Mexican drug war

Due to its location, Mexico has long been used as a staging and transshipment point for narcotics and contraband between Latin America and U.S. markets. Mexican bootleggers supplied alcohol to American gangsters throughout Prohibition in the United States, and the onset of the illegal drug trade with the U.S. began when Prohibition came to an end in 1933. In 1940, under president Lázaro Cárdenas and the impulsion of Mexican psychiatrist Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, Mexico legalized all drugs, in an early attempt to prevent the development of illegal drug trafficking organizations. Farmers in the mountainous regions of Sierra Madre Occidental near Culiacán, produced opium that was processed into legal morphine for wartime medical use by Allied forces. Although the program ended after 1945, the agricultural knowledge, smuggling routes, and local intermediary networks developed during the wartime period persisted. Historians and criminologists have identified these postwar networks as an early foundation for later illicit drug trafficking organizations in Sinaloa. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, with the rapid surge in recreational drug use in the United States, the production of narcotics in Mexico, particularly marijuana, expanded exponentially, and the Mexican criminals started to smuggle drugs on a major scale. During the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico participated in a series of United States–backed anti-narcotics initiatives, including Operation Intercept and Operation Condor. These operations were formally justified on the grounds of combating the cultivation of opium poppies and marijuana in Mexico's so-called "Golden Triangle" region, an area encompassing parts of the states of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua. As part of the campaign, the Mexican government deployed about 10,000 soldiers and police. The operation resulted in mass arrests, torture, and imprisonment of peasants who were often accused of aiding leftist insurgency groups, but no major traffickers were captured. Contemporary assessments deemed the initiatives a failure, citing their inability to curb narcotics production, enabling military corruption, and their record of human rights abuses in rural areas. As U.S. efforts in the war on drugs intensified, crackdowns in Florida and the Caribbean during the Miami drug war forced Colombian traffickers to develop new routes for smuggling cocaine into the United States. By the early 1980s, the Medellin Cartel and Cali Cartel oversaw production, while distribution increasingly relied on Mexican traffickers. Drawing on existing heroin and cannabis smuggling networks, the Guadalajara Cartel, led by Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, emerged as intermediaries, transporting Colombian cocaine across the Mexico–United States border. By the mid-1980s, the Guadalajara Cartel had firmly established itself as a reliable transporter, initially paid in cash but shifting by the late 1980s to a payment-in-kind arrangement. While many factors contributed to the escalation of drug trafficking violence, security analysts trace the origins of cartel power to the unraveling of an implicit arrangement between traffickers and then-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which began to lose its grip on power in the 1980s. The fighting between rival drug cartels began in earnest after the 1989 arrest of Félix Gallardo, with cartel infighting escalating in the 1990s. == Government operations ==

Vicente Fox The PRI ruled Mexico for over 70 years, during which cartels grew in power and anti-drug efforts targeted the seizure of marijuana and opium crops in remote regions. In 2000, Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) became the first non-PRI president since 1929; his term saw declining homicide rates through 2007, and initially, broad public optimism about regime change. Los Zetas, then the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel, based in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, escalated violence to unprecedented levels in the summer of 2003 through gruesome violence and military-like tactics against the Sinaloa Cartel. Los Zetas turf conflict also instilled terror against journalists and civilians of Nuevo Laredo. This set a new precedent, which cartels later mimicked. These activities were not widely reported by the Mexican media at the time. However, key conflicts occurred, including the Sinaloa Cartel counterattacks and the advance on the Gulf Cartel's main regions in Tamaulipas. It is estimated that in the first eight months of 2005, about 110 people died in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, as a result of the fighting between the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels. Although drug-related violence spiked markedly in contested areas along the U.S. border, such as Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana, and Matamoros, the government was initially successful in detaining and killing high-ranking cartel members, including Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, and Vicente Carrillo Leyva. Calderón expressed that the cartels seek "to replace the government" and "are trying to impose a monopoly by force of arms, and are even trying to impose their own laws". In March 2009, President Calderón called in an additional 5,000 Mexican Army troops to Ciudad Juárez. