Sessions Activity , held in January 2024. The National Assembly is Vietnam's SSOP. The SSOP rarely convenes, usually between once, twice or three times a year. For example, in former communist Eastern Europe, the
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union convened once or twice a year, the
Supreme People's Assembly of the
Albania, the
Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia, and the
People's Chamber of
East Germany convened twice a year, the
National Assembly of
Bulgaria and the
National Assembly of Hungary, convened four times, and the
Sejm of Poland and the
Assembly of
Yugoslavia convened more than four times a year. These sessions usually lasted only a couple of days. A constituent session of a new term of a supreme state organ is virtually identical from state to state. It is mainly focused on electing the state leadership. The process went through several stages. For example, in communist Hungary, the process (as in other states) began with the holding of national elections of deputies, which were held on
8 June 1980. About two weeks later, on 24 June, the
12th Central Committee of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) convened to discuss the personnel of state organs. The HSWP then sent
General Secretary János Kádár to the
Patriotic People's Front, the main
transmission belt organisation, on 26 June to get its approval for the decisions taken by the aforementioned Central Committee session: the party's proposal was adopted unanimously. The next day, the Hungarian SSOP convened for its constituent session and started proceedings by electing its permanent organ, known as the
Presidential Council. Upon its election, the permanent organ convened and issued a decree on the merger of government ministries and submitted its recommendations for the composition of the
executive organ, the
judicial organ, and the
procuratorial organ. The session approved the recommendations unanimously. Sessions can be convened to adopt laws and elect officials, but also to listen to a report by a state organ. For example, no laws were adopted or amended at a session of the Bulgarian SSOP on 21 March 1981. In other cases, such as the 20−22 December 1977 session of Bulgaria's SSOP, the elected representatives convened to approve decrees issued by the permanent organ since the last session of the SSOP. This session also by-elected new deputies to the SSOP since some incumbent deputies had died since the last session. The
7th Sejm, which lasted from 1976 to 1980, convened for 28 sessions and adopted 42 laws and four decrees, which was lower than the
6th Sejm, which approved 103 laws and 11 decrees. The Hungarian SSOP also adopted, in its 1971−1975 term, 23 laws. In comparison, the Hungarian permanent organ adopted 30 laws and decrees in the first 18 months of the electoral term. The same tendency can be discerned, according to Hazan, in Poland and other communist states: the permanent organ took over the legislative functions of the sessions of the SSOP. In cases where the SSOP enacted many changes, as the 30−31 March 1982 session of the Bulgarian SSOP did, there was little discussion. That session unanimously adopted amendments to 130 articles of the
penal code without debate. . The only major agenda item of the 20−22 December 1977 session of Bulgaria's SSOP was the report by the executive organ presented by
Stanko Todorov, the
chairman of the
Council of Ministers. This was a normal occurrence in the European communist states and is still a prominent feature of the existing communist states. In the report, the head of government normally informs the SSOP on the importance of implementing the decisions of the communist party and the tasks for the current year. Shortcomings and weaknesses can be admitted, but the overall focus is on accomplishments. These were designated as important state events, but highly symbolic. Todorov, as the Bulgarian head of government, was constitutionally bound to report on the government's activity to the SSOP. Despite the constitutional provision, the Bulgarian head of government failed to report on the government's activities in 1974, 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1982. No reasons were ever provided, and no one appeared to question why that was the case, at least in public, according to academic Baruch Hazan. Overt interference by the communist party in the activities of the SSOP is common in communist state politics. For example, at the 11th Session of the 7th National Assembly (the Bulgarian SSOP), held on 30−31 October 1979, its elected members voted unanimously to amend a law on scientific degrees and titles. The amendments were proposed by
Naco Papazov, the chairman of the
Committee on Science and Technological Progress, and only two representatives commented on it, making only minor suggestions. The amendments were adopted, but the following day,
Vladimir Bonev, the chair of the Bulgarian SSOP, read aloud a letter from
Todor Zhivkov, the
general secretary of the
Central Committee of the
Bulgarian Communist Party, that the discussions from the day before were "interesting" and, therefore, that the bill should be withdrawn so as to give them serious attention. Zhivkov proposed sending the bill to the
Legislative Commission of the SSOP to study them further. Zhivkov also suggested that instead of amending the bill, as the SSOP had done, an entirely new law should be adopted, and the proposed bill be postponed. The
Council of Ministers, the executive organ of the SSOP, then went on to withdraw the bill, and the SSOP approved the withdrawal unanimously. At the 15th Session of the
Czechoslovak Federal Assembly elected in 1976, held on 9−10 April 1980, the main agenda item was the report delivered by
Lubomír Štrougal, the
chairman of the
Council of Ministers. During the debate on the report, seventeen individuals spoke, most of whom merely repeated large parts of the report. Štrougal was asked two questions: one on the preparations of the five-year plan and another on domestic food supplies. He responded that the five-year plan was going according to plan and that he would seek to improve domestic food supplies. The session then went on to adopt the report unanimously.
