Korean DMZ Conflict

The Korean War had devastated both North and South Korea, and while neither side renounced its claims to reunify Korea under its control, neither side was in a position to force reunification. In September 1956, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Radford indicated within the U.S. government that the military's intention was to introduce atomic weapons into Korea, which was agreed to by the United States National Security Council and President Eisenhower. However paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement mandated that both sides could not introduce new types of weapons into Korea, thus preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles. The U.S. decided to unilaterally abrogate paragraph 13(d), breaking the Armistice Agreement, despite concerns by United Nations allies. At a 21 June 1957 meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, the U.S. informed the North Korean representatives that the U.N. Command no longer considered itself bound by paragraph 13(d) of the armistice. In January 1958, nuclear-armed Honest John missiles and 280mm atomic cannons were deployed to South Korea, followed within a year by atomic demolition munitions and nuclear-armed Matador cruise missiles capable of reaching China and the Soviet Union. North Korea denounced the abrogation of paragraph 13(d) as an attempt to wreck the armistice agreement and turn Korea into a U.S. atomic warfare zone. lower than most Latin American and some sub-Saharan African countries. The April Revolution that forced President Syngman Rhee from office in April 1960 was followed by a brief period of democracy before a coup d'état led to General Park Chung Hee seizing power in May 1961. Despite the political turmoil, the South Korean economy continued to grow, led by the industrial sector. Leafleting of North Korea had been resumed, such as Operation Jilli from 1964 to 1968 which delivered a few hundred million leaflets to the north. ==Military forces==

North Korea In 1966, the Korean People's Army (KPA) deployed eight infantry divisions along the DMZ, backed by eight more infantry divisions, three motorized infantry divisions, a tank division and a collection of separate infantry and tank brigades and regiments. Its total armed forced personnel numbered 386,000. and it was unlikely that the North could deliver a knockout blow before the U.S. could deploy additional forces. Details of only a few of these incursions have become public, including raids by South Korean forces in 1967 that had sabotaged about 50 North Korean facilities. Up to 7,700 South Korean soldiers and agents infiltrated North Korea from the end of the Korean war until 1972, an estimated 5,300 of whom never made it back. The ground forces were supported by fighter-bombers of the USAF 314th Air Division and by the Republic of Korea Air Force. The seas around Korea were under the control of the United States Seventh Fleet and the Republic of Korea Navy. As with the Army, the war in Vietnam was the main focus of the USAF and the USN in the Pacific. ==Defense strategies==

From October 1964 the North Koreans increased the infiltration of intelligence-gatherers and propagandists into the South. By October 1966, more than 30 South Korean soldiers and at least 10 civilians had been killed in clashes with North Korean infiltrators; however, no similar clashes had taken place along the U.S.-controlled section of the DMZ. In October 1966, South Korea staged a retaliatory attack without seeking the approval of General Bonesteel, causing tension between the U.S. command, which wished to avoid violations of the armistice, and the South Koreans, who were suffering ongoing losses. Korean coastline Preventing infiltration at sea created an impossible challenge for the UN Command, which lacked suitable aircraft, ships, radar and communications. The ROK Navy possessed only 72 vessels to patrol over 7,000 kilometers of rugged coastline. Along the coasts, some 20,000 unarmed coastwatchers, sometimes supplemented by ROKA reservists, patrolled the beaches and when signs of landings were discovered these would be reported to the National Police and quick reaction forces would be deployed. Poor communications and a lack of helicopters meant that the quick reaction forces seldom arrived in time before the infiltrators dispersed in the Korean hinterland. Counterinsurgency operations During 1966 and into 1967, there was no coordinated counterinsurgency plan in South Korea. Infiltrations were dealt with on an ad hoc basis by the ROKA, National Police, Army counter-intelligence units and the KCIA usually depending on the estimate of the threat and whichever units happened to be nearby. Park was reluctant to raise and arm a civilian militia as he did not fully trust the loyalty of the populace to his government. Bonesteel regarded counterinsurgency as entirely an internal responsibility for the South Korean Government. While he provided some material support including his helicopters and several Special Forces A-Teams from the 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa to train the ROKA and the newly formed Combat Police in counterinsurgency tactics, he declined to take responsibility for counterinsurgency operations. By late 1967 it was clear that the North Koreans were attempting to develop a full-scale insurgency in the South with strongholds in the Taebaek Mountains and around Jirisan mountain. Park in consultation with Bonesteel, developed a counterinsurgency strategy in the form of Presidential Instruction #18. The instruction established a national coordinating council with clear chains of command for all classes of incidents ranging from individual agent sightings to province-level unrest. Eight (later ten) new ROKA counter-infiltration battalions were to be formed, together with further expansion of the Combat Police. ==January 1968==

