Zhou Yongkang

Zhou was born as Zhou Yuangen () in December 1942. He is a native of Xiqiantou Village (西前头村), Wuxi County, in Jiangsu province. Xiqiantou is located outside Wuxi city proper. The majority of Xiqiantou residents were surnamed "Zhou". Zhou took on the surname of his mother because his father, whose surname was Lu, was a "live-in son-in-law" of his maternal grandparents. Upon joining the Zhou household when he married, his father took on his wife's surname and became known as Zhou Yisheng (周义生). Zhou was the eldest of three sons. Zhou's family was poor; his family made a living farming and fishing for the Asian swamp eel. Zhou was sent to school with the financial assistance of his family friends. In 1954, Zhou was enrolled at one of the two top middle schools in the eastern Wuxi area. It was during this period that Zhou changed his name to "Yongkang" on the advice of his teacher, because there was another person in his class with an identical name. Zhou excelled at school and was eventually accepted to enroll at the prestigious Suzhou High School, one of the most prominent secondary schools in the Jiangnan region. Zhou had good grades and was involved in extra-curricular activities, including the school's political ideology group as well as events promoting literacy. In 1961, after obtaining stellar results on his Gaokao exams, he was admitted to the Beijing Institute of Petroleum (now China University of Petroleum) and became the pride of his village. He majored in geophysical survey and exploration. In November 1964, he became a member of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1966, the Cultural Revolution ensnared Beijing's higher education institutions. Zhou was told by the authorities to "wait for an assignment" while the political struggles wreaked havoc on China's universities. He waited for a year. He joined geological survey work in north-east China in 1967, assigned to become an intern technician at factory No. 673 at the Daqing oil field. In 1970, Zhou was promoted to lead the geological survey division of a local department charged with carrying out an ambitious petroleum drilling initiative set out by the Party's top leadership. == Career ==

Zhou worked in the oil industry from 1967 to 1998. Oil exploration in Liaoning In 1973, Zhou was promoted to head the Geophysical Exploration Department of the Liaohe Petroleum Exploration Bureau, located in Panjin, Liaoning. Liaohe would eventually become one of the China National Petroleum Corporation's (CNPC) largest oil fields. Zhou was seen as a hard-working and emotionally mature presence to his colleagues. He abstained from drinking and smoking, and was well known for his ability to reputedly talk unscripted for hours on end to keep his colleagues engaged. In the mid-1990s, Zhou spearheaded CNPC's "go global" initiatives, winning bids for large projects in Sudan, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan. Zhou was particularly involved in the Sudan Nile petroleum project, including the construction of the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, CNPC's first major project outside of China. Zhou travelled to the African country 14 times. Beginning in 1996, Zhou became general manager (chief executive) of the CNPC. As chief executive, Zhou was instrumental in the company's restructuring and the preparation of the initial public offering of the company's subsidiary, PetroChina. In October 1997, Zhou gained a seat on the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a leadership assembly of 200 top political figures of the party. During Zhou's tenure in Sichuan, the province's GDP grew at an average rate of 9.5% a year. One of his major achievements was securing investments from large multinationals such as Intel. The company opened a new computer chip factory near Chengdu shortly after Zhou left his post in Sichuan. He also focused on improving tourism resources, significantly revamping the Mount Emei scenic region to attract more visitors. Zhou also improved public safety in the province, for example, by enacting policies that aimed to reduce accidents in the province's water lanes. While in Sichuan, he gained a reputation for dealing firmly with any signs of dissent, coming down hard on Tibetan groups and Falun Gong. Although Zhou left Sichuan to take up national leadership positions in Beijing in 2002, he cultivated a strong power base of patronage. The elite provincial political circles were stacked with Zhou's allies, the most notable being deputy provincial party committee Secretary Li Chongxi, Chengdu party boss Li Chuncheng, and chief administrator Guo Yongxiang. Indeed, Zhou's network of patronage in Sichuan remained a highly influential force in provincial politics until the anti-corruption campaign