The
Boeotian War broke out in 378 BC as the result of the revolt in Thebes against Sparta. The war saw Thebes become dominant in the Greek world at the expense of Sparta. However, by the end of the war, Thebes’ greatest leaders,
Pelopidas and
Epaminondas, were both dead and Thebes' power already waning, allowing for the
rise of Macedon.
Outbreak (378 BC) Sparta immediately sent against Thebes a force under one of their kings,
Cleombrotus, in the middle of winter. As the border fort of
Eleutherae was held by an Athenian garrison, he was forced to enter Boeotia through Mount
Cithaeron, where he wiped out a force of Theban democrats. After passing through the allied cities of
Plataea and
Thespiae, Cleombrotus's force camped at Cynoscephalae (6 km west of Thebes) to await events. The Athenians were alarmed at Cleombrotus's presence nearby, and, seeking to placate Sparta, immediately punished their own generals who had aided the Theban coup. It was probably around this time, likely due to fear that Athens would not offer support, that Thebes sent an embassy to Sparta, offering to rejoin the
Peloponnesian League in return for recognition of its new government. Cleombrotus inflicted no damage to Theban territory, as he apparently hoped for a reconciliation, but the government at Sparta, led by the other king, the anti-Theban hardliner
Agesilaus, would have nothing less than the punishment of the coup leaders and the restoration of a pro-Spartan regime, terms which Thebes rejected. Whatever negotiations Cleombrotus may have initiated on his own came to nothing, and, once it became apparent after 16 days that neither Thebes nor Athens would offer a challenge, he ended the campaign, retiring unhindered by way of
Creusis and
Aigosthena. Although Athens had not yet committed itself, it was soon the target of an act of Spartan aggression which brought it firmly to the Theban camp.
Sphodrias, the
harmost (governor) whom Cleombrotus had left in command of a Spartan remnant garrisoned at Thespiae, launched an officially unauthorized nighttime raid on the Athenian port of
Piraeus. The attack was a fiasco, as the Spartans were still a distance away from their objective when dawn broke, and Sphodrias had to content himself with plundering the Attic countryside while retreating. According to varying accounts, Sphodrias had either been enticed by a Theban bribe, aimed at forcing Athens to become more belligerent, or acted upon secret orders from Cleombrotus. A Spartan delegation in Athens, which had been probably sent earlier by Agesilaus to assess Athenian intentions, professed ignorance of the attack, but Sphodrias was then unexpectedly acquitted by the home government. Athens declared that Sparta had broken the peace and prepared for war.
Invasions of Agesilaus II Sparta called upon all its allies and, led by Agesilaus, invaded Boeotia in the spring of 378. The Thebans and their commander,
Gorgidas, had decided to resist the Spartans and screen their city by setting up, probably with aid of the Athenians, a continuous trench and palisade that stretched from the border with Thespiae in the west, alongside the northern bank of the
Asopus in the south, to the border with
Tanagra in the east. The
Sacred Band first saw action in 378 BC, at the beginning of the
Boeotian War. It was during the famous stand-off between the Athenian
mercenary commander (and later
strategos)
Chabrias (d. 357 BC) and the Spartan King
Agesilaus II (444 BC–360 BC). Prior to the creation of the Sacred Band under Gorgidas, the Athenians had helped the Theban exiles retake control of Thebes and the citadel of Cadmea from Sparta. This was followed by Athens openly entering into an alliance with Thebes against Sparta. In the summer of 378 BC, Agesilaus led a Spartan expedition against Thebes from the Boeotian city of
Thespiae (then still allied to Sparta). His force consisted of 1,500 cavalry and 28,000 infantry. At least 20,000 of the infantry were
hoplites, Agesilaus probed the stockade looking for weak points, moving his camp around it and devastating the land outside, while the Thebans and Athenians sent out repeated forays to harass his forces. After getting a measure of the defenders' movements and having them grow used to his own movements, the King surprised them by marching at daybreak and crossed the stockade at an undefended position before the enemy could reach him. Agesilaus then encountered a Theban and Athenian force set up on a defensive position in a hill some km southwest of Thebes. He dispersed their light troops and brought his army uphill to threaten the enemy, but the latter, led by the Athenian