The Blue House Raid complex in Seoul, South Korea, in April 2007. It served as the executive office and official residence of the South Korean president. On the night of 17 January 1968, 31 men of Unit 124 penetrated the 2ID sector of the DMZ by cutting through the chain-link fence and passing undetected within 30m of a manned 2ID position. The mission of Unit 124, as explained to them by KPA Reconnaissance Bureau chief, Lieutenant General Kim Chung-tae, was "to go to Seoul and cut off the head of Park Chung Hee". It was believed that by assassinating Park, the South would be thrown into turmoil, causing the South Korean populace to rise up and fight against the South Korean government and American soldiers, leading to reunification.) while 26 South Koreans and four U.S. Army soldiers were killed. The Pueblo Incident On 23 January 1968 North Korean patrol boats operating under cover of MiG-21 fighters captured the in international waters northeast of Wonsan, killing one crewman. Bonesteel was unaware of the mission of the Pueblo and the 314th Air Division had no suitable aircraft available to give assistance to the Pueblo. By the time that attack aircraft could be sent to the area, the Pueblo and her remaining 82 crewmen were in captivity in Wonsan harbour. American-South Korean reactions The seizure of the Pueblo was one of a number of crises facing the Johnson Administration in January 1968: in Vietnam, the Battle of Khe Sanh had commenced on 21 January. President Johnson ordered a show of force with a massive deployment of U.S. air and navy assets to Korea under the code-names Operation Combat Fox (200+ combat aircraft) and Operation Formation Star (six aircraft carriers plus support vessels) as well as the partial mobilization of reservists for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite this military buildup, Johnson wished to avoid escalating the existing conflict in Korea and instructed Bonesteel to begin negotiations for the return of the Pueblo crew with the North Koreans through the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. Even as the extra forces were deploying to South Korea, the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam began on 30 January 1968. Johnson regarded the seizure of the Pueblo and the timing of the Tet Offensive to have been coordinated to divert U.S. resources away from Vietnam and to force the South Koreans to withdraw their two Divisions and Marine Brigade from South Vietnam. Unlike Johnson, Bonesteel saw no such connection. He regarded the Blue House Raid as having been planned at the highest levels in North Korea, while the seizure of the Pueblo seemed merely opportunistic and the timing of the Tet Offensive as helpful but coincidental. He saw no change to his mission of defending South Korea and preventing an escalation of the existing low-intensity conflict. The South Koreans saw things differently. They regarded the Blue House Raid and the seizure of the Pueblo as signs of a North Korean threat that had to be dealt with strongly by both the ROK and the U.S. When news of negotiations between the U.S. and North Koreans at Panmunjom became public on 6 February, the Park Administration accused the U.S. of a policy of appeasement. Newspaper editorials and Government officials suggested that the Korean units in South Vietnam should be recalled to deal with the North Korean threat, while various advisers coaxed Park to "go North" with or without the Americans. Park refused to negotiate seriously with either Bonesteel or Ambassador William J. Porter. It appeared that the split that Kim Il Sung hoped to create between the ROK and the U.S. was becoming a reality. On 10 February Cyrus Vance arrived in Seoul to negotiate with Park on behalf of Johnson. Vance met with Park on 11 February and set out the Johnson Administration's position: there would be no wider war in Korea, any ROK cross-border action was subject to approval by Bonesteel who would himself need approval from Johnson and the U.S. would negotiate as necessary to secure the release of the Pueblo crew. Vance offered Park $100M in immediate military aid (including F-4D Phantom II fighter jets) with more to follow, provided Park agreed not to "go North." Four days later Park agreed to Vance's terms. ==Implementing the American and South Korean strategy==

