Stab./KG 1 was assigned to
Luftflotte 4, commanded by
Alexander Löhr under the 2nd
Fliegerdivision at Kolberg. I.
Gruppe, still with the He 111E was also at Kolberg, was subordinated to Löhr also. On 14 September 1939, both were transferred to 1st
Fliegerdivision, under the command of
Luftflotte 1 headed by
Albert Kesselring. The two commands combined fielded 47 He 111s, with 41 combat ready. Löhr began the invasion with 729 aircraft. All nine of Stab./KG 1's were operational. The command unit was equipped with the H variant.
Invasion of Poland and Phoney war KG 1 was based on the
Baltic Sea coast. Its mission was to support the
4th Army's invasion of the "Polish corridor", capture of
Gdynia, and assist the
3rd Army, advancing from
East Prussia, in destroying the
Pomorze Army. On the opening day, 1 September 1939, the
Wehrmacht invaded. The Luftwaffe planned an enormous air attack on
Warsaw, codenamed Operation
Wasserkante, while also destroying the
Polish Air Force on the ground. The plan was revised after complaints from the General Staff of the Wehrmacht (
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht).
Luftflotte 4 was impeded by severe mist which covered its airfields on that morning. Nevertheless, I./KG 1 were one of only four
Gruppen to take off on time. The group struck at airfields in
Puck,
Rumia and
Toruń. It also bombed
Polish Army forces at
Kościerzyna and
Starogard Gdański. Polish forces at
Bydgoszcz and
Danzig, were also bombed on 3 September. The
Bydgoszcz Główna railway station was probably the target. On 3 September KG 1 attacked the
Polish Navy, in support of the
Kriegsmarine. With II. and II./
StG 2, IV(St)./
LG 1, 3./KüFlGr 706 and 4.(St)/TrGr 186, it bombed the Naval Aviation
Dyon, the
torpedo boat Mazur, tender
Nurek, damaging the
Wicher and the minelayer
Gryf, which were later finished off by 4.(St)/TrGr 186. Polish targets in the Toruń and Bydgoszcz regions were attacked again on 4 September and the
Gruppe moved to
Ziethen, Brandenburg later in the day. From its new operating base it flew
rail interdiction operations northeast of Warsaw on 5 September and
Kutno the following day. Road and rail interdiction missions were flown against Polish traffic along the
Rava-Ruska lines on 8 September. It moved back to Schongarten on 8 September and flew against targets east of the
Vistula from 8–12 September. Along with II./
KG 26, I./
KG 53 and I./
KG 2 it bombed
Iłża, to break up the concentred forces of the
Prusy Army, and operated in the
Battle of Radom. Against, Löhr's objections,
incendiary bombs rather than
high explosive bombs were used. KG 1 also bombed Polish troop concentrations in the
Battle of Bzura.
Piątek was targeted by KG 1 on 13 September. On 14 September KG 1 was placed under the command of
Bruno Loerzer and 1st
Fliegerdivision, under the command of
Luftflotte 1, to support the
14th Army's attacks in southern Poland, alongside KG 26 and
KG 55. KG 1 bombed rail lines near
Kowel on 15 September, and then it moved to Krosno. Its last recorded operations were flown against rail traffic between Kowel and Luzk on 16 September 1939. The group was taken out of operations no later 21 September. I./KG 1 spent the
Phoney War in training. It moved to
Faßberg Air Base on 16 October 1939 and to
Giessen on 10 November. At Giessen it trained in
mine-laying until 2.
Staffel (squadron) left to become the nucleus of KGr 126 on 21 February 1940. The unit was renamed III./KG 26. At that time, I./KG 1 replaced 1./
KG 4, which began to train on air supply missions. I./KG 1 began its training on 10 February. The reorientation to mine-laying occurred because Hitler refused
Hermann Göring's request to attack ports in the
British Isles until he had ordered
Fall Gelb. Instead, Hitler issued Directive 9, which called for attacks on British sea communications. The Luftwaffe was to focus on mining operations until the land offensive began. 2.
staffel was later refounded at
Nordhausen. From 25 March 1940 I.
Gruppe began
dropping propaganda leaflets over eastern
France. II.
Gruppe moved to Neubrandenburg on 21 September and on to Delmenhorst on 1 October. Until April 1940 it remained in training. From 16 October 1939 it was based at
Lüneburg. From at least 20 April 1940, it began
reconnaissance and leaflet dropping over France. After briefly transferring to
Erfurt, it moved to Kirtorf/
Hesse on 9 May 1940. III./KG 1 spent the winter, 1939–40 working up and training. It moved to Nordhausen and became fully operational on 2 February 1940. From 20 April 1940, it also flew night
sorties, reconnaissance and leaflet dropping missions over eastern France. The Stab./KG 1 flew operations on 1 September 1939 against targets along the
Vistula River. Thereafter it was moved to Ziethen from
Kolberg on 4 September. It was placed under the command of
Luftflotte 4 at
Breslau on 8 September. It may have taken part in the
Battle of Bzura on 10 September but was moved to the 2nd
Fliegerdivision on 14 September. After relocating to
Neubrandenburg it was placed under 1st
Fliegerdivision, belonging to
Luftflotte 1 on 20 September. It was based at
Delmenhorst from 1 October,
Lüneburg from 16 October, and then
Giessen on 10 November 1939 under the
IV. Fliegerkorps. Over the winter the Stab./KG 54 was moved to
I. Fliegerkorps (
Luftflotte 3) with five bombers, three operational, on 10 May 1940.
