First days; banning of PCC/ZAPU and ZANU in 1964 Most of the Southern Rhodesian press predicted that Smith would not last long; one column called him "a momentary man", thrust into the spotlight by the RF's dearth of proven leaders. His only real rival to replace Field had been
William Harper, an ardent segregationist who had headed the Dominion Party's Southern Rhodesian branch during the Federal years. Some reporters predicted Welensky's imminent introduction to Southern Rhodesian politics at the head of an RF–UFP
coalition government, but Welensky showed little interest in this idea, saying he would be unable to manoeuvre in an RF-dominated House. The RF's replacement of Field with Smith drew criticism from the British Labour leader
Harold Wilson, who called it "brutal", while
John Johnston, the British High Commissioner in Salisbury, indicated his disapproval by refusing to meet Smith for two weeks after he took office. The ZAPU leader
Joshua Nkomo branded the new Smith Cabinet "a suicide squad ... interested not in the welfare of all the people but only in their own", and predicted that the RF would "eventually destroy themselves". Asserting that a lasting "place for the white man" in Southern Rhodesia would benefit all of the country's people, the new prime minister said the government should be based "on merit, not on colour or nationalism", and insisted that there would be "no African nationalist government here in my lifetime". Smith announced his Cabinet on his first day in office, 14 April 1964. He increased the number of ministers from 10 to 11, redistributed portfolios, and made three new appointments. Smith's fellow former UFP men made up most of the new RF Cabinet, with Harper and the Minister of Agriculture,
James Graham, 7th Duke of Montrose (also called Lord Graham), heading a minority of hardline Dominion Party veterans.
Ken Flower, whom Field had appointed Director of the
Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) on its creation the previous year, was surprised to be retained by Smith. Smith announced his policies to the nation through full-page advertisements in the newspapers: "No forced integration. No lowering of standards. No abdication of responsible government. No repeal of the Land Apportionment Act. No appeasement to suit the
Afro-Asian bloc." "An honest Rhodesian," a 1964 political poster declared—"Trust Mr Smith. He will never hand over Rhodesia." Smith retained the post of Minister of External Affairs to himself. One of the Smith government's first actions was to crack down hard on the black-nationalist political violence that had erupted following the establishment of a second black-nationalist organisation, the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), by disgruntled ZAPU members in Tanzania in August 1963. The rival movements were split tribally, ZAPU being mostly
Ndebele and ZANU predominantly
Shona, and politically—ZAPU, which had relabelled itself the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) within Southern Rhodesia to circumvent its ban, was
Marxist–Leninist and backed by the
Warsaw Pact and its allies, while ZANU had aligned itself with
Maoism and the bloc headed by communist China. Their respective supporters in the black townships clashed constantly, also targeting non-aligned blacks whom they hoped to recruit, and sporadically attacked whites, businesses and police stations. Amid PCC/ZAPU's calls for various strikes and protests, including an appeal for black children to boycott state schools, Smith's Justice Minister Clifford Dupont had Nkomo and other PCC/ZAPU leaders restricted at
Gonakudzingwa in the remote south-east two days after Smith took office. The politically motivated killing of a white man,
Petrus Oberholzer, near
Melsetter by ZANU insurgents on 4 July 1964 marked the start of intensified black-nationalist violence and police counteraction that culminated in the banning of ZANU and PCC/ZAPU on 26 August, with most of the two movements' respective leaders concurrently jailed or restricted. ZANU, ZAPU and their respective guerrilla armies—the
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the
Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)—thereafter operated from abroad.
