The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of
Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, highlighted the need within the
US Department of Defense for reform and reorganization. The
US Army chief of staff, General
Edward C. "Shy" Meyer, had already helped create the U.S.
Delta Force in 1977. Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate
Army SOF units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982. , former chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee in 1986 By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the
US Congress of the need for military reforms. In June, the
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator
Barry Goldwater (
R-AZ). With concern mounting on
Capitol Hill, the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF. The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters.
Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and his deputy,
Lynn Rylander, both advocated SOF reforms. At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul
United States Special Operations Forces. They included senators
Sam Nunn (
D-GA) and
William Cohen (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the
United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem. Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with
low-intensity conflicts. In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."
James R. Locher III, the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the
Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986. By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations. Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the
US secretary of defense; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process. Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral
William J. Crowe Jr.,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led
the Pentagon's opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a
three-star general. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a
four-star general in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform. By most accounts, retired Army Major General
Richard Scholtes gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during
Operation Urgent Fury, explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties. After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in
Grenada. Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the
National Security Council, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook"). The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the
Reagan administration regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation. The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department. , the first Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command in 1986 However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed
Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador
Charles Whitehouse assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC). Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command.
United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General
James Lindsay, had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the
Secretary of Defense that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President
Ronald Reagan approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.
Operation Earnest Will USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) ("Night Stalkers") aviators, SEALs, and
Special Boat Teams (SBT) working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987. During
Operation Earnest Will, the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the
Persian Gulf during the
Iran–Iraq War. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted
Kuwait to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks. The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop
Iran, which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral
Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August. The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern
Persian Gulf to thwart clandestine Iranian mining and small boat attacks. On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and
Little Birds took off from the frigate
USS Jarrett to track an Iranian ship,
Iran Ajr. The Nightstalkers observed
Iran Ajr turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As
Iran Ajr's crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters. ian oil platforms set ablaze after shelling by American
destroyers (19 October 1987) Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the Iranian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night, they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker
Sea Isle City near the oil terminal outside
Kuwait City. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack. During
Operation Nimble Archer, four
destroyers shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes. On 14 April 1988, east of
Bahrain, the frigate
USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull. Ten sailors were injured. During
Operation Praying Mantis, the U.S. retaliated fiercely, attacking the Iranian frigate
Sahand and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields. After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform. Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease-fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States. Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran's small boats and minelayers. The ability to work at night proved vital because Iranian units used darkness to conceal their actions. Additionally, because of Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the
Mark V Special Operations Craft.
Somalia Special Operations Command first became involved in
Somalia in 1992, as part of
Operation Provide Relief. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope. The first teams into Somalia were CIA
Special Activities Division paramilitary officers with elements of
JSOC. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named
Larry Freedman. Freedman was awarded the
Intelligence Star for "extraordinary heroism" for his actions. The earliest missions during
Operation Restore Hope were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for
Marines. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick. When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for President
George H. W. Bush during a visit to Somalia. In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. In January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over , captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over of explosives. in Somalia, 1993 In August 1993, Secretary of Defense