Western Europe KG 1 was assigned to
Fliegerkorps IV on 10 November 1939. The date at which it was transferred to
Fliegerkorps I, subordinated to
Luftflotte 1 by 10 May 1940. The
Fliegerkorps was placed under the overall command of
Luftflotte 3, commanded by
Hugo Sperrle, just prior to the offensive. Based at Giessen Stab./KG 1 had three of five He 111H bombers operational. Ulrich Kessler had relinquished command on 17 December 1939 to
Oberst Ernst Exss, who assumed leadership of KG 1 on 18 December. The command of I./KG 1 was taken over by
Major Ludwig Maier in November 1939. All other
Gruppen retained their commanding officers. I.
Gruppe could muster 25 operational Heinkels from 35. II./KG 1, at
Kirtorf, had 35 at its disposal with 23 operational. III.
Gruppe at
Ettinghausen on 9 May, contributed 27 serviceable bombers from 33. All three
Gruppen possessed the H variant. On the morning of 10 May 1940,
Fall Gelb began. I./KG 1 took off and attacked the
La Fère and
Amiens – Glisy Aerodrome. It also bombed rail stations at
Beaumont-Hamel, France and
Philippeville,
Belgium. II./KG 1 bombed four airfields:
Cambrai-Niergnies Airport,
Liège Airport,
Albert – Picardie Airport and
Valenciennes-Denain Airport. III./KG 1 bombed the same targets and an aircraft factory near Albert. No 60 Wing RAF engaged III./KG 1 with
No. 85 Squadron RAF, and claimed three bombers shot down. 6. and 7.
Staffeln lost a bomber each to
No. 607 Squadron RAF, of the 61st Wing RAF with both crews. III./KG 1's attack on the
Potez factory near Albert was met by
Hawker Hurricanes and 607 claimed another three of the German bombers. German records shot show III.
Gruppe suffered the loss of five on 10 May with another two seriously damaged. Two complete crews were killed and one captured. The biggest casualty was
Major Schnelle. The
Gruppenkommandeur was shot down and killed two miles east of
Saint-Quentin, Aisne. In later operation, I./KG 1 flew more missions in the
Ghent-
Brussels-
Antwerp area and it lost another bomber. The purpose was to support the
4th Army in southern Belgium. It continued to do so from 11 to 16 May. II.
Gruppe supported the 4th Army's advance over the same period. It was ordered to support the drive into the
Loire Valley by attacking tank concentrations and rail targets along the line of the advance. The
Gruppen switched to
Cologne Butzweilerhof on 20 May. KG 1's activities in the intervening period are uncertain, but II./KG 1 operated over
Cambrai on 17 and 18 May. I. and II
Gruppen began night attacks on
Boulogne in the
battle for the port. All three
Gruppen undertook bombing and armed reconnaissance operations as the
Battle of Calais and
Battle of Dunkirk. KG 1 began
maritime interdiction operations to prevent the
Dunkirk evacuation from 21 to 31 May 1940. On 27 May, the first full day of the evacuation, KG 1 bombed the east
mole, with
KG 54, though the latter probably sank the 8,000-ton
French Navy steamer
Aden. On 3 June 1940 II./KG 1 took part in
Operation Paula as did III./KG 1. Six other bomber wings took part in the attack;
KG 2,
KG 3,
KG 4,
KG 30, KG 54 and
LG 1.
JG 2,
JG 53,
JG 54,
JG 77 and
ZG 26, provided
fighter escort. The German bomber stream was sighted over
Reims-
Coulommiers, and Cambrai. A French
Potez 630 from GC I/3 shadowed the formation. It reported the height and direction of the bombers via radio to the
Eiffel Tower. The message was garbled and many French fighter units failed to understand it and scrambled too late. Large air battles developed but losses of KG 1 are unknown. 15 factories were hit, but only three suffered significant damage. 254 civilians and 652 were injured. The airfields hit were damaged. On the 13 airfields, only 16 aircraft were destroyed and six damaged. Six runways had been put out of action, and 21 motor vehicles destroyed. Twenty-one military personnel were killed. The commander of
KG 51,
Josef Kammhuber, was shot down and captured during
Paula. He would later command KG 1, albeit for only five days. German bomber losses amounted to just four. Six German fighters were lost. 35 French aircraft were lost in total. On 4 June I and II
Gruppe moved to Amiens – Glisy Aerodrome, KG 1's target on the opening day of the offensive. III./KG 1 moved to
Lille–
Vendeville. II. and III.
Gruppen supported the 4th Army's drive into the Loire Valley and the advance to
Le Havre from 5–11 June in support of
Fall Rot, the second phase of the offensive. I.
Gruppe attacked targets in
Orléans on 14 June and attacked shipping in
Brest and
Cherbourg harbours from 15 to 19 June 1940. On the night of the 18/19 June 1940, III./KG 1 and II. and III./
LG 1 bombed the port of
Bordeaux and flew 30 sorties the following day involving flights of up to 480 kilometres. II. and III./KG 1 supported the effort against the ports. III.
Gruppe moved to
Rosieres-en-Santerre Airfield, after operating from forward strips near Boulogne from 20 June. It transferred six days after the French surrender on 1 July 1940.
Battle of Britain After the
Armistice of 22 June 1940, the Luftwaffe settled into airfields along the French, Belgian and Dutch coasts. The British refusal to surrender or come to terms with Germany, precipitated Adolf Hitler's order for
Operation Sealion, an amphibious invasion of Britain which was to take place after Luftwaffe had secured
air superiority over the English Channel. The German Air Staff,
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL), was ordered by
Hermann Göring, to begin attacks on targets in southern England after the publication of his 30 June directive. Stab./KG 1 and all three
Gruppen remained under the command of
Fliegerkorps I. The command unit was based at Amiens – Glisy on 11 June, and remained there until 13 August. I.
Gruppe was based at
Montdidier and
Clairmont in late June. It began night sorties over the
United Kingdom from 22 June 1940 to test
RAF Fighter Command night fighter defences. It flew an operation over
London on 4 July. II./KG 1 also engaged in probing attacks on shipping in the
English Channel. It carried out bombing operations on some industrial targets and airfields, in what the Germans referred to as the
Kanalkampf phase of the
Battle of Britain. III.
