As early as February 1933, Hitler announced that rearmament must be undertaken, albeit clandestinely at first, as to do so was in violation of the Versailles Treaty. A year later he told his military leaders that 1942 was the target date for going to war in the east. Goebbels was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Hitler aggressively pursuing Germany's expansionist policies sooner rather than later. At the time of the
Reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, Goebbels summed up his general attitude in his diary: "[N]ow is the time for action. Fortune favors the brave! He who dares nothing wins nothing." In the lead-up to the
Sudetenland crisis in 1938, Goebbels took the initiative time and again to use propaganda to whip up sympathy for the
Sudeten Germans while campaigning against the Czech government. Still, Goebbels was well aware there was a growing "war panic" in Germany and so by July had the press conduct propaganda efforts at a lower level of intensity. After the Western powers acceded to Hitler's demands concerning Czechoslovakia in 1938, Goebbels soon redirected his propaganda machine against Poland. From May onwards, he orchestrated a campaign against Poland, fabricating stories about atrocities against ethnic Germans in
Danzig and other cities. Even so, he was unable to persuade the majority of Germans to welcome the prospect of war. He privately held doubts about the wisdom of risking a protracted war against Britain and France by attacking Poland. After the
Invasion of Poland in September 1939, Goebbels used his propaganda ministry and the Reich chambers to control
access to information domestically. To his chagrin, his rival
Joachim von Ribbentrop, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, continually challenged Goebbels' jurisdiction over the dissemination of international propaganda. Hitler declined to make a firm ruling on the subject, so the two men remained rivals for the remainder of the Nazi era. Goebbels did not participate in the military decision-making process, nor was he made privy to diplomatic negotiations until after the fact. at the front lines, January 1941 The Propaganda Ministry took over the broadcasting facilities of conquered countries immediately after surrender, and began broadcasting prepared material using the existing announcers as a way to gain the trust of the citizens. Most aspects of the media, both domestically and in the conquered countries, were controlled by Goebbels and his department. The German Home Service, the Armed Forces Programme, and the German European Service were all rigorously controlled in everything from the information they were permitted to disseminate to the music they were allowed to play. Party rallies, speeches, and demonstrations continued; speeches were broadcast on the radio and short propaganda films were exhibited using 1,500 mobile film vans. Hitler made fewer public appearances and broadcasts as the war progressed, so Goebbels increasingly became the voice of the Nazi regime for the German people. From May 1940 he wrote frequent editorials that were published in
Das Reich which were later read aloud over the radio. He found films to be his most effective propaganda medium, after radio. At his insistence, initially half the films made in wartime Germany were propaganda films (particularly on antisemitism) and war propaganda films (recounting both historical wars and current exploits of the
Wehrmacht). Goebbels became preoccupied with morale and the efforts of the people on the home front. He believed that the more the people at home were involved in the war effort, the better their morale would be. For example, he initiated a programme for the collection of winter clothing and ski equipment for troops on the eastern front. At the same time, Goebbels implemented changes to have more "entertaining material" in radio and film produced for the public, decreeing in late 1942 that 20 per cent of the films should be propaganda and 80 per cent light entertainment. As
Gauleiter of Berlin, Goebbels dealt with increasingly serious shortages of necessities such as food and clothing, as well as the need to ration beer and tobacco, which were important for morale. Hitler suggested watering the beer and degrading the quality of the cigarettes so that more could be produced, but Goebbels refused, saying the cigarettes were already of such low quality that it was impossible to make them any worse. Through his propaganda campaigns, he worked hard to maintain an appropriate level of morale among the public about the military situation, neither too optimistic nor too grim. The series of military setbacks the Germans suffered in this period – the
thousand-bomber raid on Cologne (May 1942), the Allied victory at the
Second Battle of El Alamein (November 1942), and especially the catastrophic defeat at the
Battle of Stalingrad (February 1943) – were difficult matters to present to the German public, who were increasingly weary of the war and sceptical that it could be won. On 16 November 1942 Goebbels, like all
Gauleiters, was appointed the
Reich Defense Commissioner for his