The Blue House Raid and the Pueblo Incident both served to raise the profile of the low-intensity conflict being fought in South Korea and finally brought in the resources needed to fully implement the joint U.S./ROK counterinsurgency strategy. The massive surge deployment of U.S. warships and combat aircraft in operations Formation Star and Combat Fox served to deter further large-scale incursions. Once the immediate threat subsided, the U.S. Seventh Fleet withdrew its ships by mid-1968, while the U.S. Air Force gradually reduced its Combat Fox deployment over a period of 16 months. On 1 April 1968, the Department of Defense on Bonesteel's recommendation declared the DMZ-Imjin River area as a hostile fire zone, entitling service members stationed in the area to hostile-fire pay and later for the award of the Combat Infantryman Badge and Combat Medical Badge to all qualified men serving north of the Imjin River. This change in designation also meant that Korea would now receive priority second only to South Vietnam. In addition to the $100M promised to the ROK by envoy Vance, Congress also allocated $230M to improve U.S. and ROK facilities and combat readiness across the DMZ. $32M worth of material for the construction of the DMZ barrier and communications equipment was airlifted to South Korea, allowing the completion of the improved anti-infiltration barrier along the entire DMZ by 30 July 1968. The 6th Aviation Platoon which was en route to South Vietnam was instead deployed to South Korea, with its 12 UH-1D Hueys more than doubled the number of UH-1s available, allowing some to remain on alert with quick reaction forces while others conducted counter-infiltration operations. Several thousand additional enlisted men were allocated to Eighth Army alleviating manpower shortages while the programme improved training in counterinfiltration tactics. Dog-tracker teams were deployed allowing improved detection of infiltrators, while several hundred M16 rifles were procured allowing patrols to match the firepower of KPA infiltrators. These improvements taken together resulted in a dramatic increase in the detection and elimination of KPA infiltrators in 1968. The Blue House Raid convinced Park to make one crucial change to Presidential Directive #18, in February 1968 he ordered the creation of the Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF), publicly announced in April, within six months more than two million South Korean citizens had volunteered, forming more than 60,000 local defense platoons and companies. Park also ordered the establishment of 20 Reconstruction Villages just south of the DMZ, populated by armed ex-soldiers and their families and the dispatch of ROKA civic action Medical/Enlightenment Teams into remote areas, particularly in the Taebaek and Jiri Mountain areas. ==Ulchin-Samcheok landings==

While the DMZ became increasingly difficult to penetrate during 1968, South Korea's coastline, despite some improvements in ROK Navy capabilities, remained vulnerable to infiltration. By the time Park suspended the operation on 26 December 110 North Koreans had been killed and seven captured, for the loss of 40 regular army, police and militia and 23 civilians. ==North Korean strategy changes==

