Accession On 25 December 1926, Yoshihito died and Hirohito became emperor. The Crown Prince was said to have received the succession (
senso). The
Taishō era's end and the
Shōwa era's beginning were proclaimed. The deceased Emperor was posthumously renamed
Emperor Taishō within days. Following Japanese custom, the new Emperor was
never referred to by his given name, but rather was referred to simply as "His Majesty the Emperor" which may be shortened to "His Majesty". In writing, the Emperor was also referred to formally as "The Reigning Emperor." In November 1928, Hirohito's accession was confirmed in
ceremonies (
sokui),
Second Sino-Japanese War Beginning from the
Mukden Incident in 1931 in which Japan staged a
false flag operation and made a false accusation against Chinese dissidents as a pretext to invade Manchuria, Japan occupied Chinese territories and established the
puppet government of Manchukuo. Such aggression was recommended to Hirohito by his chiefs of staff and prime minister
Fumimaro Konoe; Hirohito did not voice objection to the invasion of China. A diary by chamberlain Kuraji Ogura says that he was reluctant to start war against China in 1937 because they had underestimated China's military strength and Japan should be cautious in its strategy. In this regard, Ogura writes that Hirohito stated "once you start (a war), it cannot easily be stopped in the middle ... What's important is when to end the war" and "one should be cautious in starting a war, but once begun, it should be carried out thoroughly." Nonetheless, according to Herbert Bix, Hirohito's main concern seems to have been the possibility of an attack by the Soviet Union given his questions to his chief of staff,
Prince Kan'in Kotohito, and army minister,
Hajime Sugiyama, about the time it could take to crush Chinese resistance and how could they prepare for the eventuality of a Soviet incursion. Based on Bix's findings, Hirohito was displeased by Prince Kan'in's evasive responses about the substance of such contingency plans but nevertheless still approved the decision to move troops to
North China. According to
Akira Fujiwara, Hirohito endorsed the policy of qualifying the invasion of China as an "incident" instead of a "war"; therefore, he did not issue any notice to observe international law in this conflict (unlike what his predecessors did in previous conflicts officially recognized by Japan as wars), and the Deputy Minister of the Japanese Army instructed the chief of staff of
Japanese China Garrison Army on 5 August not to use the term "prisoners of war" for Chinese captives. This instruction led to the removal of the constraints of international law on the treatment of Chinese prisoners. The works of
Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno show that Hirohito also authorized, by specific orders (
rinsanmei), the use of chemical weapons against the Chinese. Later in his life, Hirohito looked back on his decision to give the go-ahead to wage a 'defensive' war against China and opined that his foremost priority was not to wage war with China but to prepare for a war with the Soviet Union, as his army had reassured him that the war with China would end within three months, but that decision of his had haunted him since he forgotten that the Japanese forces in China were drastically fewer than those of the Chinese, hence his shortsightedness was evident. On 1 December 1937, Hirohito had given formal instruction to General
Iwane Matsui to capture and occupy the enemy capital of Nanking. He was very eager to fight this battle since he and his council firmly believed that all it would take is a one huge blow to bring forth the surrender of Chiang Kai-shek. He even gave an Imperial Rescript to Iwane when he returned to Tokyo a year later, despite the
brutality that his officers had inflicted on the Chinese populace in Nanking; thus Hirohito had seemingly turned a blind eye to and condoned these monstrosities. During the
invasion of Wuhan, from August to October 1938, Hirohito authorized the use of chemical weapons on 375 separate occasions, despite the resolution adopted by the
League of Nations on 14 May condemning Japanese use of chemical weapons.