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) Smith, who had been to the UK only four times before 1964 and never more than briefly, was soon labelled a "raw colonial" by Whitehall. He was almost immediately engaged in a dispute with the UK government, which he claimed had forsaken British ideals, and the Commonwealth, which he said had abandoned its own founding principles amid the
Wind of Change. He accused both of isolating Southern Rhodesia because it still respected these values. When he learned in June that Salisbury would not be represented at the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference for the first time since
1932, he was deeply insulted and alleged British betrayal, double standards and appeasement. Three months later, Smith accepted the British condition that the independence terms had to be acceptable to majority opinion, but impasse immediately developed regarding the mechanism by which black views would be gauged. Labour's narrow victory in the October 1964 UK
general election meant that Smith would be negotiating not with Douglas-Home but with Harold Wilson, who was far less accommodating towards the RF stand. Smith declared acceptability to majority opinion to have been demonstrated after a largely white
referendum and an
indaba of tribal chiefs and headmen both decisively backed independence under the 1961 constitution in October and November 1964, but black nationalists and the UK government dismissed the
indaba as insufficiently representative of the black community. in 1965. Wilson, who took office in October 1964, proved a formidable opponent of Smith's.|alt=A photograph of Harold Wilson and Ian Smith Following Northern Rhodesia's independence as Zambia in October 1964—Nyasaland had been independent Malawi since July—Southern Rhodesia began referring to itself simply as
Rhodesia, but Whitehall rejected this change. Perceiving Smith to be on the verge of a
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), Wilson issued a statement in October 1964 warning of dire economic and political consequences, and wrote to Smith demanding "a categorical assurance forthwith" that no UDI would be attempted. Smith ignored this, expressing confusion as to what he had done to provoke it. The UK and Rhodesian governments exchanged often confrontational correspondence over the next year or so, each accusing the other of being unreasonable and intransigent. Little progress was made when two prime ministers met in person in January 1965, when Smith travelled to London for Sir
Winston Churchill's funeral. The RF called a fresh election for
May 1965 and, campaigning on an
election promise of independence, won all 50 "A"-roll seats (elected mostly by whites). Wilson's ministers deliberately stonewalled Smith during mid-1965, hoping to eventually break him down, but this only caused the Rhodesian hierarchy to feel yet more alienated. From June, a peripheral dispute concerned Rhodesia's unilateral and ultimately successful attempt to open an independent
mission in Lisbon; Portugal's acceptance of this in September 1965 prompted British outrage and Rhodesian delight. Amid rumours that UDI was imminent, Smith arrived in London on 4 October 1965 with the declared intent of settling the independence issue, but flew home eight days later with the matter unresolved. When Wilson travelled to Salisbury on 26 October, Smith offered to enfranchise about half a million black Rhodesians immediately along the lines of "one taxpayer, one vote" in return for independence, but Wilson said this was unacceptable as most blacks would still be excluded. He proposed a
Royal Commission to test public opinion in Rhodesia regarding independence under the 1961 constitution, and suggested that the UK might safeguard black representation in the Rhodesian parliament by withdrawing relevant devolved powers. This latter prospect horrified Smith's team as it seemed to them to have ruled out the failsafe option of keeping the
status quo. After Wilson returned to Britain on 30 October 1965, he presented terms for the Royal Commission that the Rhodesians found unacceptable—among other things, Britain would not commit itself to accepting the results. Smith rejected these conditions on 5 November, saying they made the whole exercise pointless. After waiting a few days for new terms from Wilson, Smith made a
consensus decision with his Cabinet to break ties unilaterally on 11 November 1965, and signed the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence at 11:00
local time.