Gruppe was reorganised into an operational training unit, similar to
RAF organisations. It had little direct part in the air war over Britain, although it was sent on a small number of air raids against RAF airfields and industrial targets at night from 17 to 25 August. On 15 July it possessed 32 Heinkels, with 15 operational. Stab./KG 1 had all four bombers operational. I. and II
Gruppen had 23 operational from 27 and 29 from 31 respectively. The probing attacks cost KG 1 its first casualties on 5 July. One II.
Gruppe bomber force-landed at Amiens to engine failure and at 6:30, 8
staffel lost a He 111 shot down and the crew
killed in action, when it was intercepted by a
Supermarine Spitfires from
No. 65 Squadron RAF. The crew were the first KG 1 fatalities of the campaign. The Battle of Britain opened on 10 July. On this first day, the
Royal Air Force (RAF) sent
Bomber Command to attack Luftwaffe airfields in France. II./KG 1's base at Amiens was attacked by
No. 607 Squadron RAF. The six
Bristol Blenheim's began there attack in cloudy weather but it was not sufficient to protect them.
Anti-aircraft artillery shot five of the six down before German fighters could intervene. The following day 1.
Staffel lost two bombers destroyed and another severely damaged when KG 1 attempted to bomb the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The bomber formation was intercepted by Hurricanes from
No. 145 Squadron RAF and Spitfires from
No. 601 Squadron RAF. The former accounted for both destroyed aircraft. On 12 July 1940, KG 1 lost its
Geschwaderkommodore Ernst Exss, who was shot down and posted
missing in action.
Josef Kammhuber, the future commanding officer of the German night of fighter force, took his place until 17 July. On 3 August KG 1 sent a small number of Heinkels over
Kent. The intruders avoided interception and one bomb struck a
Royal Observer Corps post at
Higham. The following day 7., 8. and 9.
Staffeln suffered one damaged bomber each to unknown causes. The battle moved inland on 13 August with
Adlertag. On 16 August II./KG 1 attacked
RAF Duxford. KG 1 bombed
RAF Biggin Hill on 18 August—known as
The Hardest Day because of high losses. KG 1 dispatched 60 He 111s from Amiens to conduct a high-level attack on Biggin Hill.
KG 76, based in airfields to the north of
Paris, was to attack RAF Kenley. KG 76 fielded 48
Dornier Do 17s and
Junkers Ju 88s for a low-level attack. Fighter escort was provided by
JG 3,
JG 26,
JG 51,
JG 52,
JG 54 and
ZG 26. The
Jagdgeschwader were ordered to carry out free-hunting and close escort from bases in the
Pas-de-Calais. The mission went awry, and KG 76 suffered heavy losses. KG 1 lost two bombers; one each from 1. and 2.
Staffeln in combat with 65 Squadron. JG 54 prevented
No. 610 Squadron RAF from inflicting more losses while KG 1 was on its bomb-run, but 65 Squadron was able to intercept with the German fighter unit was locked in combat. II.
Gruppe flew night operations against industrial areas from 17 to 25 August. III.
Gruppe were among the few German units to fly on 27 August 1940 because of deteriorating weather conditions. Near
Portland in the early morning,
Flying Officer Peter O'Brian and
Pilot Officer William Beaumont from
No. 152 Squadron RAF, engaged and shot down a III./KG 1 bomber flown by
Gruppenkommandeur Major Willibald Fanelsa, who was captured with his crew. Fanelsa had been appointed to replace Hans Steinweg only days earlier.
Hauptmann Otto Stams took command on 1 September 1940. The following day, KG 1 was involved in the morning air battles and lost one bomber fifty percent damaged after action with
No. 79 Squadron RAF. 4.
Staffel lost one bomber and two crew members killed and two wounded when an external bomb fell off during take-off and detonated. On 30 August 30 He 111s from II./KG 1 targeted the
Royal Aircraft Establishment. Escorted by
Messerschmitt Bf 110s, the
Gruppe flew up the
Thames Estuary but was intercepted by 26 Hurricanes of
1,
242 and
501 Squadrons. The bomber force penetrated as far at
Luton, where 10 bombs were dropped on the
Vauxhall Motors plant. The projectiles killed 53 people and caused 113 casualties in total. In the retreat to France KG 1 lost five He 111s. 5.
Staffel bore the brunt of the losses with four and 6.
Staffel lost one bomber. The battle was joined by
56 and
253 Squadrons, which were credited with one bomber each. 1 Squadron was also credited with a bomber destroyed while 242 Squadron destroyed two of the 5.
Staffel bombers. 1 Squadron's victim was
Staffelkapitän Hauptmann Baess, commanding 5.
Staffel, who was killed in
Werknummer 2720, V4+BV. On 1 and 4 September 1940 I./KG 1 bombed
Tilbury docks. One 6.
Staffel bomber was sixty percent damaged by RAF fighters on the first operation.
Major Ludwig Maier,
Gruppenkommandeur of I
Gruppe was killed on the night of the 4/5 September. Herrick and Pugh, crewing a Blenheim night fighter, shot down Maier and his crew at 02:15.
Werknummer 3324, V4+AB, crashed and all the crew were killed.
Hauptmann Hermann Crone replaced him. On 7 September 1940, the Luftwaffe shifted its attention to
Greater London. On this morning the
London Blitz began with an assault upon the city by five
Kampfgeschwader—1, 2, 3, 26 and 76. Bf 110s from ZG 2, and Bf 109s from JG 2, 3, 51, 52, 54, I./JG 77 and I. and II./
LG 2 were sent to escort them. KG 53 was added as another eight
Gruppen of 318 He 111s and Do 17s struck the capital. 306 people died and 1,337 were injured in the capital and another 142 killed in the suburbs. Two bombers from 3. and 4.