Chabrias, defiantly stood their ground in a defensive and provocative manner. Gorgidas and the Sacred Band occupied the front ranks of the Theban forces on the right, while Chabrias and an experienced force of mercenary hoplites occupied the front ranks of the Athenian forces on the left. In unison, his mercenary hoplites immediately assumed the resting posture—with the spear remaining pointing upwards instead of towards the enemy, and the shield propped against the left knee instead of being hoisted at the shoulders. Gorgidas, on seeing this, also commanded the Sacred Band to follow suit, which they did with the same military drill precision and confidence. The audacity of the maneuver and the discipline of the execution was such that Agesilaus halted the advance. Unwilling to charge uphill against a strong opponent, Agesilaus decided not to engage the enemy and, his bluff called, continued devastating Theban territory, reaching the walls of the city itself. Seeing that his attempts to provoke the Theban and Athenian forces to fight on lower ground were unsuccessful, Agesilaus eventually thought it wiser to withdraw his forces back to Thespiae. Xenophon and Diodorus both mention that Agesilaus nevertheless boasted of being the "unchallenged champion", claiming it was a Spartan victory since his enemies declined to accept his invitation to battle. Diodorus notes, however, that this was merely to mollify his followers who were discouraged at their king's failure to engage a smaller force. Chabrias, in contrast, was being praised for his novel strategy and was seen as a savior by the Thebans. Phoebidas was the same general responsible for the unauthorized seizure of the citadel of Cadmea in 382 BC, in violation of the
Peace of Antalcidas in place then. Agesilaus previously refused to punish Phoebidas (though he was fined), which have led some modern historians to believe that Phoebidas' earlier actions were under the direct command of the king. The Thebans under Gorgidas slaughtered 200 men that Agesilaus left near Thespiae as an outpost (προφυλακή). He also made several attacks on Thespian territory, though these accomplished little. His peltasts broke ranks and fled back to Thespiae pursued by Theban forces. Agesilaus implemented a ruse against the Theban army to bypass their stockade unopposed. After arriving at Plataea, he sent word to Thespiae requesting that a market be set up for his troops, but, once the Thebans went that way to await his arrival, he instead marched eastwards at dawn to
Erythrae and
Scolus, slipping past the stockade at an undefended point. He began laying waste to enemy territory which had not been ravaged the previous year, before reaching the Spartan-held territory of
Tanagra. Turning back westward, Agesilaus found the Theban army formed up in a hill named Graos Stethos (probably the modern Golemi), but he ignored them and marched straight to Thebes itself. Fearing for their city's safety, the Thebans abandoned their hill and marched back home by way of
Potniae, but despite being harried by the Spartans they reached Thebes first. As Agesilaus retired to Thespiae, his
Olynthian cavalry inflicted some casualties on a group of enemy
peltasts after the Athenian Chabrias refused to risk his
hoplites in support. Although Agesilaus's scorched earth tactics caused severe food shortages at Thebes, his campaigns accomplished little else. He had failed to decisively engage the enemy or to capture Thebes, and his depredations had the effect of strengthening the resolve of the affected Boeotian communities against Sparta. Sparta's allies meanwhile grew increasingly dissatisfied with the constant and fruitless campaigning. A change in policy was made after the aged Agesilaus, while on a pause at
Megara on the way back to Sparta, became afflicted with an illness which left him incapacited for years. Encouraged by the other king,
Cleombrotus, Sparta shifted its focus from Thebes on land to Athens at sea.
Spartan setbacks An expedition in 376 BC led by King Cleombrotus was blocked at the passes of
Cithaeron. As the Spartans failed to get over the Cithaeron Mountains, this gave the Thebans the chance to take the attack to the Spartans, and in doing so they conquered the Spartans' remaining strongholds in Boeotia while the Spartan base in Thespiae was also lost. The Spartans were only left with some land in the south and Orchomenus in the north-west. Because the Spartans were having a hard time attacking Thebes over land, they decided to change their strategy and rather use a naval force to try to block support for the Athenians. In response, the Athenians sent a powerful fleet towards Sparta. The Spartan general Pollis then led his small fleet to try to stop the siege, but was killed during a
naval battle against the Athenian general Chabrias. This naval victory was the first ever victory by an Athenian naval fleet since the Peloponnesian War. Later in 376 BC Chabrias raided Laconia, and possibly reached Sellasia, which is to the north-east of Sparta. In 375 BC Athens mounted two successful expeditions - one into the northern Aegean under Chabrias and a second which sailed around the
Peloponnese to western Greece. This force was led by
Timotheos, son of
Conon, who won the battle of
Alyzeia in
Acarnania.