Institutional evolution Originally, proceedings like these were the norm in the supreme state organs of power in communist Europe, and they were mostly characterised by their short, routine, and efficient sessions that produced unanimous approval of proposals. Unlike liberal democratic legislatures,
votes of no confidence, heated debates between competing views, or competitive elections were not a feature of the supreme state organs of power. However, this slowly began to change, starting with institutional reforms instigated in Yugoslavia after the
Tito–Stalin split of 1948. (NPC), dated 15 March 2015. The NPC is China's SSOP. Yugoslavia became the first communist state to experience a vote of no confidence in December 1966. In the
Socialist Republic of Slovenia, a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, the Chamber on Health and Welfare of the
Slovene state organ of power voted down the
Executive Council's (the government) proposal on social insurance. It led to
Janko Smole, the
president of the Slovene Executive Council, to offer his resignation. However, in a compromise, the National Assembly later reversed its decision, and the Executive Council amended its proposal. But Smole went on to leave office in 1967 and was replaced by
Stane Kavčič. A similar event took place in October 1978, when the
Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the Assembly, the federal-level SSOP of Yugoslavia, rejected the proposed economic plan for 1979 of the
Federal Executive Council, headed by
Veselin Đuranović, arguing that it was "too general, unclear and undefined, and therefore inadequate for effective implementation of the economic development policy." Similarly to the 1966 incident, the Federal Executive Council responded by amending its draft and the proposal was eventually accepted. The
Polish crisis of 1980–1981, which was an outgrowth of the economic crisis the country was experiencing, caused the resignation of
Edward Gierek as
first secretary of the
Central Committee of the
Polish United Workers' Party. The pressure on the political system caused the Polish SSOP, the Sejm, to take a more critical position towards the party. In late 1980, the Sejm did not unanimously adopt the economic plan for 1981, and instead transferred the case to the special committees for further analysis. This adoption was conditional, and it was noted in the official bulletin: "The Sejm passed a motion provisionally approving the budget, which, in case of the central budget, will give it validity for the first quarter of the year. The Sejm preferred to give provisional approval rather than to hastily approve the full plan and budget, to the detriment of their analysis and possible correction." During proceedings, the elected representatives questioned
Henryk Kisiel, the deputy chairman of the Polish executive organ, and
Marian Krzak, the
finance minister, after they presented the 1981 plan and state budget. This question time, uncharacteristically, lasted for two and a half hours, and dealt with a plethora of questions. By December 1981, the Polish SSOP had begun criticising the executive organ, and indirectly the party leadership, at its sessions. At the December session, several elected representatives insisted that the sessions of the Polish SSOP should have the opportunity to examine the preliminary drafts of the annual economic plan and state budget rather than just the finalised proposals, which was an unstated communist state norm. The session also called for the SSOP to be involved in all personnel changes in the state executive organ, rather than merely being notified of changes, marking a departure from a traditional communist practice. Furthermore, the SSOP insisted that ministers must attend meetings of the special committees when requested. Although these demands were not met, the session on 12 February 1981, which elected the executive and permanent organs for the new term, witnessed an election that deviated from the norms of the communist state once again. A total of 33 members of the supreme state organ opposed the recall of
Krzysztof Kruszewski as the minister of education and training, while 35 members abstained from voting. In the case of
Tadeusz Skwirzyński, the minister of forestry and the timber industry, seven members voted against his recall, and fifteen abstained. Other objections were raised during the session, which was broadcast live by