Fallout from UDI UDI, while received calmly by most Rhodesians, prompted political outrage in the UK and overseas. It astonished Wilson, who called on the people of Rhodesia to ignore the post-UDI government, which he described as "hell-bent on illegal self-destroying". Following orders from Whitehall and the passage of the
Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, the colonial
Governor Sir
Humphrey Gibbs formally sacked Smith and his
Cabinet, accusing them of treason. Smith and his ministers ignored this, considering Gibbs's office obsolete under the 1965 constitution enacted as part of UDI. After Gibbs made clear that he would not resign, Smith's government effectively replaced him with Dupont, who was appointed to the post of "
Officer Administering the Government" (created by the 1965 constitution). No attempt was made to remove Gibbs from his official residence at
Government House opposite Smith's residence at
Independence House, however; Gibbs remained there, ignored by the Smith administration, until the declaration of a republic in 1970. Smith and his government initially continued to profess loyalty to Queen
Elizabeth II. The 1965 Constitution reconstituted Rhodesia as a
Commonwealth realm, with Elizabeth II as "
Queen of Rhodesia". Indeed, the UDI document ended with the words "God Save The Queen". In December 1965, Smith, attempting to assert the prerogatives he claimed as Her Majesty's Rhodesian prime minister, wrote a letter to Elizabeth asking her to appoint Dupont as
governor-general of Rhodesia. The Queen rejected Smith's request out of hand; Buckingham Palace's response characterized Smith's request as "purported advice". The UK, with the near-unanimous support of the international community, maintained that Gibbs was still Elizabeth II's only legitimate representative in what it still reckoned as the colony of Southern Rhodesia, and hence the sole lawful authority there. The
UN General Assembly and
Security Council quickly joined the UK in condemning UDI as illegal and racist. Security Council
Resolutions 216 and
217, adopted in the days following Smith's declaration, denounced UDI as an illegitimate "usurpation of power by a racist settler minority", and called on nations not to entertain diplomatic or economic relations. No country recognised UDI as legitimate. Black nationalists in Rhodesia and their overseas backers, prominently the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), clamoured for the UK to remove Smith's government with a military invasion, but Britain dismissed this option, citing logistical issues, the risk of provoking a pre-emptive Rhodesian strike on Zambia, and the psychological issues likely to accompany any confrontation between British and Rhodesian troops. Wilson instead resolved to end UDI through economic sanctions, banning the supply of oil to Rhodesia and the import of most Rhodesian goods to Britain. When Smith continued to receive oil through South Africa and
Portuguese Mozambique, Wilson posted a
Royal Navy squadron to the
Mozambique Channel in March 1966. This blockade, the
Beira Patrol, was endorsed by
UN Security Council Resolution 221 the following month. Wilson predicted in January 1966 that the various boycotts would force Smith to give in "within a matter of weeks rather than months", but the British (and later UN) sanctions had little effect on Rhodesia, largely because South Africa and Portugal went on trading with it, providing it with oil and other key resources. Clandestine trade with other nations also continued, initially at a reduced level, and the diminished presence of foreign competitors helped domestic industries to slowly mature and expand. Even many OAU states, while bombarding Rhodesia with opprobrium, continued importing Rhodesian food and other products. Rhodesia thus avoided the economic cataclysm predicted by Wilson and gradually became more self-sufficient. "Rhodesia can not only take it, but she can also make it," Smith said on 29 April 1966, while opening the annual Central African Trade Fair in
Bulawayo. "When I say take it, I use it in two ways. Firstly, when it comes to sanctions we have proved we can take it. Secondly, when it comes to independence, we have also proved we can take it." Meanwhile, throughout the 1960s and '70s, Smith hired
pseudoarchaeologists with the aim to preserve the myth that
Great Zimbabwe was the product of a mysterious foreign civilisation. His government forced
Peter Garlake, who argued that it was the work of the
Karanga (south-central
Shona), into exile.