at the end of 2012, which saw all of Zhou's proteges fall from grace. Minister of Public Security Zhou's political fate was subject to rife speculation in the lead-up to the 16th Party Congress held in the fall of 2002. Widely regarded as a rising political star, Zhou was said to be a leading candidate for Vice-Premier or entry into the top ranks of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Zhengfawei). The central government was also in need of a tough and uncompromising figure to take reins of China's security system in the post-9/11 global security paradigm. With his quasi-military style training in the oil sector and a reputation for being able to make tough decisions, Zhou got the nod to become Minister of Public Security in December 2002. Zhou's assuming the deputy secretary position at the Zhengfawei meant that his status in the Chinese domestic security system was second only to Politburo Standing Committee member Luo Gan. Zhou was the first Minister of Public Security to hold a Politburo seat since Mao's successor Hua Guofeng, a testament to the renewed importance of the domestic security portfolio. This was partially attributed to the increasingly sharp social conflict in China as a result of the wealth imbalance created by the post-Mao era economic reform policies. At the turn of the century, "mass incidents" – a catch-all euphemism that could refer to any organized or spontaneous protests of a social, political, economic, or religious nature – had become commonplace across the country. In response, Beijing mandated sweeping structural reforms that significantly elevated the status of Public Security organs across the country. Zhou held high-profile "mass study sessions" in an attempt to indoctrinate officers politically on party policies. He also instituted a nationwide "professional training boot camp" intended to streamline police operations and teach officers about professional ethics, making it mandatory for rank-and-file officers to take "professional training" for half of their working day. Zhou also began a national campaign for xinfang petitioners to "speak directly with the police chief", aimed at creating a more effective means to address petitioner grievances. As part of this campaign, the number of petitions and their response rates were tied to financial and career advancement consequences for local officials. As a result, many local authorities hired thugs and private security firms to detain, harass, beat, or otherwise discourage petitioners from filing their grievances. It spawned an entire industry of private security firms specializing in petitioners, as well as an increase in the number of extrajudicial detention centres known as "black jails". With increased resources at the disposal of police departments and a higher concentration of power, law enforcement agencies often found themselves at odds with public interest; public trust in domestic security organs eroded. On February 20, 2011, Zhou said to assembled officials at a national security conference that law enforcement must "put together a comprehensive system to prevent disturbance and control social order, so that conflict can be resolved at the embryonic stage." Towards the end of his term, Zhou presided over a national security & law enforcement system that operated with no meaningful external oversight and operated independently from government organs and the party's collective leadership. Chinese rights activists, such as members of the Weiquan movement, were especially critical of Zhou's tenure as China's security chief. Civil rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang criticized Zhou in a public lecture at Hong Kong University in December 2011. Two years later, Pu wrote on his microblog that Zhou "brought great disaster and inflicted great suffering on the country and its people." Pu wrote that the weiwen policies spearheaded by Zhou had severely undermined progress in the protection of human rights and rule of law, led to unprecedented levels of popular distrust of government authority, expanded the realm of party control in the lives of ordinary citizens, and ran counter to the spirit of the "Harmonious Society" ideology of the Hu-Wen administration. Former State Council functionary Yu Meisun (俞梅荪) said that Zhou's ten years in power were the "ten darkest years for law and order in history [...] a severe reversal of progress." during a 2006 trip to the United States Several leaked U.S. diplomatic cables from Wikileaks have alleged Zhou's involvement in Beijing's cyber attack against Google, though the claim's veracity has been questioned. Other cables said it was "well-known" that Zhou Yongkang controlled the state monopoly of the oil sector. Zhou also served as China's 'high representative' in matters