Les Aspin directed the deployment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by General
Mohamed Farrah Aidid's supporters upon U.S. and UN forces. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF) Ranger, was charged with a mission named
Operation Gothic Serpent to capture Aidid. This was an especially arduous mission, for Aidid had gone underground, after several
Lockheed AC-130 air raids and UN assaults on his strongholds. While Marines from the 24th MEU provided an interim QRF (Force Recon Det and helicopters from HMM-263), the task force arrived in the country and began training exercises. The Marines were asked to take on the Aidid snatch mission, but having the advantage of being in the area for more than two months, decided after mission analysis that the mission was a "no-go" due to several factors, centered around the inability to rescue the crew of a downed helicopter (re: the indigenous forces technique of using RPGs against helicopters and blocking the narrow streets in order to restrict the movement of a ground rescue force). This knowledge was not passed on to the Rangers, due to the Marines operating from the USS
Wasp and the Rangers remaining on land. TF Ranger was made up of operators from
Delta Force,
75th Ranger Regiment,
160th SOAR, SEALs from the
Naval Special Warfare Development Group, and Air Force special tactics units. During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into
Mogadishu, all of which were successes. Although Aidid remained free, the effect of these missions seriously limited his movements. On 3 October, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aidid's stronghold the
Bakara Market, to capture two of his key lieutenants. The mission was expected to take only one or two hours. Helicopters carried an assault and a ground convoy of security teams launched in the late afternoon from the TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport. The TF came under increasingly heavy fire, more intense than during previous missions. The assault team captured 24 Somalis including Aidid's lieutenants and were loading them onto the convoy trucks when a
MH-60 Blackhawk was hit by a
rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). A small element from the security forces, as well as an
MH-6 assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to the crash site. The
battle became increasingly worse. An RPG struck another MH-60, crashing less than to the south of the first downed helicopter. The task force faced overwhelming Somali mobs that overran the crash sites, causing a dire situation. A Somali mob overran the second site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders of this crash site,
Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and
Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the
Medal of Honor. About this time, the mission's quick reaction force (QRF) also tried to reach the second crash site. This force too was pinned by the Somali fire and required the fire support of two
AH-6 helicopters before it could break contact and make its way back to the base. (1993) The assault and security elements moved on foot towards the first crash area, passing through heavy fire, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter. They fought to establish defensive positions so as not to be pinned down by the very heavy enemy fire while treating their wounded and worked to free the pilot's body from the downed helicopter. With the detainees loaded on trucks, the ground convoy force attempted to reach the first crash site. Unable to find it amongst the narrow, winding alleyways, the convoy came under devastating small arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casualties and sustaining substantial damage to their vehicles. Reinforcements, consisting of elements from the QRF,
10th Mountain Division soldiers, Rangers, SEALs,
Pakistan Army tanks and
Malaysian armored personnel carriers, finally arrived at 1:55 am on 4 October. The combined force worked until dawn to free the pilot's body, receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the night. All the casualties were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers, and the remainder of the force was left behind and had no choice but to move out on foot. AH-6 gunships raked the streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the
Pakistani Stadium-compound for the QRF-at 6:30 am, thus concluding one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the
Vietnam War. Task Force Ranger experienced a total of 17 killed in action and 106 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties above 1,000. Although Task Force Ranger's few missions were successes, the overall outcome of Operation Gothic Serpent was deemed a failure because of the Task Force's failure to complete their stated mission, capturing
Mohamed Farrah Aidid. Most U.S. forces pulled out of Somalia by March 1994. The withdrawal from Somalia was completed in March 1995. Even though Operation Gothic Serpent failed, USSOCOM still made significant contributions to operations in Somalia. SOF performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, assisted with humanitarian relief, protected American forces, and conducted riverine patrols. Additionally, they ensured the safe landing of the Marines and safeguarded the arrival of merchant ships carrying food.
Iraq USSOCOM's
10th Special Forces Group, elements of
JSOC, and CIA/SAD Paramilitary Officers linked up again and were the first to enter Iraq prior to the invasion. Their efforts organized the Kurdish
Peshmerga to defeat
Ansar Al Islam in Northern Iraq before the invasion. This battle was for control of a territory in Northeastern Iraq that was completely occupied by Ansar Al Islam, an ally of Al Qaeda. This was a very significant battle and led to the death of a substantial number of terrorists and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat. These terrorists would have been in the subsequent insurgency had they not been eliminated during this battle. Sargat was the only facility of its type discovered in the Iraq war. This battle may have been the
Tora Bora of Iraq, but it was a sound defeat for Al Qaeda and their ally Ansar Al Islam. This combined team then led the Peshmerga against Saddam's Northern Army. This effort kept Saddam's forces in the north and denied the ability to redeploy to contest the invasion force coming from the south. This effort may have saved the lives of hundreds, if not thousands of coalition servicemen and women. At the launch of the
Iraq War, dozens of 12-member
Special Forces teams infiltrated southern and western Iraq to hunt for
Scud missiles and pinpoint bombing targets. Scores of
Navy SEALs seized oil terminals and pumping stations on the southern coast.