Tiger and Fearless talks with Wilson , the venue for talks between Smith and Wilson in 1966 and 1968|alt=The Rock of Gibraltar, seen from the sea , the
Royal Navy ship that hosted the 1966 Anglo-Rhodesian summit off Gibraltar|alt= Wilson told the UK's
House of Commons in January 1966 that he would not enter any kind of dialogue with Smith's post-UDI government (which he called "the illegal regime") until it gave up its claim of independence, but by mid-1966 British and Rhodesian civil servants were holding "talks about talks" in London and Salisbury. By November that year, Wilson had agreed to negotiate personally with Smith. Smith and Wilson subsequently held two rounds of direct negotiations, both of which were held aboard Royal Navy ships off
Gibraltar. The first took place aboard
HMS Tiger between 2 and 4 December 1966, while the second, aboard
HMS Fearless, was held between 8 and 13 October 1968. The UK's prime minister went to HMS
Tiger in a belligerent mindset. Wilson's political secretary
Marcia Falkender later wrote of "apartheid ... on that ship", with the British and Rhodesian delegations separated in all activities outside the conference room at Wilson's orders. Despite the uneasy atmosphere—accounts from both sides describe Wilson dealing with the Rhodesians extremely tersely—talks progressed relatively smoothly until the subject turned to the manner of the transition. Wilson insisted on the abandonment of the 1965 constitution, the dissolution of the post-UDI government in favour of a "broad-based" multiracial interim administration and a period under a British governor, conditions that Smith saw as tantamount to surrender, particularly as the UK proposed to draft and introduce the new constitution only after a fresh test of opinion under UK control. When Smith asserted on 3 December that he could not settle without first consulting his Cabinet in Salisbury, Wilson was enraged, declaring that a central condition of the summit had been that he and Smith would have
plenipotentiary powers to make a deal. According to J.R.T. Wood, Wilson and his
Attorney General Sir
Elwyn Jones then "bullied Smith for two long days" to try to get him to settle, without success. A working document was ultimately produced and signed by Smith, Wilson and Gibbs, to be accepted or rejected in its entirety by each Cabinet after the Prime Ministers returned home. Whitehall accepted the proposals, but Salisbury turned them down; Smith announced on 5 December 1966 that while he and his ministers were largely satisfied with the terms, the Cabinet did not feel it could responsibly abandon the 1965 constitution while so much uncertainty surrounded the transition and the new "mythical constitution yet to be evolved". Rhodesia's Leader of the Opposition
Josiah Gondo promptly demanded Smith's resignation, reasoning that the Cabinet's rejection of the working document he had helped to draft amounted to a vote of no confidence. The RF ignored him. Warning that "grave actions must follow", Wilson took the Rhodesia problem to the United Nations, which proceeded to institute the first mandatory trade sanctions in its history with
Security Council Resolutions 232 (December 1966) and
253 (April 1968). These measures required UN member states to prevent all trade and economic links with Rhodesia. , the
Royal Navy ship that hosted the 1968 Anglo-Rhodesian summit off Gibraltar|alt= State press censorship, introduced by the Smith administration on UDI, was lifted in early April 1968, though according to the
Glasgow Herald the government retained "considerable powers to control information. It may reflect no more than Mr Smith's growing confidence that nothing—short of a sell-out to Britain—can undermine his position in Rhodesia". The series of
Rhodesian High Court cases debating the legality of UDI came to a close five months later on 13 September. A panel of judges headed by Sir
Hugh Beadle ruled UDI, the 1965 constitution and Smith's government to be
de jure, prompting the UK Commonwealth Secretary
George Thomson to accuse them of breaching "the fundamental laws of the land". On HMS
Fearless, the UK reversed its confrontational approach of the
Tiger talks and made a marked effort to appear genial and welcoming, mixing socially with the Rhodesians and accommodating Smith in the Admiral's cabin on
HMS Kent, which was moored alongside. Marked progress towards agreement was made—for example, Wilson dropped altogether the transition period under a colonial governor—but the Rhodesian delegation now demurred on a new British proposal, the "double safeguard". This would involve elected black Rhodesians controlling a blocking quarter in the Rhodesian parliament, and thereafter having the right to appeal passed legislation to the
Privy Council in London. Smith's team accepted the principle of the blocking quarter but agreement could not be reached on the technicalities of it; the involvement of the UK Privy Council was rejected by Smith as a "ridiculous" provision that would prejudice Rhodesia's sovereignty. The
Fearless summit ended with a joint Anglo-Rhodesian statement asserting that "both sides recognise that a very wide gulf still remains", but were prepared to continue negotiations in Salisbury. This never occurred.