relating to North Korea, attending the Arirang Festival as a guest of Kim Jong-il before Kim died in 2011. Aftermath of Bo Xilai's ouster In February 2012, former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun made an abrupt and unexpected visit to the United States consulate in the city of Chengdu. The event set off a political storm, which eventually resulted in the ouster of Chongqing party committee secretary Bo Xilai. Bo, considered a political ally of Zhou, was rumoured to be next-in-line to Zhou's powerful position of Legal and Political Committee (Zhengfawei) Secretary, and thus the Standing Committee. Zhou had a close relationship with Bo, and he was reportedly acquainted with Wang Lijun as far back as his early days as mayor of Panjin. On Zhou's 2010 visit to Chongqing, he publicly endorsed Bo's "Red Songs" and "Strike Black" campaigns (), showing enthusiasm for the so-called "Chongqing model" unmatched by his other Standing Committee colleagues. In 2015, Hong Kong–based media Phoenix Weekly reported that Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai had a secret meeting in Chongqing, in which both believed they should end Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policy and reinstate Mao Zedong's policy during the Cultural Revolution. In the days following Bo Xilai's fall, rumours circulated about Zhou's break with the party leadership as well as a "coup d'etat" on March 19. Unconfirmed reports surfaced on the U.K.-based Sunday Times, citing Hong Kong magazine Frontline (), that the paramilitary forces under Zhou's disposal had narrowly avoided direct conflict with the 38th Army in the center of Beijing. Outwardly, Zhou appeared to be toeing the party line between March 2012 and his scheduled retirement in November. The New York Times later reported that Zhou's status remained unchanged. At around the same time, a group of provincial party veterans from Yunnan province penned an open letter to Hu Jintao calling for the removal of Zhou Yongkang due to his support of Bo Xilai. The veterans voiced concerns that those supporting Bo intended to reinstate Mao-style policies in China. Zhou Yongkang retired from the Politburo Standing Committee after the 18th Party Congress on November 15, 2012, and retired from Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission five days later, after which Meng Jianzhu succeeded Zhou's position. ==Downfall==

Zhou retired at the 18th Party Congress held in November 2012, an event which saw Xi Jinping, the current General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, ascend to become China's paramount leader. In a significant change to China's top ruling council, Zhou's Political and Legal Affairs Commission portfolio did not feature in the new Standing Committee at all; instead, the committee had shrunk to its pre-2002 size of seven instead of nine members. This was followed by wide-ranging reforms to local Zhengfawei organs. For example, the practice of lower-level Zhengfawei chiefs concurrently holding the office of police chief (i.e. Public Security) and concurrent government posts was gradually phased out, and the Zhengfawei was discouraged from directly interfering with ongoing investigations or cases. These reforms signaled a reduction in the executive authority of Zhengfawei chiefs in favour of better checks and balances in the legal system, and a restoration of the Zhengfawei in a policy oversight role rather than being an executive organ, which had been the case under Zhou. At his visit to the China University of Petroleum campus, Zhou publicly 'pledged his allegiance' to Xi Jinping, China's new leader, rallying students to unite behind Xi to pursue the "Chinese Dream". Consensus among party leaders The new party leadership under Xi reportedly began planning the crackdown on Zhou beginning in 2012. Xi's 'tough talk' on corruption began immediately after his ascension to the post of General Secretary. In his first days in office, Xi vowed to crack down on "tigers and flies", meaning extremely powerful officials as well as petty ones. Xi moved quickly to set a new standard for the expected behavior of party officials, issuing a series of guidelines to clean up the party bureaucracy. Xi may have also been concerned that Zhou might use his influence and power to turn various state security entities into tools for advancing his interests, and in the process, undermine the central authority of the state. Discussions surrounding the Zhou case took place in the summer of 2013. In June, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party held a four-day-long conference in Beijing specifically to discuss Zhou Yongkang. During the meeting, the members of China's ruling council reportedly exchanged differing viewpoints on Zhou. Eventually, Xi