Radio Warszawa. In recent years, the way in which the supreme state organs of power conduct their business has changed in the existing communist states. Albeit there are still differences between states. For example, China's
13th National People's Congress sat from 2018 until 2023, was composed of 2980 deputies, and convened for five meetings that lasted, in total, 48 days. In between those sessions, its permanent organ, the
NPC Standing Committee, led legislative work. In Vietnam, the
14th National Assembly, which was in session from 2016 to 2021, had 496 deputies and convened for 11 meetings totaling 299 days. Similarly to the 13th NPC, its permanent organ led work between these sessions. The eighth electoral term of the Laotian SSOP, which met from 2016 to 2021, had 148 deputies and convened ten sessions, totalling 223 days. However, the Chinese SSOP convenes more than Cuba's
National Assembly of People's Power and North Korea's
Supreme People's Assembly. Cuba's
9th National Assembly of People's Power (2018–2023) convened for fifteen meetings totalling 19 days, while North Korea's
13th Supreme People's Assembly (2014–2019) convened six meetings totalling six days. Vietnam's SSOP is more active and allows for more active sessions than its communist state counterparts. For example, Vietnam's SSOP passed a law allowing transgender people to change gender in 2017: 282 representatives voted for the bill, while 84 opposed it. During the debate on whether to establish a
constitutional council,
Nguyễn Sinh Hùng, a
politburo and
chair of the SSOP, voiced support for it. In contrast,
Trần Đại Quang, another politburo member and the
public security minister, voiced his opposition. To gain a clearer understanding of the opposing sides' strength, the SSOP held a preliminary vote on establishing a constitutional review organ, with 216 voting against and 141 voting in favor. Moreover, Vietnam's SSOP organises question times of every central state officeholder (including the prime minister) at its sessions. Proceedings are televised live, with criticism by elected representatives of government mishandling and corruption a typical occurrence, and regular votes of no confidence occur. For example, on 11 June 2013, Vietnam's SSOP organised a vote of confidence, in which 42 per cent, 32 per cent, and 25 per cent of representatives voted that they had low confidence in
Minister of Industry and Trade Vũ Huy Hoàng,
State Bank governor Nguyễn Văn Bình, and
Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, respectively. Vietnam's SSOP has also rejected nominees for state positions.
Permanent organ The permanent organ of an SSOP is elected at the first session of the SSOP's new term. Since the SSOP only convenes for a few days each year, most of its duties are delegated to its permanent organ, which can meet up to several times a month. The most common names given to these organs are Standing Committee, Presidium, State Council, and Council of State. In most cases, the permanent organ of the SSOP was designated as the collective state presidency. In some countries, such as in the
Socialist Republic of Romania and the
People's Republic of Angola, the
state president as head of state served
ex officio as chairman of the permanent organ. When he is not concurrently designated as head of state, the chair of a permanent organ has no distinct powers other than chairing the sessions. Unlike common practice in liberal democratic states, the permanent organ chair could not veto the SSOP or dissolve it. Theoretically, the SSOP could remove the entirety of the presidium or change its composition as it pleased. Laws adopted by the SSOP and its permanent organ had to be promulgated, in the Soviet Union at least, through a signature by the permanent organ chair. However, in practice, the chair of the permanent organ was treated by foreign states as the head of state since the officeholder often was sent on missions to represent the state abroad. The first communist states to establish the office of president were Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The
president of Czechoslovakia was quite powerful, and could convene, postpone, and dissolve the Czechoslovak SSOP. The
East German presidency, like the Czechoslovak presidency, was elected by the SSOP, but unlike its Czechoslovak counterpart, was only empowered to represent the state abroad and promulgate laws by signature alongside the head of government. The People's Republic of China (PRC) also established a presidency, first known as the
chairman of the People's Republic of China and later reestablished in 1982 as state president.