A republic; failed accord with Douglas-Home With their hopes of Commonwealth realm status through a settlement with Britain dimming, Smith and the RF began to seriously consider the alternative of a republic as early as December 1966, after the
Tiger talks. Republicanism was presented as a means to clarify Rhodesia's claimed constitutional status, end ambiguity regarding ties with Britain and elicit official foreign recognition and acceptance. Smith's government began exploring a republican constitution in March 1967. The
Union Jack and Rhodesia's Commonwealth-style
national flag—a
defaced Sky
Blue Ensign with the Union Jack in the canton—were formally superseded on 11 November 1968, the third anniversary of UDI, by a new national flag: a green-white-green vertical
triband,
charged centrally with the
Rhodesian coat of arms. After the electorate voted "yes" in a June 1969
referendum both to a new constitution and to the abandoning of symbolic ties to the Crown, Smith declared Rhodesia a republic on 2 March 1970. The 1969 constitution introduced a
president as head of state, a multiracial senate, separate black and white electoral rolls (each with qualifications) and a mechanism whereby the number of black MPs would increase in line with the proportion of income tax revenues paid by black citizens. This process would stop once blacks had the same number of seats as whites; the declared goal was not majority rule, but rather "parity between the races". Sir
Alec Douglas-Home, with whom Smith signed a short-lived accord in 1971|alt=A photograph of Sir Alec Douglas-Home No country recognised the Rhodesian republic. The RF was decisively returned to power in the first
election held as a republic, on 10 April 1970, winning all 50 white seats. Hopes for an Anglo-Rhodesian rapprochement were boosted two months later when the Conservatives won a surprise
election victory in the UK.
Edward Heath took over as prime minister while Douglas-Home became
Foreign Secretary. Talks between Douglas-Home and Smith began with a lengthy meeting in Salisbury in April 1971 and continued until a tentative understanding was reached in early November. A UK delegation headed by Douglas-Home and the Attorney General Sir
Peter Rawlinson flew to Salisbury on 15 November for negotiations over a new constitution, and after six days of discussion an accord was signed on 21 November 1971. The constitution agreed upon was based largely on the one Rhodesia had just adopted, but would eventually bring about a black majority in parliament. Black representation in the House would be immediately increased, and a majority of both black and white MPs would have to approve retrogressive legislation; blacks would thus wield an effective veto "as long as they voted solidly together",
Robert Blake comments. "The principle of majority rule was enshrined with safeguards ensuring that there could be no legislation which could impede this," Smith wrote in his memoirs. "On the other hand, there would be no mad rush into
one man, one vote with all the resultant corruption, nepotism, chaos and economic disaster which we had witnessed in all the countries around us." The UK announced a test of opinion in Rhodesia to be undertaken by a four-man
commission headed by the veteran judge
Lord Pearce. All four population groups—black, white,
coloured (mixed) and
Asian—would have to approve the terms for Britain to proceed. ZANU and ZAPU supporters quickly formed the
African National Council (later the United African National Council, or UANC) to organise and co-ordinate black opposition to the deal. Bishop
Abel Muzorewa, the first black man to have been ordained as such in Rhodesia, was installed as the movement's leader. The Pearce Commission finished its work on 12 March 1972 and published its report two months later—it described white, coloured and Asian Rhodesians as in favour of the terms by 98%, 97% and 96% respectively, and black citizens as against them by an unspecified large majority. This came as a great shock to the white community "and a deep disappointment to those in Britain who hoped to get rid of this tiresome albatross", Blake records. Smith condemned the Pearce Commissioners as "naive and inept". The UK withdrew from negotiations, but neither government abandoned the accord entirely. "I would ask them [the black people of Rhodesia] to look again very carefully at what they rejected," Douglas-Home told the House of Commons; "the proposals are still available because Mr Smith has not withdrawn or modified them."
