Australia Perjury is punishable by imprisonment in various states and territories of Australia. In several jurisdictions, longer prison sentences are possible if perjury was committed with the intent of convicting or acquitting a person charged with a serious offence. • Australian Capital Territory: Perjury is punishable by a fine of up to AU$112,000 or 7 years imprisonment or both. If perjury was committed with the intent of convicting or acquitting someone of an offence which carries a prison sentence, the maximum penalty is AU$224,000 or 14 years imprisonment or both. • New South Wales: Under Section 327 of the
Crimes Act 1900, perjury is punishable by imprisonment of up to 10 years. Under Section 328, if a person commits perjury with the aim of convicting or acquitting a person charged with an offence that carries a prison sentence of 5 years or more, perjury is punishable by imprisonment of up to 14 years. • Northern Territory: Perjury is punishable by imprisonment of up to 14 years. If perjury was committed to convict someone of an offence that carries life imprisonment, the perjurer can be imprisoned for life. • Queensland: Perjury is punishable by imprisonment of up to 14 years. If perjury was committed to convict someone of an offence that carries life imprisonment, the perjurer can be imprisoned for life. • South Australia: Perjury and
subornation of perjury is punishable by imprisonment of up to 7 years. • Tasmania: Perjury is a crime in Tasmania. • Victoria: Perjury and
subornation of perjury is punishable by imprisonment of up to 15 years. • Western Australia: Under Section 125 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913, perjury is punishable by imprisonment of up to 14 years. If perjury was committed to convict someone of an offence that carries life imprisonment, the perjurer can be imprisoned for life.
Canada The offence of perjury is codified by section 132 of the
Criminal Code. It is defined by section 131, which provides: As to corroboration, see section 133. Everyone who commits perjury is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
European Union A person who, before the
Court of Justice of the European Union, swears anything which they know to be false or do not believe to be true are, whatever their nationality, guilty of perjury. Proceedings for this offence may be taken in any place in the State and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed in that place.
India "The offence of perjury finds its place in law by virtue of Section 191 to Section 203 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC'). Unlike many other countries, the offence of perjury is muted on account of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("Cr.P.C"). Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. restricts any court to take cognisance of an offence of perjury unless the same is by way of a complaint in writing by the court before which the offence is committed or by a superior court."
New Zealand Punishment for perjury is defined under Section 109 of the
Crimes Act 1961. A person who commits perjury may be imprisoned for up to 7 years. If a person commits perjury to procure the conviction of someone charged with an offence that carries a maximum sentence of not less than 3 years' imprisonment, the perjurer may be imprisoned for up to 14 years.
Nigeria United Kingdom England and Wales Perjury is a statutory offence in
England and Wales. It is created by section 1(1) of the
Perjury Act 1911. Section 1 of that Act reads: {{Blockquote|style=|{{ubli|(1) If any person lawfully sworn as a witness or as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding wilfully makes a statement material in that proceeding, which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of perjury, and shall, on conviction thereof on indictment, be liable to
penal servitude for a term not exceeding seven years, or to imprisonment ... for a term not exceeding two years, or to a fine or to both such penal servitude or imprisonment and fine. shall, for the purposes of this section, be treated as a statement made in a judicial proceeding in England. a statement made by such person so sworn as aforesaid (unless the Act of Parliament under which it was made otherwise specifically provides) shall be treated for the purposes of this section as having been made in the judicial proceeding in England for the purposes whereof it was made. The words omitted from section 1(1) were repealed by section 1(2) of the
Criminal Justice Act 1948. Section 1(1) of that Act also abolished penal servitude; such sentences are construed as sentences of imprisonment instead. A person guilty of an offence under section 11(1) of the
European Communities Act 1972 (i.e. perjury before the
Court of Justice of the European Union) could be proceeded against and punished in England and Wales as for an offence under section 1(1). Section 1(4) had effect in relation to proceedings in the Court of Justice of the European Union as it has effect in relation to a judicial proceeding in a tribunal of a foreign state. Due to
Brexit, the United Kingdom is no longer subject to that court's jurisdiction and the 1972 Act has been repealed in its entirety. Section 1(4) applies in relation to proceedings before a relevant convention court under the
European Patent Convention as it applies to a judicial proceeding in a tribunal of a foreign state. A statement made on oath by a witness outside the United Kingdom and given in evidence through a live television link by virtue of section 32 of the
Criminal Justice Act 1988 must be treated for the purposes of section 1 as having been made in the proceedings in which it is given in evidence. Section 1 applies in relation to a person acting as an intermediary as it applies in relation to a person lawfully sworn as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding; and for this purpose, where a person acts as an intermediary in any proceeding which is not a judicial proceeding for the purposes of section 1, that proceeding must be taken to be part of the judicial proceeding in which the witness's evidence is given. Where any statement made by a person on oath in any proceeding which is not a judicial proceeding for the purposes of section 1 is received in evidence in pursuance of a
special measures direction, that proceeding must be taken for the purposes of section 1 to be part of the judicial proceeding in which the statement is so received in evidence.
