Domestic events and policies Consolidating power Assad quickly and successfully consolidated his power in what became known as
Assadization. Assad was able to do it thanks to
Al-Jama'a, an informal group of
Assadist men that formed in the 1960s and remained loyal to Assad, helping him rise to the very top of power. According to Patrick Seale, Assad's rule "began with an immediate and considerable advantage: the government he displaced was so detested that any alternative came as a relief". He first tried to establish national unity, which he felt had been lost under the leadership of Aflaq and Jadid. Assad differed from his predecessor at the outset, visiting local villages and hearing citizen complaints. The Syrian people felt that Assad's rise to power would lead to change; one of his first acts as ruler was to visit
Sultan al-Atrash, father of the Aflaqite Ba'athist Mansur al-Atrash, to honor his efforts during the
Great Arab Revolution. He made overtures to the Writers' Union, rehabilitating those who had been forced underground, jailed or sent into exile for representing what radical Ba'athists called the
reactionary classes: "I am determined that you shall no longer feel strangers in your own country." Although Assad did not democratize the country, he eased the government's repressive policies. Assad was
approved as president in a referendum on 12 March 1971 and was formally inaugurated on 14 March. He became the only ruler of Syria who came from a peasant family, which added to his initial popular support. In later years, Assad often cited his peasant origins as evidence of his closeness to the people, especially when he was attacked by his opponents. Jadid's security services were purged, some military criminal investigative powers were transferred to the police, and the confiscation of goods under Jadid was reversed. Restrictions on travel to and trade with Lebanon were eased, and Assad encouraged growth in the
private sector. While Assad supported most of Jadid's policies, he proved more pragmatic after he came to power. Most of Jadid's supporters faced a choice: continue working for the Ba'ath government under Assad, or face repression. Assad made it clear from the beginning "that there would be no second chances". However, later in 1970, he recruited support from the Ba'athist old guard who had supported Aflaq's leadership during the 1963–1966 power struggle. An estimated 2,000 former Ba'athists rejoined the party after hearing Assad's appeal, among them party ideologist Georges Saddiqni and Shakir al-Fahham, a secretary of the founding, 1st National Congress of the Ba'ath Party in 1947. Assad ensured that they would not defect to the pro-Aflaqite Ba'ath Party in Iraq with the Treason Trials in 1971, in which he prosecuted Aflaq, Amin al-Hafiz and nearly 100 followers (most
in absentia). The few who were convicted were not imprisoned long, and the trials were primarily symbolic. At the 11th National Congress, Assad assured party members that his leadership was a radical change from that of Jadid, and he would implement a "corrective movement" to return Syria to the true "nationalist socialist line". Unlike Jadid, Assad emphasised "the advancement of which all resources and manpower [would be] mobilised [was to be] the liberation of the occupied territories". This would mark a major break with his predecessors and would, according to Raymond Hinnebusch, dictate "major alterations in the course of the Ba'thist state".
Institutionalization , Prime Minister
Abdul Rahman Khleifawi, Assistant Regional Secretary Mohamad Jaber Bajbouj, Foreign Minister
Abdul Halim Khaddam and People's Council Speaker Fihmi al-Yusufi. In the third civilian row are Defense Minister
Mustafa Tlass (MP in the 1971 Parliament) and Air Force Commander
Naji Jamil. Behind Tlass is
Rifaat al-Assad, Assad's younger brother. On the far right in the fourth row is future vice president
Zuhair Masharqa, and behind Abdullah al-Ahmar is Deputy Prime Minister Mohammad Haidar. Assad turned the presidency, which had been known simply as "head of state" under Jadid, into a position of power during his rule. In many ways, the presidential authority replaced the Ba'ath Party's failed experiment with organised, military
Leninism; Syria became a hybrid of Leninism and Gaullist constitutionalism. According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "as the president became the main source of initiative in the government, his personality, values, strengths, and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and stability. Arguably Assad's leadership gave the government an enhanced combination of consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked." Assad institutionalised a system where he had the final say, which weakened the powers of the collegial institutions of the state and party. As fidelity to the leader replaced ideological conviction later in his presidency, corruption became widespread. The state-sponsored
cult of personality became pervasive; as Assad's authority strengthened at his colleagues' expense, he became the sole symbol of the government. While Assad did not rule alone, he increasingly had the last word; those with whom he worked eventually became lieutenants, rather than colleagues. None of the political elite would question a decision of his, and those who did were dismissed. General Naji Jamil is an example, being dismissed after he disagreed with Assad's handling of the
Islamist uprising. The two highest decision-making bodies were the Regional Command and the National Command, both part of the Ba'ath Party. Joint sessions of these bodies resembled
politburos in
communist states. Assad headed the National Command and the Regional Command as Secretary General and Regional Secretary, respectively. The Regional Command was the highest decision-making body in Syria, appointing the president and (through him) the cabinet. As presidential authority strengthened, the power of the Regional Command and its members evaporated. The Regional and National Commands were nominally responsible to the Regional Congress and the National Congress—with the National Congress the
de jure superior body—but the Regional Congress had
de facto authority. The National Congress, which included delegates from Ba'athist Regional Branches in other countries, has been compared to the
Comintern. It functioned as a session of the Regional Congress focusing on Syria's
foreign policy and party ideology. The Regional Congress had limited accountability until the 1985
Eighth Regional Congress, the last under Assad. In 1985, responsibility for leadership accountability was transferred from the Regional Congress to the weaker
National Progressive Front.