Bush War soldiers on
Lake Kariba in 1976, during the
Bush War|alt=Two men in military fatigues handle a machine gun on the side of a boat , he compares both of their situations. He warns the
Rhodesian public against putting too much faith in the
détente. The
Rhodesian Bush War (or Second
Chimurenga), which had been underway at a low level since before UDI, began in earnest in December 1972 when ZANLA attacked farms in north-eastern Rhodesia. The
Rhodesian Security Forces mounted a strong counter-campaign over the next two years. Muzorewa re-engaged with Smith in August 1973, accepting the 1971–72 Douglas-Home terms, and the two signed a statement to that effect on 17 August. The UANC executive repudiated this in May 1974, but talks between Smith and Muzorewa continued sporadically. The RF again won a clean sweep of the 50 white seats in the July 1974
general election. Rhodesia's early counter-insurgency successes were undone by political shifts in the guerrillas' favour overseas. The April 1974
Carnation Revolution in Lisbon led to Mozambique's transformation over the next year from a Portuguese territory friendly to Smith's government into a
communist state openly allied with ZANU. Wilson and Labour returned to power in the UK in March 1974. Portugal's withdrawal made Rhodesia hugely dependent on South Africa, but Smith still insisted that he held a strong position. "If it takes one year, five years, ten years, we're prepared to ride it out," he told the RF congress on 20 September 1974. "Our stand is clear and unambiguous. Settlement is desirable, but only on our terms." The geopolitical situation tilted further against Smith in December 1974 when the South African Prime Minister
B. J. Vorster pressured him into accepting a
détente initiative involving the
Frontline States of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana (Mozambique and Angola would join the following year). Vorster had concluded that Rhodesia's position was untenable; in his view, it made no sense to maintain white rule in a country where blacks outnumbered whites by 22:1. He also believed that South African interests would be better served by collaborating with black African governments over a Rhodesian settlement; he hoped that success in this might win South Africa some international legitimacy and allow it to retain apartheid. Détente forced a ceasefire, giving the guerrillas time to regroup, and required the Rhodesians to release the ZANU and ZAPU leaders so they could attend a conference in Rhodesia, united under the UANC banner and led by Muzorewa. When Rhodesia stopped releasing black-nationalist prisoners on the grounds that ZANLA and ZIPRA were not observing the ceasefire, Vorster harried Smith further by withdrawing the
South African Police, which had been helping the Rhodesians patrol the countryside. Smith remained stubborn, saying in the run-up to the conference that "We have no policy in Rhodesia to hand over to a black majority government" and that his government instead favoured "a qualified franchise for all Rhodesians ... [to] ensure that government will be retained in responsible hands for all times". , the leader of
ZAPU, one of the main black-nationalist parties in Rhodesia|alt=A black and white photograph of Joshua Nkomo Nkomo remained unchallenged at the head of ZAPU, but the ZANU leadership had become contested between its founding president, the Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole, and
Robert Mugabe, a former teacher from
Mashonaland who had recently won an internal election in prison. When they were released in December 1974 under the détente terms, Mugabe went to Mozambique to consolidate his leadership of the guerrillas, while Sithole joined Muzorewa's delegation. It had been agreed that the talks would take place within Rhodesia, but the black nationalists refused to meet on ground they perceived as not neutral. The Rhodesians insisted on abiding by the accord and negotiating inside the country. To please both camps the conference was held on a train halfway across the
Victoria Falls Bridge on the border between Rhodesia and Zambia; the delegations sat on opposite sides of the frontier. The
conference, which took place on 26 August 1975 with Kaunda and Vorster as mediators, failed to produce a settlement; each side accused the other of being unreasonable. Smith afterwards held direct talks with Nkomo and ZAPU in Salisbury, but these also led nowhere; Nkomo proposed an immediate transition to an interim government headed by himself, which Smith rejected. Guerrilla incursions picked up strongly in the first months of 1976. On 20 March 1976, Smith gave a televised speech including what became his most quoted utterance. "I don't believe in majority rule ever in Rhodesia—not in 1,000 years," he said. "I repeat that I believe in blacks and whites working together. If one day it is white and the next day it is black, I believe we have failed and it will be a disaster for Rhodesia." The first sentence of this statement became commonly quoted as evidence that Smith was a crude racist who would never compromise with the black nationalists, even though the speech was one in which Smith had said that power-sharing with black Rhodesians was inevitable and that "we have got to accept that in the future Rhodesia is a country for black and white, not white as opposed to black and vice versa". The "not in 1,000 years" comment was, according to
