Military of the Islamic State

in 2014. According to the Institute for the Study of War, IS's 2013 annual report reveals a metrics-driven military command, which is "a strong indication of a unified, coherent leadership structure that commands from the top down". Middle East Forum's Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi said, "They are highly skilled in urban guerrilla warfare while the new Iraqi Army simply lacks tactical competence." IS's Military Council is made up of numerous former military officers from the Saddam Hussein era. Commanders have included Haji Bakr, a colonel; Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi, a captain; and Abu Ayman al-Iraqi, a lieutenant colonel, who all graduated from the same Iraqi military academy. Abu Omar al-Shishani, who was a sergeant in the Georgian Army before leading an IS unit in Syria, also became a prominent commander. IS's fighters are reportedly organised into seven branches: infantry, snipers, air defence, special forces, artillery forces, the "army of adversity", and the Caliphate Army. This force structure is largely replicated in each of its designated provinces, with the most skilled fighters and military strategists in each area serving in the special forces unit, which is not allowed to redeploy to other provinces. Parallel to this structure is the Caliphate Army, which is directed by IS's central command rather than its provincial leadership. Made up overwhelmingly of foreign fighters, it is deployed to assist in battles across the Islamic State. There is also an all-female Al-Khansaa Brigade tasked with enforcing religious laws. According to battle reports, IS often operates in small mobile fighting units. The Islamic State also operates outside areas it largely controls using a clandestine cell system. An IS-linked senior militant commander in Sinai told Reuters; "They [IS] teach us how to carry out operations. We communicate through the internet, ... they teach us how to create secret cells, consisting of five people. Only one person has contact with other cells. They are teaching us how to attack security forces, the element of surprise. They told us to plant bombs then wait 12 hours so that the man planting the device has enough time to escape from the town he is in." == Tactics ==

The military of IS is organized as a mixture of an irregular insurgent force and a conventional army. In its Syrian and Iraqi territory, the Islamic State organized professional units for specialised tasks, with the "Tank Battalion", the "Artillery Battalion", and the "Platoons of Special Tasks" being among the most important. The first one employed heavy armoured fighting vehicles, the second heavy artillery, while the last one was used as a rapid intervention force. The three regularly worked in tandem for breakthrough and important defense operations, made possible by a well-organised logistics system that kept operating even under regular bombardments by anti-IS forces. In contrast to these elite forces, most of IS' troops were local militias with few heavy weapons, usually deployed as territorial defense units. Less trained or less valuable troops were sometimes involved with offensive operations, although their tactics were less sophisticated. The Islamic State stood in sharp contrast to some other jihadist organizations such as the Caucasus Emirate which generally attempted to minimize their own casualties, and became notorious for its willingness to sacrifice many of its fighters. This is especially true in regard to IS's callous use of new recruits. Islamic State military training had a reputation for its strong focus on indoctrination, often to the detriment of more pertinent lessons. The organization's high command used inexperienced recruits for swarming and human wave tactics, often resulting in extremely high casualties. One high-ranking IS commander known for this approach was Abu Omar al-Shishani, who successfully employed swarming tactics during the Siege of Menagh Air Base and Battle of Tabqa Airbase. According to his reasoning, the enemy would eventually be overwhelmed or run out of ammunition regardless of the casualties among IS fighters. Regional expert Joanna Paraszczuk sarcastically remarked that al-Shishani's tactics were based on the belief that "everyone want[s] to be a Shahid" (martyr), ==Troops==

