First essay Introduction After a short account of the incidents preceding the king's conversion and of his conversations with a
philosopher, a
Christian, and a
Muslim concerning their respective beliefs, a
rabbi appears in the discussion. His first statement startles the king, for instead of giving him proofs of the
existence of God, he asserts and explains the miracles performed by God in favor of the
Israelites. The king expresses his astonishment at this
exordium, which seems to him incoherent. The rabbi replies that the existence of God, the
creation of the world, and other doctrines taught by the Jewish religion do not need any speculative demonstrations. Further, he presents the principle upon which his religious system is founded: that
revealed religion is far superior to
natural religion. The aim of ethical
self-cultivation, which is the object of religion, is not to create in humans good intentions but to cause them to perform good deeds. This aim cannot be attained by philosophy, which is undecided about the nature of
good, but can be secured by a religious education and life, which teaches what is good. As
science is the sum of all
truth found by successive generations, so religious training is based upon a set of traditions; in other words,
history is an important factor in the development of human culture and science.
Creatio ex nihilo Halevi writes that, as the Jews are the only depositaries of a written history of the development of the human race from the beginning of the world, the superiority of their traditions cannot be denied. Halevi asserts that no comparison is possible between
Jewish culture, which in his view is based upon religious truth, and
Greek culture, which is based upon science only. He holds that the wisdom of
Greek philosophy lacked the divine support with which the
Israelite prophets were endowed. Had a trustworthy tradition that the world was created out of nothing been known to
Aristotle, he would have supported it by at least as strong arguments as those advanced by him to prove the
eternity of matter. However, belief in the eternity of matter is not absolutely contrary to Jewish religious ideas: the biblical narrative of
the Creation refers only to the beginning of the human race, and does not preclude the possibility of preexistent matter. Still, relying upon tradition, Judaism assumes
creatio ex nihilo, the theological position that the universe was created from nothing by a divine act. This assumption can be supported by compelling philosophical and theological arguments, which are comparable in strength to those favoring the concept of the eternity of matter—an idea proposing that the universe has no beginning and has
existed infinitely in time. The objection that an absolutely perfect and
infinite God could not have produced imperfect and finite beings—made by the
Neoplatonists to the principle of
creatio ex nihilo—is not removed by attributing the existence of all mundane things to the action of
nature; for the latter is only a link in the chain of causes having its origin in the
First Cause, which is God.
Superiority of his faith Halevi then attempts to demonstrate the superiority of Judaism. The preservation of the
Israelites in Egypt and in the wilderness, God
revelation of the Torah on
Mount Sinai, and Israel's later history are, to him, evident proofs of its superiority. He impresses upon the king that the favor of God can be won only by following God's precepts in their totality, and that those precepts are binding
only on Jews. The question of why the Jews were favored with God's instruction is answered in the
Kuzari in line 95 of chapter 1: it was based upon their being descended from Adam, God first child, who was perfect. Later,
Noah's most pious son was
Shem. His most pious son was
Arpachshad.
Abraham was Arpachshad's descendant,
Isaac was Abraham's most pious son, and
Jacob was Isaac's most pious son. The
sons of Jacob were all worthy, and their children became the Jews. The rabbi then shows (chapter 1:109–121) that the immortality of the
soul,
resurrection, reward, and punishment are all denoted in the Hebrew Bible and referred to in Jewish writings.