Jinping and the other six members of the newly formed 18th Politburo Standing Committee came to a consensus to investigate Zhou. A number of Zhou's former subordinates who were then in high-ranking positions were fired in quick succession. These included Li Chuncheng, a former deputy party secretary in Sichuan; Jiang Jiemin, former chief executive of China Petroleum; Li Dongsheng, former deputy minister of Public Security; Ji Wenlin, Mayor of Haikou and Zhou's former secretary; and Li Chongxi, a high-ranking official in Sichuan province. His former secretaries (i.e., directors of his office, chief of staff) Li Hualin, Shen Dingcheng, and Guo Yongxiang were all detained. In December, Zhou, his son Zhou Bin and his daughter-in-law Huang Wan were taken into custody. The home of Zhou's younger brother Zhou Yuanxing () was searched by the authorities twice. Yuanxing died in December 2013 after a battle with cancer. Zhou Yongkang and his son Zhou Bin were not present at the funeral, fueling speculation that Zhou and his family members were all in custody. Zhou's family reportedly made billions of dollars by investing in the oil industry, of which Zhou had headed the largest company, China National Petroleum Corp. According to the Hong Kong–based Apple Daily, Zhou's eldest son made more than US$1.6 billion from public works in the city of Chongqing alone. He also supposedly used his father's prominence to extort millions of dollars in protection fees from various businesses and organizations. Zhou was reportedly being held in confinement without visitation rights in a heavily guarded facility on a military base near Baotou, Inner Mongolia. By March 2014, Chinese authorities were reported to have seized assets worth at least 90 billion yuan ($14.5 billion) from Zhou's family members and associates. By spring 2014, it became increasingly clear that Zhou's spheres of influence – the oil sector, Sichuan, the legal system, and his family members – were being methodically rounded up for investigation. However, in the absence of any official reports on Zhou himself, Chinese and international media became rife with speculation about his fate. At a press conference during the March 2014 national meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a reporter from Hong Kong–based South China Morning Post directly asked the spokesperson if he could provide more information on the rumours circulating about the Zhou Yongkang case. In response, the spokesman chuckled and said, "like you, I've seen some stories on a select few media outlets," he then recited a prepared party-line reply, then ended his response with a smile, "this is really all I can say in response to your question, I think you know what I mean." () Afterwards, the assembled press gallery burst into laughter. Arrest and expulsion from the CCP On July 29, 2014, state media formally announced an internal party investigation against Zhou Yongkang's "violations of party discipline", but did not mention any criminal wrongdoing. Several months later, the party investigation concluded that Zhou abused his power for the illicit gain of his family, friends, and associates, took "large amounts in bribes personally and through his family and associates; abused his power to further the interests of his family, mistresses, and associates; committed adultery with multiple women and engaged in the exchange of money and favours for sex; and leaked state and party secrets." State media announced Zhou's arrest to face criminal proceedings on December 5, 2014. He was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party. Zhou was the first Politburo Standing Committee member to be expelled from the party since the fall of the Gang of Four in 1980 after the Cultural Revolution. After the announcement of Zhou's expulsion from the party, the party's official newspaper ''People's Daily'' editorialized that Zhou's expulsion was part of the "strong resolve" to stamp out corruption in the party by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The editorial said the case demonstrated that the party saw "everyone as equal in the eyes of the law." It said that Zhou "betrayed the essence and mission of the party" and that "corruption in the party is like fire and water." Media outlets outside of mainland China speculated about the political reasons behind Zhou's downfall. The Economist compared Zhou's fall with earlier internecine struggles in the party and noted Xi's anti-corruption campaign had "apparent factional bias", quoting a study that no "Princelings" have been investigated in the anti-corruption campaign. He Pin (何频), the chief editor of the overseas Chinese news portal Mingjing, went one step further and asserted plainly that Zhou fell because he was engaged in a political conspiracy