Staffeln were lost, and
Geschwaderkommodore Koch was wounded by RAF fighters. By 7 September, I
Gruppe reported 22 from 36 He 111s operational. On 9 September KG 1 mounted the single largest raid on this date. It appears the target was Farnborough again. II./KG 1 committed 26 bombers to the attack supported by 20 Bf 110s from
ZG 76 and 60 Bf 109s from JG 3. The German intruders headed on a westerly course, to avoid the main concentration of RAF bases at Biggin Hill,
RAF Kenley,
RAF Croydon and
RAF Northolt. The approach failed and nine RAF squadrons engaged the German flights. The British made a head-on-attack with around 70 fighters. The Bf 110s adopted a
Lufbery circle and one
staffel of bombers jettisoned their bombs over
Purley and
Epsom, and turned back. The fleeing bombers joined up with 40
Junkers Ju 88s from
KG 30, which was under attack from 253 and
No. 303 Squadron RAF. KG 30 lost five bombers. KG 1 suffered only three He 111s damaged—two with around sixty percent damage and one with thirty-five. III./ZG 76 lost three fighters and one damaged and JG 3 lost another three protecting KG 1. KG 1 suffered heavier losses on 11 September. In an attack on London, 6./KG 1 suffered one bomber damaged as did 3.
Staffel, which also lost one crew killed. Another crew were lost, and a third from the Stab./KG 1—for a total of three bombers destroyed and two damaged. On
15 September the Luftwaffe carried out large-scale attacks on London. KG 1 was involved and only 1.
Staffel reported the loss of an aircraft. KG 1 are recorded in action on 29 September and 3. and 5.
Staffeln lost one bomber and one damaged each. One more bomber was lost and two damaged in landing accidents on 3 October. On a raid to London on night of the 4/5 October another II.
Gruppe bomber was lost and a second damaged. Three
Junkers Ju 88s, now beginning to arrive in KG 1 were destroyed in accidents in the following days. Accidents in night operations remained high. I. and II.
Gruppe lost a bomber to ground fire on the night of 17 October. I./KG 1 persisted with attacks on airfields attacking
RAF Horsham St Faith and
RAF West Raynham on 27 and 29 October. I.
Gruppe received support from III./KG 1, and both groups lost a bomber each night. II./KG 1 bombed airfields in the
Norwich area on 29 October. II. and III.
Gruppen began wholesale conversion to the Ju 88 at the end of October 1940.
The Blitz The night offensive over Britain began, in earnest, in the month of October 1940. The Germans utilised navigational aids such as
Knickebein,
X-Gerät and
Y-Gerät. The systems allowed the German bombers to navigate to target cities hundreds of miles from their bases. Pathfinder aircraft, from
KG 55 and
Kampfgruppe 100, were also used to guide the
bomber stream to the target area. RAF night fighters were equipped with
aircraft interception (AI) radar, but very few in number. All three
Gruppen of KG 1 were involved in bombing London on 1/2 November 1940 and carried out their assignment as the lead bomber formation that night (20:00–20:50). KG 76,
KG 77, I. and II./LG 1, I./
KG 27, 1./KG 54, II./KG 54, KGr 806, I./KG 55, II./KG 55, III./KG 55 supported the bombing operation. Other targets were bombed elsewhere this night. KG 1 returned to London on 4/5 November. III.
Gruppe bombed
Swanton Morley and
West Raynham on 5 November. On night of the 6/7 November KG 1 was involved in the first and last waves of bombings from dusk till dawn. I./KG 1 attacked the city from 19:30–21:15 while II./KG 1 completed its attacks between 06:12 and 07:15. On 7 November II./KG 1 targeted
Bacton–Norwich railway line. II.
Gruppe bombed London again on 7/8 November while 7.
Staffel bombed
Honington on 8 November. On 9 November, in the early hours, KG 1 led I. and III./KG 77 to bomb
Birmingham. It was KG 1's first operation in the
Birmingham Blitz. The following night, 9/10 November, KG 1 flew two operations, both in full strength, against London. In the early hours of 12 November I./KG 1 carried out five operations, the only group of KG 1 to do so. It bombed
Brighton, London,
Worthing,
Dover and
Horsham. III./KG 1 did the same on 13 November, against Woodford in
Gloucester and
Newton Heath. On 14/15 November KG 1 flew in full strength in a highly effective
attack on Coventry, codenamed Operation
Mondscheinsonate (Moonlight Sonata). I.
Gruppe flew three further operations: against
Eastbourne,
Newhaven and
Ramsgate. "Pathfinders" from 12
Kampfgruppe 100 (Bomb Group 100 or KGr 100) led 437 bombers from KG 1, KG 3, KG 26, KG 27, KG 55 and LG 1 and they dropped of high explosive, of incendiaries, and 127 parachute mines. Other sources say 449 bombers and a total of of bombs were dropped. The raid against Coventry was particularly devastating, and led to widespread use of the phrase "to conventrate". London was targeted again on 15/16 November while KG 1 flew a full-strength bombing attack against
Hastings. On 16/17 November two three-
Gruppen attacks were made against London while I./KG 1 bombed Birmingham and
Coventry again on 18/19 November. On 19/20 and 20/21 November KG 1 bombed Birmingham again with all three groups. I.