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security also said that it was considering using state National Guard troops to help the U.S. Border Patrol counter the threat of drug violence in Mexico from spilling over the border into the U.S. The governors of Arizona and Texas encouraged the federal government to use additional National Guard troops from their states to help those already there supporting state law enforcement efforts against drug trafficking. In the first 14 months of his administration, between December 2012 and January 2014, 23,640 people died in the conflict. In 2015, cartel leader Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán escaped from Mexico's maximum-security Altiplano maximum security prison through a mile-long tunnel equipped with lighting, ventilation, and a rail-mounted motorcycle. After six months on the run, he was recaptured in Los Mochis, Sinaloa, following a military raid. Guzmán was extradited to the United States in 2017, where he was convicted on multiple charges and sentenced to life imprisonment. Guzmán was released after approximately 700 cartel enforcers took multiple hostages, including the housing unit where military families live in Culiacán. López Obrador defended the decision to release Guzmán López, arguing it prevented further loss of life, and insisted that he wanted to avoid more massacres, and that even though they underestimated the cartel's forces and ability to respond, the criminal process against Ovidio is still ongoing. In July 2022, authorities captured Rafael Caro-Quintero, a former leader of the Guadalajara Cartel. Despite his campaign promises, military deployments and expenditures have risen, with troop levels 76% higher and defense spending up 87% between 2012 and 2022. Under U.S. pressure, the National Guard has been increasingly deployed to stem migrant flows from Central America. Claudia Sheinbaum Claudia Sheinbaum has pledged continuity with López Obrador's security strategy. She appointed Omar García Harfuch to the Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection (SSPC). Under her administration, the SSPC's powers were expanded through legislation that facilitated closer collaboration with the Attorney General's Office, and greater intelligence gathering and sharing across government agencies. Her government also led targeted operations against cartel infighting, and a greater use of surveillance technology. Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, was killed by Mexican Army during the 2026 Jalisco operation on February 22, triggering widespread retaliatory violence and travel disruptions. == Mexican cartels ==

headquarters Origins The birth of most Mexican drug cartels is traced to former Mexican Judicial Federal Police agent Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo (), who founded the Guadalajara Cartel in 1980 and controlled most of the illegal drug trade in Mexico and the trafficking corridors across the Mexico–U.S. border along with Juan García Ábrego throughout the 1980s. Guzmán claimed that he had paid former presidents Enrique Peña Nieto and Felipe Calderón bribes, which both denied. In 2019, he was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to life imprisonment, after which Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada emerged as the cartel's senior figure. Zambada was arrested in 2024 and extradited to the U.S. in 2025. In January 2023, the arrest of Guzmán's son Ovidio Guzmán sparked a wave of violence in the state of Sinaloa, with the military deploying aircraft and heavy forces in response. Following the arrests of Guzmán and Zambada, the Sinaloa Cartel has experienced infighting, with rival factions aligning under their respective names. Beltrán-Leyva Cartel The Beltrán-Leyva Cartel was founded by the four Beltrán Leyva brothers: Marcos Arturo, Carlos, Alfredo and Héctor. Juárez Cartel The Juárez Cartel controls one of the primary transportation routes for billions of dollars' worth of illegal drug shipments annually entering the United States from Mexico. By the late 2010s, the group had fragmented into rival factions such as Sangre Nueva Zeta and Zetas Vieja Escuela, some of which allied with the Gulf Cartel against the Cártel del Noreste. Remnants of Los Zetas have also operated under the Cártel del Noreste name. La Familia Michoacana Cartel report Sizable battles flared up in 2011 between the Knights Templar and La Familia. is a Mexican criminal group based in Jalisco and was headed by Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes ("El Mencho"), who was Mexico's most wanted cartel leader until his death in 2026. Jalisco New Generation Cartel started as one of the splits of Milenio Cartel, beside La Resistencia. The CJNG defeated La Resistencia and took control of Millenio Cartel's smuggling networks. The cartel expanded its operation network from coast to coast in only six months, making it one of the criminal groups with the greatest operating capacity in Mexico as of 2012. Through online messaging, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel has tried to seek social approval and tacit consent