Simko revolts against Reza Shah The weakness of the Iranian government during
World War I encouraged some Kurdish chiefs to take advantage of the chaotic situation.
Simko, chief of the Shikak tribe, established his authority in the area west of
Lake Urmia from 1918 to 1922. Jaafar Sultan of
Hewraman region took control of the region between
Marivan and north of
Halabja and remained independent until 1925. In 1922, Reza Khan (who later became the first
Pahlavi monarch), took action against Kurdish leaders. Simko was forced to abandon his region in the fall of 1922, and spent eight years in hiding. When the Iranian government persuaded him to submit, he was ambushed and killed around Ushno (
Oshnavieh) in 1930. After this,
Reza Shah pursued a crude but effective policy against the Kurds. Hundreds of Kurdish chiefs were deported and forced into exile. Their lands were also confiscated by the government.
World War II When
Allied troops entered Iran in September 1941, the Iranian Army was quickly dissolved and their ammunition was seized by the Kurds. Sons of the Kurdish chiefs seized the opportunity and escaped from their exile in
Tehran. Hama Rashid, a Kurdish chief from
Baneh, took control of
Sardasht,
Baneh and
Mariwan in western Iran. He was finally driven out of the region by the Iranian Army in the autumn of 1944.
Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad . . Although Iran had declared its
neutrality in the
Second World War, it was occupied by Allied forces. With support from the
Soviet Union, a Kurdish state was created in the city of
Mahabad in 1946 by the Kurdish Movement
Komeley Jiyanewey Kurd under the leadership of
Qazi Muhammad. Since the minuscule entity extended no further than the small cities of
Mahabad,
Bukan,
Piranshahr, and
Oshnaviyeh in Iran, not even all of Iranian Kurdistan supported the experiment, let alone the Kurds in other states. The
Republic of Mahabad, as it is often called, lasted less than a year, as the end of the war and the withdrawal of the occupying Soviet forces allowed the central government to defeat the separatists and return Kurdistan to Iran.
Islamic Revolution and the Kurds Kurdish political organizations strongly supported the
revolution that overthrew
Mohammad Reza Shah that culminated in
Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power in February 1979. The Shah had opposed Kurdish demands for greater autonomy and less interference from Tehran, but relations between Kurdish groups and the new authorities soon became tense, as the government regarded the Kurds' distinct language, traditions, and cross-border ties as potential channels for foreign influence. Tensions worsened when Kurdish representatives were excluded from the 1979
Assembly of Experts, the body charged with drafting the new constitution.
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, who had been elected from the region, was prevented by Khomeini from taking part in its opening session, and the constitution that emerged left the mainly Sunni Kurdish population without full political rights. The wave of nationalism engulfed eastern Kurdistan after the fall of the
Pahlavi dynasty in line with a series of anti-revolutionary revolts across the country. In early 1979, fighting broke out between Kurdish armed groups and the security forces of Iran's new revolutionary government. The main Kurdish organizations involved were the
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), and the left-wing
Komala, also known as the Revolutionary Organization of Kurdish Toilers. In a speech in December 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini called the concept of ethnic minorities contrary to Islamic doctrines. He also accused those "who do not wish Muslim countries to be united" in creating the issue of
nationalism among minorities. His views were shared by many in the clerical leadership. During the first fifteen years after the revolution, about 10,000-50,000 Kurds in Iran were estimated to have been killed, including during the
Iran-Iraq War, The militarization of the region also enabled Iran to pursue policies aimed at consolidating state control. These included the expansion of military projects, the seizure of land, the diversion of water resources, and efforts to strengthen the cultural dominance of the central state. Such measures were accompanied by economic development strategies that favoured a single ethno-religious framework. but David Romano reject such claims noting that there's no evidence of an active guerrilla insurgency in the area. Although, there is a new rise of Kurdish identity movement in the southern parts of Iranian Kurdistan, which has risen up from the first decade of 21st century that shows itself in the way of formation of an armed group called the Partisans of Southern Kurdistan and some other organizations specially about
Yarsani people of that parts of Kurdistan.