"Judicial proceeding" The definition in section 1(2) is not "comprehensive". The book
Archbold says that it appears to be immaterial whether the court before which the statement is made has jurisdiction in the particular cause in which the statement is made, because there is no express requirement in the Act that the court be one of "competent jurisdiction" and because the definition in section 1(2) does not appear to require this by implication either. Perjury is a
conduct crime.
Mode of trial Perjury is
triable only on indictment.
Sentence A person convicted of perjury is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, or to a fine, or to both. The following cases are relevant: •
R v Hall (1982) 4
Cr App R (S) 153 •
R v Knight, 6 Cr App R (S) 31, [1984]
Crim LR 304, CA •
R v Healey (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) 297 •
R v Dunlop [2001] 2 Cr App R (S) 27 •
R v Archer [2002] EWCA Crim 1996, [2003] 1 Cr App R (S) 86 •
R v Adams [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 15 •
R v Cunningham [2007] 2 Cr App R (S) 61 See also the Crown Prosecution Service sentencing manual.
History In Anglo-Saxon legal procedure, the offence of perjury could only be committed by both jurors and by
compurgators. With time witnesses began to appear in court they were not so treated despite the fact that their functions were akin to that of modern witnesses. This was due to the fact that their role were not yet differentiated from those of the juror and so evidence or perjury by witnesses was not made a crime. Even in the 14th century, when witnesses started appearing before the jury to testify, perjury by them was not made a punishable offence. The maxim then was that every witness's evidence on oath was true. and has been credited to
Edward Coke, who said:
Northern Ireland Perjury is a statutory offence in
Northern Ireland. It is created by article 3(1) of the
Perjury (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1714 (N.I. 19)). This replaces the
Perjury Act (Northern Ireland) 1946 (c. 13) (N.I.).
United States Perjury operates in American law as an inherited principle of the
common law of England, which defined the act as the "willful and corrupt giving, upon a lawful oath, or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, in a judicial proceeding or course of justice, of a false testimony material to the issue or matter of inquiry".
William Blackstone touched on the subject in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, establishing perjury as "a crime committed when a lawful oath is administered, in some judicial proceeding, to a person who swears willfully, absolutely, and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or point in question". The punishment for perjury under the common law has varied from death to banishment and has included such grotesque penalties as severing the tongue of the perjurer. The definitional structure of perjury provides an important framework for legal proceedings, as the component parts of this definition have permeated jurisdictional lines, finding a home in American legal constructs. As such, the main tenets of perjury, including
mens rea, a lawful oath, occurring during a judicial proceeding, a false testimony have remained necessary pieces of perjury's definition in the United States.
Statutory definitions Perjury's current position in the American legal system takes the form of state and federal statutes. Most notably, the United States Code prohibits perjury, which is defined in two senses for federal purposes as someone who: The above statute provides for a fine and/or up to five years in prison as punishment. Within federal jurisdiction, statements made in two broad categories of judicial proceedings may qualify as perjurious: 1) Federal official proceedings, and 2) Federal Court or Grand Jury proceedings. A third type of perjury entails the procurement of perjurious statements from another person. One particularly precarious aspect of the phrasing is that it entails knowledge of the accused person's perception of the truthful nature of events and not necessarily the actual truth of those events. There is a distinction between giving a false statement under oath and merely misstating a fact accidentally, but the distinction can be especially difficult to discern in court of law.