Troops in Iraq and Syria In June 2014, the Islamic State had at least 4,000 fighters in Iraq. By September 2014, the CIA estimated that the group had grown to 20,000–31,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria, while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) put its estimate at around 80,000 total (up to 50,000 in Syria and 30,000 in Iraq) by August 2014. An Iraqi Kurdish leader even estimated in November 2014 that the Islamic State's military had 200,000 fighters. The group's rapid growth was partially facilitated by IS forcing other rebel groups to fight for it, as well as conscripting individuals. In general, a large part of IS's Iraqi and Syrian armies consisted of local militias whose loyalty was generally somewhat dubious. These local forces were put under commanders from IS's core group, and only those groups who proved themselves trustworthy were provided with better weaponry. In 2015, Reuters quoted "jihadist ideologues" as claiming that IS has 40,000 fighters and 60,000 supporters. Ethnically, the Islamic State's military is dominated by Sunni Arabs. However, the group also recruited Kurds in Iraq and Syria. However, IS became increasingly anti-Kurdish over time, and even began to use anti-Kurdish racism as recruiting tool. Foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria There are many foreign fighters in IS's ranks. In June 2014, The Economist reported that IS "may have up to 6,000 fighters in Iraq and 3,000–5,000 in Syria, including perhaps 3,000 foreigners; nearly a thousand are reported to hail from Chechnya and perhaps 500 or so more from France, Britain and elsewhere in Europe." Chechen leader Abu Omar al-Shishani, for example, was made commander of the northern sector of IS in Syria in 2013. According to The New York Times, in September 2014 there were more than 2,000 Europeans and 100 Americans among IS's foreign fighters. As of mid-September 2014, around 1,000 Turks had joined IS, and as of October 2014, 2,400–3,000 Tunisians had joined the group. An IS deserter alleged that foreign recruits were treated with less respect than Arabic-speaking Muslims by IS commanders and were placed in suicide units if they lacked otherwise useful skills. According to a UN report, an estimated 15,000 fighters from nearly 70 countries have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join militant groups, including IS. Reuters has stated that according to jihadist ideologues, 10 percent of IS's fighters in Iraq and 30 percent of its fighters in Syria are from outside those countries. As of October 2015, 21% came from Europe, 50% from Western Asia or North Africa, and 29% from elsewhere; according to the Global Terrorism Index and other sources, they were of the following nationalities: List of nationalities of foreign nationals pledging to IS This is a list of nationalities of foreigners who joined IS from June 2014 to June 2018. This list does not include citizens of Syria, or Iraq. This list includes women and children who joined IS, many of whom were noncombatants. In total, 41,490 non-Iraqis and non-Syrians joined IS's main branch in these countries (32,089 were adult men), of whom 7,366 (5,930 were adult men) returned to their countries of departure, sometimes to face charges; most of the rest are presumed dead. • : 5,000 (380 returnees) • : 4,000 (900 returnees) • : 3,950 (250 returnees) • : 3,244 (760 returnees) • : 3,000 (900 returnees) • : 2,500 • : 1,910 (398 returnees) • : 1,699 (236 returnees) • : 1,502 (147 returnees) • : 1,000 • : 960 (303 returnees) • : 900 • : 900 (49 returnees) • : 863 (63 returnees) • : 850 (425 returnees) • : 800 (183 returnees) • : 600 (113-128 returnees) • : 600 • : 600 • : 500 • : 498 (123 returnees) • : 359 (133 returnees) • : 323 (56 returnees) • : 311 (150 returnees) • : 300 (60 returnees) • : 278 (87) • : 272 (40 returnees) • : 254 (94 returnees) • : 214 (40 returnees) • : 208 (30 returnees) • : 200 • : 200 (17 returnees) • : 155 (72 returnees) • : 154 (8 returnees) • : 150 (6 returnees) • : 145 (72 returnees) • : 144 (44 returnees) • : 140 (11 returnees) • : 140 (2 returnees) • : 130 • : 129 (11 returnees) • : 122 (43 returnees) • : 120 • : 110 • : 100 • : 100 (40 returnees) • : 100 (17 returnees) • : 100 • : 100 • : 100 • : 75 (11 returnees) • : 70 • : 70 (14 returnees) • : 60 (10 returnees) • : 59 (7 returnees) • : 50 • : 40 (25 returnees) • : 40 • : 32 • : 30 • : 27 (10 returnees) • : 23 • : 15 • : 15 • : 15 (2 returnees) • : 11 • : 10 • : 10 • : 10 (2 returnees) • : 9 • : 8 • : 8 • : 7 • : 6 • : 3 • : 1–3 • : 3 • : 2 • : 2 • : 1 • : 1 • : 1 • : 1 • : 1 • : 1 • : 1 • : 1 • : 1 Allegiance to IS from groups outside Iraq and Syria • Wilayat Algeria formed from the Algerian Jund al-Khilafah after it pledged allegiance to IS. • Wilayat Barqa and others formed from the allegiance of Libyan militants like the Shura Council of Islamic Youth, and defectors formerly associated with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. • Wilayat Yemen formed from militants in Yemen, including defectors from Ansar al-Sharia and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. • Wilayat Najd and others formed from unidentified militants in Saudi Arabia. Tehreek-e-Khilafat, and dissident commanders formerly associated with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. • Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya formed from Boko Haram pledging allegiance to IS. • Wilayat al-Qawqaz formed from dissident militants of the Caucasus Emirate in Chechnya and