Gruppe flew a second sortie to London while all three groups attacked an airfield in the north of London. KG 1 mounted particularly heavy air attacks on 22/23 November. It flew one full-strength operation against Birmingham and London. A third operation was carried out
against Portsmouth, although
Eastney and
Eastleigh were hit instead. A fourth mission was flown against Eastbourne. On 24/24 November KG 1 turned to bombing
Bristol, Birmingham and Coventry. On 27/28 and 28/29 November KG 1 began all-group attacks over
Plymouth and
Liverpool; London (29/30 November), Bristol (2/3 December), Birmingham, London (3/4 December) by I./KG 1, Birmingham and
Sheerness (11/12 December),
Sheffield and
Ramsgate (12/13 December), London (21/22 December and 22/23 December) with I. and III./KG 1 respectively,
Manchester and London (23/24 December). KG 1 bombed London again on 29/30 December, a night which is referred to as the
Second Great Fire of London because of the damaged caused by the Luftwaffe. Over 27,499 incendiaries and over 100 tonnes of bombs were dropped on London by 136 aircraft that night which caused a
firestorm devastated the old
City of London. The Luftwaffe targeted ports in January 1941. In February port-targets became top priority, but planners persisted in operating against cities in the interior. III.
Gruppe bombed
Cardiff and
Salisbury on 2/3 January,
Dungeness (3/4 January), Hastings (9/10 January), Portsmouth (10/11 January),
Southampton (19/20 January). III
Gruppe completed January operations with bombing operations against
Stechford,
The Wash, twice on 22 January, Stetchford–
Margate–
Hayes and Portsmouth on 28 January. On 29 and 30 January 1941 III.
Gruppe bombed
Newcastle and then Stechford and London respectively. Night operations were complicated at this time with the emergence of Wing Commander
Edward Addison's
No. 80 Wing RAF which was dedicated to the jamming of high-frequency German beams; though the success of British countermeasures in 1940 and 1941 were minimal. KG 1 used III.
Gruppe to maintain pressure on Plymouth and Birmingham on 9/10 February. It was the only group operational that night. Stab and I./KG 1 flew against London on 14/15 February. Before midnight on 17 November,
Sternford and
Leominster were bombed; again III./KG 1 was the only element to fly operations. On 19/20 February KG 1 flew a full-strength attack on Southampton with KG 28, and also alone against Brighton. Port-operations were maintained on 20/21 with an attack on Swansea, Portsmouth, Eastbourne and Cardiff; a further all-out effort against Brighton, Cardiff and Southampton was made on 26/27 February. KG 1 remained on operations into March 1941. Cardiff was bombed III./KG 1 on 1/2 March and by I./KG 1 on 3/4 March. Southampton was bombed by I. and III.
Gruppe on 3/4 March. London was attacked by I.
Gruppe on 8/9 and 9/10 March and by III./KG 1 on the latter date. I and III
Gruppen also bombed Portsmouth on consecutive nights from 9–11 March. III
Gruppe continued operation on 12/13 March against Liverpool, Eastbourne and Brighton. With first group, it made the ''Geschwader's
first contribution to the Glasgow Blitz on 13/14 March; the group also attacked Margate, Grantham and Alton. I. and II. Gruppen'' flowed suite on 14/15 March, while I./KG 1 bombed Southampton. II./KG 1 completed the night's operations with an attack on
Chatham. KG 1 continued to support the bombing operations and flew in the
Hull Blitz for the first time on 18/19 March while I./KG 1 targeted
Harwell. KG 1 began April with an attack on Birmingham by third group on first night and
Poole on the night of the 3rd and 4th. II./KG 1 were busiest on the night of 7/8; bombing Liverpool, Bristol and Glasgow. They were supported by III./KG 1 in the latter operation. KG 1 focused on the
West Midlands; bombing Coventry and Birmingham from 8/9 to 10/11 April. On 15/16 April III. and II.
Gruppen attacked Belfast,
Northern Ireland for the first time. From 16 to 29 April London, Liverpool and Plymouth were the main targets for all three
Gruppen. On the night of the 19/20 April,
Adolf Hitler's 52nd birthday, London was attacked by 712 aircraft, the largest deployment of the month. It surpassed the 685 aircraft used on the 16/17 April attack. In May, aside from previous targets, KG 1 was deployed against
Great Yarmouth twice, and Hull, (3/4 May),
Woodley (4/5 May), and Newcastle on 6/7 May with KG 76. From 8–10 May KG 1 bombed
Nottingham twice, and
Upper Heyford. On 11/12 April II./KG 1 bombed
Watton and
Sutton Bridge. From 19 to 27 May
Ipswich,
Lowestoft,
Harwich,
Dover,
Hunstanton were bombed. KG 1's last Blitz operation came on 1/2 June 1941, when II.
Gruppe assisted in a large attack on Manchester.
Eastern Front KG 1 was relocated
Powunden,
East Prussia in early June 1941. Stab. II., and III./KG 1 were assigned to
General der Flieger Helmuth Förster, commanding
Fliegerkorps I. The air corps was subordinated to
Luftflotte 1 under
Generaloberst Alfred Keller. Keller's command existed to support the attack of
Army Group North into the
Soviet Union. The invasion, codenamed
Operation Barbarossa, began on 22 June 1941. The noticeable exception was I./KG 1. The
Gruppe was sent to begin training for maritime interdiction for
Battle of the Atlantic in March 1941. On 1 April 1941 it was re-designated I./
KG 40. It would not be reformed until 8 June 1942. II.
Gruppe reported 27 from 29 Ju 88s operational and the third group, 29 from 30. On the first day, KG 1, with KG 76 and KG 77 rendered critical air support to
XXXXI Panzer Corps under the command of
Georg-Hans Reinhardt. The German tank force was engaged by forces led by
Fedor Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov ordered the mobilisation of the
Baltic Military District (later named the
Northwestern Front) to defend the
Baltic States, annexed by the
Red Army in 1939. The
3rd and
12 Mechanised Corps moved to initiate a
pincer movement as the Germans advanced on
Šiauliai. German air attacks destroyed 40 motor vehicles or tanks. The 23rd Tank Division and 12th Mechanised Corps sustained particularly heavy losses. Over the next three days, as the battle raged, the
medium bomber force was asked to provide
close air support because
Luftflotte 1 lacked such aircraft. All three bomber groups suffered the collective loss of 18 aircraft to heavy Soviet
anti-aircraft artillery. Keller was forced to repeat these operations on 28 June. Southwest of
Riga, KG 1 lost six Ju 88s this way. KG 1 was moved to Mitau, a forward base in the
Daugavpils–Riga area, to support the
4th Panzer Army's breakout from the Daugavpils bridgehead. A notable loss for KG 1 was the commander of second group, Otto Stams, who was
wounded in action on 27 June. Stams was replaced by Emil Enderle. III.