By the end of 1968 it was apparent that despite two years of unconventional operations, North Korea had failed to ignite an insurgency in the South, the U.S.–ROK relationship was stronger than ever and Park had cemented his legitimacy with the population. In late December Kim Il Sung purged the senior military officers responsible for the unconventional warfare campaign accusing them of failing to correctly implement the Party line; there could be no suggestion that the KWP line simply did not appeal to South Koreans. Defense Minister, General Kim Chongbong and KPA Political Bureau chairman, General Ho Pong-haek were both executed, while the chief of the General Staff, the Reconnaissance Bureau chief, the KPN commander and the commanders of three frontline KPA Corps were all imprisoned. Units 124 and 283 were disbanded and special warfare capabilities were made explicitly subordinate to conventional military operations. The KPA was transformed by the institution of a Commissar system in all units down to Company level to ensure KWP control over all military activity. Despite the change in strategy North Korea continued to conduct infiltrations, apparently as cover while the purge and restructuring was carried out. The UN Command did not initially appreciate the changes in Pyongyang, regarding the reduction in infiltrations as being caused by effective UN action rather than the abandonment by Pyongyang of its failed strategy; limited intelligence sources and few published speeches by Kim Il Sung gave few clues as to the KWP's policy change. In mid-March the combined forces Exercise Focus Retina began in South Korea, this exercise was condemned by the North as a dress rehearsal for an invasion and KPA regulars began a series of attacks and infiltrations against 2ID position on the DMZ that lasted until mid-May. On 15 April 1969 (the birthday of Kim Il Sung), two KPAF MiGs shot down a USAF EC-121M Warning Star on an electronic intelligence mission 167 km off the east coast of North Korea, killing all 31 crewmen. President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered a reprisal air strike or an aerial escort linked to a diplomatic complaint at the truce table, both initially favored an air strike on the basis that force should be met with force. Nixon's advisers opposed an airstrike, fearing that this could provoke a full-scale war when the U.S. was already committed in Vietnam and they were supported in this by Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter. On 18 April Nixon announced that future intelligence flights would have fighter escorts (which had been the case until the end of 1968 when the tensions on the Korean peninsula were believed to have subsided) and a protest was lodged with the North Koreans at Panmunjom which was accepted without comment. From 19 to 26 April the Seventh Fleet's Task Force 71 (including 4 carriers and their escorts) conducted operations off the east coast of North Korea as a show of force. ==Conflict diffusion and aftermath==

By May 1969, the level of intensity of the conflict had reduced substantially. Isolated incidents continued to occur particularly along the ROKA-controlled sectors of the DMZ, but it had become clear that the North had abandoned its hopes of starting an insurgency in the South. Qualitative improvements in the ROK Army meant that the U.S. could start to contemplate reducing its military presence in South Korea. On 25 July 1969, Nixon announced his Nixon Doctrine that, henceforth, the U.S. expected its allies to defend themselves with U.S. air and seapower support (and the nuclear umbrella), but not U.S. ground troops. While aimed primarily at South Vietnam, this policy would also apply to South Korea (however, Nixon assured Park that his commitment to South Korea was unchanged). On 1 October 1969 Bonesteel handed over command of USFK to General John H. Michaelis. One of Michaelis' early tasks was negotiating the release of three U.S. soldiers captured when their OH-23 helicopter was shot down after straying across the DMZ; their release on 3 December 1969 is regarded as the official end of the conflict. Several other socialist figureheads, including Leonid Brezhnev, criticized the North Koreans for engaging in escalation as the DMZ Conflict could lead the Park regime to further clamp down on opposition and to intensify its military collaboration with the US. ==Timeline==

