The Greek philosopher
Anaximander (ca. 610 – ca. 546 BCE) described the world as "endless".
Xenophanes (ca. 570 – ca. 478 BCE) declared it "the greatest". But they did not regard it as perfect.
Parmenides (
fl. in the late-6th or early-5th century BCE), however, considered
being (existence) to be "
tetelesmenon" ("finished"); and
Melissus of Samos (
fl. in the 5th century BCE), his successor in the
Eleatic school, said that
being (existence) "is entirely" ("
pan esti"). Thus both saw perfection in
being (existence). Parmenides moreover thought the world to be
finite, limited in all directions, and like a
spherewhich was a mark of its perfection. Parmenides' view was embraced to some extent by
Plato (late-5th to mid-4th century BCE), who thought that the world was the work of a good
Demiurge, and that this was why order and harmony prevailed in it. Plato believed that the world was the best, the most beautiful, perfect; and that it had a perfect shape (spherical) and a perfect motion (circular). But Plato said nothing about the Demiurge himself being perfect. Perfection implied limits; whereas it was the world, not the Demiurge, that had limits. A similar view was expressed by
Aristotle (384–322 BCE), who held the world's
primum movens, or "
first cause", to be pure form, pure energy, pure reason – features which were superior to all else. The first cause had the highest attributes, but perfection was not one of them. However, the
pantheist Stoics – Greek and Roman followers of
Zeno of Citium,
Cyprus (ca. 334 – ca. 262 BCE) – thought the divinity to be perfect, precisely because, as
pantheists, they identified it with the world. Roman politician and orator
Cicero (106 – 43 BCE) wrote in
De natura deorum (On the Nature of the Gods) that the world "encompasses ... all
beings [existences]... And what could be more absurd than denying perfection to an all-embracing
being [existence]?..." Eventually Greek philosophy became bound up with the
Christian religion – the concept of first cause, with the concept of
God the
Creator. Christian
theology united the features of the first cause in Aristotle's
Metaphysics with the features of the Creator in the
Book of Genesis. But the attributes of God did not include perfection, for a perfect being must be finite. Another reason to deny perfection to God originated in a branch of Christian theology that was influenced by a Greek
Platonist,
Plotinus (204/5 – 270 CE): The absolute from which the world derived could not be grasped in terms of human
concepts. Not only was that absolute not
matter, it was not spirit either, nor
idea. it was incomprehensible and ineffable; it was beyond all that we may imagine, including perfection. Italian
Scholastic Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225 – 1274), indicating that he was following
Aristotle, defined a perfect thing as one that "possesses that of which, by its nature, it is capable." There were, in the world, things perfect and imperfect, more perfect and less perfect. God permitted imperfections in Creation when they were necessary for the good of the whole. It was natural for man to go by degrees from imperfection to perfection. To
Duns Scotus (ca. 1265/66 – 1308), perfection was not an attribute of God but a property of Creation, and all things partook of perfection to a greater or lesser degree. A thing's perfection depended on what sort of perfection it was eligible for; and that was perfect which had attained the fullness of the qualities possible for it. Hence "whole" and "perfect" meant more or less the same. This, notes Tatarkiewicz, was a
teleological concept, for it implied a "
telos" (an end – a goal or purpose). God created things that served certain purposes – created even those purposes – but He himself did not serve a purpose. Since God was not finite, He could not be called perfect: for the concept of perfection served to describe
finite things. Perfection was not a
theological concept, but an
ontological one, writes Tatarkiewicz, because it was a feature, in some degree, of every
being (existence). The concept of perfection, as an attribute of God, entered theology only in modern times, through French philosopher, scientist, and mathematician
René Descartes (1596 – 1650).
Leibniz (1646 – 1716) wrote: "As Descartes states,
existence itself is perfection." Leibniz also construed perfection in a different way in his
Monadology: "Only that is perfect which possesses no limits – that is, only God." Leibniz's pupil and successor,
Christian Wolff (1679 – 1754), however, ascribed perfection not to
existence as a whole, but once again to its individual constituents. He gave, as examples, an eye that sees faultlessly, and a watch that runs faultlessly. Wolff's pupil
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714 – 1762) derived perfection from rules, but anticipated their "collisions" leading to exceptions and limiting the perfection of things. Eventually he arrived at the conclusion that "everything is perfect". Tatarkiewicz writes that Wolff and his pupils had returned to the
ontological concept of perfection that the
Scholastics had used; and that the
theological concept of perfection had lasted only from Descartes to Leibniz, in the 17th century. Thanks to Wolff's school, the concept of perfection endured in Germany through the 18th century. In other western countries, especially France and Britain, the concept was already in decline and was ignored by the French
Encyclopédie. In Christian Wolff's school, perfection was an essential property of every thing, without which the thing cannot exist. "This", says Tatarkiewicz, "was a singular moment in the history of the
ontological concept of perfection; soon thereafter, that history came to an end." ==See also==