Second essay Question of attributes In the second essay, Halevi enters into a detailed discussion of some of the theological questions hinted at in the preceding one. To these belong, in the first place, those of the
divine attributes. Halevi rejects entirely the doctrine of essential attributes, which had been propounded by
Saadia Gaon and
Bahya ibn Paquda. For him, there is no difference between essential and other attributes. Either the attribute affirms a quality in God, in which case essential attributes cannot be applied to him more than can any other, because it is impossible to predicate anything of him, or the attribute expresses only the negation of the contrary quality, and in that case, there is no harm in using any kind of attributes. Accordingly, Halevi divides all the attributes found in the Hebrew Bible into three classes: active, relative, and negative, which last class comprises all the essential attributes expressing mere negations. Halevi enters into a lengthy discussion on the question of attributes being closely connected with that of
anthropomorphism. Although opposed to the conception of
God's corporeality as contrary to Jewish scripture, he would consider it wrong to reject all the sensuous concepts of anthropomorphism, as there is something in these ideas which fills the human soul with the awe of God. The remainder of the essay comprises dissertations on the following subjects: the excellence of
Israel, the land of
prophecy, which is to other countries what the Jews are to other nations; the
sacrifices; the arrangement of the
Tabernacle, which, according to Halevi, symbolizes the human body; the prominent spiritual position occupied by Israel, whose relation to other nations is that of the heart to the limbs; the opposition evinced by Judaism toward
asceticism, in virtue of the principle that the favor of God is to be won only by carrying out his precepts, and that these precepts do not command humans to subdue the inclinations suggested by the
faculties of the soul, but to use them in their due place and proportion; and the excellence of the
Hebrew language, which, although sharing now the fate of the Jews, is to other languages what the Jews are to other nations and what Israel is to other lands.
Third essay: The oral tradition The third essay is devoted to the refutation of the teachings of
Karaism and to the history of the
development of the
oral tradition in the
Mishnah and
Talmud. Halevi shows that there is no means of carrying out the precepts without having recourse to oral tradition; that such tradition has always existed may be inferred from many passages of the Hebrew Bible, the very
reading of which is dependent upon it, since there were no
vowels or accents in the
original text.
Fourth essay: Names of God The fourth essay opens with an analysis of the various
names of God found in the Hebrew Bible. According to Halevi, all these names, with the exception of the
Tetragrammaton, are attributes expressing the various states of God's activity in the world. The multiplicity of names no more implies a multiplicity in his essence than do the multifarious influences of the rays of the sun on various bodies imply a multiplicity of suns. To the prophet's intuitive vision, the actions proceeding from God appear under the images of the corresponding human actions.
Angels are God's messengers, either existing for a long time or created only for special purposes. Halevi shifts from discussing God's names and the nature of angels to emphasizing that the prophets offer a more genuine understanding of God than philosophers do. While he shows deep respect for the
Sefer Yetzirah—quoting many passages from it—he quickly clarifies that Abraham's ideas were held by the patriarch before God revealed himself to him. The essay ends with examples of ancient Hebrew knowledge in astronomy and medicine.
Fifth essay: Arguments against philosophy The fifth and last essay is devoted to a criticism of the various philosophical systems known at the time of the author. Halevi attacks by turns
Aristotelian cosmology, psychology, and
metaphysics. To the
doctrine of emanation, based, according to him, upon the Aristotelian cosmological principle that no
simple being can produce a compound being, he objects in the form of the following query: "Why did the emanation stop at the lunar sphere? Why should each intelligence think only of itself and of that from which it issued and thus give birth to one emanation, thinking not at all of the preceding intelligences, and thereby losing the power to give birth to many emanations?" He argues against the theory of Aristotle that the soul of humankind is in its mind and that only the souls of philosophers will be united—after the death of their bodies—with the active intellect. "Is there," he asks, "any curriculum of the knowledge one has to acquire to win immortality? How is it that the soul of one man differs from that of another? How can one forget a thing once thought of?" and many other questions of the kind. He shows himself especially severe against the
Motekallamin, whose arguments on the creation of the world, on God, and his unity he terms dialectic exercises and mere phrases. However, Halevi is against limiting philosophical speculation to matters concerning creation and God; he follows the Greek philosophers in examining the creation of the material world. Thus, he admits that every being is made up of
matter and form. The movement of
celestial spheres formed the sphere of the elements, from the fusion of which all beings were created. This fusion, which varied according to climate, gave to matter the potentiality to receive from God a variety of forms: from the mineral, which is the lowest in the scale of creation, to humankind, which is the highest because of its possessing, in addition to the qualities of the
mineral,
vegetable, and
animal, a hylic intellect that is influenced by the active intellect. This hylic intellect, which forms the rational soul, is a spiritual substance, not an accident, and therefore imperishable. Discussions concerning the soul and its faculties naturally lead to the question of
free will. Halevi upholds the doctrine of free will against the
Epicurean and the
Fatalist and endeavors to reconcile it with the belief in God's
providence and
omniscience. == Commentaries on the book ==