from the Mexican government to confront Los Zetas by posing as a "righteous" and "nationalist" group. By 2018 the CJNG was claimed to be the most powerful cartel in Mexico, though Insight Crime has said the Sinaloa Cartel is still the most powerful cartel and the CJNG its closest rival. In 2019, the group was weakened by infighting, arrests of senior operatives, and a war with the Sinaloa Cartel and its allies. Cartel affiliates and street gangs Smaller drug cartels and localized street gangs operate across Mexico. These gangs can control retail drug markets, extortion rackets, and serve as enforcers of cartels. In Ciudad Juárez, for example, La Línea, historically allied with the Juárez Cartel, and Los Mexicles, aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel, have been responsible for major spikes of violence, and both groups maintain ties to U.S.-based gangs. In Jalisco and Michoacán, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel has recently allied with gangs such as Los Viagras (a former autodefensa group), to fight for territory and run oil theft operations, despite the two groups having been bitter rivals throughout the 2010s. While cartels are sometimes portrayed as centralized, hierarchical organizations, they often function more as loose networks of cells and affiliates that can shift loyalties or rebrand over time. This structure can make them resilient, but it also fuels infighting and fragmentation, contributing to persistent and unpredictable violence even when leaders are captured. Even long-standing cartels have experienced prolonged, violent internal disputes, such as the Sinaloa Cartel infighting in the 2020s. Paramilitaries and other sources of income Beyond drug trafficking, Mexican cartels derive revenue from activities including extortion, kidnapping, oil theft from pipelines, human smuggling, illegal mining and logging, arms trafficking, sex trafficking, and protection rackets in territories under their control. The fragmentation of larger cartels into regional groups has extended their operations beyond traditional strongholds in Michoacán, Guerrero, and Northern Mexico, with organized crime now present in nearly every Mexican state. Paramilitary groups work alongside cartels to enforce these activities. It has been suggested that the rise in paramilitary groups coincides with a loss of security within the government. These paramilitary groups came about in a number of ways. First, waves of elite armed forces and government security experts have left the government to join the side of the cartels, responding to large bribes. Some of the elite armed forces members who join paramilitaries are trained in the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC, formerly known as the School of the Americas). One theory suggests that paramilitaries have emerged from the deregulation of the Mexican army, which private security firms have gradually replaced. Physical "narco messages", ranging from printed banners to handwritten notes, are often displayed in public spaces or left at crime scenes. Some groups, notably the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), maintain dedicated propaganda arms producing coordinated messages with logos, slogans, and professional formatting. Propaganda is also directed at cartel members themselves, with organizations such as La Familia Michoacana and the Knights Templar promoting religious, mythologizing narratives to reinforce loyalty. In 2011, President Felipe Calderón met with major media outlets, urging them to reduce sensationalist coverage and limit the dissemination of cartel messaging. Many cartels tacitly control local information environments by threatening journalists, bloggers, and others who speak out against them. In recent years, cartel messaging has moved into social media short-form videos and imagery that glamorize cartel life, weapons, and loyalty. Cartel slang is increasingly echoed in popular culture, blurring between criminal identity signifiers and everyday Mexican Spanish. Some journalists and researchers have used the term narcoculture to describe this blend of subcultural references, while others have criticized the label as sensationalistic, noting that cartel recruitment also relies heavily on coercion, patronage networks, and legal businesses. The concept nonetheless points to how cultural symbols and narratives can help cartels normalize their presence and project power. == Socioeconomic and structural factors ==

Government corruption Genaro García Luna was found guilty on multiple charges related to corruption and drug trafficking. He is the highest-ranking Mexican official ever to be convicted in the United States. Cartels also use body armor, Kevlar helmets, improvised explosive devices, narco-submarines and unmanned aerial vehicles. Although Mexico accounts for only a small share of worldwide heroin production, it supplies a large share of the heroin distributed in the United States. Cartels have adapted by diversifying their markets and suppliers, expanding beyond the United States, and sourcing chemicals through multiple international channels. Poverty One of the main factors driving the Mexican drug war is widespread poverty. From 2004 to 2008, the portion of the population who received less than half of the median income