Air Force combat controllers flew combat missions in
MC-130H Combat Talon IIs and established austere desert airstrips to begin the flow of soldiers and supplies deep into Iraq. It was notably different from the
Persian Gulf war of 1991, where Special Operations forces were mostly kept participating. But it would not be a replay of Afghanistan, where
Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs led the fighting. After their star turn in Afghanistan, many special operators were disappointed to play a supporting role in Iraq. Many special operators felt restricted by cautious commanders. From that point, USSOCOM has since killed or captured hundreds of insurgents and
Al-Qaeda terrorists. It has conducted several foreign internal defense missions, successfully training the
Iraqi security forces.
Afghanistan United States Special Operations Command played a pivotal role in fighting the former
Taliban government in
Afghanistan in 2001 and toppling it thereafter, as well as combating the insurgency and capturing
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. USSOCOM in 2004 was developing plans to have an expanded and more complex role in the global campaign against terrorism, and that role continued to emerge before and after the
killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011. In 2010, "of about 13,000 Special Operations forces deployed overseas, about 9,000 [were] evenly divided between Iraq and Afghanistan." gives an
Afghan boy a coloring book in
Kandahar Province during a meeting with local leaders, 12 September 2002 In the initial stages of the
War in Afghanistan, USSOCOM forces linked up with CIA Paramilitary Officers from
Special Activities Division to defeat the Taliban without the need for large-scale conventional forces. This was one of the biggest successes of the global
war on terrorism. These units linked up several times during this war and engaged in several furious battles with the enemy. One such battle happened during
Operation Anaconda, the mission to squeeze the life out of a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold dug deep into the
Shah-i-Kot Valley and
Arma Mountains of eastern Afghanistan. The operation was seen as one of the heaviest and bloodiest fights in the War in Afghanistan. The battle on an Afghan mountaintop called
Takur Ghar featured special operations forces from all 4 services and the CIA. Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Air Force Combat Controllers, and Pararescuemen fought against entrenched Al-Qaeda fighters atop a mountain. Subsequently, the entrenched Taliban became targets of every asset in the sky. According to an executive summary, the
Battle of Takur Ghar was the most intense firefight American special operators have been involved in since 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in
Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993. During
Operation Red Wings on 28 June 2005, four Navy SEALs, pinned down in a firefight, radioed for help. A Chinook helicopter, carrying 16 service members, responded but was shot down. All members of the rescue team and three of four SEALs on the ground died. It was the worst loss of life in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001. The Navy SEAL
Marcus Luttrell alone survived. Team leader
Michael P. Murphy was awarded the
Medal of Honor for his actions in the battle.
Global presence In 2010, special operations forces were deployed in 75 countries, compared with about 60 at the beginning of 2009. In 2011, SOC spokesman Colonel Tim Nye (Army) was reported to have said that the number of countries with SOC presence will likely reach 120 and that joint training exercises will have been carried out in most or all of those countries during the year. One study identified joint-training exercises in Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Germany, Indonesia, Mali, Norway, Panama, and Poland in 2010 and also, through mid-year 2011, in the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, and Thailand, among other nations. In addition, SOC forces executed the high-profile
killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011. In November 2009,
The Nation reported on a covert JSOC/
Blackwater anti-terrorist operation in Pakistan. In 2010,
White House counterterrorism director
John O. Brennan said that the United States "will not merely respond after the fact" of a terrorist attack but will "take the fight to al-Qaeda and its extremist affiliates whether they plot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond." Olson said, "In some places, in deference to host-country sensitivities, we are lower in profile. In every place, Special Operations forces activities are coordinated with the U.S. ambassador and are under the operational control of the four-star regional commander." The conduct of actions by SOC forces outside of Iraq and Afghan war zones has been the subject of internal U.S. debate, including between representatives of the
Bush administration, such as
John B. Bellinger III, on one hand and the
Obama administration on another. The United Nations in 2010 also "questioned the administration's authority under international law to conduct such raids, particularly when they kill innocent civilians. One possible legal justification – the permission of the country in question – is complicated in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, where the governments privately agree but do not publicly acknowledge approving the attacks," as one report put it. In two decades fighting terrorism, 660 members of the special operation community have been killed and a further 2,738 were wounded. ==Subordinate commands==