Pacific War Preparations In July 1939, Hirohito quarrelled with his brother,
Prince Chichibu, over whether to support the
Anti-Comintern Pact, and reprimanded the army minister,
Seishirō Itagaki. But after the success of the
Wehrmacht in Europe, Hirohito consented to the alliance. On 27 September 1940, ostensibly under Hirohito's leadership, Japan became a contracting partner of the
Tripartite Pact with
Germany and
Italy forming the
Axis powers. To avoid a multi-front war,
a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was signed in April 1941, two years after the conclusion of the
Soviet–Japanese border conflicts. The objectives to be obtained were clearly defined: a free hand to continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia, no increase in U.S. or British military forces in the region, and cooperation by the West "in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire." In early 1940, the U.S. began imposing targeted embargoes on Japan—specifically restricting iron, steel, and aviation gasoline—to penalize its invasion of French Indochina and the Japanese war with China. These sanctions, part of an "
ABCD Encirclement" aimed to halt Japanese expansion which were tightened into a near-total oil embargo by July 1941. On 5 September, Prime Minister Konoe informally submitted a draft of the decision to Hirohito, just one day in advance of the Imperial Conference at which it would be formally implemented. On this evening, Hirohito had a meeting with the chief of staff of the army, Sugiyama, chief of staff of the navy,
Osami Nagano, and Prime Minister Konoe. Hirohito questioned Sugiyama about the chances of success of an open war with
the Occident. As Sugiyama answered positively, Hirohito scolded him: {{blockquote Chief of Naval General Staff Admiral Nagano, a former Navy Minister and vastly experienced, later told a trusted colleague, "I have never seen the Emperor reprimand us in such a manner, his face turning red and raising his voice." Nevertheless, all speakers at the Imperial Conference were united in favor of war rather than diplomacy. Baron
Yoshimichi Hara, President of the Imperial Council and Hirohito's representative, then questioned them closely, producing replies to the effect that war would be considered only as a last resort from some, and silence from others. On 8 October, Sugiyama signed a 47-page report to the Emperor (sōjōan) outlining in minute detail plans for the advance into Southeast Asia. During the third week of October, Sugiyama gave Hirohito a 51-page document, "Materials in Reply to the Throne," about the operational outlook for the war. As war preparations continued, Prime Minister
Fumimaro Konoe found himself increasingly isolated, and he resigned on 16 October. He justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita, by stating: The army and the navy recommended the appointment of
Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, one of Hirohito's uncles, as prime minister. According to the Shōwa "Monologue", written after the war, Hirohito then said that if the war were to begin while a member of the imperial house was prime minister, the imperial house would have to carry the responsibility and he was opposed to this. Instead, Hirohito chose the hard-line General
Hideki Tōjō, who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution, and asked him to make a policy review of what had been sanctioned by the Imperial Conferences. on 29 April 1943 On 2 November Tōjō, Sugiyama, and Nagano reported to Hirohito that the review of eleven points had been in vain. Emperor Hirohito gave his consent to the war and then asked: "Are you going to provide justification for the war?" The decision for war against the United States was presented for approval to Hirohito by General Tōjō, Naval Minister Admiral
Shigetarō Shimada, and Japanese Foreign Minister
Shigenori Tōgō. On 3 November, Nagano explained in detail the plan of the
attack on Pearl Harbor to Hirohito. On 5 November Emperor Hirohito approved in imperial conference the operations plan for a war against the
Western world and had many meetings with the military and Tōjō until the end of the month. He initially showed hesitance towards engaging in war, but eventually approved the decision to strike Pearl Harbor despite opposition from certain advisors. In the period leading up to Pearl Harbor, he expanded his control over military matters and participated in the Conference of Military Councillors, which was considered unusual of him. Additionally, he sought additional information regarding the attack plans.
