Commander in Flanders, France and Britain , GOC 3rd Division, and Major-General
Dudley Johnson, GOC 4th Division, pictured here in either 1939 or 1940. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, in September 1939, Brooke commanded
II Corps in the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF)—which included in its subordinate formations the
3rd Infantry Division, commanded by the then Major-General
Bernard Montgomery, as well as Major-General
Dudley Johnson's
4th Infantry Division. As corps commander, Brooke had a pessimistic view of the
Allies' chances of countering a German offensive. He was sceptical of the quality and determination of the
French Army, and of the
Belgian Army. This scepticism appeared to be justified when he was on a visit to some French front-line units and was shocked to see unshaven men, ungroomed horses and dirty vehicles. , 30 April 1940. He had also little trust in
Lord Gort,
Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, who Brooke thought took too much interest in details while being incapable of taking a broad strategic view. Gort, on the other hand, regarded Brooke as a pessimist who failed to spread confidence, and was thinking of replacing him. Brooke correctly predicted that the Allied powers'
Plan D envisioning an advance along the
Meuse would allow the
Wehrmacht to outflank them, but British High Command dismissed his warnings as defeatist. When the
German offensive began, Brooke, aided by
Neil Ritchie, his Brigadier General Staff (BGS), distinguished himself in the handling of the British forces in the
retreat to Dunkirk. His II Corps faced rapid
German Army armoured advances following the Allied defeat at the
Battle of Sedan. Brooke's actions not only saved his own forces from capitulation, but prevented the Germans from seizing the 20-mile gap left by the Belgian surrender and capturing the entire BEF before it could safely evacuate. He was told by Gort to "proceed home ... for (the) task of reforming new armies" and so returned on a destroyer (30 May). Then "on June 2nd set out for the War Office to find out what I was wanted for" with a "light heart" and with no responsibility, and was then told by
John Dill (CIGS) that he was to "return to France to form a new BEF"; he later said that hearing the command from Dill was "one of his blackest (moments) in the war". He had already realised that there was no hope of success for the "Brittany plan" (
Breton redoubt) to keep an allied redoubt in France. After General
Maxime Weygand warned him that the French Army was collapsing and could offer no further resistance, he decided that he needed to convince his superiors to allow him to withdraw his forces to
Cherbourg and
Brest for evacuation to Britain. In his first conversation with Prime Minister
Winston Churchill (Brooke had been rung by Dill who was at
10 Downing Street) he insisted that all British forces should be withdrawn from France. Churchill initially objected but was eventually convinced by Brooke; around 200,000 British and Allied troops were successfully evacuated from ports in northwestern France. light tank at the
Staff College, Camberley, 6 January 1941.
Home Forces After returning for a short spell at
Southern Command Brooke was appointed in July 1940
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, with orders to take charge of
anti-invasion preparations. Thus it would have been Brooke's task to direct the land battle in the event of a
German amphibious invasion of Great Britain. Contrary to his predecessor General Sir
Edmund Ironside, who favoured a static coastal defence, Brooke developed a mobile reserve which was to swiftly counterattack the enemy forces before they were established. A light line of defence on the coast was to assure that the landings were delayed as much as possible. Writing after the war, Brooke acknowledged that he also "had every intention of using sprayed
mustard gas on the beaches". Brooke believed that the lack of a unified command of the three services was "a grave danger" to the defence of the country. Despite this, and the fact that the available forces never reached the numbers he thought were required, Brooke considered the situation far from "helpless" if the Germans were to invade. "We should certainly have a desperate struggle and the future might well have hung in the balance, but I certainly felt that given a fair share of the fortunes of war we should certainly succeed in finally defending these shores", he wrote after the war. But in the end, the German invasion plan was never taken beyond the preliminary assembly of forces.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, pictured here sometime in 1942. In December 1941 Brooke succeeded
Field Marshal Sir
John Dill as
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), the professional head of the British Army, in which appointment he also represented the British Army on the
Chiefs of Staff Committee. In March 1942 he succeeded
Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Dudley Pound as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. As CIGS, Brooke was the functional head of the British Army, and as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which he dominated by force of intellect and personality, he took the leading military part in the overall strategic direction of the British war effort. In 1942, Brooke joined the
Western Allies' ultimate command, the U.S.-British