rose from 17% to 21%, and the proportion of the population living in extreme or moderate poverty rose from 35% to 46% (52 million persons) between 2006 and 2010. The head of the U.S. drug enforcement reported that there are an estimated 45,000 members, associates, and brokers spread over more than 100 countries working under the Sinaloa cartel and the Jalisco New Generation cartel. In the 1960s, when Mexican narcotic smugglers started to smuggle drugs on a major scale, only 5.6% of the Mexican population had more than six years of schooling. More recently, researchers from the World Economic Forum have noted that despite the Mexican economy ranking 31st out of 134 economies for investment in education (5.3% of its GDP), as of 2009, the nation's primary education system is ranked only 116th, thereby suggesting "that the problem is not how much but rather how resources are invested". The WEF further explained: "The powerful teachers union, the SNTE, the largest labor union in Latin America, has been largely responsible for blocking reforms that would increase the quality of spending and help ensure equal access to education.". Teachers in the Acapulco region were "extorted, kidnapped, and intimidated" by cartels, including death threats demanding money. They went on strike in 2011. == Effects in Mexico ==

Casualties Casualty numbers have escalated significantly over time. According to a Stratfor report, the number of drug-related deaths in 2006 and 2007 (2,119 and 2,275) more than doubled to 5,207 in 2008. The number further increased substantially over the next two years, from 6,598 in 2009 to over 11,000 in 2010. According to data from the Mexican government, the death numbers are even higher: 9,616 in 2009, 15,273 in 2010, coming to a total of 47,515 killings between 2006 and January 2012. Violence Although Mexican authorities often distinguish between homicides linked to organized crime and those that are not, the conflict has strained state resources and created an environment of impunity that has worsened crime overall. In 2009, the Mexican attorney general's office claimed that 9 of 10 victims of the Mexican drug war are members of organized crime groups, Some see these efforts as intended to sap the morale of the Mexican government; others see them as an effort to let citizens know who is winning the war. Similarly, at least one dozen Mexican norteño musicians have been murdered. Most of the victims performed narcocorridos, folk songs that tell the stories of the Mexican drug trade. Small and medium businesses in cartel-dominated areas are affected by widespread extortion, known as piso, while multinational corporations have delayed or reduced investments due to security risks. At the government level, the costs of military deployment and police expansion have represented a growing fiscal burden. Given Mexico's high rates of tax noncompliance, these expenditures have further constrained public finances and limited funding for other essential services. Finance Minister Agustín Carstens said that the deteriorating security alone is reducing gross domestic product annually by 1% in Mexico, Latin America's second-largest economy. Calderón justified their deployment under his constitutional role as commander-in-chief of the Mexican Armed Forces (Article 89, Section VI), but this interpretation has been criticized for circumventing constitutional limits on military authority. Efforts to formalize this role, such as Peña Nieto's 2017 Internal Security Law, and López Obrador's 2022 transfer of the National Guard to SEDENA, were struck down by the Supreme Court, though in practice the deployments have continued under executive decrees, and in the case of López Obrador, constitutional amendments. Effects on public health Illicit drug use in Mexico is low compared to the United States, but it is on the rise, with the availability of narcotics gradually increasing since the 1980s. Women officials, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, paralegals, reporters, business owners, social media influencers, teachers, and non-governmental organizations directors and workers have also been involved in different capacities. Women citizens and foreigners, including migrants, have been raped, tortured, and murdered in the conflict. Cartels and gangs fighting in the conflict carry out sex trafficking in Mexico as an alternative source of profits. Some members of criminal organizations also abduct women and girls for sexual slavery Groups of women known as madres buscadoras ('searching mothers') have become prominent for organizing searches for disappeared relatives, and their work has uncovered unmarked mass graves that provide evidence of widespread disappearances. Journalists and the media in May 2017 The increase in violence related with organized crime has significantly deteriorated the conditions in which local journalism is practiced. In addition, because mayors usually appoint local police chiefs, they are seen by cartels as key assets in their criminal activities to control the police forces in their areas of influence. Mass graves have been also discovered in Mexico containing bodies of migrants. == Effects internationally ==