1966 • 2 November: 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) patrol (1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment) ambushed south of DMZ. Six U.S. KIA, one KATUSA KIA, one U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses. Private Ernest Reynolds was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for his actions during the ambush. An ROKA patrol was ambushed the same night. Two ROK KIA. 39 sailors of the crew of 79 are killed. • 12 February: 2ID patrol (3/23 Infantry) ambushed south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses. • 5 April: 2ID guard post engaged KPA infiltrators south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; five KPA KIA. • 29 April: 2ID patrol ambushed KPA infiltrators south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA, one KPA WIA, one KPA captured. • 22 May: 2ID barracks (1/23 Infantry) demolished by night time explosion south of DMZ. Two U.S. KIA, 17 U.S. WIA. • 16 July: 2ID barrier position #32 overrun. Three U.S. KIA (2-23 Infantry), one KATUSA WIA. • 10 August: 7ID construction team (B Company 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th ID) ambushed well south of DMZ in daylight. Three U.S. KIA, sixteen U.S. WIA, one WIA later died of his wounds at 121st EVAC; unknown KPA losses. • 15 August: 2ID Barrier position near Crab Island. Three armed enemy agents engaged in fire fight. Two agents killed and bodies recovered, one other believed killed in river, trying to escape. • 22 August: 2ID jeep destroyed by mine and ambush south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA, one U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses. • 28 August: Eighth Army construction team (76th Engineers) ambushed in daylight near the Joint Security Area but still south of the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA, two KATUSA KIA, fourteen U.S. WIA, nine KATUSA WIA, three civilians WIA; unknown KPA losses. • 29 August: 2ID jeep destroyed by mine south of DMZ. Three U.S. KIA, five U.S. WIA; no KPA losses. • 7 October: 2ID patrol boat ambushed on Imjin River south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses. 1968 • 20–21 January: 31 North Korean Unit 124 commandos crossed the border disguised as South Korean soldiers in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee at the Blue House. The failed mission resulted in 28 commandos killed, two presumed dead, and the last captured. 68 South Koreans were killed and 66 wounded, including about 24 civilians. Three Americans were killed and another three wounded in an attempt to prevent the commandos from escaping back via the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA, two KATUSA KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses. • 20 April: 2ID (2/23 Infantry) patrol ambushed in DMZ near MDL one U.S. WIA one KPA KIA • 21 April: 7ID patrol (2/31 Infantry) engaged KPA infiltrator company in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, three U.S. WIA; five KPA KIA, fifteen KPA WIA. • 27 April: 7ID patrol (2/31 Infantry) ambushed in the DMZ. One KATUSA KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses. • 3 July: 2ID patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses. • 20 July: 2ID patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses. 7ID patrol (1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment) ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses. • 21 July: 2ID patrol (2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment) ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. WIA, one KATUSA WIA. • 30 July: 2ID patrol (3/23 Infantry) ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, three U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses. • 5 August: 2ID patrol (1/38 Infantry) ambushed south of the DMZ in daylight. One U.S. KIA, four U.S. WIA; one KPA KIA. • 18 August: 7ID patrol (1/32 Infantry) ambushed south of the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA; two KPA WIA. • 19 September: 2ID patrols (2/38 Infantry) and quick reaction forces (4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) and the 2nd Division Counter Agent Company) isolated and destroyed KPA infiltrator squad. Two KATUSA KIA, six KATUSA WIA; four KPA KIA, one KPA WIA. • 27 September: 2ID jeep ambushed in the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses. • 3 October: 7ID guard post (1/31 Infantry) engaged KPA exfiltrator south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA. • 5 October: 2ID patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses. • 10 October: 2ID boat patrol engaged KPA infiltrator crossing the Imjin River. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA. • 11 October: 2ID patrol ambushed KPA infiltrators in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; two KPA KIA. • 23 October: 2ID patrol engaged KPA infiltrators in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA and five WIA; one KPA KIA. • 30 October: Ulchin-Samcheok (Gangwon Province) landings by 120 men of KPA Unit 124; 110 of them were killed, 7 were captured and 3 escaped. 40 ROKA and Police were KIA and 23 civilians were killed. Three U.S. KIA and three WIA. 1969 • 23 January: 2ID guard posts repulsed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses. • 4 February: 2ID guard posts repulsed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses. • 13 March: 2ID fence repair patrol (2/38 Infantry) engaged by KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses. • 15 March: 2ID marker maintenance patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, two U.S. WIA, one KATUSA WIA. Medical evacuation helicopter crashed after takeoff, killing five airmen and the three wounded. • 16 March: 2ID patrol engaged KPA infiltrators in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses. • 20 March: 2ID patrol engaged KPA patrol in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses. • 29 March: 2ID patrol engaged KPA patrol in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses. • 7 April: Six North Korean infiltrators crossed the border near Chumunjin, Gangwon Province and killed a South Korean policeman on guard duty • 15 April: KPAF fighters shoot down a US Navy EC-121 Warning Star aircraft over the Sea of Japan (East Sea); 31 U.S. crewmen killed. • 15 May: 2ID patrol engaged KPA infiltrator. One U.S. WIA, one KATUSA WIA; unknown KPA losses. • 20 May: 2ID guard post engaged KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA. • 21 July: 2ID guard posts engaged and repulsed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses. • 17 August: Eighth Army OH-23 helicopter (59th Aviation Company) strayed north of the DMZ and was shot down. Three U.S. captured and finally released on 3 December 1969. • 18 October: 7ID jeep ambushed in the DMZ. Four U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses ==See also==