse are covered, and thus succeeded in preventing the Prussians from following up their success.
Gérard's Corps retreat on Vandamme's rearguard At this moment, intelligence was received that General Pirch was pursuing the French with the Prussian II Corps upon the high road leading from Sombreffe to Namur; whereupon the cavalry of the Prussian III Corps was moved in this direction. A French column, consisting of about twelve battalions and two batteries, but without any cavalry, was perceived marching along that road. They belonged to Gérard's IV Corps, which had brought about its retreat by Limale, through
Mont St Guibert. Upon the height on which the
Château de Flawinne is situated was posted a detachment from Vandamme's Corps, consisting of from four to five battalions with a battery, and a regiment of cavalry, for the purpose of receiving Gérard's column as it fell back, and of protecting its retreat As the Enemy continued its retrograde march in close column and in good order; it was not deemed advisable to undertake an attack with the two Prussian cavalry brigades of the III Corps, which were much fatigued: but the horse battery was drawn up, and discharged several rounds of shell and grape at the French troops during their retreat upon the town. The latter, therefore, quitted the high road, and moved along the adjacent heights until they reached the battalions which had been drawn up in support, and which now opposed the further advance of the Prussians. At his juncture Thielmann's III Corps cavalry withdrew, leaving the engagement of the French to the Pirch's II Corps.
Action at Flawinne It was not until 05:00 on 20 June that Pirch received intelligence that the French was retiring by Gembloux upon Namur. Lieutenant-Colonel Sohr was immediately detached, in all haste, to Gembloux with his cavalry brigade, a battery of horse artillery, and the fusilier battalions of the 9th, 14th, and 23rd regiments, as a vanguard. On approaching that town, Sohr ascertained that Thielmann's cavalry was pursuing the French along the high road from Gembloux to Namur. He therefore decided upon marching by the narrow road on the right of the
chaussée leading from Sombreffe, in full trot, covered by woodland, to overtake the French troops in retreat. At
Temploux, the latter presented a force of two battalions, some cavalry, and four pieces of artillery in position, prepared to cover the retreating column. Sohr immediately attacked with both the regiments of hussars, supported by the battery of horse artillery; and defeated this portion of the French force. It was at this moment, too, that a cannonade was opened upon the latter by the horse battery, before mentioned, of Thielmann's Corps; whereupon the French fell back upon the favourable position taken up near
Flawinne, and in which the French appeared determined to make a stand. Pirch immediately ordered the attack and directed that it should be supported by Major-General
Krafft with the 6th Brigade, which had closely followed the vanguard, and had come up with the latter at 16:00. Three columns of attack were formed. The first consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment, the Fusilier Battalion of the 26th Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the 1st Elbe Landwehr. It was under the command of Major Schmidt, and detached to the left of the road, to drive back the French troops posted in the woodland and upon the heights. The second consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 26th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment, under Colonel Reuss, and of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Elbe Landwehr, under Colonel
Bismarck. This column, which advanced partly on the right, and partly on the left, of the road, was supported by the Battery No 5, and led by Major-General Krafft in person. The third column comprised the fusilier battalions which had constituted the infantry of the vanguard; and was detached more to the right, towards the Sambre, to support the general advance upon Namur. General Krafft, after a short bombardment upon the French with his artillery, ordered the attack with his infantry. Colonel Reuss threw out his skirmishers, who were quickly followed by the columns of attack. The French, after some little resistance, were driven into Namur by a charge with bayonets, and suffered much loss. In the meantime, Major Schmidt, with his column of three battalions, had turned the right flank of the French on the
Louvain road; and so the French were now limited to the defence of the Namur suburbs, which, however, they maintained with great obstinacy.