Gruppe was heavily involved in operations. It bombed
Red Air Force airfields at
Ventspils,
Liepäja,
Jelgava and Riga from 27 to 28 June. From 1–4 July it bombed Soviet troop concentrations at Jelgava and over southern
Latvia. After the capture of Jelgava it moved there on 5 July to support attacks on airfields in
Estonia. The group also interdicted rail lines between
Lake Ilmen and
Lake Peipus. The group attack
Luga on 10 July. On this day a formation from KG 1 was intercepted by
Polikarpov I-16s from 154 IAP. Pilot Sergey Titovka carried out a
taran attack on
Feldwebel Paul Kempf's bomber. KG 1 reported the loss of three Ju 88s. II./KG 1 carried out similar operations and it bombed
Leningrad on 3 July. It extended its sphere of operations into the Baltic Sea and
Gulf of Finland, attacking Soviet shipping and the
Baltic Fleet. Both groups moved to
Saborovka. It focused on rail and road targets near
Bologoye on 23 July while supporting the general advance to Leningrad. Attacks against Soviet shipping took priority in late August: between
Narva and
Kronstadt. In September attacks on naval traffic on
Lake Ladoga and in the Gulf of Finland became the focus of KG 1's operations. KG 1 was also active against the
Soviet evacuation of Tallinn. On 28 August KG 77 and KGr 806 sank the steamer
Vironia, the Lucerne, the
Atis Kronvalds and the ice breaker
Krišjānis Valdemārs (). The rest of the Soviet fleet were forced to change course. This took them through a heavily mined area. As a result, 21 Soviet warships, including five destroyers, struck mines and sank. On 29 August, the Ju 88s accounted for the transport ships
Vtoraya Pyatiletka (), Kalpaks () and
Leningradsovet () sunk. In addition, the ships
Ivan Papanin,
Saule, Kazakhstan and the
Serp i Molot were damaged by I./KG 4, which also sank three more. Some 5,000 Soviet soldiers died. KG 1 was also active in the Luftwaffe's traditional interdiction role.
Gerhard Baeker's III./KG 1 severed the rail lines to Luga on 16 August. The success of the attack forced the Soviets to abandon
Kingisepp. II.
Gruppe was removed from the front on 12 September to re-equip with the Ju 88A-4 until 9 October. All remaining aircraft were handed over to III./KG 1. As Army Group North neared Leningrad, all the bombers of the first air fleet began bombing operations against the centre of the city: beginning the
Siege of Leningrad. On 8 September 27 Ju 88s dropped 6, 327
incendiary bombs, starting 183 fires. The targets were the Badayevo warehouses holding supplies for the trapped Soviet forces and the city's civilians. An entire reserve of sugar weighing 2,500 tons was destroyed. Bombing commenced around the clock, a systematic attempt to destroy the city. Most
air raids were confined to the night, because of heavy ground fire and the arrival of 5, 7, 44 and 191 IAP fighter regiments. On 28 September and into early October operations against rail lines in the Lake Ilmen. It moved to
Dno airbase on 17 October. It continued interdiction, or disruption, operations against
Tikhvin (29 October),
Yaroslavl (31 October),
Shum (19 December) and
Chudovo on 29 December 1941. II.
Gruppe returned to Saborovka on 9 October and bombed rail lines southeast of Leningrad from 9–13 October. It moved to
Staraya Russa on 23rd. It was in action over Bolshoi-Dvor lines on 17 December. Both groups fought against Soviet counteroffensives in the Lake Ilmen area until the end of December, and the ultimate failure of
Barbarossa. Before the year was out, II./KG 1 lost its second commander, Emil Enderle, posted
missing in action on 3 November.
To Stalingrad II. and III.
Gruppen remained on operations opposing the Soviet winter offensives. On 2 January, with KG 4, it bombed the ice roads and unloading port of
Osinovets. In January 1942, KG 1 bombed targets around Staraya Russa, Kholm and the
Volkhov River into February and until 20 March. From 26 March–3 April 1942, KG 1 flew bombing and
supply missions over the
Demyansk Pocket.
Luftflotte 1 carried out 3,185 sorties in the first month of 1942. KG 1. and I./KG 4 flew 913 bomber sortied in the Volkhov and 473 in the Demyansk area. The wing commenced Operation Eisstoss, against Kronshtadt port on 4 April and continued to support trapped
German Army units in the
Kholm Pocket. KG 1 remained mostly active around Kholm–particularly in opposition to the
Toropets–Kholm Offensive–and the Volkhov front in April and May 1942, with sporadic attacks on Lake Ilmen (22 April) Leningrad (24 April). II./KG 1 returned to Germany to rest and refit in May. III./KG 1 retained a small contingent at Pskov, but moved to
Insterburg, East Prussia on 21 April. The group returned rapidly and were apparently in the Kholm area by 30 April. III.
