ISWAP's origins date back to the emergence of
Boko Haram, a
Salafi jihadist movement centred in
Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. The movement launched an insurgency against the Nigerian government following an
unsuccessful uprising in 2009, aiming at establishing an
Islamic state in northern Nigeria, and the neighbouring regions of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Its
de facto leader
Abubakar Shekau attempted to increase his international standing among
Islamists by allying with the prominent
Islamic State (IS) in March 2015. Boko Haram thus became the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). When the insurgents were subsequently defeated and lost almost all of their lands during the
2015 West African offensive by the
Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), discontent grew among the rebels. Researcher
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi summarized that the Boko Haram leader proved to be "too extreme even by the Islamic State's standards". Shekau had always refused to fully submit to ISIL's central command, and the latter consequently removed him as leader of ISWAP in August 2016. Shekau responded by breaking with ISIL's central command, but many of the rebels stayed loyal to IS. As a result, the rebel movement split into a Shekau-loyal faction ("Jama'at Ahl al-sunna li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad", generally known as "Boko Haram"), and a pro-IS faction led by
Abu Musab al-Barnawi (which continued to call itself "Islamic State's West Africa Province"). These two groups have since clashed with each other, though they possibly occasionally cooperated against the local governments. It also changed its tactics, and attempted to win support by local civilians unlike Boko Haram which was known for its extensive indiscriminate violence. ISWAP begun to build up basic government services and focused its efforts on attacking Christian targets instead of Muslim ones. However, the group also continued to attack humanitarian personnel and select Muslim communities. In the course of 2020, the
Nigerian Armed Forces repeatedly attempted to capture the Timbuktu Triangle from ISWAP, but suffered heavy losses and made no progress. In April 2021, ISWAP overran a
Nigerian Army base around Mainok, capturing
armoured fighting vehicles including
main battle tanks, as well as other military equipment. In the next month, ISWAP
attacked and overran Boko Haram's bases in the
Sambisa Forest and Abubakar Shekau killed himself. As a result, many Boko Haram fighters defected to ISWAP, and the group secured a chain of strongholds from Nigeria to
Mali to southern
Libya. Despite this major victory, ISWAP was forced to deal with Boko Haram loyalists who continued to oppose the Islamic State. In August 2021, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was reportedly killed, either in battle with the Nigerian Army or during inter-ISWAP clashes. The accuracy of this claim was questioned by
Humangle Media researchers who gathered "multiple sources" suggesting that al-Barnawi had disappeared due to being promoted. Later that month, ISWAP suffered a defeat when attacking
Diffa, but successfully raided
Rann, destroying the local barracks before retreating with loot. In October and November, there were further leadership changes in ISWAP, as senior commanders were killed by security forces, with
Sani Shuwaram becoming the new leading commander. By January 2022, ISWAP began to increase its presence in Nigeria's
Borno State, occupying villages and setting up markets. On 24 January 2022, the small town of
Gudumbali was captured, whereupon the insurgents declared it the province's new capital and drove away the local chieftains. Gudumbali is of strategic as well as symbolic importance, as it is placed at a well defendable position and was a major Boko Haram stronghold during the latter group's peak in power. However, Nigerian troops immediately counter-attacked this time, retaking the settlement, destroying the local ISWAP headquarters, and a nearby night market associated with the group. By this point, researchers Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh argued that ISWAP had become one of IS' most important strongholds. In March, IS central command recognized its Greater Sahara branch as an autonomous province, called the "Sahel Province". Regardless, ISWAP maintained influence over IS forces in Mali,
Burkina Faso, and
Niger. In June 2022, the Nigerian
National Security Council declared that ISWAP was probably responsible for the
Owo church attack. As of October 2022, ISWAP had absorbed most of the former Boko Haram groups; However, some Boko Haram factions continued their resistance, Meanwhile, the
Battles of Toumbun Allura Kurnawa and Toumbun Gini erupted between ISWAP and Boko Haram. By January 2023, these clashes had ended in a substantial Boko Haram victory and the loss of several ISWAP bases at Lake Chad, though heavy fighting continued during the next months. From March to June 2023, ISWAP greatly increased the number of small-scale raids in Cameroon's
Far North Region, targeting Gassama,
Amchide,
Fotokol, and
Mora among other locations. According to researcher Jacob Zenn, these attacks appeared to be mostly operations to gather loot and supplies as well as spread terror among civilians who refused to pay taxes to IS. The repeated raids caused "severe economic disruption" in northern Cameroon. On 29 January 2026, the
Islamic State's
Sahel Province and
West Africa Province launched a large scale attack on
Diori Hamani International Airport in
Niamey,
Niger. The attack resulted in the deaths of twenty IS fighters and the capture of eleven others. == Organization ==