Gau. This enabled him to issue direct instructions to authorities within his jurisdiction in matters concerning the civilian war effort. On 15 January 1943, Hitler appointed Goebbels as head of the newly created Air Raid Damage committee, which meant Goebbels was nominally in charge of nationwide civil air defences and shelters as well as the assessment and repair of damaged buildings. In actuality, the defence of areas other than Berlin remained in the hands of the local
Gauleiters, and his main tasks were limited to providing immediate aid to the affected civilians and using propaganda to improve their morale. By early 1943, the war produced a labour crisis for the regime. Hitler created a three-man committee with representatives of the State, the army, and the party in an attempt to centralise control of the war economy. The committee members were
Hans Lammers (head of the Reich Chancellery), Field Marshal
Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command; OKW), and
Martin Bormann, who controlled the party. The committee was intended to independently propose measures regardless of the wishes of various ministries, with Hitler reserving most final decisions to himself. The committee, soon known as the
Dreierausschuß (Committee of Three), met eleven times between January and August 1943. However, they ran up against resistance from Hitler's cabinet ministers, who headed deeply entrenched spheres of influence and were excluded from the committee. Seeing it as a threat to their power, Goebbels, Göring, and Speer worked together to bring it down. The result was that nothing changed, and the Committee of Three declined into irrelevance by September 1943. , 18 February 1943. The banner says
"TOTALER KRIEG – KÜRZESTER KRIEG" ("Total War – Shortest War"). Partly in response to being excluded from the Committee of Three, Goebbels pressured Hitler to introduce measures that would produce "
total war", including closing businesses not essential to the war effort, conscripting women into the labour force, and enlisting men in previously exempt occupations into the Wehrmacht. Some of these measures were implemented in an edict of 13 January, but to Goebbels' dismay, Göring demanded that his favourite restaurants in Berlin should remain open, and Lammers successfully lobbied Hitler to have women with children exempted from conscription, even if they had child care available. After receiving an enthusiastic response to his speech of 30 January 1943 on the topic, Goebbels believed he had the support of the German people in his call for total war. His next speech, the
Sportpalast speech of 18 February 1943, was a passionate demand for his audience to commit to total war, which he presented as the only way to stop the
Bolshevik onslaught and save the German people from destruction. The speech also had a strong antisemitic element and hinted at the extermination of the Jewish people that was already underway. The speech was presented live on radio and was filmed as well. During the live version of the speech, Goebbels accidentally begins to mention the "extermination" of the Jews; this is omitted in the published text of the speech. Goebbels' efforts had little impact for the time being, because Hitler, who in principle was in favour of total war, was not prepared to implement changes over the objections of his ministers. The discovery around this time of a mass grave of Polish officers that had been killed by the Soviet
NKVD in the 1940
Katyn massacre was made use of by Goebbels in his propaganda in an attempt to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the other Western Allies.
Plenipotentiary for total war (to Goebbels' left) observe rocket tests at
Peenemünde, August 1943 Willi Hübner the
Iron Cross for the defence of
Lauban (now Lubań in Poland) After the
Allied invasion of Sicily (July 1943) and the strategic Soviet victory in the
Battle of Kursk (July–August 1943), Goebbels began to recognise that the war could no longer be won. Following the Allied invasion of Italy and the fall of Mussolini in September, he raised with Hitler the possibility of a separate peace, either with the Soviets or with Britain. Hitler rejected both of these proposals. As Germany's military and economic situation grew steadily worse, on 25 August 1943
Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler took over the post of interior minister, replacing
Wilhelm Frick. Intensive air raids on Berlin and other cities took the lives of thousands of people. In December 1943, Hitler asked Goebbels to take on the job of
Stadtpräsident (City President) of Berlin, and Goebbels agreed to this as a means of obtaining more direct control over the municipal authorities, though Hitler delayed the formal appointment for several months. Goebbels took over direct administrative control of the city when he was formally named
Stadtpräsident on 7 April 1944, thus uniting under his control the city's most powerful party and governmental offices. As air raids on Berlin continued, Göring's
Luftwaffe attempted to retaliate with air raids on London in early 1944, but they no longer had sufficient aircraft to make much of an impact. While Goebbels' propaganda in this period indicated that a huge retaliation was in the offing, the
V-1 flying bombs, launched on British targets beginning in mid-June 1944, had little effect, with only around 20 per cent reaching their intended targets. To boost morale, Goebbels continued to publish propaganda to the effect that further improvements to these weapons would have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war. Meanwhile, in the