War: advance and retreat On 8 December (7 December in Hawaii), 1941, Japanese forces launched the
Pacific War with a series of simultaneous surprise attacks. U.S. territories were targeted during the
attack on Pearl Harbor, and the
invasion of Batan Island and aerial
attack on Clark Field in the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
British Empire territories were attacked in the
Battle of Hong Kong and the
invasion of Malaya. With the nation fully committed to the war, Hirohito took a keen interest in military progress and sought to boost morale. According to Akira Yamada and Akira Fujiwara, Hirohito made major interventions in some military operations. For example, he pressed Sugiyama four times, on 13 and 21 January and 9 and 26 February, to increase troop strength and launch an attack on
Bataan. On 9 February, 19 March, and 29 May, Hirohito ordered the Army Chief of staff to examine the possibilities for an attack on
Chongqing in China, which led to Operation Gogo. While some authors, like journalists
Peter Jennings and
Todd Brewster, say that throughout the war, Hirohito was "outraged" at Japanese war crimes and the political dysfunction of many societal institutions that proclaimed their loyalty to him, and sometimes spoke up against them, others, such as historians
Herbert P. Bix and
Mark Felton, as well as the expert on China's international relations Michael Tai, point out that Hirohito personally sanctioned the "
Three Alls policy" (Sankō Sakusen), a
scorched earth strategy implemented in China from 1942 to 1945 and which was both directly and indirectly responsible for the deaths of "more than 2.7 million" Chinese civilians. As the tide of war began to turn against Japan (around late 1942 and early 1943), the flow of information to the palace gradually began to bear less and less relation to reality, while others suggest that Hirohito worked closely with Prime Minister
Hideki Tojo, continued to be well and accurately briefed by the military, and knew Japan's military position precisely right up to the point of surrender. The chief of staff of the General Affairs section of the Prime Minister's office, Shuichi Inada, remarked to Tōjō's private secretary, Sadao Akamatsu: and their children on 7 December 1941 In the first six months of war, all the major engagements had been victories. Japanese advances were stopped in the summer of 1942 with the
Battle of Midway and the landing of the American forces on
Guadalcanal and
Tulagi in August. Hirohito played an increasingly influential role in the war; in eleven major episodes he was deeply involved in supervising the actual conduct of war operations. Hirohito pressured the High Command to order an early attack on the Philippines in 1941–42, including the fortified Bataan peninsula. He secured the deployment of army air power in the
Guadalcanal campaign. Following Japan's withdrawal from Guadalcanal he demanded a
new offensive in
New Guinea, which was duly carried out but failed badly. Unhappy with the navy's conduct of the war, he criticized its withdrawal from the central
Solomon Islands and demanded naval battles against the Americans for the losses they had inflicted in the Aleutians. The battles were disasters. Finally, it was at his insistence that plans were drafted for the recapture of
Saipan and, later, for an offensive in the
Battle of Okinawa. With the Army and Navy bitterly feuding, he settled disputes over the allocation of resources. He helped plan military offenses. In September 1944, Hirohito declared that it must be his citizens' resolve to smash the evil purposes of the Westerners so that their imperial destiny might continue, but all along, it is just a mask for the urgent need of Japan to scratch a victory against the counter-offensive campaign of the Allied Forces. On 18 October 1944, Imperial headquarters had resolved that the Japanese must make a stand in the vicinity of Leyte to prevent the Americans from landing in the Philippines. This view was widely frowned upon by the policymakers from both the army and navy sectors. Hirohito was quoted that he approved of such a stand, as if they won in this campaign, they might finally force the Americans to negotiate. Despite the hopeful outlook, a reality check for the Japanese was coming, as the forces that had been sent to attack Leyte, were also the ones designated to defend the island of Luzon, striking a huge blow to the Japanese military strategy. The media, under tight government control, repeatedly portrayed him as lifting the popular morale even as the Japanese cities came under heavy air attack in 1944–45 and food and housing shortages mounted. Japanese retreats and defeats were celebrated by the media as successes that portended "Certain Victory." Only gradually did it become apparent to the Japanese people that the situation was very grim owing to growing shortages of food, medicine, and fuel as U.S. submarines began wiping out Japanese shipping. Starting in mid 1944, American raids on the major cities of Japan made a mockery of the unending tales of victory. Later that year, with the downfall of Tojo's government, two other prime ministers were appointed to continue the war effort,
Kuniaki Koiso and
Kantarō Suzuki—each with the formal approval of Hirohito. Both were unsuccessful and Japan was nearing disaster.