Action at Namur The Prussian columns of attack, advancing at the
pas de charge (at the double), drove the French out of the Namur suburb, and endeavoured to gain possession of the gates of the town. Colonel
Zastrow, the second in command of the Sixth Brigade, wished to burst open the gate which leads to the Louvain road; but was repulsed by a most murderous fire of musketry and grape, directed upon the assailants from the walls of the town. On repeating the attempt, the Prussian battalions fought with distinguished bravery, but with a great sacrifice of life. Colonel Zastrow was killed at their head; Colonel Bismarck also fell; Colonel Reuss was wounded; and the 6th Brigade alone lost 44 officers, and 1,274 other ranks. The main body of Grouchy's Army was at this time in full retreat upon
Dinant, along the Defile of the Meuse. The French troops left in Namur, to keep the Prussians at bay as long as possible, consisted of General
Teste's division. They carefully barricaded all the gates, lined the walls facing the Prussians, and made a most gallant resistance. The officers, finding that their men continued so perfectly steady as not to require their attention, armed themselves with the muskets of the wounded, and assisted in maintaining the fire from the walls. The greatest order prevailed in the town. The wounded, the provisions, and ammunition, had already been removed; and were on the line of march. General Pirch was well aware that the French defended the town solely for the purpose of covering their retreat and had therefore no intention of undertaking any serious attack; he simply wished to possess himself of the suburbs, and to hold the French in check by detaching troops to the
Porte de Fer (Iron Gate) and the St Nicholas Gate. He thought that a demonstration against the latter gate would raise apprehensions in the minds of the French respecting the security of the bridge over the
Sambre. With this view, he ordered General
Brause to relieve, with the 7th Brigade, the troops then engaged; and together with the vanguard under Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, to blockade the town. At the same time he directed the remainder of the Corps to bivouac near Temploux. General Brause proceeded to post the Fusilier Battalion of the 22nd Regiment in the direction of the
Porte de Fer, and the Fusilier Battalion of the 2nd Elbe Landwehr towards the Brussels Gate. The main body of the 7th Brigade, under Colonel Schon, was stationed in rear of the suburb. The first mentioned battalion stood, under cover, at four hundred paces distance from the
Porte de Per, having its
Tirailleurs in the avenue near the gate. Just as General Brause rode up to examine its formation, an alarm was spread in front that the French was making a sortie. The General desired the commanding officer, Major Jochens, to lead his battalion quickly against the defenders, to overthrow them, and then, if possible, to penetrate into the town along with the retreating troops. As Major Jochens approached the gate, he found in its immediate vicinity the
Tirailleurs of the 6th Brigade, still maintaining the contest in that quarter. The attacking column and the
Tirailleurs now rushed towards the gate and the walls, which the French, probably not deeming themselves strong enough to resist this pressure, abandoned in the greatest haste. General Teste had, in fact, prepared everything for his retreat; and had so well calculated the time which the Prussians would require in forcing an entrance by the
Porte de Fer, that he succeeded in filing his battalions along the parapets of the bridge, which had been barricaded, and thus withdrew them to the south bank of the Sambre. The Prussians found it impossible to force open the gate. The windows of the adjoining house of the
Douanitrs (custom officers) were therefore driven in, and a small iron door which led from the interior of the house into the town was opened, and, in this manner, an entrance was effected for the assailants; who were conducted by Major Jochens, of the 22nd, and Major Luckowiz, of the 9th Regiment, across the Market Place, and as far as the bridge over the Sambre: which the French had barricaded, as before stated, and behind which they had again established themselves. These troops were closely followed by Major Schmidt, with the 9th Regiment, and lastly by the 2nd Elbe Landwehr, in
close column, under Majors Mirbach and Lindern. The Prussians immediately occupied the captured portion of the town; posted a column of reserve on the Market Place, and with loud cheers, made themselves masters of the bridge over the Sambre. An attempt had been made to gain the rear of the French, by means of a ford in this river; but it proved unsuccessful. The French were driven with so much impetuosity towards the gate leading out to
Dinant, that there appeared every probability of a considerable number of them falling into the hands of the Prussians. The former, however, had heaped up large bundles of wood, intermingled with straw and pitch, against the gate, and set them on fire on the approach of the Prussian troops. The gate and the street were soon in flames, and the pursuit was thus obstructed; but even had this not occurred, the great fatigue of the Prussian troops who, during the previous sixteen hours, had been either marching or fighting, was sufficient to deprive them of the power of following the retreating French with any degree of vigour. After 21:00, the town was in the possession of the Prussians. Major Schmidt took the command at the Dinant Gate and Major Jochens at the bridge over the Sambre. The remaining troops of the 7th, and some battalions of the 6th Brigade were posted by General Brause upon the market place. The Fusilier battalions of the vanguard, which had supported the attack, more to the right, had also advanced into the town, towards the bridge over the Sambre. They had been sharply cannonaded by the French from the east bank of the Sambre.
