The
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand eventually led to
Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to
Serbia on 23 July 1914 with German backing, and after the Serbian response to it was rejected, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia on 28 July. Russia had made a decision to support Serbia and defend its interests in the
Balkans before that, and on 29 July Russian emperor
Nicholas II ordered a partial mobilization of the
Russian Army in the military districts that bordered Austria. The following day he was convinced by his advisors to order a full mobilization to follow the military's existing mobilization schedule. Nicholas hoped Germany would see this as a regional conflict between Russia and Austria, but because their war plans depended on taking advantage of Russia's slower mobilization speed, and due to the position of both countries, they felt pressure to go to war immediately. Austria-Hungary began full mobilization on 31 July, and Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914.
Russia Russia's plan at the outbreak of war was known as Schedule 19. Approved by Emperor Nicholas II in July 1910 and amended over the next two years, the plan concentrated Russia's armies on its western border with Germany and Austria-Hungary and was initially defensive. The original Schedule 19 would have had the Russian Army mobilize its troops to locations that were a significant distance away from its western border and leave the entire
Polish salient to be defended by local fortresses and the Warsaw garrison. Under this version Russia would not have taken any offensive action and would have waited to react to movements by Germany and Austria-Hungary. The defensive nature of Russian planning went back to the military reforms in the 1860s following the
Crimean War and was also influenced by the limited capacity of
Russia's railway network to facilitate the quick mobilization of troops, though that was gradually improving. Russian strategy remained this way until developments that took place starting in 1911, when the
Chief of Staff of the French Army visited Russia and asked the Russian high command to plan for an immediate offensive if war with Germany broke out to help prevent them from capturing Paris. This was also in accordance with Russia's 1892 promise to attack Germany if France was invaded in order to open a second front. In 1912 the Russian chief of staff,
Yakov Zhilinsky, told the French that Russia would go on the offensive against Germany fifteen days after the start of its mobilization. By this point, the improvements in Russia's infrastructure made this a lot more feasible, and there was also domestic pressure for Russia to not abandon its borderlands to foreign occupation. In 1911 new proposals for modifying Schedule 19 were made by army officers, with the most notable among them being Quartermaster-General
Yuri Danilov's argument for going on the offensive against both Germany and Austria-Hungary. In early 1912, the Russian high command decided on a variant of the plan known as Schedule 19A, in which two Russian armies would invade
East Prussia while four armies would invade
Galicia. This did not give Russia the decisive advantage in either location, but it tried to balance the need for Russia to support France by attacking Germany while also acknowledging that the main interest of
Russian foreign policy was in the Balkans. The plan also meant that Russia would begin its offensive before its army was fully mobilized, but it was believed that this was a necessary risk, because there would be a limited amount of time to attack Germany in support of France. The adoption of Schedule 19A in 1912 marked the first time in decades that Russian war planning was primarily offensive.
Germany Prior to the outbreak of war, German strategy was based on the
Schlieffen Plan. With the
Franco-Russian Agreement in place from the early 1890s, Germany knew that war with either of these combatants would result in war with the other, which meant that there would be a
two-front war in both the west and the east. Therefore, the German General Staff, led by
Alfred von Schlieffen from 1891 to 1906, developed a plan that called for German armies to pass through
Belgium and then turn south to quickly capture Paris, while a smaller German force would pin down the French defenders along the Franco-German border. With France being defeated before Russia could fully mobilize, Germany could then turn its focus on Russia, which Schlieffen believed would not be taken out of the war as quickly because of its much larger territory. The Schlieffen Plan was actually a change from his predecessor in the 1880s,
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who believed that Germany should first be on the defensive in the west and coordinate with Austria to defeat Russia. Schlieffen's successor at the General Staff,
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, maintained the basic plan that Schlieffen put forward in 1905 of quickly knocking out France in the west before turning to focus on Russia, thereby avoiding a two-front war. This strategy was fully adopted by the German government in 1913. But the plan did not take into account that the growing military capabilities of Russia in the years since the
Russo-Japanese War meant that the Russian mobilization would proceed faster than Schlieffen had originally thought. Another problem with the German strategy was the deliberate choice to not coordinate it with their allies in Austria-Hungary. Moltke the Younger wanted Austria to assist Germany by going on the offensive against Russia in the early stages of the war, and never told his Austrian counterpart,
Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, that Germany was not going have its own offensive in the east. Conrad, for his part, was also misleading the Germans by allowing them to think Austria would prioritize an attack against Russia, when he actually planned to focus the Austro-Hungarian offensive power against Serbia. Conversely, the
Imperial German Navy believed it could be victorious over Britain with Russian neutrality, something which Moltke knew would not be possible.