Normandy landings of 6 June 1944, the Allies successfully gained a foothold in France. Throughout July 1944, Goebbels and Speer continued to press Hitler to bring the economy to a total war footing. The
20 July plot, where Hitler was almost killed by a bomb at his field headquarters in
East Prussia, played into the hands of those who had been pushing for change: Bormann, Goebbels, Himmler, and Speer. Over the objections of Göring, Goebbels was appointed on 23 July as
Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War, charged with maximising the manpower for the Wehrmacht and the armaments industry at the expense of sectors of the economy not critical to the war effort. Through these efforts, he was able to free up an additional half a million men for military service. However, as many of these new recruits came from the armaments industry, the move put him in conflict with armaments minister Speer. Untrained workers from elsewhere were not readily absorbed into the armaments industry, and likewise, the new Wehrmacht recruits waited in barracks for their turn to be trained. Hitler ordered a nationwide militia of men previously considered unsuitable for military service — the
Volkssturm (People's Storm) — to be formed on 25 September 1944; it was launched on 18 October. In his capacity as
Gauleiter and
Reich Defense Commissioner, Goebbels was named
Führer des Deutschen Volkssturms im Gau Groß-Berlin on 25 September 1944, and he administered the oath of allegiance to the assembled Berlin
Volkssturm troops on 12 November. Goebbels recorded in his diary that 100,000 recruits were sworn in from his
Gau alone. However, the men, mostly age 45 to 60, received only rudimentary training and many were not properly armed. Goebbels' notion that these men could effectively serve on the front lines against Soviet tanks and artillery was unrealistic at best. The programme was deeply unpopular. Goebbels realised that his influence would diminish in wartime. He suffered a series of setbacks as propaganda became less important compared to warfare, the war economy, and the Allied bombing of German cities. Historian
Michael Balfour states that from 1942 onward, Goebbels, "lost control over Nazi policy toward the press and over the handling of news in general." Rival agencies expanded. The foreign ministry assumed responsibility for propaganda outside Germany. The military established its own propaganda division, providing daily reports on the progress of the war and the conditions of the armed forces. The Nazi Party also generated and distributed its own propaganda during the war. Goebbels remained influential when he had the opportunity to meet with Hitler, who became increasingly unavailable as he moved his headquarters closer to the military front lines. They met perhaps once a month. Furthermore, Hitler rarely delivered speeches or attended rallies of the kind that had dominated propaganda in the 1930s. After Hitler returned to Berlin in 1945, Goebbels' ministry was destroyed by an Allied air raid on 13 March, making it exceedingly difficult for him to disseminate propaganda. In April 1945, he assumed responsibility for the work rival agencies had been doing and took full control of propaganda, but by that time, the Soviet Red Army had already entered Berlin. Goebbels was an astute observer of the war, and historians have extensively examined his diary for insights into how the Nazi leadership attempted to maintain public morale.
Defeat and death In the last months of the war, Goebbels' speeches and articles took on an increasingly apocalyptic tone. By the beginning of 1945, with the Soviets on the
Oder River and the Western Allies preparing to cross the
Rhine River, he could no longer disguise the inevitability of German defeat. Berlin had little in the way of fortifications or artillery, and even
Volkssturm units were in short supply, as almost everything and everyone had been sent to the front. Goebbels noted in his diary on 21 January that millions of Germans were fleeing westward. He tentatively discussed with Hitler the issue of making peace overtures to the Western Allies, but Hitler again refused. Privately, Goebbels was conflicted at pushing the case with Hitler since he did not want to lose Hitler's confidence. When other Nazi leaders urged Hitler to leave Berlin and establish a new centre of resistance in the
National Redoubt in Bavaria, Goebbels opposed this, arguing for a heroic last stand in Berlin. His family (except for Magda's son Harald, who had served in the Luftwaffe and been captured by the Allies) moved into their house in Berlin to await the end. He and Magda may have discussed suicide and the fate of their young children in a long meeting on the night of 27 January. He knew how the outside world would view the criminal acts committed by the regime and had no desire to subject himself to the "debacle" of a trial. He burned his private papers on the night of 18 April. Goebbels knew how to play on Hitler's fantasies, encouraging him to see the hand of providence in the death of United States President