Aftermath—Grouchy's retreat by Namur on Dinant In his report to Napoleon written in Dinant, 20 June, Marshal de Grouchy explained why he ordered a substantial holding operation at Namur: A small party of cavalry, under Captain Thielmann, of the Pomeranian Hussars, was sent forward a short distance on the road to Dinant, to form the advance of the troops destined to pursue the enemy at daybreak. General Teste's division retired slowly, and in good order, by the Dinant road, as far as
Profondeville. where it took up a position during three hours. At midnight it resumed its march and arrived at Dinant at 04:00 on the following morning. In the view of the military historian William Slbourn this retreat of Grouchy by Namur upon Dinant was executed in a skilful and masterly manner; and the gallant defence of the former town by General Teste's Division, unaided by artillery, merits the highest commendation. In this action the Prussians suffered a loss, including that already mentioned as having occurred to the 6th Brigade, of 1,500 men; and the French are supposed to have lost about the same number. In the last attack, the latter abandoned 150 prisoners they had previously taken from the Prussians. The Prussian II Corps during the night. The cavalry of the III Corps bivouacked at Temploux; the infantry of the latter (which had been rejoined on the march from Wavre by the 9th Brigade), near the town of Gembloux. The circumstances under which the French army, generally, was placed on 19 June rendered it sufficiently obvious that Grouchy would be compelled to effect his retreat by Namur; and further, that whatever show of resistance he might offer on that point would be solely intended to gain time for the security of his troops whilst retiring, in one column only, by the long and narrow defile of the
river Meuse which leads to Dinant. Aware that Napoleon's defeated army was retiring along the direct line of operation, the Charleroi road; he immediately saw the imminent risk of his own retreat becoming intercepted, and the consequent necessity of his effecting the latter in a parallel direction, with a view to his rejoining the main army as soon as practicable. To retire, therefore, by Geinbloux upon Namur, and thence along the line of the Meuse, by Dinant and Givet. In the view of Slbourn this naturally presented itself as the true and proper course to be pursued. To generals in command of corps, such as Thielmann and Pirch, a little reflection upon Grouchy's critical position must have led to a similar conclusion. The inactivity of the Thielmann, during the afternoon and evening of 19 June, is probably to be explained by his having satisfied himself that the longer Grouchy continued in the vicinity of Wavre, the greater became the chance of his retreat being cut off by a portion of the Coalition armies; which, in their advance, would reach the Sambre much sooner than it would be in the power of the French marshal to do: and that, therefore, it would he injudicious on his part to attempt to force the latter from the position, which appearances induced him to believe he still occupied with his entire force, on the Dyle. He may also have been strengthened in this opinion by the circumstance of his not having received any positive instructions as to his future dispositions, or any reinforcements to secure for him a preponderance over Grouchy. With Pirch, however, the case was very different. He received distinct orders, on the evening of 18 June, to march at once from the battlefield of Waterloo, and continue his movement during that night, so as to cut off Grouchy's retreat upon the Sambre. However (it has already been explained), that on reaching Mellery at 11:00 on the following morning, he halted to give his troops rest; that be subsequently ascertained, through Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, who had been despatched, during the march, with his cavalry brigade to reconnoitre on the left, that the French occupied the defile of Mont-Saint-Guibert in force. In Sibourn's opinion this intelligence might have satisfied Pirch that Grouchy had not yet reached Namur; but, if he entertained any doubts on that point, these could easily have been settled by means of a reconnoitring party, detached from Mellery, by
Gentinnes and
Saint-Géry, to Gembloux, a distance of . He would then have learned, that no portion whatever of Grouchy's force had by then crossed this line, in retreat; that he had, consequently, gained considerably on his rear, and had it in his power, after allowing a few hours rest to his troops, to march them by the high road which leads directly from Mellery into the high road near Sombreffe, and to anticipate Grouchy in the possession of Namur.