Austria-Hungary is named Tsar. Austria-Hungary, in the person of Emperor
Francis Joseph, annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Ottoman Sultan
Abdul Hamid II looks on helplessly. Austria-Hungary's participation in the outbreak of World War I has been neglected by historians, as emphasis has traditionally been placed on Germany's role as the prime instigator. However, the "spark" that ignited the First World War is attributed to the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, which took place on 28 June 1914. Approximately a month later, on 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. This act led to a series of events that would quickly expand into the First World War; thus, the Habsburg government in Vienna initiated the pivotal decision that would begin the conflict. The Austro-Hungarian situation in the Balkans pre-1914 is a primary factor in its involvement in the war. The
movement towards South Slav unity was a major problem for the Habsburg Empire, which was facing increasing nationalist pressure from its multinational populace. As Europe's third largest state, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was hardly homogeneous; comprising over fifty million people and eleven nationalities, the Empire was a conglomeration of a number of diverse cultures, languages, and peoples. Specifically, the South Slavic people of Austria-Hungary desired to amalgamate with Serbia in an effort to officially solidify their shared cultural heritage. Over seven million South Slavs lived inside the Empire, while three million lived outside it. With the growing emergence of nationalism in the twentieth century, unity of all South Slavs looked promising. This tension is exemplified by
Conrad von Hötzendorf's letter to Franz Ferdinand: The unification of the South Slav race is one of the powerful national movements which can neither be ignored nor kept down. The question can only be, whether unification will take place within the boundaries of the Monarchy – that is at the expense of Serbia's independence – or under Serbia's leadership at the expense of the Monarchy. The cost to the Monarchy would be the loss of its South Slav provinces and thus of almost its entire coastline. The loss of territory and prestige would relegate the Monarchy to the status of a small power. The
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 by Austrian foreign minister Baron von Aehrenthal in an effort to assert domination over the Balkans inflamed Slavic nationalism and angered Serbia. Bosnia-Herzegovina became a "rallying cry" for South Slavs, with hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia steadily increasing. The situation was ripe for conflict, and when the Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated Austrian imperial heir, Franz Ferdinand, these longstanding hostilities culminated in an all-out war. The Allied Powers wholeheartedly supported the Slavs' nationalistic fight.
George Macaulay Trevelyan, a British historian, saw Serbia's war against Austria-Hungary as a "war of liberation" that would "free South Slavs from tyranny." In his own words: "If ever there was a battle for freedom, there is such a battle now going on in Southeastern Europe against Austrian and Magyar. If this war ends in the overthrow of the Magyar tyranny, an immense step forward will have been taken toward racial liberty and European peace."
Romania In the immediate years preceding the
First World War, the Kingdom of Romania was involved in the
Second Balkan War on the side of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and the Ottoman Empire against Bulgaria. The
Treaty of Bucharest, signed on 10 August 1913, ended the Balkan conflict and added 6,960 square kilometers to Romania's territory. Although militarized, Romania decided upon a policy of neutrality at the start of the First World War, mainly due to having territorial interests in both Austria-Hungary (
Transylvania and
Bukovina) and in Russia (
Bessarabia). Strong cultural influences also affected Romanian leanings, however. King
Carol I, as a
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, favoured his Germanic roots, while the Romanian people, influenced by their Orthodox church and Latin-based language, were inclined to join France. Perhaps King Carol's attempts at joining the war on the side of the Central powers would have been fruitful had he not died in 1914, but Romanian disenchantment with Austria-Hungary had already influenced public and political opinion. French endorsement of Romanian action against Bulgaria, and support of the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest was particularly effective at inclining Romania towards the Entente. Furthermore, Russian courting of Romanian sympathies, exemplified by the visit of the Tsar to
Constanța on 14 June 1914, signaled in a new era of positive relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, King
Ferdinand I of Romania maintained a policy of neutrality, intending to gain the most for Romania by negotiating between competing powers. The result of the negotiations with the Entente was the
Treaty of Bucharest (1916), which stipulated the conditions under which Romania agreed to join the war on the side of the Entente, particularly territorial promises in
Austria-Hungary: Transylvania,
Crișana and
Maramureș, the whole
Banat and most of Bukovina. According to historian John Keegan, these enticements offered by the Allies were never concrete, for in secret, Russia and France agreed not to honor any conventions when the end of the war came. == 1914 ==