Franklin D. Roosevelt on 12 April. Whether Hitler really saw this event as a turning point as Goebbels proclaimed is not known. By this time, Goebbels had gained the position he had wanted so long—at Hitler's side. Göring was utterly discredited, although he was not stripped of his offices until 23 April. Himmler, whose appointment as commander of
Army Group Vistula had led to disaster on the Oder, was also in disgrace with Hitler. Most of Hitler's inner circle, including Göring, Himmler, Ribbentrop, and Speer, prepared to leave Berlin immediately after Hitler's birthday celebration on 20 April. Even Bormann was "not anxious" to meet his end at Hitler's side. On 22 April, Hitler announced that he would stay in Berlin until the end and then shoot himself. Goebbels moved with his family into the
Vorbunker, connected to the lower
Führerbunker under the Reich Chancellery garden in central Berlin, that same day. He told Vice-Admiral
Hans-Erich Voss that he would not entertain the idea of either surrender or escape. On 23 April, Goebbels made the following proclamation to the people of Berlin: After midnight on 29 April, with the Soviets advancing ever closer to the bunker complex, Hitler married
Eva Braun in a small civil ceremony in the
Führerbunker. Afterward, he hosted a modest wedding breakfast. Hitler then took secretary
Traudl Junge to another room and dictated his
last will and testament. Goebbels and Bormann were two of the witnesses. In his last will and testament, Hitler named no successor as Führer or leader of the Nazi Party. Instead, he appointed Goebbels as Reich Chancellor; Grand Admiral
Karl Dönitz, who was at
Flensburg near the Danish border, as Reich President; and Bormann as Party Minister. Goebbels wrote a postscript to the will stating that he would "categorically refuse" to obey Hitler's order to leave Berlin—as he put it, "the first time in my life" that he had not complied with Hitler's orders. He felt compelled to remain with Hitler "for reasons of humanity and personal loyalty". His wife and children would stay as well. They would end their lives "side by side with the Führer". In the mid-afternoon of 30 April,
Hitler shot himself. Goebbels was depressed, and said he would walk around the Chancellery garden until he was killed by the Russian shelling. Voss later recounted Goebbels as saying: "It is a great pity that such a man [Hitler] is not with us any longer. But there is nothing to be done. For us, everything is lost now and the only way out left for us is the one Hitler chose. I shall follow his example." On 1 May, Goebbels carried out his sole official act as Chancellor: he dictated a letter to General
Vasily Chuikov and ordered German General
Hans Krebs to deliver it under a
white flag. Chuikov, as commander of the
Soviet 8th Guards Army, commanded the Soviet forces in central Berlin. Goebbels' letter informed Chuikov of Hitler's death and requested a ceasefire. After this was rejected, Goebbels decided that further efforts were futile. Later on 1 May, Voss saw Goebbels for the last time: "While saying goodbye I asked Goebbels to join us. But he replied: 'The captain must not leave his sinking ship. I have thought about it all and decided to stay here. I have nowhere to go because with little children I will not be able to make it, especially with a leg like mine'." On the evening of 1 May, Goebbels arranged for an SS dentist,
Helmut Kunz, to inject
his six children with
morphine so that when they were unconscious, an ampule of a
cyanide compound could be then crushed in each of their mouths. According to Kunz's later testimony, he gave the children morphine injections but Magda Goebbels and SS-
Obersturmbannführer Ludwig Stumpfegger, Hitler's personal doctor, administered the cyanide. At around 20:30, Goebbels and Magda left the bunker and walked up to the garden of the Chancellery, where they killed themselves. There are several different accounts of this event. One is that they each bit on a cyanide ampule near where Hitler had been buried and were given a
coup de grâce immediately afterward. Goebbels' SS adjutant
Günther Schwägermann testified in 1948 that they walked ahead of him up the stairs and out into the Chancellery garden. He waited in the stairwell and heard shots. Schwägermann then walked up the remaining stairs and, once outside, saw their lifeless bodies. Following Goebbels' prior order, Schwägermann had an SS soldier fire several shots into Goebbels' body, which did not move. In a contradictory account,
Rochus Misch claimed that mechanic
Johannes Hentschel told him that early on 2 May, Goebbels killed himself in his room in the
Führerbunker, while Magda did so in the
Vorbunker. The corpses were then doused with petrol, but they were only partially burned and not buried. A few days later, the Soviets brought Voss back to the bunker to identify the Goebbels' partly burned bodies. The remains of the Goebbels family, Krebs, and
Hitler's dogs were repeatedly buried and exhumed. The last burial was at the
SMERSH facility in
Magdeburg on 21 February 1946. In 1970, KGB director
Yuri Andropov authorised an operation to destroy the remains. On 4 April 1970, a Soviet
KGB team used detailed burial charts to exhume five wooden boxes at the Magdeburg SMERSH facility. They were burned, crushed, and scattered into the Biederitz river, a tributary of the nearby
Elbe. ==Family life==