What might have been In this case, Grouchy, on approaching the latter place, and finding it occupied by Pirch, would, in all probability, have hesitated to risk the loss of so much time as an attempt to force the town and the
Pont de Sambre (Sambre Gate) would necessarily incur, and have preferred endeavouring to pass his troops across the Sambre by some of the bridges and fords between Charleroi and Namur, and retire upon either Philippeville or Dinant; but with a Prussian Corps at each of these points, and another in his rear, this would have been, a most hazardous undertaking, and if he attempted to cross the Meuse below Namur, his chance of regaining Napoleon's army would have been still more remote. But setting aside the circumstance of Pirch's not having, in this manner, taken due advantage of the position in which he stood relatively with Grouchy during 19 June; and passing to the fact, that he first learned, at 05:00 on 20 June, whilst still at Mellery, that the French were retiring along the high road from Gembloux to Namur, pursued by Thielmann's cavalry: it seems strange that, inferring, as he must naturally have done, that Grouchy would only endeavour to hold out long enough at Namur to effect his passage by the Pont de Sambre, and to cover his retreat to Dinant, he did not immediately move off by his right, and push his troops across the Sambre by some of the bridges and fords higher up the stream; and then, marching in the direction of Profondeville, under cover of the woods within the angle formed by the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, intercept Grouchy's retreat through the long and narrow defile in which the road to Dinant winds in the Meuse valley. The situation in which Grouchy would have been placed by a movement of this kind — his troops in a long, narrow, precipitous defile, obstructed in front by Pirch, and attacked in rear by Thielmann — would have been perilous in the extreme. Pirch probably felt that his corps, part of which was then attached to the army pressing the French by the
Charleroi road, was not equal to cope with Grouchy's troops; but in the case here supposed, by judiciously disposing his force then present so as to command the defile at some favourable point in its course, he would have secured for himself an advantage which, under such circumstances, would have fully compensated for his deficiency in regard to numbers.
Napoleon proceeds to Paris The scattered remnants of the main French army continued to be hurried forward in wild confusion across the frontier. Some of the fugitives hastened towards Avesnes to Philippeville: whilst a very great proportion of them sought no temporary rest of this kind, but, throwing away their arms, tied into the interior, to return to their homes; the cavalry, in many instances, disposing of their horses to the country people. Several of the superior officers hastily collected such of the troops as appeared better disposed and conducted them in the direction of Laon. Napoleon reached the latter town in the afternoon of 20 June. After conferring with the
Prefet, he desired
de Bussy, an
aides de camp, to superintend the defence of this important place; and despatched General
Dejean to Avesnes, and General
Flahaut to Guise. In the meantime, a body of troops had been discerned in the distance, moving towards the town. Napoleon sent an
aide de camp to reconnoitre it; when it proved to be a column of about 3,000 men, which Soult,
Jerome,
Morand,
Colbert,
Petit, and
Pelet had succeeded in rallying and preserving in order. Napoleon now appeared intent upon remaining at Laon until the remainder of the army had reassembled: but he subsequently yielded to the force of the arguments expressed in opposition to this determination by the
Duke of Bassano and others who were present, and took his departure for Paris; purposing, at the same time, to return to Laon on the 25th or 26th of the month.
Armies dispositions evening 20 June The following was the general disposition of the respective armies on the evening of 20 June. Blücher's headquarters were at
Merbes-le-Château. The Prussian army had its I Corps at Beaumont; IV Corps at
Colleret; II Corps at Namur, with the exception of the 5th Brigade, which was on the march to blockade
Maubeuge and bivouacked at Villers-Sire-Nicole; III Corps was at Gembloux, with its cavalry bivouacked at Temploux. The Duke of Wellington's headquarters were at Binche. The Anglo-allied army had its right at Mons, and its left at Binche. The British cavalry was cantoned in the villages of
Strepy,
Thieu,
Boussoit-sur-Haine,
Ville-sur-Haine, and
Goegnies; Vivian's 6th Brigade in those of
Merbes-Sainte-Marie,
Bienne-lez-Happart, and
Mont-Sainte-Geneviève and the Hanoverian cavalry in those of
Givry and
Croix-lez-Rouveroy. The reserve was at
Soignies. Napoleon had left Laon for Paris. The French army retreating was completely dispersed. A few of the troops took refuge in
Avesnes, others in
Guise, and the principal body of them evidencing any kind of order, (but not exceeding 3,000 men), had reached Laon. The French forces under Grouchy were at Dinant. ==21 June==