Precedents The development of perjury law in the United States centers on
United States v. Dunnigan, a seminal case that set out the parameters of perjury within United States law. The court uses the Dunnigan-based legal standard to determine if an accused person: "testifying under oath or affirmation violates this section if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory." However, a defendant shown to be
willfully ignorant may in fact be eligible for perjury prosecution.
Dunnigan distinction manifests its importance with regard to the relation between two component parts of perjury's definition: in willfully giving a false statement, a person must understand that she is giving a false statement to be considered a perjurer under the
Dunnigan framework. Deliberation on the part of the defendant is required for a statement to constitute perjury. Jurisprudential developments in the American law of perjury have revolved around the facilitation of "perjury prosecutions and thereby enhance the reliability of testimony before federal courts and grand juries". With that goal in mind, Congress has sometimes expanded the grounds on which an individual may be prosecuted for perjury, with section 1623 of the United States Code recognizing the utterance of two mutually incompatible statements as grounds for perjury indictment even if neither can unequivocally be proven false. However, the two statements must be so mutually incompatible that at least one must necessarily be false; it is irrelevant whether the false statement can be specifically identified from among the two. It thus falls on the government to show that a defendant (a) knowingly made a (b) false (c) material statement (d) under oath (e) in a legal proceeding. The proceedings can be ancillary to normal court proceedings, and thus, even such menial interactions as bail hearings can qualify as protected proceedings under this statute. Wilfulness is an element of the offense. The mere existence of two mutually-exclusive factual statements is not sufficient to prove perjury; the prosecutor nonetheless has the duty to plead and prove that the statement was willfully made. Mere contradiction will not sustain the charge; there must be strong corroborative evidence of the contradiction. One significant legal distinction lies in the specific realm of knowledge necessarily possessed by a defendant for her statements to be properly called perjury. Though the defendant must knowingly render a false statement in a legal proceeding or under federal jurisdiction, the defendant need not know that they are speaking under such conditions for the statement to constitute perjury. All tenets of perjury qualification persist: the "knowingly" aspect of telling the false statement simply does not apply to the defendant's knowledge about the person whose deception is intended.
Materiality The evolution of United States perjury law has experienced the most debate with regards to the materiality requirement. Fundamentally, statements that are literally true cannot provide the basis for a perjury charge (as they do not meet the falsehood requirement) just as answers to truly ambiguous statements cannot constitute perjury. However, such fundamental truths of perjury law become muddled when discerning the materiality of a given statement and the way in which it was material to the given case. In
United States v. Brown, the court defined material statements as those with "a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to be addressed", such as a jury or grand jury. While courts have specifically made clear certain instances that have succeeded or failed to meet the nebulous threshold for materiality, the topic remains unresolved in large part, except in certain legal areas where intent manifests itself in an abundantly clear fashion, such as with the so-called
perjury trap, a specific situation in which a prosecutor calls a person to testify before a grand jury with the intent of drawing a perjurious statement from the person being questioned.
Defense of recantation Despite a tendency of US perjury law toward broad prosecutory power under perjury statutes, American perjury law has afforded potential defendants a new form of defense not found in the English common law. This defense requires that an individual admit to making a perjurious statement during that same proceeding and recanting the statement. Though this defensive loophole slightly narrows the types of cases which may be prosecuted for perjury, the effect of this statutory defense is to promote a truthful retelling of facts by witnesses, thus helping to ensure the reliability of American court proceedings just as broadened perjury statutes aimed to do.
Subornation of perjury Subornation of perjury stands as a subset of US perjury laws and prohibits an individual from inducing another to commit perjury. Subornation of perjury entails equivalent possible punishments as perjury on the federal level. The crime requires an extra level of satisfactory proof, as prosecutors must show not only that perjury occurred but also that the defendant positively induced said perjury. Furthermore, the inducing defendant must know that the suborned statement is a false, perjurious statement. ==Notable convicted perjurers==