Peter Godwin, an attempt to reassure the RF's right wing, which opposed any transition whatsoever, that white Rhodesians would not be sold out. In her 1978 biography of Smith, Berlyn comments that regardless of whether the statement was "taken out of context, or whether his actual intent was misinterpreted", this was one of his greatest blunders as prime minister as it gave obvious ammunition to his detractors. , the
U.S. Secretary of State, was instrumental in Smith's public acceptance in 1976 of the principle of majority rule.|alt=A black and white photograph of Henry Kissinger
Henry Kissinger, the
U.S. Secretary of State, announced a formal interest in the Rhodesian situation in February 1976, and over the next half-year held discussions with the United Kingdom, South Africa and the Frontline States in what became the "Anglo-American initiative". Meeting Smith in
Pretoria on 18 September 1976, Kissinger proposed majority rule after a transition period of two years. He strongly encouraged Smith to accept his deal, though he knew it was unpalatable to him, as any future offer could only be worse from Smith's standpoint—especially if, as expected, U.S. president
Gerald Ford lost the upcoming
election to
Jimmy Carter. Smith expressed great reluctance, but agreed on 24 September after Vorster intimated that South Africa might cut off financial and military aid if he refused. It was the first time Smith had publicly accepted the principles of unconditional majority rule and one man, one vote. However, the Frontline States then abruptly revised their stance and turned the Kissinger terms down, saying that any transition period was unacceptable. The UK quickly arranged an all-party conference in
Geneva, Switzerland to try to salvage a solution. ZANU and ZAPU announced that they would attend this and any summit thereafter as a joint "Patriotic Front" (PF), including members of both parties under a combined leadership. The
Geneva Conference, held between October and December 1976 under British mediation, also failed.
Internal Settlement and Lancaster House; becoming Zimbabwe Smith's moves towards a settlement with black-nationalist groups prompted outrage in sections of Rhodesian Front's right wing, but he remained unassailable within the party as a whole, which had in late 1975 granted him a mandate to negotiate for the best possible settlement however he saw fit. The split in the party ultimately led to the defection in July 1977 of 12 RF MPs after Smith introduced legislation to remove racial criteria from the Land Tenure Act. The loss of these seats to the breakaway
Rhodesian Action Party, which opposed any conciliation with black nationalists, meant that Smith now only barely had the two-thirds majority in parliament he would need to change the constitution, as he would have to in the event of a settlement. He therefore called an early
election, and on 31 August 1977 roundly defeated the defectors—"the dirty dozen", the RF called them—as well as all other opposition; for the third time in seven years, the RF had won all 50 white seats. The party revolt turned out to be a blessing in disguise for Smith, Berlyn comments, as it allowed him to "shed the dead wood of the right wing", giving him more freedom in negotiations with the nationalists. The need for a settlement was becoming urgent—the war was escalating sharply, white emigration was climbing and the economy was starting to struggle as the UN sanctions finally began to have a serious effect. In March 1978, Smith and non-militant nationalist groups headed by Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief
Jeremiah Chirau agreed what became the "
Internal Settlement", under which the country would be reconstituted as
Zimbabwe Rhodesia in June 1979 after
multiracial elections. ZANU and ZAPU were invited to participate, but refused; Nkomo sardonically dubbed Smith's black colleagues "the blacksmiths". The deal was badly received abroad, partly because it kept the police, the military, the judiciary and the civil service in white hands. There would be a senate of 20 blacks and 10 whites, and whites would be reserved 28 out of 100 seats in the new House of Assembly. Smith and Nkomo re-entered negotiations in August 1978, but these ended after ZIPRA
shot down an
Air Rhodesia passenger flight on 3 September and massacred survivors at the crash site. Smith cut off talks, introduced
martial law across most of the country and ordered reprisal attacks on guerrilla positions. Smith, Muzorewa and Sithole toured the United States in October 1978 to promote their settlement, and met Kissinger, Ford and others including the future president
Ronald Reagan. On 11 December, ZANLA attacked Salisbury's oil storage depot, causing a fire that lasted six days and destroyed a quarter of Rhodesia's fuel. Two months later ZIPRA