Economy Assad called his domestic reforms a
Corrective Movement, and it achieved some results. He introduced
Ta'addudiyya and
Infiraj policies, aimed at limited economic and political
liberalization, and tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors; one of his main achievements was the completion of the
Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River in 1974. One of the world's largest dams, its reservoir was called Lake al-Assad. The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria. Many peasants and workers received increased income, social security, and better health and educational services. The urban middle class, which had been hurt by the Jadid government's policy, had new economic opportunities. By 1977 it was apparent that despite some success, Assad's political reforms had largely failed. This was partly due to Assad's foreign policy, failed policies, natural phenomena, and corruption. Chronic socioeconomic difficulties remained, and new ones appeared. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education (particularly in rural areas), increasing emigration by professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among problems faced by the country. The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems, encouraging corruption and a black market. The
Fourth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) set ambitious goals but failed to achieve most of them, as well as
Fifth (1981-1985) and
Sixth (1986-1990) Plans. The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers—including Assad's brother Rifaat—in smuggling from Lebanon, which affected government revenue and encouraged corruption among senior government officials. During the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened; by mid-1984, the food crisis was severe, and the press was full of complaints. Assad's government sought a solution, arguing that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning. The food crisis continued through August, despite government measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment; this resulted in soaring prices, long queues and rampant black marketeering. Smuggling goods from Lebanon became common. Assad's government tried to combat the smuggling, encountering difficulties due to the involvement of his brother Rifaat in the corruption. In July 1984, the government formed an effective anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon–Syria borders. The Defense Detachment commanded by Rifaat al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, importing $400,000 worth of goods a day. The anti-smuggling squad seized $3.8 million in goods during its first week. The Syrian economy grew five to seven percent during the early 1990s; exports increased, the balance of trade improved, inflation remained moderate (15–18 percent) and oil exports increased. In May 1991 Assad's government liberalized the Syrian economy in so-called
Al-Ta`addudiyya Al-Iqtisadiyya campaign, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most foreign investors were Arab states around the Persian Gulf since Western countries still had political and economic issues with the country. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects; because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Assad's government did not privatize state-owned companies. Syria fell into recession during the mid-1990s. Several years later, its economic growth was about 1.5 percent. This was insufficient since population growth was between 3 and 3.5 percent. Another symptom of the crisis was
statism in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis coincided with a recession in world markets. A 1998 drop in oil prices dealt a major blow to Syria's economy; when oil prices rose the following year, the Syrian economy partially recovered. In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused a drop of 25–30 percent in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998. Assad's government implemented emergency measures, including loans and compensation to farmers and the distribution of free fodder to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the economy. Assad's government tried to decrease population growth, but this was only marginally successful. One sign of economic stagnation was Syria's lack of progress in talks with the EU on an agreement. The main cause of this failure was the country's difficulty in meeting EU demands to open the economy and introduce reforms. Marc Pierini, head of the EU delegation in Damascus, said that if the Syrian economy was not modernised it would not benefit from closer ties to the EU. Assad's government gave civil servants a 20-percent pay raise on the anniversary of the corrective movement that brought him to power. Although the foreign press criticised Syria's reluctance to liberalize its economy, Assad's government refused to modernize the bank system, permit private banks and open a stock exchange.
