Career in the Marcos Sr. cabinet
boarding to a
Philippine Airlines Boeing 747-200 Presidential Flight
Before martial law Enrile, as did Ferdinand Marcos, hailed from the
northern Philippines, a region that had become Marcos's recruiting ground for key political and military leaders. Enrile was with Marcos since his election in 1965. From 1966 to 1968, he was the Undersecretary and sometime Acting Secretary of the Department of Finance. He concurrently became acting Insurance Commissioner and Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. From 1968 to 1970, he was the Secretary of Justice. Enrile later spoke about social justice and equality, reflecting wider debates on legal reform in the country. The
Department of National Defense would expand its power when Marcos assumed the presidency in 1965. Marcos appointed Enrile as his Secretary of National Defense on February 9, 1970, a position Enrile held until he resigned on August 27, 1971, to run for Senator. However, he failed to secure one of the eight Senate seats in the
1971 election, finishing 12th with 3,044,461 votes. He was re-appointed Defense Secretary by Marcos in 1972. For almost the entire period of
martial law, Enrile served officially as the martial law administrator as he was in charge of all the armed forces' services during that time. Furthermore, as early as Marcos's planning and preparation for the declaration of martial law, Enrile was involved. In his memoir, Enrile recalled Marcos's careful preparations. He noted that as early as December 1969, Marcos instructed him to study the
1935 Constitution, specifically the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief. Marcos had already foreseen a rise in violence and chaos in the country and wanted to know the exact extent of his powers. At the end of January of the following year, Enrile, with help from Efren Plana and Minerva Gonzaga Reyes, submitted the only copy of the report regarding the detailed nature and extent of martial law to Marcos. Soon after, Marcos allegedly ordered Enrile to prepare all documents necessary for the implementation of
Martial Law in the Philippines. In August 1972, Marcos once again met with Enrile and a few of his other most trusted commanders to discuss tentative dates for the declaration. By September 23, 1972, Marcos appeared on television to announce that he had placed the entire country under martial law as of 9 p.m. via
Proclamation No. 1081 which, as historians claimed, he signed on September 21, 1972.
Martial law administration role Despite the later controversy, at the time, Enrile remained one of Marcos's most loyal allies. In 1973, under the new modified
parliamentary system then in place under the country's new constitution under martial law, Enrile's title became Defense Minister. Enrile focused his efforts on a broad review of defense policies and on dealing with pressing social unrest. The abolition of civilian institutions such as
Congress, the weakening of the judiciary, and the outlawing of
political parties, left the military as the only other instrumentality of the national government outside of the Presidency.
Role in logging, and in the Coconut Authority According to the
National Historical Commission of the Philippines, Enrile was also appointed as the middleman for logging in the Philippines during martial law. He was tasked by Marcos to give certificates to logging companies, which eventually led to one of Asia's most devastating environmental disasters. During that time, the forest cover of the Philippines shrank until only 8% remained. Enrile also owned numerous logging companies such as Ameco in
Bukidnon, Dolores Timber in
Samar, San Jose Timber in
Northern Samar, Kasilagan Softwood Development Corp in
Butuan, Eurasia Match in
Cebu, Pan Oriental which operates in Cebu and Butuan, Palawan-Apitong Corp in
Palawan, and Royal Match. He also invested heavily in a rubber plantation in
Basilan. A share of Marcos's ill-gotten wealth was siphoned into those companies.
Supreme Court dismissal of coco levy case vs Enrile Enrile was also appointed by Marcos as the President of the
Philippine Coconut Authority, where he established control of the copra industry together with
Danding Cojuangco. The two were accused of corruption. Enrile denied the allegations and even filed a libel case against a newspaper over claims that he benefited from the coco levy funds. The Supreme Court of the Philippines dismissed the coco levy–related graft case against Juan Ponce Enrile and several others primarily on procedural and evidentiary grounds rather than a full determination of guilt or innocence. The Court found that there were significant legal issues affecting the case, including questions about the sufficiency of the evidence presented and the long delay in pursuing the charges, which undermined the accused’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases. Because of these factors, the case could not proceed to trial or conviction, leading to its dismissal. This means the ruling effectively cleared Enrile from criminal liability in that particular case, although it did not serve as a definitive historical judgment on the broader controversy surrounding the coco levy funds.
Sandiganbayan / later dismissals of coco levy cases The Sandiganbayan has, in several instances, dismissed civil cases tied to the coco levy funds involving figures such as Juan Ponce Enrile, largely on procedural grounds rather than a conclusive ruling on the merits of the allegations. A key reason cited in these dismissals was “inordinate delay,” meaning the cases had remained unresolved for decades, which the court found to be a violation of the defendants’ constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases. In some rulings, the court also pointed to weaknesses in how the claims were pursued or documented over time. As a result, the cases were terminated without a full trial, effectively relieving the defendants of legal liability in those specific proceedings, though the decisions did not settle the broader historical and political debate over accountability for the coco levy funds.
Reduced influence (center) meeting U.S. President
Gerald Ford at the
White House in 1976. With rising factionalism in the Marcos administration towards its latter years, Enrile's influence began to be reduced. On November 28, 1978, Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction no. 776, which stated that "No changes of assignment of senior officers including provincial commanders, brigade commanders, division commanders, and special unit commanders shall be made without clearance from the president." By the 1980s, Marcos began to more aggressively bypass Enrile's authority. He clipped the powers of the Minister of National Defense and the Chief of Staff over the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Enrile started to break away from the Marcos dictatorship. He began aligning himself with dissident elements in the army, particularly the
Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) - which was then headed by his
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel
Gregorio Honasan. In a 1986 press conference, Enrile was quoted as having said: As far back as 1982, we have been getting persistent reports that there were efforts to eliminate us ... and it was [at] that point that we decided to organize a group to protect ourselves ... now known as the AFP Reform Movement. ==Role in aborted coup and the People Power Revolution==