Surrender In early 1945, in the wake of the losses in the
Battle of Leyte, Emperor Hirohito began a series of individual meetings with senior government officials to consider the progress of the war. All but ex-Prime Minister
Fumimaro Konoe advised continuing the war. Konoe feared a communist revolution even more than defeat in war and urged a negotiated surrender. In February 1945, during the first private audience with Hirohito he had been allowed in three years, Konoe advised Hirohito to begin negotiations to end the war. According to Grand Chamberlain
Hisanori Fujita, Hirohito, still looking for a
tennozan (a great victory) in order to provide a stronger bargaining position, firmly rejected Konoe's recommendation. With each passing week victory became less likely. In April, the Soviet Union issued notice that it would not renew its neutrality agreement. Japan's ally Germany surrendered in early May 1945. In June, the cabinet reassessed the war strategy, only to decide more firmly than ever on a fight to the last man. This strategy was officially affirmed at a brief Imperial Council meeting, at which, as was normal, Hirohito did not speak. The following day,
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido prepared a draft document which summarized the hopeless military situation and proposed a negotiated settlement. Extremists in Japan were also calling for a death-before-dishonor mass suicide, modeled on the "
47 Ronin" incident. By mid-June 1945, the cabinet had agreed to approach the Soviet Union to act as a mediator for a negotiated surrender but not before Japan's bargaining position had been improved by repulse of the anticipated Allied invasion of mainland Japan. On 22 June, Hirohito met with his ministers saying, "I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts be made to implement them." The attempt to negotiate a peace via the
Soviet Union came to nothing. There was always the threat that extremists would carry out a coup or foment other violence. On 26 July 1945, the Allies issued the
Potsdam Declaration demanding
unconditional surrender. The Japanese government council, the Big Six, considered that option and recommended to Hirohito that it be accepted only if one to four conditions were agreed upon, including a guarantee of Hirohito's continued position in
Japanese society. That changed after the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet declaration of war. On 9 August, Emperor Hirohito told
Kōichi Kido: "The Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us." On 10 August, the cabinet drafted an "
Imperial Rescript ending the War" following Hirohito's indications that the declaration did not comprise any demand which prejudiced his prerogatives as a sovereign ruler. On 12 August 1945, Hirohito informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles,
Prince Yasuhiko Asaka, asked whether the war would be continued if the
kokutai (national polity) could not be preserved. Hirohito simply replied "Of course." On 14 August, Hirohito made the decision to surrender "unconditionally" and the Suzuki government notified the Allies that it had accepted the
Potsdam Declaration. A hardline faction of the army opposed to the surrender attempted a
coup d'état on the evening of 14 August, prior to the broadcast. They seized the Imperial Palace (the
Kyūjō incident) in an attempt to put Hirohito under house arrest, but the physical pre-taped recording of Hirohito's speech was hidden and preserved overnight while Hirohito himself was in an underground bomb shelter at the Imperial Palace where he remain there throughout the night untouched. The coup failed, and the speech was broadcast the next morning. On 15 August, a recording of
Hirohito's surrender speech was broadcast over the radio (the first time Hirohito was heard on the radio by the Japanese people) announcing Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. During the historic broadcast Hirohito stated: "Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization." The speech also noted that "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage" and ordered the Japanese to "endure the unendurable." The speech, using formal, archaic Japanese, was not readily understood by many commoners. According to historian
Richard Storry in
A History of Modern Japan, Hirohito typically used "a form of language familiar only to the well-educated" and to the more traditional
samurai families. In his first ever press conference given in Tokyo in 1975, when he was asked what he thought of the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito answered: "It's very regrettable that nuclear bombs were dropped and I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima but it couldn't be helped because that happened in wartime" (
shikata ga nai, meaning "it cannot be helped"). Hirohito himself visited Hiroshima on December 7, 1947, marking his first visit to the city since the atomic bombing. During this trip, part of his post-war tour, he toured the ruined city, met with residents and encouraged rebuilding efforts, with large crowds gathering to see him. He visited again in 1951 and 1971. == Postwar reign ==