Canada The Mexican Army curtailed the ability of the Mexican drug cartels to move cocaine inside the U.S. and Canada, prompting an upsurge in gang violence in Vancouver in 2009, where the cocaine price has increased from $23,300 to almost $39,000 per kilo as the Canadian drug markets experienced prolonged shortages. In December 2011, the government of Spain remarked that Mexican cartels had multiplied their operations in that country, becoming the main entry point of cocaine into Europe. The 2017 wedding of Daniel Kinahan in Dubai helped investigators identify key members such as Ridouan Taghi, Ricardo Riquelme Vega, Naoufal Fassih, and Camorra boss Raffaele Imperiale. In 2022–23, a major international operation led to 49 arrests, including traffickers Edin "Tito" Gacanin and Zuhair Belkhair, accused of moving large amounts of cocaine through Rotterdam; though many members of the "Super Cartel" remain in custody, both were released shortly after their arrests. Involvement of Mexican cartels in the Russo-Ukrainian War On July 2025, the Mexican Intelligence in collaboration with Ukrainian security forces, revealed that in the Russian invasion of Ukraine Colombian and Mexican mercenaries were sent in the war-zone in the International Legion by the drug cartels to gain war tactics and especially knowledge on the use of drones FPV for battles with the security forces and rival cartels in Mexico. On August 2025, it was revealed that the CJNG created a specific paramilitary unit, of at least 10 members, for the use of drones FPV using the tactics learned in the War in Ukraine. Los Zetas have gained ground in Guatemala after they killed several high-profile members and the supreme leader of Los Leones, an organized crime group from Guatemala. South America Patricio Pazmiño, the Interior Minister of Ecuador, stated that the February 2021 riots at three prisons that took 79 lives were related to Mexican and Colombian drug gangs. The government intercepted a record 126 tons of cocaine in 2020. On September 8, 2021, National Prosecutor Jorge Abbott declared that Mexican cartels were attempting to establish themselves in Chile. It is known that Sinaloa Cartel has attempted to use Chile as a transit route for the shipment of cocaine to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. In March 2009, the U.S. DHS said that it was considering using the National Guard to counter the threat of drug violence in Mexico from spreading to the U.S. The governors of Arizona and Texas have asked the federal government to send additional National Guard troops to help those already there supporting local law enforcement efforts against drug trafficking. Many of the deaths are from an extremely potent opioid, fentanyl, which is trafficked from Mexico. The drug's precursor chemicals, which have a variety of legitimate uses, are manufactured in China, then shipped to Mexico, where it is processed and packaged, which is then smuggled into the US by drug cartels. The opioid crisis in the United States is largely fueled by drugs smuggled from Mexico; approximately 98% of fentanyl entering the U.S. comes from Mexico. In 2023, the Biden administration announced a crackdown on members of the Sinaloa Cartel smuggling fentanyl into the United States. In 2025, President Donald Trump launched a process to designate Mexican drug cartels and other criminal organizations as foreign terrorist organizations. The Trump administration has considered drone strikes against cartels in Mexico. West Africa At least nine Mexican and Colombian drug cartels have established bases in several West African nations, with notable activity in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, among other places. They have reportedly worked closely with local criminal gangs to carve out a staging area for access to the lucrative European market. The Colombian and Mexican cartels have discovered that it is easier to smuggle large loads into West Africa and then break that up into smaller shipments to Europe – mostly Spain, the United Kingdom and France. Higher demand for cocaine in Western Europe in addition to North American interdiction campaigns has led to dramatically increased trafficking in the region: nearly 50% of all non-U.S. bound cocaine, or about 13% of all global flows, is now smuggled through West Africa. == Controversies ==

Allegations of CIA involvement is the son of Ismael Zambada García (alias, "El Mayo"), one of the top leaders of the Sinaloa drug-trafficking organization Vicente Zambada Niebla, a high-ranking member of the Sinaloa Cartel, claimed after his arrest that he and other Sinaloa Cartel members had received immunity from U.S. agents and a virtual license to smuggle cocaine over the United States border, in exchange for intelligence about rival cartels engaged in the Mexican drug war. In 2011, Wachovia, at one time a major U.S. bank, was implicated in laundering money for Mexican drug traffickers. In a settlement, Wachovia paid federal authorities $110 million in forfeiture. In June 2021, the Supreme Court decriminalized recreational cannabis use, a decision viewed as a step toward modernizing national drug policy. However, critics note that these measures have had little impact on drug-related violence, since marijuana sales in Mexico constitute only a minor share of cartel revenues compared to synthetic drugs, cocaine, and other illicit activities. == See also ==