Combined Chiefs of Staff. Despite the traditional distrust that had existed between the military and the political side of the
War Office, he got along quite well with his political counterpart, the
Secretary of State for War, first the
Conservative politician
David Margesson and later Sir
James Grigg, the former
head civil servant of the department, who in an unusual move was promoted to the ministerial post. , General Sir
Harold Alexander, General Sir Alan Brooke and General Sir Bernard Montgomery. Brooke's focus was primarily on his
Mediterranean strategy for the
Mediterranean theatre. Here, his principal aims were to rid
North Africa of
Axis forces and knock
Italy out of the war, thereby opening up the Mediterranean for Allied shipping. Later, to mount the cross-Channel invasion when the Allies were ready and the Germans sufficiently weakened. Brooke's and the British view of the Mediterranean operations contrasted with the American commitment to an
early invasion of western Europe, which led to several heated arguments at conferences of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 's mobile headquarters in
Normandy, France, shortly after the
Normandy landings, 12 June 1944. At the
Casablanca Conference in January 1943, it was decided that the Allies should
invade Sicily, under the command of General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a decision that effectively postponed the planned invasion of Western Europe until 1944. The Casablanca agreement was in fact a compromise, brokered largely by Brooke's old friend Field Marshal Sir
John Dill, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in
Washington, D.C. "I owe him [Dill] an unbounded debt of gratitude for his help on that occasion and in many other similar ones", Brooke wrote after the war. The post of CIGS was less publicised than command of an important theatre of war, an example being the many press releases on General Montgomery but few, if any, about the CIGS. However, the CIGS chose the generals who commanded the operational theatres and decided what men and munitions they should have. When it came to finding the right commanders he often complained that many officers who would have been good commanders had been killed in the First World War and that this was one reason behind the difficulties the British had in the beginning of the war. When
General Sir
Claude Auchinleck was to be replaced as the commander of the
British Eighth Army in 1942, Brooke preferred
Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery (Montgomery was both Brooke's ex-pupil and his protégé ) instead of Lieutenant-General
William Gott, who was Churchill's candidate. Soon thereafter Gott was killed when his aircraft was shot down and Montgomery received the command. Brooke would later reflect upon the tragic event which led to the appointment of Montgomery as an intervention by God. A few days earlier Brooke had been offered Auchinleck's main job of Commander-in-Chief Middle East. Brooke declined, believing he now knew better than any other general how to deal with Churchill. He recorded that it would take a new CIGS six months to learn to handle Churchill, and "during those six months anything might happen". HQ, Italy, 15 December 1943. A year later, the war had taken a different turn and Brooke no longer believed it necessary to stay at Churchill's side. He therefore looked forward to taking command of the
Allied invasion of Western Europe, a post Brooke believed he had been promised by Churchill on three occasions. During the
first Quebec Conference in August 1943, it was decided that the command would go to General
George Marshall. (Although in the event Marshall's work as
U.S. Army Chief of Staff was too important for him to leave Washington, D.C., and Dwight Eisenhower was appointed instead.) Brooke was disappointed, both at being passed over and of the way the decision was conveyed to him by Churchill, who according to Brooke "dealt with the matter as if it were one of minor importance". ,
Ministry of Defence Building,
Whitehall, London. Brooke or "Brookie" as he was often known, is reckoned to be one of the foremost of all the heads of the British Army. He was quick in mind and speech and deeply respected by his military colleagues, both British and Allied, although his uncompromising style could make the Americans wary. As CIGS, Brooke had a strong influence on the grand strategy of the Western Allies. The war in the west unfolded more or less according to his plans, at least until 1943 when the American forces were still relatively small in comparison to the British. Among the most crucial of his contributions was his opposition to an early landing in France, which was important for delaying
Operation Overlord until June 1944. According to historian
Max Hastings, Brooke's reputation as a strategist was "significantly damaged" by his remarks at the
Trident Conference in Washington in May 1943, where he claimed that no major operations on the continent would be possible until 1945 or 1946. His diary says that he wanted "operations in the Mediterranean to force a dispersal of German forces, help Russia, and thus eventually produce a situation where cross Channel operations are possible" but that Churchill "entirely repudiated" (or half repudiated) the paper we (the CCOS) had agreed on;
Harry Hopkins got him to withdraw his proposed amendments but that Churchill had aroused suspicions with his talk of "ventures in the Balkans."