Battle of Tegyra showing the location of the city of
Orchomenus As a single unit under Pelopidas, the first recorded victory of the Sacred Band was at the
Battle of Tegyra (375 BC). It occurred near the Boeotian city of
Orchomenus, then still an ally of Sparta. Hearing reports that the Spartan garrison in Orchomenus had left for
Locris, Pelopidas quickly set out with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, hoping to capture it in their absence. They approached the city through the northeastern route since the waters of
Lake Copais were at their fullest during that season. Upon reaching the city, they learned that a new
mora had been sent from Sparta to reinforce Orchomenus. Unwilling to engage the new garrison, Pelopidas decided to retreat back to Thebes, retracing their northeastern route along Lake Copais. However, they only reached as far as the shrine of
Apollo of Tegyra before encountering the returning Spartan forces from Locris. They outnumbered the Thebans at least two to one. According to Plutarch, upon seeing the Spartans, one of Thebans allegedly told Pelopidas "We are fallen into our enemy's hands;" to which Pelopidas replied, "And why not they into ours?" He then ordered his cavalry to ride up from the rear and charge while he reformed the Sacred Band into an abnormally dense formation, hoping to at least cut through the numerically superior Spartan lines. The Spartans advanced, confident in their numbers, only to have their leaders killed immediately in the opening clashes. Leaderless and encountering forces equal in discipline and training for the first time in the Sacred Band, the Spartans faltered and opened their ranks, expecting the Thebans to pass through and escape. Instead, Pelopidas surprised them by using the opening to
flank the Spartans. The Spartans were completely routed, with considerable loss of life. The Thebans didn't pursue the fleeing survivors, mindful of the remaining Spartan
mora stationed in Orchomenus less than away. They stripped the dead and set up a
tropaion (τρόπαιον, a commemorative trophy left at the site of a battle victory) before continuing on to Thebes. An account of the battle was mentioned both by Diodorus and Plutarch, both based heavily on the report by
Ephorus. Xenophon conspicuously omits any mention of the Theban victory in his
Hellenica, though this has traditionally been ascribed to Xenophon's strong anti-Theban and pro-Spartan sentiments. An obscure allusion to Orchomenus in
Hellenica, however, implies that Xenophon was aware of the Spartan defeat. The Plataean citizens were allowed to leave alive, but they were reduced to being refugees and sought sanctuary in Athens. Of the pro-Spartan Boeotian
poleis, only Orchomenus remained. Pelopidas is again mentioned as the commander of the abortive Theban siege of the Phocian city of
Elateia (c. 372 BC). In response to the Theban army outside the city's walls, the Phocian general
Onomarchus brought out all the inhabitants of the city (including the elderly, women, and children) and locked the gates. He then placed the non-combatants directly behind the defenders of Elateia. On seeing this, Pelopidas withdrew his forces, recognizing that the Phocians would fight to the death to protect their loved ones.
378–371 BC – Aftermath When news of the uprising at Thebes reached Sparta, an army under
Cleombrotus I had been dispatched to subdue the city, but turned back without engaging the Thebans. Another army under
Agesilaus II was then dispatched to attack the Thebans. However, the Thebans refused to meet the Spartan army in battle, instead building a trench and stockade outside Thebes, which they occupied, preventing the Spartans advancing on the city. The Spartans ravaged the countryside but eventually departed, leaving Thebes independent. This victory so heartened the Thebans that they undertook operations against other neighboring cities as well. In short order the Thebans were able to reconstitute their old Boeotian confederacy in a new, democratic form. The cities of Boeotia united as a federation with an executive body composed of seven generals, or
Boeotarchs, elected from seven districts throughout Boeotia. This political fusion was so successful that henceforth the names
Theban and
Boeotian were used interchangeably in a nod to the newfound solidarity of the region. Seeking to crush the Thebans, the Spartans would invade Boeotia three times over the next few years (378, 377, ? possibly Leuctra). Although Sparta remained the dominant land power in Greece, the Boeotians had demonstrated that they, too, were a martial threat and a politically cohesive power. At the same time, Pelopidas, an advocate of an aggressive policy against Sparta, had established himself as a major political leader in Thebes. Epaminondas's role in the years to 371 BC is difficult to piece together. Certainly, he served with the Theban armies in the defence of Boeotia in the 370s, and, by 371 BC, he had become a Boeotarch. It seems safe to assume, given their close friendship, and their close collaboration after 371 BC, that Epaminondas and Pelopidas also collaborated closely on Theban policy in the period 378–371 BC.
Peace conferences The years following the Theban coup had seen desultory fighting between Sparta and Thebes, with Athens also drawn into the conflict. In 375 BC there was a renewal of the
King's Peace, but this lasted but a few months. The capture of
Plataea by the Thebans put the Theban-Athenian Alliance under strain, as the Plataeans were expelled from their city and found asylum in Athens, where they were a strong voice against Thebes. Though the alliance held, Athens insisted on negotiations with Sparta. A peace treaty was agreed but significant disagreements arose at the treaty signing.