Sectarianism on the latter's arrival at
Damascus Airport, 15 July 1974 When Assad came to power, he increased Alawite dominance of the security and intelligence sectors to a near-monopoly. The coercive framework was under his control, weakening the state and party. According to Hinnebusch, the Alawite officers around Assad "were pivotal because as personal kinsmen or clients of the president, they combined privileged access to him with positions in the party and control of the levers of coercion. They were, therefore, in an unrivalled position to act as political brokers and, especially in times of crisis, were uniquely placed to shape outcomes". The leading figures in the Alawite-dominated security system had family connections;
Rifaat al-Assad controlled the Struggle Companies, and Assad's brother-in-law
Adnan Makhlouf was his second-in-command as Commander of the Presidential Guard. Other prominent figures were
Ali Haydar (special-forces head), Ibrahim al-Ali (Popular Army head),
Muhammad al-Khuli (head of Assad's
Air Force Intelligence Directorate from 1970 to 1987) and Military Intelligence head
Ali Duba. Assad controlled the military through Alawites such as Generals
Shafiq Fayadh (commander of the 3rd Division),
Ibrahim Safi (commander of the 1st Division) and
Adnan Badr Hassan (commander of the 9th Division). During the 1990s, Assad further strengthened Alawite dominance by replacing Sunni General
Hikmat al-Shihabi with General
Ali Aslan as chief of staff. The Alawites, with their high status, appointed and promoted based on kinship and favor rather than professional respect. Therefore, an Alawite elite emerged from these policies.
Anti-Sunni orientation of his Alawite regime also pushed Assad to pursue closer relations with
Shia Iran. During the early years of his rule, some of Assad's elite had appeared non-sectarian; prominent Sunni figures at the beginning of his rule were
Abdul Halim Khaddam, Shihabi, Naji Jamil,
Abdullah al-Ahmar and
Mustafa Tlass. However, none of these people had a power base distinct from that of Assad. Although Sunnis held the positions of Air Force Commander from 1971 to 1994 (Jamil, Subhi Haddad and Ali Malahafji), General Intelligence head from 1970 to 2000 (Adnan Dabbagh, Ali al-Madani, Nazih Zuhayr, Fuad al-Absi and Bashir an-Najjar), Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army from 1974 to 1998 (Shihabi) and defense minister from 1972 until after Assad's death (Tlass), none had power separate from Assad or the Alawite-dominated security system. When Jamil headed the Air Force, he could not issue orders without the knowledge of Khuli (the Alawite head of Air Force Intelligence). After the failed Islamist uprising, Assad's reliance on his relatives intensified; before that, his Sunni colleagues had some autonomy. A defector from Assad's government said, "Tlass is in the army but at the same time seems as if he is not of the army; he neither binds nor loosens and has no role other than that of the tail in the beast." Another example was Shihabi, who occasionally represented Assad. However, he had no control in the Syrian military; Ali Aslan, First Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations during most of his tenure, was responsible for troop maneuvers. Although the Sunnis were in the forefront, the Alawites had the power.
Militarization From the very beginning of his rule, Assad pursued an active policy of
militarizing the Syrian state and its society - his goal was to build a strong traditional army (with the support of the
USSR) to fight
Israel. Assad gave a very high priority to building a strong military and preparing it for a confrontation with Israel, both for offensive and defensive purposes and to enable him to politically negotiate the return of the
Golan Heights from a position of military strength. He allocated up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and received large quantities of modern arms from the Soviet Union: Eventually, with the help of it, Assad built a large and professional military equipped with modern tanks, airplanes and long-range
ground-to-ground missiles capable of launching chemical warheads into most Israeli cities. The
Syrian Arab Army, which was mainly a conscripted force, increased from 50,000 personnel in 1967 to 225,000 in 1973 and to over 500,000 in 1986, and its air and armored fleets were among the largest in the world. Already high military spending has steadily increased, burdening the Syrian economy. The policy of general militarization also affected the civil sphere of the country: militaristic propaganda was very widespread, especially in schools and educational institutions (where students were taught military tactics and the use of weapons and go to military camps known as moaskar for 15 days, where they were further introduced to soldier's life and were under the command of military officers. Thus, taking into account only the soldiers of the Syrian army, Syria was already the 4th country in the world in terms of militarization per capita, despite the fact that even more people in the country knew how to own a weapon, from school days.