downed another civilian flight, this time killing all on board. After whites endorsed the Internal Settlement by 85% in a
referendum on 30 January 1979, Smith dissolved the
Rhodesian parliament for the last time on 28 February. The RF won all the white seats in the April 1979 elections while Muzorewa and the UANC won a majority in the common roll seats with 67% of the popular vote; the PF rejected this, however, as did the UN, which passed a
resolution branding it a "sham". Sithole, astounded that his party had won only 12 seats to the UANC's 51, suddenly turned against the settlement and alleged that the polls had been stage-managed in Muzorewa's favour. Mugabe dismissed the bishop as a "neocolonial puppet" and pledged to continue ZANLA's campaign "to the last man"; Nkomo similarly committed himself to ZIPRA. On 1 June 1979, the day of the country's official reconstitution as Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Muzorewa replaced Smith as prime minister, at the head of a
UANC–RF coalition Cabinet made up of 12 blacks and five whites. Smith was included as
Minister without portfolio; Nkomo promptly dubbed him the "Minister with all the portfolios". , the country's first black prime minister, who succeeded Smith in June 1979 following the
Internal Settlement|alt=A portrait photograph of Abel Muzorewa An observer group from the UK Conservative Party did regard the April 1979 elections as fair, and
Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative leader, was personally disposed to recognise Muzorewa's government and lift sanctions. The potential significance of the Conservative victory in the May 1979 British
general election was not lost on Smith, who wrote to Thatcher: "All Rhodesians thank God for your magnificent victory." The
United States Senate passed a resolution urging President Carter to remove sanctions and declare Zimbabwe Rhodesia legitimate, but Carter and his Cabinet remained strongly opposed. Carter and Thatcher ultimately decided against accepting Zimbabwe Rhodesia, noting the continued international support for the guerrillas. After the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in
Lusaka in August 1979, the UK Foreign Secretary
Lord Carrington invited the Zimbabwe Rhodesian government and the Patriotic Front to attend an all-party constitutional conference at
Lancaster House in London, starting on 10 September. Smith was part of Muzorewa's delegation at Lancaster House. Several aspects of the Internal Settlement constitution, such as a declaration of human rights and a guarantee that land redistributed by the government would be paid for, were retained; it was also agreed to have 20 reserved white seats out of 100 for at least seven years. Fresh elections would be held during a brief period under a British governor invested with full executive and legislative powers. The new constitution was agreed on 18 October, and on 12 December 1979 the House of Assembly voted to dissolve itself, ending UDI.
Lord Soames arrived in Salisbury later the same day to become Southern Rhodesia's last Governor; among other things he announced that Smith would be granted amnesty for declaring independence. The final
Lancaster House Agreement was signed on 21 December. Smith was the only member of any delegation to openly oppose the accords; he refused to attend the signing ceremony and boycotted the post-agreement party, instead having dinner with former RAF comrades and
Group Captain Sir
Douglas Bader. The UK government and the international community ultimately declared the February 1980
general election free and fair, though many observers attested to widespread political violence and intimidation of voters, particularly by ZANU (which added Patriotic Front to its name to become "ZANU–PF"). British monitors in the ZANU–PF-dominated eastern provinces were strongly critical, reporting "brutal 'disciplinary murders' as examples of the fate awaiting those who failed to conform", name-taking and "claims to the possession of machines which would reveal how individuals had voted". The
Commonwealth Observer Group acknowledged that irregularities were occurring but ruled that accounts were exaggerated. After the RF won all 20 white seats, Soames announced late on 4 March 1980 that Mugabe and ZANU–PF had won 57 of the 80 common roll seats, giving them a majority in the new House of Assembly. Mugabe invited Smith to his house that evening and according to Smith treated him "most courteously"; Mugabe expressed joy at inheriting a "wonderful country" with modern infrastructure and a viable economy, outlined plans for gradual reform that Smith found reasonable, and said that he hoped to stay in regular contact. This meeting had a profound effect on the former prime minister. Having denounced Mugabe as an "apostle of Satan" before the election, Smith now publicly endorsed him as "sober and responsible". "If this were a true picture, then there could be hope instead of despair," he recalled in his autobiography. "When I got home I said to Janet that I hoped it was not an hallucination." ==Opposition==