1996 demonstrations On December 2, 1996, the death of a prominent Sunni clergyman, Mulla Mohammed Rabiei, in
Kermanshah led to violent clashes between Sunni Kurds and the security forces. Mulla Rabiei was the prayer leader in the Al-Shafe'i mosque in Kermanshah. The protests continued for three days and spread to neighboring towns in the region.
Khatami period , the second-largest city in Iranian Kurdistan Reformist president
Mohammad Khatami was the first senior politician to acknowledge the exclusion of Iran's Kurds from political and economic power. His promise to address these issues attracted more Kurdish voters than any previous candidate since 1979. During his first term, Khatami chose
Abdollah Ramezanzadeh to be the first Kurdish governor of the Iranian province of Kurdistan. He also appointed several Sunni and Shia Kurds as his own or cabinet members' advisors. Those hopes were ultimately frustrated. In September 2001, parliamentarians from Kurdistan Province attempted to resign collectively in protest at discrimination against Kurdish and Sunni communities. They criticized Khatami for neglecting Kurdish grievances and complained of poverty, limited university access, and the Interior Ministry's failure to consult them over the replacement of the popular governor Ramezanzadeh.
1999 demonstrations In February 1999, Kurdish nationalists took to the streets in several cities such as
Mahabad,
Sanandaj and
Urmia and staged mass protests against the government and in support of
Abdullah Öcalan. This was viewed as "trans-nationalization" of the Kurdish movement. These protests were violently suppressed by the government forces. According to human rights groups, at least 20 people were killed.
The Shivan Qaderi incident On July 9, 2005, a Kurdish opposition activist,
Shivan Qaderi (also known as Shwane Qadri or Sayed Kamal Asfaram), and two other Kurdish men were shot by Iranian security forces in
Mahabad. For the next six weeks, riots and protests erupted in Kurdish towns and villages throughout Eastern Kurdistan such as
Mahabad,
Piranshahr. Sinne (
Sanandaj),
Sardasht,
Oshnavieh (Şino),
Baneh,
Bokan and
Saqiz The unrest also spread beyond Kurdish areas, prompting protests in southwestern Iran and in
Baluchistan in the east. Many people were killed or wounded, and large numbers were detained without charge. The authorities also closed several leading Kurdish newspapers and detained reporters and editors. Authorities accused Fattahian of carrying arms for an "illegal organization" and sentenced him to several years in prison. Fattahian never confessed to carrying arms and was not given a fair trial, nor was he permitted access to his lawyer, and the Komala – the illegal organization he was accused of associating with – claimed that he had left the group a long time ago. Fattahian attempted to appeal, and when he did so, he was sentenced to death for "enmity against God". His execution was condemned by human rights groups and activists internationally. In January 2010, Iran executed a second Kurdish political prisoner, Fasih Yasamani, for "enmity against God". Like Fattahian, Yasamani was tortured and authorities tried to force him to confess, but he refused. He was also denied a fair trial. Without notifying the families or lawyers of the political prisoners, Iranian authorities ordered the execution of four more Kurdish political prisoners – Ali Heydarian, Farhad Vakili, Mehdi Eslamian, Shirin Alam Hooli, and
Farzad Kamangar, a teacher who received a lot of attention internationally following his arrest – in Iran on May 9, 2010. The four political prisoners suffered severe torture at the hands of Iranian authorities and were also forced to confess to membership in the illegal PJAK. None of the activists were given fair trials nor did they have access to their lawyers. Amnesty International described the executions as "a blatant attempt to intimidate members of the Kurdish minority." Despite repeated international calls demanding the release or retrial of these four political prisoners, all were executed without any prior notice or warning. Following the executions, Iranian authorities refused to return the bodies of those executed to their families. By May 2010, at least 16 other Kurdish political prisoners were awaiting execution. There were no reports that any of them had received a fair trial. The rebels aimed to achieve the fall of the Iranian state and
self determination. In February 2026, the
Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK) was formed as an
alliance of major
Iranian Kurdish parties. It emerged during the
2025–2026 internal crisis in Iran, amid rising Kurdish unrest. Its aim was to unite Kurdish forces in Iranian Kurdistan following the
2025–2026 protests, the resulting instability of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the subsequent
United States military buildup in the Middle East. The US has voiced support and possible aid to these groups who have united to form the CPFIK. ==Discrimination and persecution of Kurds==