Epaminondas insisted that he should sign for the Boeotians as a whole rather than just for Thebes. In response, the Spartan king Agesilaus struck the name of Thebes off the list of signatories. Both sides then left the conference and prepared for renewed hostilities. Desultory fighting between Athens and Sparta had resumed by 373 BC (at the latest). By 371 BC, Athens and Sparta were again war-weary, and in 371 BC a conference was held at Sparta to discuss another attempt at a common peace. Epaminondas was serving as a Boeotarch for 371 BC, and led the Boeotian delegation to the peace conference. Peace terms were agreed at the outset of the conference, and the Thebans presumably signed the treaty in their own name alone. However, on the following day, Epaminondas caused a drastic break with Sparta when he insisted on signing not for the Thebans alone, but for all the Boeotians. Agesilaus refused to allow the change of the Theban envoys' signature, insisting that the cities of Boeotia should be independent; Epaminondas countered that if this were to be the case, the cities of
Laconia should be as well. Irate, Agesilaus struck the Thebans from the document. The delegation returned to Thebes, and both sides mobilized for war.
Battle of Leuctra (371 BC) leading the Thebans at the
Battle of Leuctra Immediately following the failure of the peace talks, orders were sent out from Sparta to the Spartan king Cleombrotus, who was at the head of an army in
Phocis, commanding him to march directly to Boeotia. Skirting north to avoid mountain passes where the Boeotians were prepared to ambush him, Cleombrotus entered Boeotian territory from an unexpected direction and quickly seized a fort and captured 10 or 12
triremes. Then marching towards Thebes, he camped at
Leuctra, in the territory of
Thespiae. Here, the Boeotian army came to meet him. The Spartan army contained some 10,000
hoplites, 700 of whom were the elite warriors known as
Spartiates. The Boeotians opposite them numbered about 6,000, but were bolstered by a cavalry superior to that of the Peloponnesians. Epaminondas was given charge of the Boeotian army, with the other six Boeotarchs in an advisory capacity. Pelopidas, meanwhile, was captain of the
Sacred Band, the elite Theban troops. Before the battle, there was evidently much debate amongst the Boeotarchs about whether to fight or not. As a consistent advocate of an aggressive policy, Epaminondas wished to fight, and supported by Pelopidas, he managed to swing the vote in favour of battle. During the course of the battle, Epaminondas was to display a grasp of tactics hitherto unseen in Greek warfare. The
phalanx formation used by Greek armies had a distinct tendency to veer to the right during battle, "because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the right". Traditionally, a phalanx therefore lined up for battle with the elite troops on the right flank to counter this tendency. Thus, in the Spartan phalanx at Leuctra, Cleombrotus and the elite '
Spartiates' were on the right, while the less experienced Peloponnesian allies were on the left. However, needing to counter the Spartans' numerical advantage, Epaminondas implemented two tactical innovations. Firstly, he took the best troops in the army, and arranged them 50 ranks deep (as opposed to the normal 8–12 ranks) on the
left wing, opposite Cleombrotus and the Spartans, with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band on the extreme left flank. Secondly, recognizing, that he could not have matched the width of the Peloponnesian phalanx (even before the deepening the left flank), he abandoned all attempts to do so. Instead, placing the weaker troops on the right flank, he "instructed them to avoid battle and withdraw gradually during the enemy's attack". The tactic of the deep phalanx had previously been used by
Pagondas, another Theban general, who used a 25 man deep formation at the
Battle of Delium. However, the reversing of the position of the elite troops, and an oblique line of attack were innovations; it seems that Epaminondas was therefore responsible for the military tactic of refusing one's flank. The fighting at Leuctra opened with a clash between the cavalry, in which the Thebans were victorious over the inferior Spartan cavalry, driving them back into the ranks of the infantry, and thereby disrupting the phalanx. The battle then became general, with the strengthened Theban left flank marching to attack at double speed, while the right flank retreated. After intense fighting, the Spartan right flank began to give way under the impetus of the mass of Thebans, and Cleombrotus was killed. Although the Spartans held on for long enough to rescue the body of the king, their line was soon broken by the sheer force of the Theban assault. The Peloponnesian allies on the left wing, seeing the Spartans put to flight, also broke and ran, and the entire army retreated in disarray. One thousand Peloponnesians were killed, while the Boeotians lost only 300 men. Most importantly, since it constituted a significant proportion of the entire Spartan manpower, 400 of the 700 Spartiates present were killed, a loss that posed a serious threat to Sparta's future war-making abilities. When, after the battle, the Spartans asked if they and the Peloponnesians could collect the dead, Epaminondas suspected that the Spartans would try to cover-up the scale of their losses. He therefore allowed the Peloponnesians to remove their dead first, so that those remaining would be shown to be Spartiates, and emphasise the scale of the Theban victory. The victory at Leuctra shook the foundations of the
Spartan dominance of Greece to the core. Since the number of Spartiates was always relatively small, Sparta had relied on her allies in order to field substantial armies. However, with the defeat at Leuctra, the Peloponnesian allies were less inclined to bow to Spartan demands. Furthermore, with the loss of men at Leuctra and other battles, the Spartans were not in a strong position to reassert their dominance over their erstwhile allies. Spartan supremacy was effectively overthrown and a new era of
Theban hegemony was set up. ==Theban hegemony==