Mao Zedong, the first leader of the PRC, rejected that the chairmanship functioned as a head of state, arguing instead that the major differences between the Soviet system and the Chinese was that the chairman acted as a representative of the state collective leadership.
Liu Shaoqi, Mao's deputy, in his report on the
1954 Constitution of China, stated that the powers of the Chinese head of state was jointly exercised by the permanent organ, the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and the state chairman. The president has no independent powers other than those bestowed by China's permanent organ. To be eligible for election to a permanent organ, one must already be a member of the SSOP. As part of the delegation of power, the permanent organs holds legislative powers, such as issuing decrees, representing the state abroad, interpreting the laws, organising national elections, convoking the sessions of the SSOP, holding referendums, adopting treaties, appointing and recalling diplomatic representatives, and representing the SSOP when it is not in session. While it is officially accountable to the sessions of the SSOP, the permanent organ has usually amassed so much power that the supreme state organ of power has failed to hold the members of the permanent organ accountable. The permanent organ is firmly under the party's control. However, in circumstances where more than one party exists, the other parties are usually represented in the membership. In some instances, they hold important positions within the permanent organ. For example,
Petur Tanchev as leader of the
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union served as first deputy chairman. In East Germany,
Gerald Götting, the leader of the
Christian Democratic Union,
Heinrich Homann, chairman of the
National Democratic Party, and
Manfred Gerlach, as leader of the
Liberal Democratic Party served as deputy chairmen of the State Council. The same goes for Poland, where in 1985,
Tadeusz Młyńczak from the
Alliance of Democrats and
Zdzisław Tomal from the
United Peasants' Party concurrently served as deputy chairs of the State Council. The permanent organs of communist states share many common features. For example, the
Presidium of Albania's Supreme People's Assembly was composed of a chair, two vice chairs, one secretary, and about ten members. In Bulgaria, the
State Council was composed of 29 members, of which one served as chair, one as first deputy chair, three deputy chairs, and one secretary. The
Hungarian People's Republic named its permanent organ the
Presidential Council, and it was composed of about 21 members, of which one served as chair, two as deputy chairs, and one as secretary.
Special committees The special committees are established by the sessions of the SSOP, and their work is coordinated and led by the permanent organ. The modern system of special committees of the SSOP was established in 1938 during the 1st Session of the
1st Supreme Soviet. It established eight special committees, of which four were established in the lower house and the other four in the upper house. During its first years, there were few signs of activity from the special committees, and their influence on Soviet law-making was, according to academic Robert W. Siegler, negligible. However, with Stalin's death in 1953, power became gradually more dispersed, but the committee system remained virtually unchanged until 1966. The 1st Session of the
7th Supreme Soviet established twelve new commissions and expanded the size of the existing ones. At the 1st Session of the
9th Supreme Soviet, held in 1974, the number of special committees was increased to 28. This period significantly increased their importance and role in law-making: laws, decrees, and other issues were discussed at meetings of the special committees instead of the sessions of the SSOP. The special committees of the supreme state organs of power have gained more influence with time. They have a sizeable role in determining the state budget and approving economic plans in these states. These committees use their institutional position to gain help from academic institutions, individual specialists, the broader public, and transmission belt organisations, to help legislate properly. According to Stephen White, in the Soviet Union, the special committee's impact "upon educational, environmental, budgetary and other matters [was] often considerable." Despite their lack of autonomy, the supreme state organs of power hold the other state organs to account and supervise their work in a non-oppositional way. Accountability work is mainly the responsibility of special committees in communist states. They achieve this by evaluating a given state organ's performance and legal compliance. The special committees are normally empowered to call officials in for questioning and could initiate investigations on the implementation and effects of state policies. They are typically authorised to write reports that act as a recommendation to a specific state organ. A written report had to be given an official response by the state organ in question, in which it had to inform the special committee on the progress of policy implementation and possible countermeasures.