Gruppe moved to Rozhkopolve from 21 May to 1 June. By 8 June the group was back at Dno with II
Gruppe. I./KG 1 was re-created on 8 June at
Lübeck-Blankensee but was sent to
Avord in France. From there it flew night operations over
Great Britain from 5 August (
Baedeker Blitz), including bombing operations against the
Dieppe Raid. The group returned to the Eastern Front on 3 September 1942. That same day
Geschwaderkommodore Hans Keppler was killed in action and replaced with Heinrich Lau. From 22 June 1942 II./KG 1 flew armed reconnaissance over the Gulf Finland. In July 1942 the group moved to
Bryansk on
Army Group Centre's front. Several
Staffeln flew
anti-tank operations. from 10 to 27 July. Within the same timeframe, 11 to 16 July, it attacked rail, troop and tank concentrations in the
Sukhinichi,
Kozelsk and
Belyov sectors. By 20 July the group was operating in the
Pola River and combated Soviet breakthroughs in the
Battles of Rzhev from 7 August 1942. Acting as fire-brigade support in the north, the group supported Operation Wirbelwind; a counteroffensive east of Roslavl near Sukhinichi from 9–27 August. By 20 September it could must 10 operational Ju 88s, from the 26 available to it. III./KG 1 repeated these operations but spent slightly longer operating over Bryansk (7–27 July) and Operation Wirbelwind. In September it flew support for the army in Demyansk and Lake Ilmen, before moving to Morosovskaya on 6 October, to support
Operation Blue, and
Army Group South in the
Battle of Stalingrad before withdrawing to East Prussia again on 31 October. II.
Gruppen was joined by I./KG 1 in the south under the command of
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen's
Fliegerkorps VIII. The first group returned to the East and began operations over the familiar Demyansk area. Its operational condition was better than the other
Gruppen and it could employ 21 of the 33 Ju 88s available to it. On 7 October both groups began operations over Stalingrad and the northern
Caucasus. It bombed
Grozny on 10 October and Stalingrad on 16th before being removed to the
Orsha on the central sector, and subordinated to
Fliegerdivision 1 on 3 November. KG 1 responded to Richthofen's 14 October call for an all-out attack on the city. In 2,000 sorties the Germans dropped a total of 600 tons of bombs. KG 1 lost three Ju 88s. II./KG 1 was pushed deeper in the south as the
Battle of the Caucasus reached a climax. It bombed
Astrakhan on 18 October but was withdrawn to Orsha on the same day as I./KG 1. Consequently, KG 1 missed the final stages of the battle which ended in the
destruction of Axis armies in Stalingrad. Nevertheless, II./KG 1 lost
Gruppenkommandeur Heinz Laube killed in an accident on 8 December.
Final operations in the East I.
Gruppe returned under the command of
Oberstleutnant Hellmut Schalke until July when
Major Werner Dahlke took command. It was rushed into action in the
Rzhev sector into November. On 26 November 1942, KG 1 flew its 20,000th mission. In December 1942 it fought in the
Battle for Velikiye Luki. From Orsha, it moved to
Kharkov and Volchenko on 25 December to bolster the defences on the
Don River. It abandoned the area on 17 January 1943 to avoid being overrun. During the transfer it moved to IV.
Fliegerkorps and conducted a fighting withdrawal against infantry and tank targets. Based at
Kiev, from 5 February, the group flew in the
Third Battle of Kharkov. It also operated from
Poltava Air Base before moving north, to Kolty near
Narva. On consecutive nights from 19 to 21 March, the airfield was bombed costing two Ju 88s destroyed and four damaged. The group bombed targets around Lake Ladoga from 23 March and left the Soviet Union until May 1944. II./KG 1 carried out similar operations, differing only in its earlier retirement to
Königsberg for rest and refit from 19 to 30 December. The group did not return to the Eastern Front until June 1944. III./KG 1 handed its aircraft to II
Gruppe when it left for East Prussia on 31 October 1942. It returned in January 1943 and remained on the Eastern Front until July.
Hauptmann Werner Kanther became the last-but one commanding officer in October 1942; he held command until the first disbandment of the unit in April 1944. On 9 March, (Eis)/KG 1 was created. It was equipped with the Ju 88C and trained for specialised train-busting operations. It remained supporting Army Group North until June 1943 until it was transferred to
Luftflotte 6. It served on the Volkhov, Kolpino and Kholm. It assisted German forces hold the line at
Krasny Bor after the
Battle of Krasny Bor. On 2 June KG 1 bombed the rail station at Kursk, in preparation for
Operation Citadel; it also bombed
Leninsky,
Yelets and
Voronezh. The command staff of the Luftwaffe used this idea to free their service from the air support role.
Robert Ritter von Greim's Luftflotte 6, with support from
Luftflotte 4, was assigned seven bomber wings to carry out a
strategic bombing offensive—
KG 55,
KG 3,
KG 4,
KG 27,
KG 51,
KG 53 and
KG 100. Factory Number No. 466 at
Gorkiy with five percent total and one-tenth of all fighter engine production were the targets. Three of the five
ball bearings plants were in range, the
synthetic rubber plant at
Yaroslavl (23 percent of output) and oil refineries along with steel plants were all considered. Surviving intelligence maps show the
crude oil and ball bearing plant at
Saratov was also considered. In the end phase, the production of tanks and armoured vehicles received the weight of the attacks. The facilities at
Gorkiy drew most attention for it produced 15 percent of
T-34s and was the largest plant west of the
Urals. In error, planners targeted the State Motor Vehicles Plant No. 1 Molotov, the largest automobile plant in the country which produced the less threatening
T-60 and
T-70. The
Krasnoye Sormovo Factory No. 112 was targeted because of its production of munitions. Third group was the only element of KG 1 to take part, from 5 to 8 June. It bombed the
synthetic rubber plant on 20 June. It lost two aircraft. During repeated attacks between 4 and 22 June, all of the plant's 50 buildings, 9,000 metres of conveyors, 5,900 units of process equipment and 8,000 engines were destroyed or damaged. Russian authorities have still not disclosed how many people were killed. German wartime estimates are 15,000, but are not supported. Owing to failed intelligence and targeting, the attacks against the Molotov factory disrupted the T-70 light tank. Roughly half of the Soviet light tank production—5, 134 from 9, 375 in 1942, was made there. Factory Number 112, produced the T-34 tank, which was only lightly affected by the raids. Repair was rapid, and completed within six weeks.