Relationship with Churchill During the years as CIGS, Brooke had a stormy relationship with
Winston Churchill. Brooke was often frustrated with the Prime Minister's habits and working methods, his abuse of generals and constant meddling in strategic matters. At the same time Brooke greatly admired Churchill for the way he inspired the Allied cause and for the way he bore the heavy burden of war leadership. In one typical passage in Brooke's war diaries Churchill is described as a "genius mixed with an astonishing lack of vision – he is quite the most difficult man to work with that I have ever struck but I should not have missed the chance of working with him for anything on earth!" Shortly after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, Churchill and his senior military staff used the
Arcadia Conference in Washington to decide the general strategy for the war. The American Army Chief of Staff
George C. Marshall came up with the idea of a
Combined Chiefs of Staff that would make final military decisions (subject to approval by President Roosevelt and Churchill). Marshall sold it to Roosevelt and together the two sold the idea to Churchill. Churchill's military aides were much less favourable, and Brooke was strongly opposed. However, Brooke was left behind in London to handle the daily details of running the British war effort, and was not consulted. The combined board was permanently stationed in Washington, where Field Marshal Dill represented the British half. The Combined Board did have thirteen in-person full meetings, which Brooke attended. are, left to right: Air Chief Marshal Sir
Charles Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Dudley Pound, General Sir Alan Brooke, Winston Churchill. When Churchill's many fanciful strategic ideas collided with sound military strategy it was only Brooke on the Chiefs of Staff Committee who was able to stand up to the Prime Minister. Churchill said about Brooke: "When I thump the table and push my face towards him what does he do? Thumps the table harder and glares back at me. I know these Brookes – stiff-necked
Ulstermen and there's no one worse to deal with than that!" It has been claimed that part of Churchill's greatness was that he appointed Brooke as CIGS and kept him for the whole war. , 25 March 1945. Brooke was particularly annoyed by Churchill's idea of capturing the northern tip of
Sumatra. But in some cases Brooke did not see the political dimension of strategy as the Prime Minister did. The CIGS was sceptical about the British intervention in the
Greek Civil War in late 1944 (during the
Dekemvriana), believing this was an operation which would drain troops from the
central front in Germany. But at this stage the war was practically won and Churchill saw the possibility of preventing
Greece from becoming a communist state. ; Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke; Winston Churchill; Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Andrew Cunningham. Standing, left to right: Major-General
Leslie Hollis; General Sir
Hastings Ismay. The balance of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was tilted in October 1943 when Admiral Sir
Dudley Pound, Brooke's predecessor as chairman, retired as a result of poor health and Admiral Sir
Andrew Cunningham succeeded Pound as
First Sea Lord and naval representative on the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Brooke as a consequence got a firm ally in his arguments with Churchill. This was reflected in the most serious clash between the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff, regarding the British preparations for final stages of the
Pacific War. Brooke and the rest of the Chiefs of Staff wanted to build up the forces in Australia while Churchill preferred to use India as a base for the British effort. It was an issue over which the
Chiefs of Staff were prepared to resign, but in the end a compromise was reached. Despite their many disagreements Brooke and Churchill held an affection for each other. After one fierce clash Churchill told his chief of staff and military adviser, General Sir
Hastings Ismay, that he did not think he could continue to work any longer with Brooke because "he hates me. I can see hatred looking from his eyes." Brooke responded to Ismay: "Hate him? I don't hate him. I love him. But the first time I tell him that I agree with him when I don't will be the time to get rid of me, for then I can be no more use to him." When Churchill was told this he murmured, "Dear Brookie." , July 1945. The partnership between Brooke and Churchill was a very successful one. According to historian
Max Hastings, their partnership "created the most efficient machine for the higher direction of the war possessed by any combatant nation, even if its judgments were sometimes flawed and its ability to enforce its wishes increasingly constrained". Brooke's diary entry for 10 September 1944 is particularly revealing of his ambivalent relationship with Churchill: ==War diaries==