Arab Belt project From 1973 to 1976, under Assad's orders, an
Arabization campaign known as the "
Arab Belt" was carried out in northeastern Syria. Assad government called campaign "
Plan to establish model state farms in the Jazira region"
. The aim of the campaign was to change the ethnic composition of north-east Syria in favor of the Arabs and to the detriment of the local inhabitants, the
Kurds. It involved the seizure of land which was then settled with Arabs displaced by the creation of
Lake Assad. The programme was implemented in 1973; forcibly deporting around 140,000 Kurds from 332 villages and confiscating their lands around a 180-mile strip. Tens of thousands of Arab settlers coming from
Raqqa were then granted these lands to establish settlements. The area of the project was a strip of land - almost 15 km in breadth - that extended over 375 km in length; across the north-eastern boundary-regions of Syria with
Turkey and
Iraq. Twelve were built each around
Qamishli and
Al-Malakiyah and sixteen around
Ras al Ayn. The Kurdish village names of the area were replaced by Arabic names not necessarily related to the traditions and history of the region. Later, Hindawi began to claim that everything was planned by
Mossad, but most countries accepted the first version of events about Syria's involvement. After the court found Hindawi guilty, the then-British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher broke off diplomatic relations with Syria. Following this, the United States and Canada recalled their ambassadors from Syria. The
European Community also imposed minor sanctions.
Gulf War When
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Assad sided with Kuwait and considered Iraq's aggression as a serious threat to Syria's interests.
Assad and Saddam had long detested each other, As a result, Syria joined the US-led coalition and sent up to 20,000 troops to defend Saudi Arabia.
Political assassinations When Hafez al-Assad came to power, he did not limit his authority to purging Syrian institutions; in addition, his regime organized assassinations and political murders of his potential (and proven) enemies who did not support either Assad or his policies. Moreover, the assassination attempts organized by the Assad regime affected not only Syrians and not only those who live in Syria. On his deathbed in May 2000, Assad said that
Mahmoud Al-Zoubi had betrayed him. He did not say what the betrayal was but demanded that "an investigation be conducted and that he be held accountable." The next day, at an emergency meeting of the Ba'ath Party, Zoubi was expelled from the party. On May 25, the Damascus police chief came to him and allegedly shot him in his own apartment - the official version was that Zoubi committed suicide.
Salim Lawzi was a Lebanese journalist and founder of
al Hawadeth magazine. His criticism of the Syrian role in Lebanese Civil War escalated leading to serious threats on his life. The Hawadeth main building was destroyed during the war. Fearing for his life due to the threats he was receiving, Lawzi chose self-exile in
London, from where he continued editing his magazine. But After his mother died, he decided to return for her funeral. After landing in
Beirut International Airport, he was kidnapped by gunmen on the Airport Road on 25 February 1980. His heavily bruised tortured body was found nine days later on 4 March 1980 in
Aramoun, on the outskirts of Beirut. Forensic reports found heavy signs of torture, including a broken and dislocated right arm, maimed and disjointed writing hand, fingers burnt and blackened through use of acid and phosphoric substances, pens pierced into abdomen and intestines (obvious messages in mutilation for other critics of Syria) and an assassination-style bullet in the head. Alleged perpetrator was the Syrian intelligence agents. Khalil Akkawi was the leader of the
Islamic Unification Movement lived in Lebanese Tripoli. Syrian Military Intelligence killed Khalil Akkawi in February 9, 1986, because he refused to fight the
Lebanese Forces. Three supporters of Akkawi's Islamic Tawheed, or Islamic Unification Movement, were slain in gunfights with Syrian troopers after his burial. In the 1980s, Syrian intelligence services were very active in assassination attempts (
mostly successful) against their opponents in Lebanon.
Europe Even earlier,
Salah ad-Din al-Bitar had been sentenced to death in absentia by the new government, and had fled to
Beirut. Later, in 1978, Assad pardoned him and allowed him to return to Syria. However, a quarrel and conflict soon broke out between them again, Al-Tantawi was the wife of former
Muslim Brotherhood director general
Issam al-Attar and lived in
Aachen, Germany. In March 1981, her father,
Ali Al-Tantawi, called her, saying that she was in serious danger (in the form of assassins sent by Assad after her and her husband). An hour later, a neighbor knocked on her door at gunpoint - Tantawi, hearing a familiar voice, opened the door and was immediately killed by two men. == Political ideology and beliefs ==