to depose Xi Jinping. In contrast, The New York Times did not speculate on political reasons behind Zhou's arrest, simply writing that ordinary Chinese people may be alarmed that the legal system was once in the hands of a deeply corrupt politician. Duowei News expressed disappointment with mainstream Western media characterization of the event as "yet another political purge", asserting that seeing modern China, particularly the post-Xi Communist Party, as rife with political intrigue and full of backroom deals is imprecise and naive. Duowei stated that Western media had a very poor grasp of what Xi was trying to achieve, and that Zhou's downfall was but a small element of a larger campaign by Xi Jinping to clean up the party, institutionalize power structures, and re-build the party's legitimacy. Trial and sentencing In the days leading up to the anticipated trial, Supreme Court President Zhou Qiang (of no relation) told an assembled international press conference that Zhou Yongkang's trial would be "open and in accordance with the law." In April 2015, Zhou Yongkang was formally charged with abuse of power, bribery, and intentionally leaking state secrets, and scheduled to face trial at the Tianjin First Intermediate People's Court. Overseas Chinese media were rife with speculation about the 'treatment' Zhou was to receive. However, Zhou's trial unexpectedly took place behind closed doors. On June 11, state media made an announcement – without any apparent warning – that Zhou's verdict had already been reached. The official report on Zhou's trial was brief and stated that he had been convicted on all three charges. The legal sentence, according to the state, was life in prison for bribery, seven years for abuse of power, and four years for "leaking state secrets". The court decided that Zhou could serve prison terms concurrently and amalgamated the sentences into one 'combined' life sentence. The total value of bribes taken by Zhou and his family was said to be 129.7 million yuan (~$18.87 million). State television showed Zhou pleading guilty with a head of fully gray hair, in contrast to his combed jet black hair dye he was known for before his retirement. Overseas media had compared Zhou's trial to that of Bo Xilai two years earlier, which was noted for being unusually open. In contrast to Bo, Zhou did not appear to dispute his charges. Bo, for the most part, denied his guilt and blamed much of the misdeeds he was accused of on his associates and his family. Zhou, on the other hand, said that "they tried to bribe my family, but really they were after my power. I should assume major responsibility for this". State-run news agency Xinhua said that the trial took place in secret because state secrets were involved in the case. Zhou's son, Zhou Bin, fled to the US in early 2013 and returned after negotiations with Chinese authorities. In June 2016, Zhou Bin was found guilty of taking 222 million yuan ($34m) in bribes and illegally trading in restricted commodities, and 350 million yuan ($53m) of illicit gains were confiscated; Zhou's wife, Jia Xiaoyue, was fined 1m yuan ($150,000) for bribe-taking. Zhou's son and wife were sentenced to 18 years and 9 years imprisonment respectively. ==Personal life==

Zhou Yongkang has two sons, Zhou Bin () and Zhou Han (), with his first wife, Wang Shuhua (), whom he met while working in the oilfields of Liaoning province. Wang has been described as a plain, hardworking woman who devoted much of her time to family and raising their two children. The couple had cordial relations while Zhou was at the Liaohe oil field, but the marriage later deteriorated. Zhou was said to be a workaholic on the oil fields, often working into the morning hours and sleeping in his office. Wang died in a motor vehicle collision in 2001, reportedly one of the vehicles involved had military license plates; the cause of the crash was unclear. In 2013, overseas Chinese news websites Mingjing and Boxun both reported that Zhou Yongkang had conspired with his secretary to kill Wang. The credibility of these reports has been questioned. Zhou and Jia wed at a small, tense private ceremony; no photos were allowed to be taken. Indeed, the first official mention of Jia Xiaoye in her capacity as Zhou's wife was during the latter's sentencing announcement in June 2015. Zhou Bin was investigated, tried, and sentenced to 18 years in prison. The younger Zhou is married to Chinese-American Huang Wan (), whom he met while studying oil and gas exploration in Texas. Huang's mother, Zhan Minli (), held a stake in a number of companies with business dealings with China National Petroleum and lives in southern California. Zhou's younger son, Zhou Han, maintains a comparatively lower profile and was not close to his father. == Notes ==