Dagestan who switched their allegiance to IS. • Militants of the group Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade (Palestinian Territories) pledged allegiance to IS. • Militants of the group Abu Sayyaf under Isnilon Totoni Hapilon and Radullan Sahiron (Philippines, Malaysia). pledged allegiance to IS. • Members of Ansar Khalifa Philippines pledged allegiance to IS and they start using IS props in their training. • Some Bangladeshi terrorist cells pledged allegiance to IS and starts attacking civilians and bloggers. • Some members of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, including leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur pledged allegiance. • Abnaa ul-Calipha was formed by some Al-Shabaab dissidents in Puntland, led by Abdul Qadir Mumin, who pledged allegiance to IS in 2015. Since then, Al-Shabaab has unsuccessfully attempted to kill these defectors. • Jabha East Africa, an Islamist group operating in Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia and Uganda, defected from Al-Qaeda and pledged allegiance to IS. • In 2016, Abu-Walid al-Sahraoui and dissidents from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb pledged allegiance to IS creating the group known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. The group operates in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso • The City of Monotheism and Monotheists group, operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has pledged allegiance to IS. • The "Lions of the Caliphate in the Maghreb Al Aqsa", operating in Morocco, has pledged allegiance to IS. Child soldiers IS is reported to employ child soldiers, known as "Cubs of the Caliphate", for both combat and propaganda purposes. ==Weapons==

Conventional weapons . The most common weapons used against US and other Coalition forces during the Iraq insurgency were those taken from Saddam Hussein's weapon stockpiles around the country. These included AKM variant assault rifles, PK machine guns and RPG-7s. IS has been able to strengthen its military capability by capturing large quantities and varieties of weaponry during the Syrian Civil War and the post-withdrawal Iraqi insurgency. These weapons seizures have improved the group's capacity to carry out successful subsequent operations and obtain more equipment. Weaponry that IS has reportedly captured and employed include SA-7 and Stinger surface-to-air missiles, M79 Osa, HJ-8 and AT-4 Spigot Humvees, T-54/55, T-72, and M1 Abrams main battle tanks, truck-mounted DShK guns, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, IS shot down an Iraqi helicopter in October 2014, and claims to have shot down "several other" helicopters in 2014. Observers fear that they have "advanced surface-to-air missile systems" such as the Chinese-made FN-6, which are thought to have been provided to Syrian rebels by Qatar and/or Saudi Arabia, and purchased or captured by IS. Aircraft IS also captured many inoperable fighter aircraft after capturing the Syrian airbase of Al-Tabqa. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported in October 2014 that former Iraqi pilots were training IS militants to fly captured Syrian jets. Witnesses reported that MiG-21 and MiG-23 jets were flying over al-Jarrah military airport, but the US Central Command said it was not aware of flights by IS-operated aircraft in Syria or elsewhere. On 21 October, the Syrian Air Force claimed that it had shot down two of these aircraft over al-Jarrah air base while they were landing. Non-conventional . IS has a long history of using truck and car bombs, suicide bombers, and improvised explosive devices. Chemical weapons Reports suggested that IS captured Saddam-era chemical weapons from an Iraqi military base, and the group also forcibly enlisted the aid of scientists living in its territories to produce their own chemical weapons. IS managed to produce its own mustard gas, and employed it on battlefields in Iraq and Syria. According to one scientist involved in the project, the main value of the mustard gas to IS was not its impact on actual combat, but its effect in psychological warfare. The production of chemical weapons slowed greatly from early 2016, however, as the United States and the Iraqi government targeted production facilities and killed or captured the leaders of the programme. Regardless, it is generally believed that IS remains in possession of hidden data and equipment to restart the production of chemical weapons in the future. IS deployed mustard gas as well as unidentified chemical weapons against the Syrian Democratic Forces. According to the US military, IS used the chemical weapons effectively on a tactical level, but never managed to employ them in a way that impacted the larger strategic situation. The group produced not enough chemical weapons, being hampered not just by airstrikes and raids, but also lack of skilled personnel and equipment. ==See also==