Executive organ The executive and administrative organ of the state is most often denoted as an internal organ of the SSOP (as in China, East Germany, North Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia). However, in other states, such as Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union, it was designated most commonly as "the supreme executive and administrative state organ of power" or simply as "the supreme executive state organ of power", meaning that it is part of the
unified state apparatus and formally inferior to the SSOP. These organs were formally designated as the governments of their respective countries and were most commonly given the name "Council of Ministers", though Czechoslovakia's was known as the government and Yugoslavia's was designated as the
Federal Executive Council. In the existing communist states, the executive organ has a plethora of designations: as the
State Council in China, as the government in Laos and Vietnam, as the
Council of Ministers in Cuba, and as the
Cabinet in North Korea. The head of the executive organ was equivalent in rank to a
prime minister in non-communist systems. Per unified power, the executive organ is subordinate to the SSOP. However, in reality, since the very establishment of the first communist state in Russia, the executive organ has been more powerful than the SSOP, according to scholar Georg Brunner. Across most of the communist world, the executive organ is the most powerful state organ. In cases where it is not, the permanent organ most often acts as the most powerful state organ. The reason for its preeminent position is that the executive organ is responsible for the state administrative structures, meaning ministries, departments, and other administrative units. In certain cases, the executive organ developed from being a mere administrative decision coordinator to its prime instigator. There have been cases in communist history in which the party leader concurrently served as the head of the executive organ.
Vladimir Lenin served as both the party's informal leader and the executive organ's head. After his death,
Alexey Rykov served as head of government until
Joseph Stalin's protege,
Vyacheslav Molotov, took power. At the height of his powers, Stalin concurrently served as party general secretary and head of the executive organ. Having the party leader serve concurrently as head of government was common in the late 1940s and early 1950s in communist Europe. However, this norm was eventually discarded since it was believed to centralise too much power in one person. Ever since, the norm has been that the party leader and the head of the executive organ are two distinct individuals.
Unified state apparatus The SSOP heads the
unified state apparatus, meaning the state is organised as a single branch of government where all powers emanate from the organs of state power. This is why, for example, the 1936 Soviet constitution designates the Supreme Soviet as the SSOP: it holds the supreme powers of the state. All other state organs are inferior to the SSOP, which acts as the chief lawmaker and the pinnacle of the constitutional system. This also means, as was the case in the Soviet Union, that the SSOP controlled the lower-level soviets (state organs of power). From a Marxist−Leninist perspective, the SSOP personifies the people's will. According to
Andrey Vyshinsky, a leading Soviet legal theorist who served as the
Procurator General of the Soviet Union, power is "personified in the [SSOP], the will of the people—of the masses of millions of workers, peasants and intellectuals—finds expression." In communist states, all state organs are elected by the SSOP, which is either directly elected through controlled elections, as in the Soviet Union, or indirectly elected, as in China. The
supreme judicial organ of communist states is the
supreme court. It is elected at the sessions of the SSOP and is held accountable to the SSOP and its permanent organ. The permanent organ controls the supreme judicial organ by supervising its activities and interpreting laws. It was also not uncommon that there was an overlap in personnel between the SSOP and the supreme judicial organ. For example,
Alexander Gorkin, the longstanding president of the
Supreme Court of the Soviet Union, began working for the Soviet Central Committee in 1930 before starting work in the SSOP, most prominently as the secretary of the Soviet permanent organ. After working there for 20 years, Gorkin was elected as the president of the Supreme Court in 1957. The
supreme procuratorial organ of a communist state is often known as the procuracy, as in Vietnam's
Supreme People's Procuracy or the Office of the Procurator General in the Soviet Union. Like the supreme judicial organ, the procuracy's leadership is elected during sessions of the SSOP. It is accountable to both the SSOP and its permanent organ. While it is the highest prosecutorial organ of communist states, the permanent organ is also nominally vested with prosecutorial authority. It's also inferior to the permanent organ, considering the former adopts and interprets the laws, and supervises the procuracy's work. ==Membership==