Night fighter and
search light defences were also increased. The factory was fully operational by 18 August. In the fourth quarter of 1943, it superseded production quotas by 121 percent. When Citadel began III./KG 1 carried out bombing operations until 13 July. It moved to Bryansk on 14 July and attacked Soviet armour when
Operation Kutuzov broke through to Orel on 20 July. The
Gruppe lingered on the Eastern Front until 2 August 1943, when it appears to have been withdrawn. Only the specialist 9.(Eis)/KG 1
Staffel remained. On 20 July it moved back to Seshchinskaya and operated from Stari Bykhov from 18 September. In October 1943 it helped Army Group Centre contain the
Orsha offensives. It may have been transferred to
Flensburg to convert to the Ju 88P. In mid-March it was re-designated 14(Eis)./KG 3. III.
Gruppe disbanded in mid-April 1944. 7. and 8.
Staffeln re known to have retrained as anti-tank units at Flensburg until 12 August and the aircraft were given to 9.(Eis)./KG 1. Only one month later, the
Gruppe was reformed by the re-designation of I./KG 100. It began training on the
Heinkel He 177 but never became operational again. It was dissolved at Prowehren East Prussia, on 25 August 1944. II./KG 1 returned to the front under the command of IV.
Fliegerkorps after action in
Italy and the
Mediterranean. Equipped with the He 177s, the bomber group flew against railheads from June 1944, as the
Soviet summer offensive opened. It was ordered by
Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring to attack tanks and act as close air support. Using the
heavy bomber in this way was disastrous:
Oberstleutnant Horst von Riesen carried out the orders with reluctance and lost two on the 26th, another two on 27th and a fifth bomber on 28 June. It bombed rail yards at Kalinkovichi and
Gomel, and at Velikaya Luki on 26 June. Fuel shortages forced the group to be withdrawn and disbanded on 28 July at
Brandis. Flight personnel were sent to I./
JG 7, operating the
Messerschmitt Me 262 fighter jet. It was formally renamed I./JG 7 on 5 September 1944. In July KG 1 made its last substantial contribution in
Lithuania. It counted the Soviet
Vilnius Offensive and slowed preparations for the
Kaunas Offensive. The Soviet supply base at
Molodechno, southeast of
Vilnius, at
Minsk, Velikiye Luki and
Novosokolniki were repeatedly attacked by night bombers. On 20 July Riesen led all 70 of KG 1's operational He 177 bombers on a daylight raid against Velikiye Luki rail station. Riesen flew so high Soviet fighter aircraft could not intercept and the bombing caused mass devastation to the station and town for no loss. On 23 July, the crews struck again and reported large fires and explosions after bombing Molodechno. KG 1 was ordered to disrupt Soviet rail traffic in the
Lublin sector—to contain the
Lublin–Brest Offensive. On 25 July the He 177s repeated effective attacks. At the
Bug River, near Brest-Litovsk, the bombers destroyed the headquarters of the Soviet 80th Army Corps, killing the commander in the process. On 28 July KG 1 carried out its last bombing mission of the war when it attacked concentrations of the
2nd Guards Tank Army. I./KG 1 remained in
Laon, France from April and June 1943 before serving in Italy. It also began training on He 177s from September 1943 and handed its Ju 88s to KG 54 and KG 76. At
Burg from 18 November 1943, it made slow progress and suffered many accident losses from 15 March. By the end of April it could field 22 He 177s. Considered operational, it transferred to
East Prussia at
Prowehren and Seerappen in June. In June and July it attacked Soviet tank formations and on one operation, under the command of
Major Manfred von Cossart, nearly bombed
Adolf Hitler's headquarters, the
Wolf's Lair. It disbanded at Brandis on 20 August 1944 and personnel were sent to JG 7.
Italian Campaign and the Mediterranean KG 1 was rushed to
Piacenza in June 1943 after the
North African Campaign ended with the defeat of Axis forces. From here I./KG 1 was moved to
Viterbo on 10 July. The
Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) provided the bomber group with the immediate task of destroying Allied shipping the Mediterranean. From this date it attacked harbours in
Algeria and
Tunisia. It moved further south to
Foggia on 26 July, but serviceability was poor: just five of the 18 Ju 88s were operational by 20 August 1943. Bombing operations over
Syracuse (17, 22 July),
Augusta harbour (21 July),
Malta (22 July),
Gela (27 July),
Palermo (4 August) and Syracuse again on 10 August degraded operational readiness. The
Allied invasion of Italy took place on 3 September and I./KG 1 recorded its last sortie off
Naples on 8 September. II./KG 1 arrived in
Grottaglie on 28 March and was subordinated to II.
Fliegerkorps, subordinated to
Luftflotte 2. It flew supply operations to Tunisia in an attempt to overcome the effects of
Operation Flax. It also flew
anti-submarine warfare operations and aerial escort for convoys from 10 to 27 April 1943. It bombed
Bŏne harbour on 15 May, days after the
Battle of Tunisia ended in the capitulation of Axis forces. It also bombed
Oran harbour and then moved to
Sardinia on 19 May. From June to August to flew against the landing in Sicily and the invasion of Italy, mainly in anti-shipping roles which decimated the group. Based at Foggia on 20 August 1943, it had 11 operational to 21 Ju 88s on strength. On 9 September it handed its aircraft to KG 54 and KG 76. The personnel temporarily acted as occupation forces near
Airasca in the
Province of Turin, when Italy changes sides before departing Italy for the last time on 4 November 1943 for conversion to the He 177 at Burg. ==Commanding officers==